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Abstract 
In recent times, monetary policy has increasingly adopted the interest rate as an 
instrument and inflation as the ultimate objective. This is congruous with the 
propositions of the New consensus macroeconomics (NCM) and synonymous with the 
somewhat widespread practice of inflation targeting. However, the optimality of a 
monetary policy approach depends critically on its effectiveness and costs; which 
would differ between developing and developed countries. This thesis investigates the 
effectiveness and costs of an NCM-type monetary policy in Nigeria. Essentially, it is a 
systematic study of the implications of monetary policy in Nigeria, while paying 
attention to the peculiarities of the Nigerian economy and using a rigorous up-to-date 
framework.  Effectiveness is investigated by considering some underlying assumptions 
of the NCM. First, the assumption of a complete pass-through from the policy interest 
rate to the market rates (which is critical for the success of monetary policy) is 
investigated. Here an array of market, retail deposit and lending rates are examined 
while an attempt is also made to capture the role of financial market 
(under)development. Second, the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand is 
investigated, since it constitutes the intermediate target of policy. Given the high 
incidence of poverty in Nigeria and our associated assumption that consumption 
would, in this case, be inelastic to policy changes, the aggregate demand effect is 
limited to investigating the responsiveness of investment to monetary policy induced 
changes in the interest rate. Finally, the cost and benefit analysis of monetary policy 
in Nigeria is investigated by estimating a NCM-type Phillips curve. To understand the 
dynamics and source of inflation the standard NCM-type Phillips curve is augmented 
with supply factors. The relative importance of demand vis-à-vis supply factors as well 
as the cost and benefits of disinflation are thereafter determined. These are analysed 
using both theoretical and empirical approaches. Results indicated that an NCM-type 
monetary policy is generally ineffective in anchoring interest rates or aggregate 
demand and may be conducted at a considerably high cost in terms of output loss and 
financial instability. These findings and their policy implications are not entirely 
surprising given the institutional features of the Nigerian economy. They generally 
suggest that the use of interest rate policies tended to create more problems than it 
can solve. Hence, to avert the associated problems, there is a need for other 
instruments which the central bank can control effectively. Moreover, monetary policy 
focus should be on long-run output expansion and short-run price-stability, rather 
than the converse. This would have the benefit of moderating poverty and 
unemployment.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Monetary policy is typically concerned with the way in which monetary authorities 
use the instruments at their disposal to influence the decision of economic agents with 
the intention of achieving overall macroeconomic stability. Theoretical debate on the 
instruments of monetary policy has been based on two major paradigms: monetarist vs.  
Wicksellian. Under the monetarist view money supply is within the control of the 
central bank, so that Friedman’s rule (of maintaining a target rate of growth of the 
money supply) is more apt in determining optimal inflation and economic growth 
(Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.5). The Wicksellian paradigm deems money as 
endogenous so that the interest rate becomes the appropriate instrument of monetary 
policy. However, recent developments in mainstream monetary policy have led to the 
refutation of the monetarist framework based on the premise that the interest rate 
paradigm represents the true behaviour of central banks (Fontana, 2007). 
Consequently, modern design of monetary policy has followed the proposition of the 
new consensus macroeconomics (NCM). The basic principle of the NCM is the use of 
short-term interest rate to achieve price-stability (Meyer, 2001; Arestis, 2007). The 
objective of price-stability is centred on the supply-side equilibrium and the inability 
of monetary policy to have any long-run impact on real variables (Bean, 2007; 
Fontana, 2009a). In the short-run, however, the existence of nominal rigidities means 
that policy can affect real variables temporarily. At the centre of this is the relationship 
between price and real variables, as captured by the Phillips curve. Thus, a major 
feature of the NCM framework is the Phillips curve, which is assumed to be sloped in 
the short-run (negatively when inflation-unemployment relationship is portrayed; 
positively when it is inflation-output) but vertical in the long-run. This illustrates the 
trade-off between output and inflation in the short-run and implies that disinflation 
would result in temporary output loss and/or increased unemployment (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2004; Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.3). In the long-run, however, the vertical 
Phillips curve based on rational expectations and continuous market clearing, suggests 
that monetary policy can only influence prices and not real variables. Thus, monetary 
policy should aim exclusively at price-stability. Proponents of the NCM and the 
objective of price-stability have further argued that it is a requisite condition for 
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sustained growth and employment while high inflation is damaging to the economy 
(Epstein and Yeldan, 2008).  
Typical discussions of monetary policy like this, however, do not distinguish between 
developed and developing countries (Huang and Wei, 2006). Thus, central banks in 
developing countries are adopting inflation targeting (IT), which is founded on the 
tenets of the NCM. This is based on the erroneous but widespread belief that policies 
would have similar outcomes irrespective of the development status of the country 
(Epstein and Yeldan, 2008). Generally, most developing countries are characterised by 
weak institutions and financial underdevelopment which ensure that the effectiveness, 
transmission and implications of policy differ from those of advanced countries 
(Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007). Therefore, the gains and costs of low inflation can 
vary considerably between developing and developed countries.  
IT intrinsically requires central banks to be highly averse to inflation – or at least 
reputably more inflation averse than political policymakers. The degree of aversion 
has important implications for the cost of disinflation. According to Carlin and 
Soskice (2006,ch.3), the nonlinearity of the short-run Phillips curve causes the cost of 
disinflation to increase with the degree of inflation aversion so that IT may be very 
expensive overall. Hence, even if the NCM/IT approach is effective in stabilising 
prices it may have adverse consequences on economic growth, employment, equality, 
and poverty reduction particularly among developing countries (Cordero, 2008; 
Epstein, 2008a). Under IT, price-stability is normally defined as inflation rate circa 2-
3 per cent. For developing countries, the inflation threshold – which is the level 
beyond which inflation becomes harmful – is variously estimated at 11-18 per cent 
(Dada, 2011; Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Pollin and Zhu, 2006). In this regard, 
moderate inflation rate may therefore be optimal for developing countries rather the 
very low rate advocated for developed countries (Huang and Wei, 2006). There would 
thus be little justification for low inflation as the dominant objective of monetary 
policy in developing countries. The negative effect of IT on growth and employment 
underlies the need for the alternative monetary policy approach, especially for 
developing countries (Pollin et al., 2007; Epstein and Yeldan, 2008; Cordero, 2008). 
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In addition to those countries already practicing formal IT, a number of developing 
countries practice an implicit IT, while some (like Nigeria) propose to adopt the 
explicit version within the medium term. Nigeria is an oil-driven emerging economy, 
with moderate inflation, high unemployment, a regional economic and financial hub, 
and a principal proponent of the West African Monetary Zone (WAZM). Given its 
policymaker’s drive to lower inflation at all cost, this study focuses on Nigeria. In 
Nigeria, monetary policy is conducted with the use of the short-term interest rate as 
key instrument, while price-stability is the overriding objective. Price-stability is here 
defined as achieving and sustaining a “single-digit” rate of inflation; thus, giving the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) an asymmetric target below a 10 per cent threshold. 
Nigeria is, however, characterised by weak institutional features, underdeveloped 
financial sector and a dominant government sector.
1
 These debilitate the conduct of 
monetary policy and diminish its reliability. Importantly, financial market 
underdevelopment can enfeeble the ability of policy to influence the money market 
interest rates. Such ineffectiveness would bring about a weak transmission mechanism 
and emphasises the need for an alternative approach (CBN, 2007a). In the medium 
term, thus, the CBN plans to migrate to a full-fledged IT framework. This would entail 
the announcement of a specific inflation target around which the effectiveness of the 
Bank’s policy actions would be judged. Adopting IT requires CBN independence, 
credibility, an adequate understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy and the willingness to sacrifice other macroeconomic objectives (such as 
economic growth and employment) for the attainment of price-stability. 
Inadequate knowledge of the economic system can deter policy actions from having 
the desired effects. Similarly, inadequate understanding of the consequences of 
monetary policy would lead to misjudgement and would substantially increase the 
costs of achieving any given goal. In Nigeria, uncertainty about the transmission 
mechanism and incomplete understanding of the system has remained a major 
challenge for monetary policy (Uchendu, 2009a). This is compounded by the 
existence of a vibrant informal sector, the fabric of which remains largely 
                                            
1 The weak institutional features are manifested in prevalent corruption in public administration, low credibility of 
the monetary authorities and gross inability of government to adequately use taxation to generate revenue. This 
inadequate tax revenue makes government reliant on the CBN for FD financing; hence, the incidence of fiscal 
dominance. These issues – including the constitutional and legal backing of FD financing – are further discussed in 
chapter 3.   
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indiscernible. Monetary policy in Nigeria is, therefore, undermined and characterised 
by uncertainty and inadequate knowledge (by policymakers and others) of the 
economy. These challenges are believed to contribute to volatility and slow economic 
growth in Nigeria (Batini, 2004; Balogun, 2007).  
Most studies on the design of monetary policy in Nigeria have generally tended to 
investigate the effectiveness of the monetary policy – in terms of money supply 
changes rather than interest rates – with narrow focus on it costs. Feridun et al. (2005) 
found that the monetary policy approach in Nigeria, though ineffective, has resulted in 
increased instability in inflation and in the exchange rate. This instability, according to 
Adam and Goderis (2008) and Olubusoye and Oyaromade (2008), can be further 
attributed to the disruptive effect of crude oil price volatility on monetary policy 
efforts. Crude oil price volatility impacts on monetary policy through its impact on the 
fiscal revenue and monetary expansion. The dominance of the fiscal sector and the 
continued monetisation of crude oil receipts creates liquidity in the system and heats 
up the economy. Hence, in measuring the effects of monetary policy in Nigeria, 
Chuku (2009) concluded that the monetary authority should place more emphasis on 
quantity-based anchors as against price-based ones. In a recent study, Dada (2011) 
investigated the suitability of an IT framework in Nigeria via a nonlinear IS-LM 
framework which assumes monetary growth as the CBN policy variable, and found 
that IT would increase output variability. However, the reality is that the quantity 
theory of money (QTM) approach which underlies all these studies is obsolete, given 
the realisation that money cannot be exogenously controlled by central banks. Hence, 
the practice of monetary policy is not synonymous with managing the level and 
growth rate of the money supply, and policy effectiveness does not depend on the 
ability to control the growth rate of money stock. 
The current practice of monetary policy, in many countries, is congruous with the 
assumptions, conclusions and recommendations of the NCM, with the short-term 
nominal interest rate as instrument and price-stability as objective. This assumes 
among other things that the financial and/or money markets are adequately developed 
and capable of effectively conducting policy impulses to the rest of economy. 
Furthermore, low inflation is assumed achievable at minimal cost. However, Nigeria’s 
financial system is relatively underdeveloped, shallow, bank dominated and 
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characterised by a dearth of market instruments and securities. This can impede the 
pass-through from policy rate changes to market rates; thus, diminishing policy 
effectiveness. Besides, the fact that banks may be more willing to hold risk-free 
government securities rather than lend to private investors implies that monetary 
policy interest rate changes may not affect aggregate demand as suggested by the 
NCM. This further undermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. Again, even if 
the NCM-type policy were effective, the cost of such policy in Nigeria may be severe; 
especially given the realities of the economy. Though, recent economic growth and 
the inflation rate (during 2001-2011) averaged 7 and 11 per cent, respectively; 
unemployment has remained high at about 20 per cent while poverty is rife – with 
over 60 per cent of the population living below $1.25/day in 2004.
2
 At 48 per cent in 
2001-2011, average capacity utilisation is also low. An NCM-type policy by 
depressing demand would further aggravate unemployment and poverty; an enormous 
cost to bear. This poses a serious concern as to whether an overriding price-stability 
objective should be pursued.        
Recognising the many challenges facing Nigeria, Batini (2004) attempted an ex-ante 
analysis of monetary policy in Nigeria, with a view to recommending an optimal 
alternative. She noted the undesirable and prevailing effects of fiscal dominance, a 
subservient central bank, a weak transmission mechanism, and an underdeveloped 
financial system for monetary policy. However, her analysis held these effects 
inconsequential, by examining available alternatives if these challenges were 
successfully resolved. Batini concluded that a long-run inflation target (à la NCM) 
complemented by a freely floating exchange rate regime is the optimal policy option. 
One major highlight of Batini’s study is the assumption that all the underlying 
problems have been adequately settled. However, the reality is that though resolution 
of these issues is possible in the long-run, it is more-or-less impracticable in the short-
run. Hence, these factors, and others, are a major feature of the Nigerian economy 
now and in the foreseeable future. Even if NCM-type policy was effective in the 
absence of these factors, the question still arises: is the NCM-type monetary policy 
optimal for Nigeria in the presence of the identified constraints and the country’s 
institutional features? Optimality requires that a given policy option be both effective 
                                            
2 See chapter six  
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and achievable at a minimal cost. Given the current reality of the Nigerian economy, 
there is the need to understand the effectiveness and potential costs of an interest rate 
based IT-type monetary policy. Thus, this study aims to fill the identified gap by 
investigating the aptness, for Nigeria, of some of the assumptions and 
recommendations of the NCM; especially those bothering on effectiveness and costs. 
The specific goals of this study are to  
 Assess the transmission of policy rate changes to market and retail interest 
rates.  The ability of the financial market to act as the pivot of the economy is 
critically presumed by the NCM. Essentially, the NCM framework is based on 
the assumption that policy rate impulses are conveyed on a one-to-one basis to 
the other market/retail rates while these subsequently affect the level of 
aggregate demand. Hence, an inexact and/or time-varying pass-through may 
hinder policy effectiveness or policy determinacy. 
 Examine the responsiveness of aggregate demand (or its components) to 
interest rate changes. In the NCM framework, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in achieving its target of price-stability depends on the ability to 
influence demand. An inability to adequately control demand renders policy 
ineffective. Under the NCM, aggregate demand function is usually derived 
from household consumption behaviour over time. Nonetheless, this study 
focuses essentially on the investment component of demand to deduce policy 
effectiveness.  
 Determine the long-run consequences/cost of an NCM-type monetary policy in 
Nigeria. The NCM is built on the assumption of long-run neutrality of 
monetary policy. Hence, policy changes can have no permanent effect on 
output and employment, given a vertical long-run Phillips curve and supply-
determined equilibrium. However, if the long-run Phillips curve is oblique (or 
if inflation is supply-driven), then the cost of disinflation can be enormous. 
Beside, changes in interest rates may have other ramifications that can increase 
financial instability. 
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To achieve these objectives, empirical analyses are conducted using time-series 
econometrics technique in the relevant chapters. The study principally employs 
quarterly data (although pass-through analysis adopted monthly data) starting from 
1985:1 up to the most recent data that was available at the time of estimation. These 
data, as much as possible, reflected the oil versus non-oil dichotomy of the Nigerian 
economy and are sourced mainly from the Central Bank of Nigeria and the National 
Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria. Stylized facts in the preliminary chapters are, however, 
discussed using annual data on different variables spanning 1970-2011 (at the longest) 
for 38 developing countries. These are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators published by the World Bank. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters excluding the introductory and concluding 
sections. Chapters one to three contain discussions on the theories of monetary policy, 
on the general features of developing countries, and on the conduct of monetary policy 
in Nigeria, respectively; chapters four to seven comprise analytical and empirical 
exercises. The specific content of these are as follows:  
 Chapter one presents an overview of the currently competing theories of monetary 
policy, an exposition of the key assumptions and equations of the NCM, as well 
as the implications and limitations of the NCM.  The link between the NCM and 
IT is discussed here, while noting that policy effects and consequences would 
differ for developing vis-à-vis developed countries. 
 Chapter two provides a general discussion of developing countries. It highlights 
the key distinguishing features of developing vis-à-vis developed countries and 
presents stylised analyses of important financial and macro-variables in 
developing countries. Monetary policy frameworks are also compared among 
thirty-eight developing countries, for inflation targeters versus non-targeters. 
 Chapter three narrows the discussions to Nigeria. Here an overview of the 
monetary policy in Nigeria is provided, covering a historical discussion on the 
conduct of monetary policy, the features of the Nigerian economy and the 
relationship between the CBN and rest of the economy.  
 Chapter four begins the systematic analysis NCM-type monetary policy for 
developing countries, the assumptions and implications of which were discussed 
8 
 
 
 
earlier. The chapter contains a theoretical discussion on the nature, determinants 
and implications of the interest rate pass-through in developing countries. Here, 
we explain the pricing behaviour of banks, the relationship between pass-through 
and mark-up, and the determinants of market power. The chapter also expounds 
the implications of inexact pass-through for NCM-type monetary policy. 
 Chapter five investigates the pattern of the interest rate pass-through in Nigeria, 
following theoretical discussions in the preceding chapter. Empirical analysis is 
conducted for policy-to-market, policy-to-retail, and market-to-retail interest rates. 
We examine the reliability of pass-through by rigorously applying up to date 
modelling techniques to an array of interest rates. These enabled the 
determination of asymmetric and inter-temporal effects in pass-through. 
 Chapter six examines the effectiveness of an NCM-type monetary policy via retail 
lending rates on aggregate demand – proxied by investment. This chapter relates 
to the preceding chapter by considering real policy effects subsequent to pass-
through, and considers a whole range of investment theories. Hence, using an 
exhaustive eclectic modelling framework, the potential effects of other 
determinants of investment are examined in order to identify the most important 
factors. Again, using modern techniques, empirical analyses examine both 
asymmetric and non-monotonic monetary policy effects. 
 Chapter seven analyses the ramification of disinflation for an NCM-type 
monetary policy reflected in the Phillips curve relationship. This chapter follows 
from preceding chapters and derives from the core objective of the NCM. Hence, 
if monetary policy is effective in affecting retail interest rates and aggregate 
demand (investment), disinflation may still be achieved at a high cost. Essentially, 
we examine the assumption of long-run neutrality of monetary policy and the 
welfare implication of non-neutrality in Nigeria. The investigation utilises 
advanced threshold econometric techniques which allows the concurrent 
determination of the slope and curvature of the long-run Phillips curve with the 
associated costs, in a supply-augmented framework. 
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1: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF 
CONTEMPORARY MONETARY POLICY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Generally, monetary policy is discussed under two paradigms viz: the money supply or 
the interest rate theories (Allsopp and Vines, 2000; Carlin and Soskice, 2006, ch.5). 
The money supply view is associated with the QTM approach in which money is 
considered as exogenous and under the control of central banks (CBs).
3
 Underlying 
this is the notion that inflation correlates with the growth rate of money supply so that 
money becomes the most appropriate instrument of monetary policy (Carlin and 
Soskice, op.cit; Davidson, 2006). The interest rate paradigm generally follows the 
Wicksellian structure where money is considered as endogenously determined in the 
economy and outside the control of the authorities (Fontana, 2007). In the absence of 
shocks, therefore, inflation reflects government interest rate policy decisions (Carlin 
and Soskice, op.cit). Following the proven inability of CBs to control money supply, 
emphasis has shifted essentially to the short-term nominal interest rate as the 
instrument of monetary policy; hence, the fall of monetarism.  
Contemporary monetary policy is congruent with NCM tenets; with inflation as the 
overriding objective and the interest rate as the sole instrument of monetary policy. In 
the NCM model, money supply is treated as residual (set by the demand for money) 
and inflation as an aggregate demand (AD) phenomenon. The key assumptions 
underlying the NCM and its major conclusions have been criticised both theoretically 
and practically (see Davidson, 2006; and Fontana, 2009a). In this chapter, we present 
an overview of the currently competing theories of monetary policy, an exposition of 
the key assumptions and equations of the NCM, as well as the implications and 
limitations of the NCM especially for developing countries.   
                                            
3 The QTM postulates a direct and proportional relationship between money supply and the rate of inflation. It is 
based on the assumption of a constant velocity of money so that the product of money supply and its velocity is 
equivalent to nominal income (i.e.       ). It thus suggests that changes in money supply would lead to 
proportional changes in nominal income. If real income ( ) is held constant, these changes impact directly on the 
price level. However, changes in real money balances can affect output given the constant money velocity; so 
that           . 
1 
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1.2 Alternative Theoretical Views 
Although there is a general acceptance of the importance of monetary policy for 
macroeconomic management, there is no consensus on the appropriate approach for 
its conduct. This disagreement appears both in the scale and scope of monetary policy. 
For instance, there is considerable division with regards to the variables that are 
germane to its conduct and its effectiveness over a time horizon. Palley (2007) 
observed that these differences derive from the various theoretical understandings of 
competing schools of thought. Following the doctrine of monetarism and the belief 
that inflation is a monetary phenomenon since the 1970s, the weight of monetary 
policy in macroeconomic stabilisation increased considerably (Arestis and Sawyer, 
2008a). With this came the consensus that CBs have the responsibility of controlling 
inflation (or at least targeting inflation as the central objective). Debilitation of the 
monetarist school notwithstanding, the role of monetary policy remained intact, while 
the debate on how it should be framed and conducted has taken prominence.  
Competing ideologies on the role and nature of monetary policy include those of the 
new-classical, new-Keynesians and post-Keynesians. Critical area of divergence 
include: the relationship between prices (wages) and output (unemployment) as 
specified by the Phillips curve (PC); the nature of prices and wages inflexibility; and 
exogenous/endogenous treatment of demand vis-à-vis real growth (Palley, 2007). The 
basic conclusion of the new-classical school is that monetary policy only affects 
inflation but not unemployment, real wages and growth. In essence, real economic 
magnitudes are self-adjusting so that their equilibrium path is independent of 
monetary policy (Gali, 2008). In the new-Keynesian analysis monetary policy affects 
real variables in short-run but not unemployment and growth in long-run, while the 
post Keynesian model disputes any form of dichotomy in the long-run (Palley, op.cit).  
The new-classical model has its derivation basically from classical economics which 
was essentially based on the QTM. In the classical theory, monetary policy is 
synonymous with money supply or its rate of change based on the belief that interest 
rates are determined in the real sector (Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.3; Carlin and 
Soskice, 2006,ch.2). Given the importance of money in the classical framework, 
Meyer (2001,p.1) argued that “monetarism is the reincarnation of classical 
macroeconomics, with its focus on the long-run properties of the economy as opposed 
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to short-run dynamics.” The QTM underlined the neutrality of money and assumed a 
stable velocity of money via a stable demand for money. Neutrality entails that real 
variables are unaffected by money supply and are driven only by real factors like 
savings and productivity (Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.1; Gali, 2008). The theory 
suggests that prices are directly related to money supply, the growth of which (in 
excess of real output growth) is inflationary. The basic conclusion of the classical 
analysis is that policy is irrelevant; monetary authorities cannot affect the level or 
growth rate of output. In essence, there is no trade-off between inflation and output. 
Any intervention by the CB would only distort price-stability.  
A major departure of the new-classical economists from their classical ancestors is the 
acceptance of a trade-off between inflation and output in the short-run. This trade-off, 
captured by the PC, is enriched in new-classical analysis by applying rational 
expectations hypothesis to the model of continuous market clearing (Bain and Howells, 
2009,ch.6). Again with the collapse of monetarism, monetary policy became 
associated with short-term nominal interest rate management. According to Palley 
(2007), the new-classical model can be captured by interactions of the interest rate, 
inflation rate, real wage rate, unemployment rate, output growth and profit rate, with 
associated microeconomic foundations and the incorporation of rational expectations. 
Figure 1.1 presents an illustration of the model (at equilibrium) containing: an IS-
curve (interest rate versus output); a PC (inflation versus output); Okun’s relationship 
(unemployment versus output); supply-function (profit versus output); profit-wage-
frontier (profit versus real wage); and the wage-curve (unemployment versus real 
wage). The model implicitly contains the assumption of continuous market clearing 
which supposes that prices adjust instantaneously to clear the market. This implies the 
absence of involuntary unemployment at the market-clearing wage rate. By combining 
the rational expectation concept with the assumption of continuous market clearing, 
the new-classical model postulates that unemployment oscillates around its natural 
level (Bain and Howells, op.cit). This further implies that there exists a level of 
unemployment at which inflationary pressures abate and output is at full employment 
equilibrium; hence, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). At 
the NAIRU the PC is vertical and there is supply-driven equilibrium.  
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According to the framework, interest rate affects investment and consumption 
components of the AD which are subsequently transmitted to real growth. The 
incorporation of the rational expectations hypothesis in the model means that 
economic agents can (on average) correctly predict policy actions. This has 
implications for the outcome of policy. Only unexpected policy would have temporary 
real effects on the economy while anticipated policy actions would have nominal 
effects. Thus, even under the assumption of rational expectation, provided that 
markets clear continuously, systematic policy would be incapable of altering real 
economic activities (Handa, 2000,ch.15; Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.3). For instance, 
(in figure 1.1) if the monetary authorities embarked upon an unanticipated reduction in 
the interest rate, this would increase AD and inflation. Money wage rises as 
unemployment declines. However, real wage falls below its equilibrium raising profits 
and causing output expansion. This is nonetheless temporary as agents, armed with the 
correct model of the economy, would adjust their expectation in line with the new 
level of inflation. As the policy surprise dissipates, the short-run Phillips curve (SR-
PC) shifts upward, unemployment and real wage rise, and all real variables revert back 
to their equilibrium level at a higher level of inflation. According to Palley (2007) this, 
therefore, implies that the goal of monetary policy should be price stabilisation. Hence, 
monetary policy would only have nominal effect in the long-run when expectations 
are fully adjusted. 
The conclusion of the new-classical framework that expansionary monetary policy 
would have no effect on unemployment suggests that policy cannot be justified on the 
basis of the deviations of actual unemployment from the natural rate, since these 
deviations are random. (Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.6). This reflects “the assumption 
of continuous market clearing [which accordingly] implies that...all unemployment is 
voluntary” (op.cit, p.164). The new-Keynesians, however, dispute the assumption of 
continuous market clearing but acknowledge the idea of a long-run equilibrium and 
the propensity of an economy to revert to this equilibrium. This equilibrium reversion 
is not instantaneous but may take a considerable time. Unlike the new-classical 
economists which believe that disequilibrium results from incorrect expectations due 
to policy surprises, the new-Keynesians argue that disequilibrium results from price 
rigidities that arise from the institutional features of a market. Consequently, the 
fulcrum of new-Keynesian analysis is the sticky wage and price model (Carlin and 
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Soskice, 2006,ch.15). According to this model, wage contracts prevent nominal wage 
adjustment in the short-run (at least until the contract runs through). Hence, an 
expansionary monetary policy increases AD and inflation. In addition, it lowers 
unemployment and real wage while nominal wages remains unchanged due to existing 
contract. The fall in real wage increase profits and spurs producers to increase output. 
In the long-run, however, as wage contracts end, nominal wage begins to be adjusted 
upward thereby increasing real wage. This causes a decline in profit, output and 
employment. Thus, contrary to new-classical postulations, when prices and wages are 
rigid, the equilibrium outcome of real variables is not exogenous to monetary policy 
(Gali, 2008). Monetary policy may, thus, be used to manage deviations of output and 
employment around their NAIRU-consistent level (Palley, 2007).   
Figure 1.1: The New-Classical Framework 
 
 Source: Adapted from Palley (2007) 
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An amalgamation of some of the key assumptions of the new-classical (rational 
expectations) and the new-Keynesians (short-run rigidities and long-run flexibility) 
constitutes the bedrock of the NCM model, the policy conclusion of which is that 
price-stability is the main objective of monetary policy. According to Setterfield 
(2006), the key elements of the NCM model are the assumption of real wage 
bargaining, monetary neutrality, supply-driven equilibrium and demand-determined 
inflation. Following Clarida et al. (1999) and Meyer (2001), these elements are 
typically summarised by three equations – IS-type AD, PC, and monetary rule (MR) – 
with micro-foundations in agents’ optimisation procedure (see Gali, 2008; Walsh, 
2003,ch.5; and Woodford, 2003,ch.4). The views of the NCM (discussed in later 
sections) are parallel to those of the new-Keynesians and new-classical in arguing that 
a CB cannot engage in real output stabilisation in the long-run, since the combination 
of rational expectation and continuous market clearing ensures the emergence of 
inflationary pressures without output gains. The CB should thus concentrate on long-
run price-stability and short-run output stabilisation (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007). 
Post-Keynesians are sceptical of NAIRU as a unique rate of unemployment that is 
unaffected by the path of demand and consistent with constant inflation. While some 
like Davidson (2006) totally rejects this concept, others like Arestis and Sawyer (2005) 
accept the existence of a level of economic activity that is consistent with zero 
inflation; hence, inflation barrier. For Davidson, the argument of price-stability as the 
key policy objective crumples without the “vague slippery...notion” of NAIRU 
(p.691). However, unlike NAIRU which emphasises supply-side equilibrium based on 
labour market dynamics, inflation barrier recognises the interrelationship between the 
goods market and the labour market. Hence, the barrier is set by product market 
conditions and productive capacity – rather than by labour market conditions. It also 
envisaged that this barrier be continuously changing and path dependent, and does not 
act as a strong attractor for the actual level of unemployment.  
Essentially, post-Keynesians posit that inflation derives from conflicts over income 
share between workers and employers; and supply factors related to productive 
capacity (Arestis and Sawyer, op.cit; Setterfield, 2009). In this regard, attempts by 
workers or firms to increase their share alter the inflation barrier and are inflationary. 
Changes in income distribution (between firms’ profit and workers’ wages) depend on 
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bargaining power which in turn depends on the level of unemployment and can affect 
economic growth. Investment and capital stock also play a critical role in the economy 
affecting both AD and aggregate supply (AS), and hence the level of economic 
activity and unemployment. Changes and/or intensity (i.e. productivity) of capital 
stock affect incomes distribution and inflation barrier. Hence, the interest rate by 
affecting investment affects capital stock and productive capacity, and via hysteresis 
can affect an economy’s long-run path.4 In general, the post-Keynesian framework 
contains an oblique long-run Phillips curve (LR-PC) implying a long-run trade-off 
between inflation and output (or unemployment), making IT undesirable and costly. 
Setterfield (2006) broadly summarise post-Keynesian stance as nominal (rather than 
real) wage bargaining, monetary non-neutrality, demand-driven equilibrium, cost-
determined inflation. Post-Keynesians conclude that the one-instrument-one-objective 
approach is sub-optimal. Policy should, rather, be conducted in a multi-instrument-
multi-objective framework to ensure balanced and socially optimal outcome (Heintz 
and Ndikumana, 2011).   
1.3 Contemporary Issues in the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
Following the collapse of monetarism, monetary policy became associated with CBs 
management of the short-term interest rate. This is viewed by many as a significant 
alignment of the theories and practice of monetary policy. In fact, as noted by Fontana 
(2007)  
“One of the greatest achievements of the modern 
mainstream approach to monetary policy is to have 
rejected the old quantity theoretic framework and to have 
replaced it with a[n]...interest rate analysis, which closely 
reflects the actual behaviour of central banks” (p.43). 
The view that money is exogenous (and within the control of CBs) is rejected by many 
modern economists, particularly the post-Keynesians. Consequently, there is reduced 
focus on monetary aggregates in many CBs around the world. Nonetheless, the belief 
remains that inflation is a monetary policy phenomenon and thus the responsibility of 
CBs. Monetary policy, therefore, has become prominent in macroeconomic 
                                            
4 Hysteresis refers to the possibility that output loss (or high unemployment) in time t can lead to lower growth 
rates (or increased unemployment rate) in period t+h; h=1,2,... 
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management and is conducted in a one-instrument-one-target framework (Arestis, 
2007; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008a). In this case, the interest rate is the instrument of 
monetary policy while inflation is the target.
5
 This typifies IT whether explicitly or 
implicitly (Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.3). According to Arestis and Sawyer (2008b) 
the use of the interest rate as the major instrument of monetary policy has some 
fundamental elements viz: objectives of price-stability; a PC with real economic 
activity and expectations explaining inflation; incorporation of a variant of the 
classical dichotomy; and the notion of a supply-side equilibrium. These elements are 
consistent with the NCM model and constitute features of the economic model on 
which the justification for IT by an independent CB is based.  
Although NCM and IT are broadly treated as congruent in this thesis, there is however 
some subtle distinctions between these. IT is a conditioning policy framework adopted 
by an independent CB which is perceived by rational economic agents to be credibly 
committed to an overriding objective of price-stability. The practice of IT in many 
countries is associated closely with the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983) which argued that in an economy characterised by rational 
expectations, given the problems of time-inconsistency, discretionary policies would 
lead to sub-optimal equilibrium while rule-based policies would maximise the social 
objective function. In these studies, macroeconomic policy is deemed an expectations-
game between the policymakers and the rational economic agents. Since policymakers 
are inclined to expanding economy activities, agents’ aim to avoid policy surprises by 
anticipating policymakers’ decisions. Rule-based policies built on pre-commitment to 
a certain objective eliminate policy surprises where discretionary policies devoid of 
any commitment create surprises.  
In the Kydland–Prescott–Barro–Gordon tradition, given that real economic activities 
are invariant to policies due to agents’ rational expectations, systematic attempts of 
policymakers to expand economic activities would only create inflation surprises; that 
is the so-called inflation bias (Gerlach, 2003; Hartely, 2006). Thus, discretionary 
policies would raise inflation rate above the optimal level that would have been 
achieved if rules were followed. Under rational expectations, therefore, pre-
                                            
5  Whilst IT has been widely used, there is however, a range of countries in which the exchange rate is of 
considerable concern for monetary policy. 
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commitment to an inflation objective ensures that inflation expectations by agents 
coincide with that defined by the rule (Barro and Gordon, op.cit). Following the works 
of Kydland and Prescott (op.cit) and Barro and Gordon (op.cit), therefore, IT 
highlights the role of policy institutions (i.e. CBs) rather than policy choices/tools. 
As a conditioning framework, IT is based on an inflation-averse CB legally committed 
to the objective of price-stability and as such seen to be credible by rational agents in 
achieving this objective. The basic difference between IT and NCM is that while the 
former is a conditioning approach that requires commitment and credibility of a CB, 
the latter is an optimal control framework that does not explicitly require such 
commitment. Besides, under IT the expectations channel of transmission is deemed 
important while the AD channel is emphasised by the NCM. Furthermore, under 
NCM the policy instrument is restricted strictly to the short-term interest rate whereas 
IT allows the use monetary growth, interest rates or any other feasible monetary 
policy instrument. However, IT and NCM are somewhat similar; first, in the sense that 
are both built on the notion of rational expectations; second, they both contain a 
monetary policy rule, and lastly, they both emphasise an overriding objective of price-
stability. In our analysis, the link between both frameworks is due to the contemporary 
practice of IT, where the short-term interest rate is largely adopted as the monetary 
policy instrument to combat inflation.      
1.3.1 The New Consensus Model  
The NCM is a perpetuation of the new-Keynesian principles which also contained 
some new-classical ideologies (Gnos and Rochon, 2007). It basically highlights the 
long-run new-classical growth models so that the long-run outcomes of output and 
employment are supply-driven, while monetary policy remains important in the short-
run (Fontana, 2008). Hence, it is based on supply-side driven equilibrium with the 
business cycle oscillating near this equilibrium (Arestis, 2007). The NCM was 
developed with the fundamental reasoning that Say’s law holds (through the way in 
which the policy interest rate is set); hence, in the long-run effective demand has no 
real implications in the economy (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008a). Further underpinnings 
of the NCM are: the existence of temporal nominal rigidities in wages and prices so 
that monetary policy would have real effects in the short-run; inflation is a monetary 
policy phenomenon; there is rational expectations as agents possess correct knowledge 
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of the workings of the economic model; and, due to the concept of Ricardian 
equivalence, fiscal policy is deemed impotent.   
Conventionally, the NCM is derived in Woodford (2003,ch.4) from inter-temporal 
general equilibrium and is represented by AD, PC and MR equations (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2008a).
6
 These summarise the dynamics of output (or output gap), inflation 
and the interest rate (Fontana, 2007). Primarily, an AD relationship is represented as   
      (         )                                            1.1 
where    is the level of output,   is autonomous demand,    represents the short-term 
nominal interest rate and        is inflation expectation. The equation shows that 
output is an inverse function of the real interest rate. In the NCM model, however, the 
equation is expressed in the form of deviations from equilibrium. Hence, a canonical 
NCM-AD relationship is given as 
 ̃     (           ̅)                                         1.2 
 ̃      ̅ 
where  ̅ is (the NAIRU-consistent) equilibrium output and  ̃  is output gap. The term 
 ̅ is the equilibrium real interest rate – analogous to Wicksell’s natural rate of interest 
– congruous with the NAIRU and zero output gap (Fontana, 2007).7 This implies that 
monetary policy, by changing the short-term nominal interest rate, can affect the 
output gap. The AD equation represents the demand side of the economy and basically 
suggests that the output gap is explained by real interest rate disequilibrium. Under the 
assumption of nominal rigidities the equation is dynamised multi-period as 
                     ̃    ∑    ̃   
 
    ∑   (                 ̅)
 
                     
implying                          
 ̃      ̃     (           ̅)                                1.3 
                                            
6 Arestis (2007) expanded the model to six equations by incorporating the external sector. This attempted to capture 
the effect of exchange rate in a NCM framework.  
7 Wicksell’s natural rate of interest is perceived to correspond to the rate of interest which would bring savings and 
investment into equality in a barter (non-monetary) economy. Fontana (2007) provides a detailed discussion of the 
Wicksellian natural rate and its role in the NCM model.  
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where             are typically assumed. This shows that in addition to real 
interest rate differentials, previous outcomes of output gap are important in 
determining its current evolution. However, in a more general form Gali (2008) and 
Woodford (2003,ch.4) derived the NCM-AD from household optimisation behaviour 
by log-linearising the associated Euler equation approximately as 
 ̃      ̃     (         )                                       1.4 
where        (      
 ) represents random errors. This shows that the short-term real 
interest rate (rather than its disequilibrium) explains AD dynamics and represents the 
prevalent characterization of NCM-AD. By emphasising household utility, the NCM-
AD supplants firms’ investment behaviour and the equilibrium interest rate in the 
economy; thus, suggesting that household consumption and savings patterns vis-à-vis 
the prevailing real interest rates are sufficient determinants of AD. This point is, 
however, discussed further in chapter 6.     
The second NCM equation is a PC describing supply-related effects. Allowing for 
sticky prices and rational expectations, it is simply written as 
                    (    ̅)                                 1.5 
Inflation (  ) is depicted as a positive function of output gap, future expectations of 
inflation (      ) and inflation inertia (    ). The model suggests an output-inflation 
trade-off in the short-run – where         implies that such trade-off disappears 
in the long-run. In essence, the NCM postulates a vertical LR-PC at the NAIRU. 
Therefore, as Meyer (2001) puts it 
“... the [NCM-PC] pins down the degree to which prices 
are sticky in the short run, allowing scope for both short-
run movements in actual output relative to potential and 
for stabilization policy, while providing a mechanism 
that ensures a transition to the long-run classic 
equilibrium” (p.3).  
By postulating a continuous supply-side equilibrium, the NCM model assumes that 
inflation is demand driven. Accordingly, the model suggests that supply shocks – 
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       (      
 ) – are transient, stochastic and neither affect inflation nor inflation 
expectations (Arestis and Sawyer, 2006). In essence, the NCM assumes that inflation 
can be controlled by AD management and that the interest rate is the appropriate 
monetary policy instrument. It further suggests that at the equilibrium rate of interest 
the output gap is zero (implying also that AD equates AS) and inflation constant. 
Consequently, deviation of the interest rate from its natural level impacts on the output 
gap which in turn influences the level of inflation. The assumption of random supply 
shock with zero mean complements the premise of a constant NAIRU so that the 
natural level of output is unaffected by monetary policy shocks (Gali, 2008).  
Expansionary monetary policies are, thus, steered at demand shocks in order to 
increase economic activity thereby raising the rate of inflation (Smith and Wickens, 
2007). Hence, the final impact of monetary policy is on the rate of inflation and as 
such this should constitute the policy target. The fundamental trust of the NCM is that 
the short-term interest rate management would only be effective (i.e. affect inflation 
rate) if it impacts on the level of AD (Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.8). By assuming that 
inflation is a demand phenomenon, the NCM critically undermines other sources of 
inflation particularly cost related factors (Gnos and Rochon, 2007). 
The last equation of the NCM model is the monetary policy rule (which is CBs’ 
reaction function) illustrating the process of interest rate determination in the economy 
and represented simply as  
           ̅   (    
 )   (    ̅)                             1.6 
This shows that the difference between the actual and the equilibrium real interest rate 
depends on deviations of actual inflation from inflation target (  ) and the output gap. 
Equation 1.6 is a Taylor-type-rule that endogenises interest rate adjustments by CBs 
and has two distinct derivations (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008a; 2008b). The first is a 
methodical search (           )that generalises CBs’ behaviour (Allsopp and Vines, 
2000). Alternatively, it is derived (as in Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.5; Clarida et al., 
1999; and Svensson, 2003) by minimising a CB’s quadratic loss function of the form 
  (    
 )   (    ̅)
                                        1.7 
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where the parameter     is the weight assigned to output deviations from its trend. 
If     then more weight is placed on output stabilisation vis-à-vis price-stability. 
Conversely,     implies inflation aversion while     indicates strict IT. 
Generally,        is assumed so that the objective of CBs is to minimise output 
loss associated with disinflation.  
The operating rule, thus, depicts the policy “instrument [as] a function of a small 
subset of the information available to [CBs]” with inflation and output gaps as 
operating targets (Svensson, 2003, p.426). According to Clarida et al. (1999, p.1670), 
“the policy problem is to choose a time path for the instrument    to engineer time 
paths of the target variables...that [minimises] the objective function.” The operating 
rule therefore shows that the CB reacts to economic developments in a systematic and 
predictable manner (Arestis, 2007; Gnos and Rochon, 2007; Svensson, op.cit). Hence, 
a rise in inflation above target would lead to higher interest rate to slow the economy 
and reduce inflation and vice-versa. One important implication of the monetary rule is 
that if     
  and      ̅   , then CBs actually fix   ̅           . This 
presupposes that  ̅ is unique, attainable and known thereby enabling CBs to steer the 
economy towards equilibrium (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008a). Precise knowledge of the 
equilibrium real interest rate is, however, impossible. 
8
 
Nonetheless, the NCM-MR relationship suggests that accurate knowledge of  ̅ 
alongside inflation expectations enable CBs to fix the short-term nominal interest rate. 
This is seen by re-arranging the monetary rule  
    ̅          (    
 )   (    ̅)                             1.6` 
which, by incorporating interest rate smoothing, is sometimes modified as  
   (   )      [ ̅          (    
 )   (    ̅)]              1.8 
This represents a prototype operating rule contained in contemporary literature of 
monetary policy where equations 1.6` and 1.8 become identical if     holds. The 
robustness of this rule relies on a number of interrelated and requisite properties. 
Svensson (2003) highlighted these properties to include: satisfaction of the “Taylor 
                                            
8 It is evident from equation 1.4 that when     ̅    then  ̅                  and may not be unique. 
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principle” (i.e. the requirement that the interest rate respond more than proportionately 
to changes in inflation) to ensure determinacy; use of interest rate smoothing to 
improve performance; response of instrument to determinants of operating targets 
(rather than directly at the targets); parameters of equation 1.8 depend on the weight 
( )  in 1.7; and ability to fit adequately into competing macro-models while 
approximating reality. A simple Taylor-rule is in this regard deemed optimal. 
Taylor (1993) approximated the behaviour of the Federal Reserve by assuming that 
 ̅    per cent,       and      . The coefficients   and   indicate the required 
adjustment of nominal interest rates following non-zero inflation and output gaps, 
respectively. To guarantee unique equilibrium and model stability, Taylor (op.cit) 
suggested that     and       ; so that the short-term nominal interest rate 
adjusts by more than one-to-one to inflation changes. By implication the rule expects 
that CBs are largely inflation averse so that     holds based on the supposed costs 
of inflation. According to Mishkin (2007), the proponents of the goal of price 
stabilisation argue that inflation causes uncertainty in relative prices and makes firms 
to take sub-optimal decisions which affect the real economy. This is in addition to the 
new-classical claim of monetary policy long-run neutrality.
9
 However, the weight that 
CBs place on inflation stability cannot be justified on the bases of the inability of 
monetary policy to affect economic activity in the long-run (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 
2007). In reality the weight that CBs place on the inflation and output stabilisation 
should depend on their mandate, preferences, business cycle, country-specific 
institutional features, and level of economic development. This weight may be 
asymmetric around equilibrium (Nobay and Peel, 2003) and given the nature of 
economic shock (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007).  
Furthermore, the outcome of monetary policy based on this type of rule depends on 
the interest rate sensitivity of AD and the slope of the PC (Carlin and Soskice, 
2006,ch.5; Walsh, 2003,ch.5). These imply that the interest rate may respond by more 
than one-to-one to output deviations so that the condition     (and    ) holds. 
                                            
9 This connotes somewhat a contradiction in the underlying new-classical principles viz: inflation causes sub-
optimal decisions affecting the real economy; monetary policy influences inflation and hence real agents’ 
decisions; decisions lead to actions which affect real economy; therefore, monetary policy affects real quantities 
and is non-neutral. 
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According to Woodford (2003,ch.4) the model may have a unique and stable 
equilibrium even under this condition.  
Endogenising interest rate determination within the model is based on obtaining 
feedback from real output; hence, the interest rate is essentially policy-determined 
(exogenous) within the NCM policy framework. This implies that money supply 
becomes endogenous and is determined as a residual based on the requirements of the 
economic system (Meyer, 2001; Arestis, 2007, Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b; Gnos and 
Rochon, 2007).
10
 Nonetheless, policy rules should not be used mechanically but 
regarded as a framework applied with informed discretion (Svensson, 2003)  
1.3.2 Implication of the NCM Framework: Inflation Targeting  
A major conclusion from the NCM is that inflation is not only a monetary policy 
phenomenon but also a demand management phenomenon. Inflation should therefore 
remain the ultimate target of monetary policy while the short-term nominal interest 
rate is the operating target. Attempts to use monetary policy for long-run output 
expansion (beyond the equilibrium) would lead to inflation bias as output would revert 
back to the NAIRU-consistent level while inflation increases above its optimal level 
(Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.5). This implies that since the monetary authorities 
cannot influence the path of long-run growth, monetary policy should be confined to 
long-run price-stability and short-run output stabilisation (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 
2007).  
Long-run output growth is assumed to be independent of monetary policy action so 
that the supply-side is always in equilibrium. In essence, while AD can fluctuate in the 
short-run, it ultimately converges to AS in the long-run. As Fontana and Palacio-Vera 
(2007, p.273) noted, “...the natural...growth rate of output is assumed to be 
independent of the level and time path of [AD], ideally current output should grow in 
line with potential output.” When actual output surpasses its trend, AD would exceed 
AS and would culminate in inflationary pressure. This implies that monetary policy 
should be the key tool for macroeconomic management and should be conducted in a 
one-instrument-one-target framework. Essentially, other tools of macroeconomic 
                                            
10 Operating rule based on monetary aggregate was suggested by McCallum (1988). Taylor (2000) noted that 
uncertainty in the measurement of the interest rate, substantial shocks to investment and net exports, and inability 
to correctly estimate the equilibrium real interest rate are some justifications for such a rule. 
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management, like fiscal policy, are relegated, while a monetary aggregate is discarded 
as instrument of monetary policy. Within the NCM framework, no importance is 
accorded to the exchange rate as it is considered to play no direct role in the CB’s 
interest rate determination process (Arestis, 2007).
11
 
The NCM therefore constitutes the major theoretical foundation of an IT monetary 
policy framework. The proponents of IT argue that low and stable inflation is required 
for sustainable growth and market efficiency. This removes money illusion and 
uncertainties in relative prices thereby allowing economic agents to take optimal 
decisions (Mishkin, 2007). In practice, IT is associated with CB independence (devoid 
of political interference), public announcement of inflation targets, accountability and 
transparency in the monetary policy process; which jointly ascertain rational 
expectations among agents. The CB is accordingly committed to its overriding 
objective of price-stability. IT, therefore, suggests a high degree of inflation aversion 
by CBs so that even the slightest deviation of inflation from target is corrected by the 
willingness to sacrifice larger fall in output and or faster rise in unemployment (Carlin 
and Soskice, 2006,ch.3). Hence, even during stagflation, the policy choice is to 
combat inflation irrespective of deepening recession and regardless of the source of 
inflation. According to Bain and Howells (2009,ch.8), 
“...even if we are willing to accept the control of inflation 
as the dominant macroeconomic objective, we may well 
require [a] strong justification for propositions that it 
should take precedence...irrespective of the...level of 
unemployment” (p.224). 
Though the framework to monetary policy is instituted on the AD and expectations 
channels of monetary policy, its success rests crucially on the significance of the latter. 
Since monetary policy operates with a lag, the ability of CBs to effectively anchor 
expectations is therefore critical to the attainment of the inflation target (Gnos and 
Rochon, 2007). In the monetary rule, inflation target provides a direction for expected 
inflation and as such steers expectations. Agents base their economic decisions on the 
announced target as long as it sees the CB as credible. However, given the lag in the 
                                            
11 Indeed, conventional NCM model is derived for a closed economy.  
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transmission of monetary policy, CBs in practice announce inflation forecast, which 
guides the expectation of agents. In view of the imperfect control of inflation, this 
forecast then becomes the intermediate target of policy (Arestis, 2007). If expectations 
are formed on the basis of the announced forecast, then actual inflation may coincide 
with the forecast. Thus, there is “a self-adjusting element to inflation forecasting in so 
far as inflation expectations build on forecasts, which then influence actual inflation” 
(Arestis, op.cit, p.30). Inflation expectations are deemed to lower the cost of IT in 
terms of output lost. This indicates that a strong expectations channel would reinforce 
the AD channel of monetary policy transmission (Fontana, 2010).     
In countries where low and stable rate of inflation is the foremost objective of 
monetary policy, optimal inflation rate usually below 5 per cent is assumed. In many 
cases, the target revolves around 2 per cent based on the argument that this is close 
enough to zero. Particularly if the measured rate of inflation is seen as upwardly 
biased, this helps to avoid slipping into deflation and also accounts for price increases 
due to quality improvement. The underlying argument is that lower variability in 
inflation would lead to higher stability of output. However, if the PC is nonlinear 
disinflation is not costless. In reality, the PC may be convex (Clark et al., 1996). 
Accordingly, the slope and curvature of the PC connote a higher sacrifice ratio at 
lower levels of inflation (Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.3). Being quadratic, the CB’s 
loss function quantifies somewhat the nonlinearity in the relationship where “a 
doubling of inflation [gap] leads to a quadrupling of losses” in terms of social welfare 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b, p.766). Khan and Senhadji (2001) and Pollin and Zhu 
(2006) indicated that this relationship contained two different nonlinearities. They 
showed that there is a threshold in the relationship below which inflation and output 
are positively associated and above which they correlate inversely. Particularly they 
conclude that since this threshold vary significantly between countries very low 
inflation targets cannot be justified across all countries. Similarly, Masson et al. (1998) 
reasoned that for countries where inflation has remained between 15-25 per cent for a 
number of years this kind of monetary policy would be inappropriate. IT may, 
therefore, only be applicable in an environment of low and stable inflation especially 
in the absence of a business cycle downturn (Buiter, 2008; Fontana, 2009a). In 
essence, disinflation may not be desirable simply because inflation is high but may be 
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justified by high and rising inflation so that the goal is basically that of stabilising 
inflation at a lower rate (Carlin and Soskice, 2006,ch.5).   
1.3.3 Limitations and Critiques of the NCM 
The NCM model integrates the short-run new-Keynesian views with the long-run 
new-classical postulations. By incorporating forward-looking rational expectations, it 
implied that even the slightest consideration for real output vis-à-vis price-stability by 
a CB is inflationary and without long-run growth benefits. Besides, output and 
inflation exhibit a trade-off only in the short-run while “exogenously-driven changes 
in [AS] determine the long-run, full-employment equilibrium position of the economy” 
(Fontana, 2010, p.525). This implies that the economy also possesses automatic 
stabilising properties which ensure that it reverts back to real equilibrium after 
episodes of shocks. Hence, changes in AD do not affect the long-run equilibrium since 
they cannot influence potential levels of output.  
Criticisms of the NCM, according to Fontana (2009a), derive both from within and 
outside the school. For instance, Posen’s (2008) denunciation of rational expectations 
within the NCM framework (and its undermining of activist monetary policy for long-
run output stabilisation) represents internal disapproval. Posen (op.cit) asserted that 
assumption of rational expectation is both exaggerated and misleading thereby causing 
unwarranted and excessive fear of inflation explosion. This associates NCM-type 
policies to the problem of unemployment bias which is the tendency to constrain real 
output and employment as long as inflation is above target. Even if forward-looking 
expectations were accepted, the reality that heterogeneous agents lack accurate 
knowledge of the CB model, means that expectations are not exactly fulfilled; thus 
leaving room for long-run output objective. Hence, CBs may assign more weight to 
output (and employment) vis-à-vis inflation without incurring inflationary pressure 
(Fontana, op.cit; Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007). Blanchard (2008), in another 
internal assessment, indicated that the NCM contains inadequate treatment of the 
financial cum credit market, labour market and goods market. This according to 
Fontana (op.cit) emanates from overlooking financial instability, the assumptions of 
workers’ non-exiting of the labour market, and constant mark-up in the goods market.      
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Outsiders’ critique of the NCM framework (mainly by post-Keynesians) lies in the 
rejection of its underlying tenets. A major theoretical criticism of the NCM is the 
assumption that supply-side equilibrium holds while monetary policy (which operates 
via the AD channel) is incapable of ensuring output stabilisation. Post-Keynesian 
economists question the NCM conclusion that monetary policy should focus on short-
run output stabilisation and long-run price-stability. Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007) 
argued that real shocks can change output and (un)employment permanently. 
Monetary policy can affect the time path of demand thereby having long-lasting effect 
on its long-run trend level. Since an implicit assumption of the NCM model is that 
interest rate changes would affect investment, then it can consequently affect the 
future outcome of AS in the economy. Arestis and Sawyer (2008b) argued that if 
investment is responsive to monetary policy interest rate shifts, its dynamics would 
affect the capital stock in the economy which would subsequently influence the 
productive capacity. Essentially, changes in investment, by altering the time path of 
the capital stock, cause variations in the long-run supply-side outcomes of the 
economy.  
The foregoing nullifies the assumption of a zero long-run trade-off in inflation and 
output. It shows that the LR-PC may not be vertical as postulated by the NCM model. 
In fact, according to Arestis and Sawyer (2008a; 2008b), there is no empirical support 
for the assumption of a vertical PC. For instance, Akerlof (2000), Eisner (1997), and 
Turner (1995) provided evidence of non-vertical LR-PC. Similarly, Karanassou et al. 
(2008) demonstrated that the emergence of a vertical LR-PC depends on the 
assumptions of no inflation persistence, a zero cost of disinflation and a zero discount 
rate. These assumptions, especially that of a zero discount rate, are implausible (Carlin 
and Soskice, 2006,ch.3; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008a). Karanassou et al. (op.cit, p.38), 
therefore, asserted that “in the presence of time discounting the [LR-PC] is downward-
sloping and there is inflation persistence.” Changes in the monetary policy interest rate 
would affect the time discounting rate and the inter-temporal consumption and 
investment decisions of economic agents. In this way the slope of LR-PC would 
depend on the discount rate and the sensitivity of demand. The existence of an oblique 
PC demolishes the arguments of a unique NAIRU and enfeebles the basis for an 
overriding objective of price-stability.  
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Analysis within the NCM is simplified on the further assumption that the SR-PC is 
linear. However, empirical studies have shown nonlinearity in the relationship 
between output and inflation. A nonlinear PC implies a positive relationship between 
the sacrifice ratio and degree of inflation aversion. Linearity presupposes that the 
sacrifice ratio is unaffected by the degree of inflation aversion (Carlin and Soskice, 
2006,ch.3). The NCM-PC, therefore, obscures the true cost of disinflation. In principle 
high inflation aversion as recommended under the IT is costly. As CBs move towards 
IT they may suffer greater losses in terms of output and employment.   
The supply-side of the economy is reflected in the NCM framework by the 
potential/natural output; upon which its analysis critically rests. Davidson (2006) and 
Setterfield (2006) imply that the NCM recommendation of IT is impracticable without 
this concept. Besides the debate on its existence, the question of definition and 
measurement also arise. Potential output is sometimes depicted as a country’s 
productive capacity; in which case it would reflect a production possibility frontier 
(PPF). The problem here is that feasible region of the PPF does not contain 
overheating so that inflation may not necessarily be attributable to excess demand. 
Another characterisation of potential output is in terms of the trend or long-run path of 
output, which is usually dependent on business cycles and actual outcomes of output 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b).
 12
 Moreover, this level of output is unobservable and can 
only be estimated ex post (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007). The inability to measure 
this variable ex ante undermines the potency of monetary policy under the NCM. In 
addition, the measure of potential output depends on the method of its estimation. 
Different methods produce different estimates with no indication as to which is the 
best technique. This makes potential output an unreliable policy variable (Gnos and 
Rochon, 2007).    
By assuming a random supply-side shock with zero long-run average, the NCM 
asserts that inflation is an AD phenomenon. Essentially the exchange rate and other 
possible causes of inflation are overlooked. In reality, inflation can emanate from a 
number of sources particularly the cost-push factors like wages, exchange rate 
                                            
12 Thus, the issue essentially between how potential and trend output are characterised. Whereas the trend derives 
from some average rate of growth, potential has connotations of maximum output or, at least, cost minimising level 
of output. 
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gyrations, import prices and inadequate productive capacity (Arestis and Sawyer, 
2006). The implicit assumption is that shocks from this source are transitory and as 
such requires no policy action. However, changes in the exchange rate can have long-
lasting effect on capital flows and on the productive capacity of the economy, 
especially for developing countries. In reality supply shocks may not be transitory so 
that other sources of inflation then have permanent effects in the economy. Applying 
demand driven policy to such shocks would have adverse consequences for the 
economy so that recessions can become policy induced. In addition, by impacting on 
investment, productive capacity, output and employment, the deflationary monetary 
policy under the NCM framework can have long-lasting depressing effect on the 
economy (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007). 
The use of interest rate as a policy variable in the NCM model has also been criticised 
for its distributional effect and its implication for financial stability. With its micro-
foundations in household utility optimisation, the NCM obscures the effect of interest 
rate changes on production costs. For borrowing firms, interest rates changes affect 
overhead costs: the burden thereof can be transferred to consumers thereby 
exacerbating the original problem (Fontana, 2009a). Besides, interest rate changes 
would also affect the income of rentier households who own financial assets so that 
rising interest rate increases demand and inflation thus negating the policy outcome 
(Fontana, op.cit). These distributional effects indicate that interest rate manipulations 
may fuel rather than curb inflationary or deflationary pressures. In addition, Setterfield 
(2009) showed that the NCM framework can be modified to accommodate a policy 
rule that allows the CB to set the interest rate at constant level regardless of 
macroeconomic conditions.
13
 This corresponds with some post-Keynesians’ views that 
the CB should permanently fix the policy rate at approximately zero given that 
constant manipulation of interest rates leads to speculation and fuels financial 
instability (Fontana, op.cit).
14
        
1.4 Relevance of the NCM for Developing Countries 
The implications and applicability of the NCM approach is different for developing 
countries vis-à-vis developed ones. While the proponents of the theories postulated 
                                            
13 In this regard, Setterfield proposed the use of income policy to manage aspiration gap (i.e. the difference 
between workers’ actual and target wage) and price inflation.   
14 See also Minsky (1982) and Wray (2004).  
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based on the conditions of advanced countries, a number of the assumptions are 
incongruous with the realities of developing countries. This is essentially because the 
characteristics of developing countries differ considerably from those of developed 
countries. Acknowledging price-stability as the foremost policy objective in an 
environment of slow (or no) growth, under-production and high unemployment is 
simply unjustifiable. Besides, the reliance on the interest rate as the sole policy 
instrument in an underdeveloped financial system vulnerable to foreign capital flows 
can propagate uncertainty and instability (given the volatile nature of interest rate 
sensitive portfolio investments). Nonetheless, since the introduction of IT by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990, a number of countries (both developed and 
developing) have adopted the approach. The success of this approach differs 
substantially among countries. 
Developing countries are generally characterised by weak public governance and a of 
lack policy credibility vis-à-vis their developed counterparts (Huang and Wei, 2006). 
In addition, most developing countries experience episodes of moderate inflation 
within the low double digit region. These features have implications for the cost of 
disinflation in these countries. A costless disinflation requires that the economy 
operate without nominal rigidities and that the CB is credible (Carlin and Soskice, 
2006,ch.3). These conditions are generally not met by developing countries so that 
attempts at disinflation can raise the real costs asymptotically. Generally, low inflation 
is desirable, but its benefits must be weighed against its costs. Studying the suitability 
of IT among African countries, Heintz and Ndikumana (2011) noted that 
“there is nothing intrinsically desirable about inflation. If 
[developing] countries could experience rapid growth 
and development with 2% inflation or the same rate of 
development with 15% inflation, it would be rational to 
choose the lower inflation rate. However, if maintaining 
a 2% rate of inflation slows the rate of economic 
development, then it is unclear whether keeping inflation 
at that level is the best option” (p.72). 
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Hence, although low and stable inflation is desirable, the emphasis should be on stable 
rather than on low. Disinflation should be pursued in the presence of high and volatile 
inflation. Thus, CBs in these countries may be less inflation averse and less willing to 
sacrifice output/employment for disinflation. In countries with weak institutional 
qualities, optimal inflation may be relatively higher (Huang and Wei, op.cit). For 
developing countries, the proposition that monetary policy should focused on low 
inflation is, therefore, untenable.  
Given that the LR-PC may be sloped so that inflation-output trade-off is nonzero, 
developing countries can concentrate their monetary policy efforts on economic 
growth. These set of countries are characterised in so many instances by low capacity 
utilisation and, consequently, low AS.
15
 Monetary policy might give more weight to 
the goal of economic growth, while ensuring that inflation does not become 
unmanageable. Studies like Khan and Senhadji (2001) and Pollin and Zhu (2006) 
show that moderate (rather than low) levels of inflation are beneficial to these 
countries growth so that there is no justification for them to target price-stability 
primarily. Furthermore, Heintz and Ndikumana (2011) and Epstein (2008b) argued 
that the long-run goal of developing countries should be economic development and 
poverty reduction. Provided that disinflation slows down economic growth, IT would 
be a sub-optimal approach among these countries (Heintz and Ndikumana, op.cit). 
This is due to the prominence of supply shocks in such countries which, coupled with 
hysteresis, implies that IT can deepen poverty and undermine long-run socio-
economic development.  
The NCM framework also presumes a stable relationship between monetary policy 
rate and other rates in the economy (Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.5; Fontana, 2007). 
The CBs change their policy rate trusting that it would affect retail rates, including 
lending rates, so that lending to the private sector is influenced. It is therefore 
important to gauge the responsiveness of private sector credit to changes in policy rate. 
The effectiveness of this kind of monetary policy depends on the pattern of the interest 
rate pass-through, viability of the market for government securities and the 
willingness cum ability of the banking system to lend to the private sector. In many 
                                            
15 Though low capacity utilisation generally reflects bottlenecks in the supply capacity of the economy, it can in a 
few instances be a product of depressed demand.  
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developing countries, underdeveloped financial markets coupled with weak 
institutional features diminishes pass-through and the ability of the interest rate to 
affect private sector credit. High credit risk ensures that commercial banks are averse 
to funding private sector investments even if such investments are viable and 
productive. These banks are rather more willing to hold risk-free government 
securities even at low yield (Weeks, 2010). Attempts to raise interest rates to combat 
inflation would, in this situation, only encourage further holding of government 
securities. Low pass-through and poor responsiveness of domestic credit also implies 
that interest would have to be raised more than proportionally to have the desired 
effect on output.   
Underdeveloped financial markets further make developing (vis-à-vis developed) 
countries fragile and vulnerable to external and internal shocks. As earlier mentioned, 
frequent changes in interest, by furthering uncertainty and speculation, exposes these 
countries to even more severe financial instability. Besides, the linkage among interest 
rates, the exchange rate and capital flows weighs on the minds of policymakers in 
developing countries than it generally does in developed countries. The exchange rate 
level and volatility are deemed important in the evolution of growth and inflation in 
these countries (Barbosa-Filho, 2008); Galindo and Ros, 2008). Given the moderate 
inflation rate (versus developed countries), near-zero inflation requires a substantial 
rise in the interest rate (Epstein, 2008b). The high interest rate, besides deterring 
investment (and thereby growth and development), attracts rent-seeking foreign 
capital. This can cause real exchange rate appreciation which subsequently reduces net 
exports and domestic production. Being usually short-tem, these inflows increase the 
risk of financial fragility, such that a reversal of policy causes massive outflow which 
can crash the domestic currency and cause economic crises (Heintz and Ndikumana, 
2011). Hence, frequent changes in the interest rate to manage inflation can lead to 
both financial and economic volatility in these countries. 
Besides, the NCM framework presupposes the existence of a perfect capital market 
and the absence of credit rationing (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b). However, not only 
are capital markets in developing countries imperfect they are grossly underdeveloped. 
They are also prone to large volatilities vis-à-vis developed countries (Batini, 2004; 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007; Mishkin, 2004). In 
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addition, a good number of these countries are characterised by some form of credit 
rationing, which impedes the transmission mechanism as delineated in the NCM 
model. Existence of dual economies reported in some developing countries can also 
weaken the transmission of monetary policy. While it may be possible to predict the 
response of the formal section of the economy to policy changes, the reaction of the 
informal sector is unrecorded and at best ambiguous. Hence, the overall impact of 
policy would be difficult to assess.    
Many developing countries are under-industrialised and specialise in the production of 
primary sector commodities. These sectors, for instance agriculture, are prone to 
substantial shocks, which exposes the economy to enormous supply-side shocks. The 
NCM model posits that such shocks are transient and as such should be 
accommodated (Clarida et al., 1999). However, Morling (2002) found that supply 
shocks can have permanent effects in developing countries while accounting for a 
substantial amount of output variations. Since these shocks are usually not transitory 
they would require policy actions to rescue the economy. Considering the low 
productive capacity of these countries such supply shocks can quickly transmit to 
higher prices. If misinterpreted, the monetary authorities may apply deflationary 
policies which contract the economy and exacerbate the condition.  
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, underlying the three equations of the NCM framework is the assumption of 
complete pass-through from the policy interest rate to other interest rates in the 
economy (Fontana, 2007). Owing to nominal rigidities and rational expectations, the 
CB by controlling the nominal interest rate actually alters the real market interest rates 
(Clarida et al., 1999; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007). Markets interest rate in the 
analysis is assumed to be a mark-up over the monetary policy and it is this mark-up 
rate that affects investments (Arestis and Sawyer, 2006; 2008a). Hence, a change in 
policy rate transmits through the market rate to investment, AD and finally the rate of 
inflation. Arestis and Sawyer (2008a), however, argued that credit market investment 
decisions are not based only on the dynamics of interest rates but also on the 
availability of credit. Besides, the success of the NCM framework depends on country 
idiosyncrasies and institutional features, particularly regarding developed versus 
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developing countries, heterogeneity. These issues are treated further in subsequent 
chapters.   
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2: COMMON IDIOSYNCRASIES OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Institutional features of monetary policy differ widely between advanced and 
developing countries. Appreciation of the challenges of these peculiar features would 
be impaired if these sets of countries are treated alike; especially if models built for 
advanced economies are simply adopted for developing ones. Generally, most 
developing countries are characterised by financial underdevelopment, fiscal 
dominance, low credibility of monetary authorities, and considerable financial and 
exogenous shocks (Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007). These features ensure that the 
transmission of policy decisions differs from that obtainable in advanced countries. In 
this chapter we highlight the key features that distinguish developing countries from 
developed ones and also conduct stylised analyses of important financial and macro-
variables for developing countries. Monetary policy frameworks are also compared 
among thirty-eight developing countries, for inflation targeters versus non-targeters.  
2.2 Prevailing Characteristics 
In many developing countries, the financial sector is relatively underdeveloped and 
fragile thereby exposing them to considerably protracted consequences of financial 
shocks. In addition, regulatory arrangements are in many cases inadequate. While it is 
not uncommon to have poor prudential procedures, attempt to ensure control of 
financial developments have resulted in repressive systems. Consequently, many 
developing countries have experienced shortages of financial intermediation and the 
emergence of informal markets. Although, the global financial market is becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and deep, those in developing countries – particularly the 
capital markets – remain arguably shallower than in more advanced countries.  
The legal framework for conducting monetary policy can undermine policy 
effectiveness, especially for developing countries. This is especially true in the area of 
fiscal management. Poor fiscal management and inappropriate legal framework has 
2 
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culminated in fiscal dominance in these countries.
 16
  Hence, CBs are often obliged to 
finance fiscal deficits (FD) and are sometimes required to underwrite government 
debts as well as print money to repay these debts (Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007). 
Though there are increasing attempts at fiscal prudence, some countries like Nigeria 
and Ghana are confronted with non-binding fiscal constraints.
17
 Accordingly, 
excessive FD have resulted in severe macroeconomic instability characterised by 
growing inflationary pressure (Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, op.cit; CBN, 2009b; Narh, 
2010).     
Since the introduction of IT in New Zealand in 1990 the desirability of an independent 
CB has gained increasing prominence in monetary policy literature. Several studies 
including Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), 
McCallum (1997), Fry (1998), and de Haan and Kooi (2000) attempted to investigate 
the importance of CB independence for macroeconomic outcomes and reached no 
consensus particularly for developing countries. Forder (2000) presented a critical 
view of CB independence, arguing its irrelevance for monetary policy effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, the IMF regards autonomy as conducive for sustainable economic 
growth (Lybek, 2004). A number of CBs in developing countries enjoy some form of 
autonomy in the conduct of monetary. However, inadequate legal restrictions on 
deficit financing have negated the operational autonomy of these banks. Ghatak and 
Sánchez-Fung, (2007), therefore argued that fiscal dominance and lack of adequate 
autonomy have combined to ensure low credibility of monetary institutions in many 
developing countries. In addition, they noted that these features have impeded 
monetary policy efforts at attaining macroeconomic stability.  
Given the idiosyncrasies of developing countries, studies have been conducted to 
understand the statistical relationships between macroeconomic variables in these 
countries. In a study of forty-four developing countries, Fry et al. (1996) found that 
CB deficit financing is inflationary and retards economic growth, while inflation and 
growth are inversely related in the short- and long-run.  Similarly, Agénor et al. (2000) 
studying twelve developing countries confirmed the importance of private sector 
                                            
16  Fiscal dominance implies the extent to which the monetary authority finances FD or backs/underwrites 
government debts (Nachega, 2005; Resende, 2007). Hence, government’s needs for deficit financing by the central 
bank are considered to be crucial irrespective of its impact on the objectives of monetary policy.   
17 These constraints are non-binding because the central banks cannot enforce it legally. It is based rather on 
persuasion and moral suasion of the fiscal authorities by the bank.  
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credit for economic growth, and also found high output volatility vis-à-vis the 
advanced economies. These studies jointly imply that domestic government borrowing 
from the banking system would reduce economic growth via the crowding-out of the 
private sector. The inverse relationship between growth and inflation has implications 
for supply-side shocks. However, other studies have argued that the inverse 
relationship would depend on the inflation threshold of 11-12 per cent (Khan and 
Senhadji, 2001) or 15-18 per cent (Pollin and Zhu, 2006) for developing countries.   
Furthermore, developing countries are subject to more financial and exogenous shocks 
than advanced countries (Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007). These, in conjunction 
with substantial supply shocks, prolong and complicate the resolution of 
macroeconomic instability. In order to curb macroeconomic volatility and ensure 
price-stability, many CBs in developing countries, including the Bank of Ghana, has 
resorted to IT (Narh, 2010). However, these countries encounter enormous difficulties 
in their endeavour to maintain inflation within its target largely because of the 
frequency and size of supply shocks. In addition, following a supply shock, monetary 
policy aimed at lowering inflation may inadvertently worsen macroeconomic 
outcomes and increase instability (Pollin et al., 2007).   
2.3 Some Stylised Facts 
Using a sample of thirty-eight developing and emerging market economies, stylised 
facts about the key economic relationships in these countries are reported in this 
section. The countries include seventeen inflation targeters and twenty-one non-
targeters. The relationships of interest are explored using annual data for 1970-2011 
(at the longest) obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
Given the importance of supply-side shocks in developing countries, a dynamic 
correlation of inflation and output is presented in table 2.1. While Fry et al. (1996) 
argued that inflation and growth are inversely related in the short- and long-run for 
developing countries, table 2.1 shows a slightly different result. The dynamic 
relationship between output and inflation differ between leads and lags. For most of 
the countries in the sample, inflation and output relate inversely in the 
contemporaneous period. However, the lagged growth of GDP correlated positively 
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with inflation while future growth rate correlated inversely with inflation. This 
difference shows that the source of a change is important for its impact. 
  
The result for lagged output may imply that increases in output are inflationary; thus, 
showing the importance of AD. Nonetheless, lagged inflation tended to relate 
inversely with output growth. Rising inflation in the current period relates with a fall 
in future output. This may imply the importance the supply-side shocks. Exogenous 
factors that cause inflation to rise also reduce output in the current and future periods. 
Though the coefficients are somewhat low on the average, those for the 
contemporaneous and future output were generally higher than those of lagged outputs; 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
IT Countries
Brazil 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Chile -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
Colombia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Czech Republic -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5
Ghana -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Hungary -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Israel 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Korea, Rep. 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0
Mexico 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Peru -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Philippines 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.2
South Africa 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
Thailand 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Indonesia 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Romania -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
Turkey 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
AVERAGE 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Non-IT Countries
Argentina 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Bulgaria -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
China -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Costa Rica 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Dominican Republic -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2
Ecuador -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4
El Salvador -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
India 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.5
Malaysia 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Morocco 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Nigeria 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Pakistan 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Panama 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Russian Federation -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2
Saudi Arabia 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.1
Venezuela, RB 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Vietnam -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5
Singapore -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
AVERAGE 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
OVERALL AVERAGE 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Source: Author's computations based on data from the World Development Indicators.
Table 2.1 Dynamic Correlations of Inflation Rate and Output Growth for Selected Developing Countries
Cross Correlation with GDPt + k  
Note:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1) Data is for the period 1970 to 2008. Given the incidence of hyperinflation some of the countries in the sample, an inflation threshold 
was set at 50% to reduce artificial noise in the relationships; hence, inflation rates above the threshold are converted to 50%.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
(2) Averages above are the correlation of average inflation and average output growth for the respective groups. 
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thereby implying that supply shocks are more prominent in these set of developing 
countries than the demand shocks.  
Although the result holds moderately well for the broad groups of inflation targeters 
and non-targeters, it differs somewhat across countries. Saudi Arabia, on one extreme, 
shows positive relationship at all leads and lags implying the absence of significant 
supply shocks, while other countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and Morocco showed 
considerable net positive relationship indicating the prominence of demand shocks. 
Conversely, data for Peru, Romania, and Russian suggests entirely negative 
relationship at all periods. For Nigeria, the result shows a rather weak association 
between inflation and output. Nonetheless, the sign of the relationship indicate that 
demand shocks were important in the lags 2 to 5 of output, while it reverses at lag one 
and is sustained until the fifth lead.  
To control inflation, many CBs attempt to affect AD by varying the  price and 
quantity of credit in the system. However, the flow of credit in the economy to the 
public and private sector has important implications for the evolution of inflation as 
shown in figure 2.1a. For the sampled countries, the average banking system credit to 
government as a percentage of broad money (M2) is slighty lower than that to the 
private sector, although both had tended to swing sympathetically. Moreover, the 
covariance of these credits with average inflation may portend the importance of the 
credit channel in the transmission mechansism of monetary policy. This connotes that 
policy decisions that reduces credits may also moderate inflation. As a percentage of 
GDP, aggregate credit to the domestic economy was substantially different from that 
to the private sector implying the sizeability of credit to government.  
In Nigeria, although the pattern is a bit more difficult to discern, it nonetheless shows 
that credit to government has reduced considerably in the recent past. This has 
important implications for inflation dynamics as inflation has generally followed net 
government credit, albeit weakly in some instances. The oscillations in inflation and 
net claims on government may be related to developments in the international crude 
oil market, as this affects government FD significantly. Besides, while oil rich 
countries like Ecuador, Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia have occasionally recorded 
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negative net claimes to government (indicating increased deposits), others like 
Argentina, Egypt, Ghana and Turkey have hardly posted net deposit positions.  
Figure 2.1: Developing Countries’ Credit Ratios and Inflation 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
The implication of the credit channel of monetary policy is elaborated by the level of 
financial depth in these countries. Batini (2004), Mishkin (2004), Ghatak and 
Sánchez-Fung, (2007) acknowledged the adverse consequence of low financial depth 
for monetary policy outcomes in developing and emerging market. While the degree 
of liquidity, monetisation, and intermediation can be measured by the ratio of money 
supply to GDP, the depth of the capital market is captured by the market capitalisation 
GDP ratio. Though these measures have limitations, they nonetheless provide 
indicators as to the extent of financial developments in a country. Typically, a ratio 
below 50 per cent is interpreted to indicate shallowness of the financial market.    
On average, the countries in our sample showed inadequate depth in terms of stock 
market valuation, while they maintained a moderate level of liquidity as shown by the 
M2-GDP ratio. Inter-country comparisons, however, showed South Africa, China, 
Malaysia and Singapore as having adequate financial depth while others like 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey were considerably shallow in terms of both 
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ratios. For inflation targeters, a sound and adequately developed financial system is 
often considered a prerequisite. Of the seventeen IT countries in our sample, eight 
have ratios of less than 50 per cent for both indicators, while only four satisfy the 
condition in both cases.  
 
1990-1999 2000-2008 2008 1990-1999 2000-2008 2008
IT Countries
Brazil 31.5 49.6 61.5 21.5 49.4 37.4
Chile 37.9 50.9 58.6 84.0 101.6 78.1
Colombia 29.4 20.6 21.2 14.1 24.9 35.7
Czech Republic 63.4 67.5 73.2 22.3 25.9 22.7
Ghana 17.9 26.3 NA 14.8 17.5 20.4
Hungary 44.6 46.6 54.2 13.6 25.0 12.0
Israel 68.5 91.4 90.9 39.0 78.2 66.5
Korea, Rep. 39.0 65.1 62.6 38.2 62.5 53.2
Mexico 26.2 25.3 25.6 31.9 24.8 21.4
Peru 19.6 29.3 30.7 16.7 41.2 43.1
Philippines 45.0 54.8 NA 55.5 45.3 31.2
Poland 30.4 42.6 48.6 5.8 25.8 17.1
South Africa 49.4 56.2 64.3 147.4 199.1 177.7
Thailand 84.7 107.3 98.3 54.6 56.1 37.7
Indonesia 43.6 42.9 35.7 22.4 25.8 19.3
Romania 28.7 27.7 31.9 1.2 14.1 10.0
Turkey 23.5 35.8 43.7 18.6 26.3 16.0
AVERAGE 40.2 49.4 53.4 35.4 49.6 41.1
Non-IT Countries
Argentina 18.3 28.0 25.2 14.9 45.7 15.9
Bulgaria 47.6 50.3 67.9 2.8 17.5 17.8
China 89.8 139.5 146.1 12.9 63.3 64.6
Costa Rica 24.7 21.4 24.8 7.8 11.4 6.4
Cote d'Ivoire 24.9 24.7 27.8 7.6 18.9 30.2
Dominican Republic 21.6 22.5 21.3 0.7 NA NA
Ecuador 22.1 21.9 25.3 7.7 7.7 8.3
Egypt, Arab Rep. 76.6 85.3 84.5 16.1 55.6 52.9
El Salvador 37.7 41.3 39.7 9.5 19.0 21.1
India 42.8 61.6 73.4 29.7 61.2 55.7
Malaysia 102.2 120.1 111.9 195.4 135.8 84.4
Morocco 59.9 83.3 98.7 19.2 48.9 74.0
Nigeria 16.9 20.2 30.1 7.7 19.6 24.0
Pakistan 41.2 42.2 NA 15.5 24.5 14.3
Panama 58.5 78.8 79.5 16.6 27.1 28.4
Russian Federation 16.5 27.8 37.7 10.0 60.9 78.7
Saudi Arabia 44.5 47.5 49.3 34.1 88.2 52.5
Tunisia 46.1 56.1 60.8 11.8 12.3 15.8
Venezuela, RB 22.4 20.7 26.0 12.6 4.9 NA
Vietnam 21.7 64.5 93.6 NA 9.4 10.6
Singapore 89.8 112.2 122.6 152.4 187.4 98.9
AVERAGE 44.1 55.7 62.3 29.2 46.0 39.7
OVERALL AVERAGE 42.3 52.9 58.5 32.1 47.6 40.4
Source: Author's computations based on data from the World Development Indicators.
Table 2.2 Measures of Financial Depth for Selected Developing Countries
M2 GDP Ratio Market Capitalisation GDP Ratio
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Financial market underdevelopment exposes these countries to the vagaries of the 
international capital market. A key feature of most developing and emerging market 
economies is the phenomenon of sudden changes in capital flows, usually associated 
with large negative changes in the flow (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  This 
phenomenon, à la Mishkin (2004), is confined to developing countries because of the 
weak fiscal and financial institutions. Though the degree of vulnerability differ from 
country to country, the average capital account balance as a percentage of GDP, in the 
thirty-eight countries, has experienced wild oscillations particularly since late-1980s 
(figure 2.2). The different spikes noticeable between 1990 and 2000 coincided with 
the various crises experienced by developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
Though, a number of countries like China and India have attracted more stable inflows 
in the form of foreign direct investment, the capital account balance are largely driven 
by the more volatile portfolio investment. The considerable volatility in portfolio 
investment and the consequent swings in the capital account expose developing 
countries to international financial market shocks. Weak fiscal and financial 
institutions coupled with shallow domestic financial markets complicate the ability of 
these countries to cope with such shocks.  
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
The size of capital inflows to developing countries depends on a number of factors 
which include returns on investment, perceived risk premium on countries’ sovereign 
debt, political and macroeconomic stability, and the degree of openness of an 
economy. While a number of these indicators can vary substantially among the 
sampled countries, trade openness has been considerably high in most cases. 
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Measured simply as the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP, the average degree of 
openness stood at 64.2 per cent during 1970-2008, while the end-2008 average is 81.4 
per cent. According to Batini (2004), “openness subjects [an] economy to both 
financial and market shocks...[such that] high interchange with the rest of the world 
suggests...[exposure] to external shocks like shocks to commodity prices, exchange 
rates and/or relative prices of imported intermediate or final goods” (p.12). The degree 
of openness can also cause a decline in countries export and depress domestic growth 
in income and output. For instance, increases in the domestic interest rate may attract 
foreign capital inflow, which consequently causes exchange rate appreciation; 
weakens export competiveness and increases imports. It is therefore not surprising that 
while total trade has maintained a high and increasing trend, net trade has been 
negative on the average for these countries (see figure 2.3).     
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
Batini (2004), Mishkin (2004), Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, (2007) also outlined the 
importance of fiscal stability in developing economies. While this affects key 
macroeconomic variables like exchange rate (Batini, op.cit), and inflation rate 
(Mishkin, op.cit), it is affected by political and legal systems in those countries. 
Although, many developing countries have democratically elected government, some 
of these operate dictatorially. This has implication for the vulnerability of CBs, the 
conduct of monetary policy, and overall macroeconomic stability. As shown by 
Sikken and de Haan (1998), political vulnerability of the CBs coupled with high 
turnover rate of its governors are key determinants of CBs credit to government. This 
alongside political instability affects inflation and growth adversely (Cukierman and 
Webb, 1995). Political and fiscal instability increases the perceived risk premium on 
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the country’s sovereign debt which in turn increases the volatility of capital flows and 
the exchange rate, and can complicate the conduct of monetary policy.       
2.4 Monetary Policy in Developing Economies 
In many developing countries, the explicit objectives of monetary policy include 
either the achievement of price and/or exchange rate stability. For instance, while 
monetary policy in South Africa is designed to achieve price-stability, in China its 
objective is to maintain a stable value of the domestic currency, and in Nigeria it is 
expected to accomplish price and exchange rate stability. Historically, the framework 
of monetary policy in many developing countries has followed the monetary targeting 
or exchange rate targeting approaches. However, over the last two decades a number 
of developing countries have adopted IT. This is principally due to the alleged 
reduction in inflation and interest rate variability, together with the achievement of 
sustainable growth associated with IT (Gonçalves and Salles, 2006).  Generally 
speaking, IT is based on the use of monetary policy (the prevailing practice being the 
use of short-term interest rate) to control inflation contingent on the ability of the CB 
to effectively anchor inflation expectations. Given the susceptibility of developing 
countries to AS shock this approach to monetary policy may be pro-cyclical. A 
number of studies have presented the pros and cons of IT for developing countries. 
For instance, Fraga et al. (2003), Frenkel et al. (2006), and Epstein and Yeldan (2008) 
presented critical views of IT in developing countries while Gonçalves and Salles 
(op.cit) and Khan (2009) hold favourable dispositions. However, a comparison of IT 
countries and non-IT countries provides some insights. 
Interest rates in many developing countries have been historically high, mainly 
because of the desire to disinflate, especially when compared with those in advanced 
countries (Dymski, 2003). This has the potential of reducing investment through the 
output gap channel (Batini, 2004). Similarly, the spread between lending rates and 
deposit rates in the countries has been high; thereby discouraging both savings and 
investments. High spread in developing countries has been attributed to imperfect 
information and potential high default risk among borrowers (Dymski, op.cit), 
inadequate regulatory framework and high required reserve ratios (Crowley, 2007), 
underdeveloped and weak financial sector (Jayaraman and Sharma, 2003), and the 
crowding-out effect of government borrowing (Folawewo and Tennant, 2008). 
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Although, the spread reduced in IT countries, it nonetheless surpassed that in non-IT 
countries converging to about 7.9 percentage points in 2008 (see figure 2.4a). In 
addition, real interest rates have remained high and volatile especially among targeters. 
While the level has been declining in both groups since 2001, it nonetheless stayed 
higher for IT countries (figure 2.4b).  
Figure 2.4: Developing Countries Interest Rate Trends 
  
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
It can therefore be argued that though IT countries have experienced a declining real 
interest rate, this development cannot be attributed to the adoption of IT. Other non-IT 
countries have not only experienced less volatile interest rate they have also enjoyed 
lower levels of real interest rates. Hence, the alleged IT gains of low and stable 
interest rates may not be a robust premise. Studying the Brazilian IT experience, 
Barbosa-Filho (2008) noted that although IT has led to modest gains in the real 
interest rate, the rate has remained relatively high. This has reduced productive 
investment in Brazil and has increased the burden of government debt servicing. For 
South Africa, Esptein (2008) proposed a targeted reduction in the real interest rate to 
reinforce the government’s objective of increased employment generation.  
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The high interest rate, as noted earlier, also has implications for capital flows and 
exchange rate volatility. Between 1991 and 2007 real effective exchange rate (REER) 
of sampled countries showed considerable swings. Nonetheless since 2003, IT 
countries have witnessed an increasing rate of appreciation compared to non-targeters, 
and began to record a higher level of REER by 2005. In both groups, the exchange 
rate has not only shown some degree of overvaluation but considerable volatility, 
especially among the IT countries (see figure 2.5).
18
 Overvalued exchange rate 
reduces the competitiveness of exports while making imports more attractive.  
Figure 2.5: Exchange Rate Level and Volatility 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
Galindo and Ros (2008) showed that IT in Mexico is conducted with a bias toward 
overvalued exchange rate which has adverse effects on output. In various studies of IT 
Barbosa-Filho (2008), Galindo and Ros (op.cit), Telli et al. (2008), and Lim (2008) 
advocated the inclusion of a competitive real exchange rate to replace or complement 
the current IT framework in Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and Philippines, respectively. 
Similarly, Frenkel and Rapetti (2008) underscored the success of exchange rate 
                                            
18 Volatility reflects appreciation/depreciation, where positive outcomes depict appreciation. 
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targeting in Argentina in aiding employment and growth, as Packard (2005) opined 
that exchange rate-focused approach is superior to an IT framework in Vietnam.          
A key argument in favour of IT is that it helps to lock-in inflation expectations in 
order to maintain inflation within a given range. Fraga et al. (2003) however noted 
that IT has been less successful in developing countries due to challenges confronting 
these countries. As shown in figure 2.6a, of the seventeen IT countries, only Czech 
Republic and Israel kept inflation within target range. Brazil, Korea and Poland were 
the only other countries able to maintain their target in the medium-term, while few of 
the remaining had their end-2011 outcome within target. For about half of the 
countries, both the 5-year average and the end-period outcomes were off-target. Kahn 
(2009) identified the cost of meeting the preconditions and the vulnerability to 
external shocks as the possible reasons for this development.  
Figure 2.6a: Inflation Targets and Outcomes 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from respective CBs and the 
World Development Indicators 
This non-realisation of targets notwithstanding, the reality is that average inflation fell 
significantly among the IT countries after adopting the framework. For instance, as 
shown in figure 2.6b, average inflation during the five years preceding IT was 
considerably higher than average inflation in the five years following its adoption in 
each of the IT-countries. This is illustrated by the fact that the broken trend-line in 
figure 2.6b, which depicts pre-IT trend, lies noticeably above the solid line that shows 
post-IT average level for all the countries. The data from the above chart suggests that, 
on the average, inflation among these countries fell from a five-year average of 9.03 
per cent pre-IT to a five-year average of 10.21 per cent post-IT, indicating an average 
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disinflation of 8.91 per cent following the adoption of IT. Indeed, these figures are 
consistent with the arguments in favour of IT; that it lowers average inflation trend. 
However, robust conclusion on whether the observed disinflation was due entirely (or 
somewhat) to IT requires that an unbiased comparison of inflation outcome between 
the IT and the non-IT countries.         
Figure 2.6b: Average Inflation Rates (Pre- vs. Post-IT) 
 
Notes:    1/ Dates in bracket are the year of respective countries adopted IT   
2/ Czech Rep. pre-IT average is for 4 year. 
3/Peru and Turkey pre-IT averages capped at 50 per cent for analytical 
convenience – actual averages are 2408 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively. 
Source: Author’s computation based on data from respective CBs and the World 
Development Indicators 
Comparing inflation and output outcomes between targeters and non-targeters, diverse 
views have been expressed in the literature. Gonçalves and Salles (2008) and Khan 
(2009) opined that even when inflation targets have been missed in IT countries, the 
framework has reduced output and inflation volatility in these countries below those 
of non-targeters. However, Ball and Sheridan (2003) showed that declining inflation 
may be attributable to mean reversion, particularly for countries that experienced very 
high inflation prior to adopting IT.  
Although figure 2.6b indicates a sizable benefit of IT, analysis of available data 
however shows that this episode of disinflation is not confined to the IT countries 
alone as the non-IT countries also experienced significant decline in average inflation. 
To evaluate inflationary trends among both groups of countries, it is important that 
comparison is conducted over identical periods. Given that the earliest adoption of IT 
among the sampled countries occurred in 1991 (i.e. in Chile) and the latest was in 
2007 (i.e. in Ghana), we compare five-year average inflation prior 1991 and since 
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2007 for IT vis-à-vis non-IT countries. This removes any bias in our analysis. Hence, 
the average inflation for the period 1986-1990 (before IT began in any developing 
country) is compared with the average inflation during 2007-2011 (when IT is already 
being fully practiced in the sampled countries) for both groups of countries. The 
analysis indicates that for the targeters, average inflation rate fell from 27.0 per cent 
pre-IT to 5.20 per cent post-IT, implying an average disinflation of 21.67 percentage 
points. For the non-targeters, the decline is from 18.35 to 5.86 per cent with average 
disinflation of 12.49 percentage points.
19
 Thus, disinflation may not be attributed to IT, 
as average post-IT inflation is low for both groups of countries. This is further 
highlighted in figure 2.7 which shows the path since 1970 for both groups.  
Figure 2.7: Average Inflation and GDP Volatilities 
  
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
In the four panels of figure 2.7, a comparison of inflation and output outcomes 
between the IT countries and the non-IT countries is performed. Average inflation in 
IT countries is observably higher vis-à-vis non-IT countries over the sample period 
until 2004 when the trend reversed. Nonetheless, average inflation in both groups 
began to trend downward since 1991. This seems to corroborate the findings of Ball 
                                            
19 To compute average inflation consideration was given to episodes of hyperinflation in some of the sampled 
countries. In order to control for these outliers while retaining the essence of the analysis, an inflation threshold of 
50 per cent was set for all countries. Consequently, inflation rates above threshold were capped at 50 per cent.  
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and Sheridan (op.cit) that lower inflations may not be attributable to the IT framework. 
Beginning from 2000, however, inflation variability became higher for IT vis-à-vis 
non-IT countries.
 20
  
Although, disinflation is generally preferred among all countries, an important 
question that arises is that relating to the costs of disinflation in terms of output loss or 
economic slowdown incurred. Consequently, we appraise GDP and its relationship 
with inflation among these countries. Generally, economic expansion has been similar 
for both groups of countries on the average, although it has been fairly higher among 
non-IT countries particularly since 2003. While growth dissimilarity is less discernible 
in both groups that of volatility is quite apparent. Essentially, the IT countries have 
experienced high variability in output as a group relative to their non-IT counterparts.  
Figure 2.8: Non-BRICKS Average Inflation and GDP Volatility 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
Recognising that some emerging economies had performed better than others, it can 
be argued that this group would have an overriding impact on the overall analysis. 
Consequently, countries in the BRICKS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Korea, and South Africa – were temporarily removed from both IT and non-IT 
categories. Excluding the BRICKS countries from the analysis did not change the 
                                            
20 Volatility is computed as the 10-year rolling standard deviation of average inflation among the different groups. 
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comparative outcomes as figure 2.8 shows. Hence, reduction of inflation and output 
variability in developing countries may not be attributable to IT.     
The similarity of the observed trends among both targeters and non-targeters suggests 
the existence of a common vulnerability among these countries. Key among the 
common idiosyncrasies of these countries is the inherence of exogenous shocks. As 
shown earlier these sets of countries are exposed to considerable supply-side shocks. 
In fact, Khan (2009) stated that while supply shocks are not unique to inflation 
targeters, dealing with it is especially difficult. The coordinates of average inflation 
and output growth for all countries between 1970 and 2008 is depicted in figure 2.9. 
As shown by the trend-lines, inflation and output maintained a negative relationship in 
both countries indicative of a prominent supply-shock. The AD focus of contemporary 
monetary policy frameworks implies that output would be hurt if inflation is forced 
down. It can also imply that disinflationary policies may be inherently inflationary. 
This is because by depressing demand, investment may fall; thus, constraining supply. 
The resulting shortage is inflationary. Hence, even if IT is successful in stabilising 
prices it may have adverse consequences for economic growth, employment, equality, 
and poverty reduction particularly among developing countries (Cordero, 2008; 
Epstein, 2008b). 
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
The extent to which economic growth is reduced depends on the inherent trade-off 
between inflation and output. If output loss due to disinflation is significant, then 
growth enhancing frameworks (tolerating moderate inflation) are beneficial. In figure 
2.10 the average changes in inflation is plotted vis-à-vis that of output for all countries. 
The chart also includes a 45 degree line which represents the points of zero-cost; 
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hence, along this line inflation and output would bear equal weight in a loss function. 
However, points above the line show lower cost of disinflation because for higher 
changes in inflation output responds less proportionately. For points below the line the 
converse holds. By and large, the coordinates for most of the countries fall below the 
line indicating that targeted disinflation may be costly. Of the seventeen inflation 
targeters, only six lie above the zero-cost line while the rest are below it. This 
corroborates Epstein and Yeldan (undated) position that costs of disinflation is not 
lower for IT than for non-IT countries.   
 
Data Source: World Development Indicators 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Though developing countries have shared features, their individual characteristics are 
in many instances different. Hence, while they generally show the prominence of 
supply-side shocks, the differences in their inflation-output trade-off indicate that IT 
may actually be optimal for only few of these countries. The inherent high cost of 
disinflation implies that some inflation targeters may hurt overall macroeconomic 
growth in their quest for price-stability. Overall, the framework of monetary policy 
should not be chosen based on the developed-developing countries divide, but rather 
on the specific features of each economy. For some economies a mix of various 
frameworks might be optimal, while for others targeting real variables like output or 
unemployment may be the best option. 
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3: MONETARY POLICY IN NIGERIA 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Throughout its 54 years of existence, the CBN has been tasked with the responsibility 
of implementing monetary policy in accordance with the macroeconomic policy 
objectives of the federal government of Nigeria (CBN, 2009b). These objectives, as 
contained in the various Acts of the CBN, are broadly defined as the maintenance of 
internal and external balance. Consequently, monetary policy has been designed, over 
the years, with a view to attaining price, interest rate and exchange rate stability, 
maintaining a viable balance of payments position, and achieving accelerated growth 
of the economy (Nnanna, 2001). The policy framework in Nigeria has evolved over 
time, depending on political regimes and/or international best practices. Currently, the 
country targets inflation loosely with plans to migrate to a strict version eventually. In 
this chapter, an overview of the monetary policy in Nigeria is conducted by providing 
a historical discussion on the conduct of monetary policy, the features of the Nigerian 
economy and the relationship between the CBN and rest of the economy.  
3.2 The Conduct of Monetary Policy: General Overview 
With the evolution of the country from a simple traditional economy to a 
comparatively modern one, the framework for the conduct of monetary policy has 
been transformed considerably to accommodate the increasing complexity of the 
economy. Beginning from a regime of exchange rate targeting in 1959 under the 
Bretton Woods system, the framework changed to that of direct monetary targeting in 
1973 and indirect monetary targeting from 1991 to date. In the first two regimes, 
monetary variables were administratively fixed with markets playing no role except to 
absorb the determined quantities. During direct monetary targeting, the authorities set 
the interest rate and issue directives to operating banks on sectoral credit allocation 
while identifying priority sectors. The indirect regime, however, derived from 
financial liberalisation and is characterised by the use of market based instruments to 
manage the level of money stock in the system. Accordingly, the CBN fixes the target 
for monetary aggregates that are consistent with broad macroeconomic objectives 
while the market determines the cost and flow of capital. Under the indirect regime, 
3 
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the primary policy instrument is the open market operations (OMO) complemented by 
discount window operations and reserve requirements.  
In order to ensure its efficiency, the conduct of monetary policy requires a conducive 
socio-political and economic environment. However, the potency of monetary policy 
in Nigeria has, over time, been weakened by legal, institutional and political factors 
such as the lack of independence, unrestricted CBN credit to government, and the ill-
defined policy objectives (Saxegaard, 2006). At various times monetary policy was 
conducted jointly by the government and the Bank, while at other times the CBN was 
subjugated to the federal government in monetary policy decisions (CBN, 2009b). The 
inability of the CBN to take policy actions without recourse to government inhibited 
the achievement of the set objectives. This was further enfeebled by the presence of 
ambiguous and usually conflicting objectives (Batini, 2004; Folawewo and Osinubi, 
2006; Saxegaard, op.cit). For instance, the goals of reducing inflation while 
intensifying economic growth, as well as those of expanding credits to priority sectors 
while lowering the money stock seem inconsistent and create confusion in the 
working of the monetary system.  
Over the decade, the conduct of monetary policy in Nigeria has undergone 
considerable changes. With the advent of elected government in 1999, the 1958 CBN 
Act was amended to grant, among other things, instrument autonomy to the Bank. 
This was based on “the recognition of the need to have an institution that could be 
relied upon by the government, the private sector [and] the general public to stabilise 
the economy, through its own independent actions” (CBN, 2009b, p.21). With this 
development, the CBN gradually shifted its focus from attaining rapid economic 
growth to ensuring low inflation (Nnanna, 2001). Though OMO remained the major 
instrument of monetary policy, the use of short-term interest rate gained prominence 
in liquidity management. The minimum rediscount rate (MRR) served as the nominal 
anchor for the other interest rates in the economy and was varied in response to 
economic conditions. 
The current approach to monetary policy derives from the notion that inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon. Consequently, the CBN uses financial programming to 
estimate monetary targets in tandem with inflation targets – usually defined as a 
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“single-digit” rate of inflation (Okafor, 2009; Uchendu, 2009b). Having established a 
monetary target, interest rate and the other market instruments are deployed to restrain 
liquidity surfeit and inflation. This approach is premised on the view that liquidity in 
excess of target is inflationary, and vice versa. Hence, policy is tightened in the event 
of excessive monetary expansion with a view to curbing inflationary pressures.   
Monetary policy efforts notwithstanding, macroeconomic conditions in Nigeria 
remained unsatisfactory as the MRR could not anchor the money market interest rates 
effectively thereby weakening the transmission mechanism (CBN, 2007a). Over time, 
money market rates seem not to respond significantly to variations in the MRR; thus, 
monetary policy changes of the MRR had marginal effects on the rest of the economy. 
In order to ensure effective anchorage of market rates, the CBN announced a new 
framework in December 2006 (CBN, 2009b). The key element of this framework is 
the introduction of the monetary policy rate (MPR) as the operating instrument of 
monetary policy and the withdrawal of MRR as the anchor rate for the interbank and 
money market. According to the CBN (2009b), in addition to ensuring interest rate 
stability, the new framework is designed to “achieve efficient liquidity management 
position and encourage interbank trading of funds in the money market” (p.55). 
Though the banking system can access the standing (lending and deposit) facilities of 
the CBN through this framework, the interest rate corridor around the MPR increases 
the appeal of interbank trading.  Thus, an active interbank market would evolve such 
that the banking system holds zero excess reserves at the CBN. This, therefore, 
equilibrates the cost of overdraft at the CBN and the opportunity cost of holding 
surplus reserves (CBN, undated).  
Over the years, the CBN has increasingly focused its policies on AD management. 
Hence, if effective, MPR alterations are transmitted via money market rates; thereby 
enabling the CBN to affect AD and stabilise prices as desired. The CBN Act of 2007 
institutionalised the objective of price-stability by expressly mandating the Bank to 
pursue monetary and price-stability (FGN, 2007). This is congruent with the current 
regime of monetary targeting. Though, the Act removed the attainment of rapid 
economic growth as a principal objective of the bank, it nonetheless retained exchange 
rate stability. Based on the emergence of price-stability as one of its core mandates, 
the CBN, in 2007, announced its intention to adopt a full-fledged IT framework within 
56 
 
 
 
the medium-term. This would imply the announcement of an inflation target to which 
the Bank is committed over and above all other objectives. The current practice, 
though described as monetary targeting, is largely an implicit form of IT. In this case, 
the bank announces its inflation target as ‘achieving a “single-digit” inflation rate’ 
while remaining committed to the other macroeconomic objectives.     
The responsibility of monetary policy within the Bank is vested in the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC). This committee is mandated by the current Act to meet at 
least four times a year in order to review economic performance and formulate 
policies that would ensure price and exchange rate stability. The institutional 
framework of monetary policy incorporates other sub-committees whose major 
functions, at different levels, is to evaluate and forecast the amount of liquidity in the 
system for the consideration of the MPC. Though price-stability is a major goal of 
monetary policy, the MPC and its various sub-committees do not analyse inflation 
dynamics directly. Rather these committees base their expectations of inflation 
evolution on the assumed relationship between inflation and liquidity. Hence, if excess 
liquidity is forecasted, it is assumed to connote imminent inflation acceleration. 
3.3 Cardinal Features of the Nigerian Economy 
Beginning in 1956 when oil was discovered in commercial quantities, the structure of 
the Nigerian economy has changed considerably. From being an agrarian economy, 
the Nigerian economy has become increasingly oil-driven. The sector became the 
major foreign exchange earner and the most important source of revenue for 
government. It accounted for 28.9 per cent of GDP, 76.8 per cent of government 
revenue, and 94.3 per cent of export earnings during 1985-2011 (see Table 3.1).   
Table 3.1: Contributions of the Oil Sector to the Nigerian Economy 
  1985-1990 1991-1998 1999-2011 1985-2011 
% GDP 34.5  33.8  23.4  28.9  
%  Govt Revenue 71.6 77.6 78.7 76.8 
% Export 93.2 94.7 94.5 94.3 
Data Source: CBN 
Consequently, fiscal operations of the federal government have depended on oil 
revenue and oil price fluctuations. Figure 3.1 below shows an inverse relationship 
between changes in crude oil price and FD. Changes in the price of oil drive 
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government’s fiscal operations; increases in oil prices are associated with decline in 
FD-GDP ratio and vice versa. The fall in FD following an increase in the price of oil 
reflects a less proportionate expansion in government expenditure vis-à-vis revenue. 
Figure 3.1: Oil Prices and Fiscal Deficit 
 
Data Source: CBN 
Given the size of government in Nigeria, estimated at about 30.3 per cent of GDP 
between 1985 and 2011, the impact of oil price changes is directly felt on domestic 
prices. Rising crude oil prices cause an upsurge in government expenditure which is 
immediately imparted to AD. Increased fiscal expansion has over the years correlated 
with rising inflationary pressure. Figure 3.2 (depicting a direct relationship between 
FD and inflation) shows two distinct episodes in this relationship. Between the mid-
1980s and the late-1990s, higher inflation was generally preceded by large FDs. 
However, beginning from 1997, FD-GDP ratio declined accompanied by periods of 
relatively lower rates of inflation. The impact of oil on the Nigerian economy is 
transmitted via the fiscal operations of the government. Naturally, international crude 
oil market is very volatile; thus, oscillations in the prices of oil are direct sources of 
instability in the Nigerian economy. These developments are usually outside the 
control of the domestic policies except when the economy is insulated via sterilisation 
of oil revenue. However, the 1999 Nigerian constitution mandates the immediate 
disbursement of oil revenue to all tiers of government; thus making sterilisation 
impossible. Non-sterilisation of oil revenue and lack of fiscal discipline exposes the 
economy to the vagaries of the international oil market.     
The dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil has further weakened the ability of 
the government to effectively use fiscal policy for macroeconomic management. As 
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shown in table 3.1 (above), oil contributes over 71.5 per cent of government revenue; 
highlighting the low tax base of the Nigerian government. This incapacitates the 
government’s ability to effectively impact on private demand through tax policies. 
Hence, fiscal policy in Nigeria is essentially designed to manage government 
expenditure based on expected inflow of oil revenue. However, the poor management 
of public expenditure coupled with fiscal pro-cyclicality has continued to retard 
development of the Nigerian economy (Katz, 2003; Batini, 2004; Sanusi, 2010).  
Figure 3.2: Fiscal Deficit and Inflation Rate 
 
Data Source: CBN 
Though oil accounts for most of fiscal revenue, it however, constitutes only about 28.9 
per cent of GDP. The other sectors, which account for about 71.1 per cent of GDP, 
contribute less than a third of government revenue. According to the CBN (2009a), the 
non-oil sector’s contribution to the GDP is essentially driven by the agricultural sector 
which accounts for about half of GDP growth. The importance of the agricultural 
sector in the economy is further manifested in the computation of headline consumer 
price index (CPI) by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Food prices constitute 
over 63.8 per cent of the overall CPI basket (NBS, 2010a). Hence, variations in the 
supply of agricultural produce directly impacts on its prices which imminently dictate 
the direction of headline inflation. In essence, variability of the conditions in the 
agricultural sector is a key determinant of the volatility in GDP and inflation.     
The agricultural sector is the highest employer of labour in Nigeria accounting for 
about 45 per cent of the active labour force (NBS, 2005). However, the economy is 
generally characterised by high incidence of unemployment as only about 87.3 per 
cent of the active labour force are estimated to be in employment between 2004 and 
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2008 (CBN, 2009a). A good number of this employment is found in the informal 
sector (Atoloye, 2007). The employment profile of the country is exacerbated by a 
weak manufacturing sector with an average capacity utilisation circa 50 per cent. The 
poor performance of the manufacturing sector and low capacity utilisation is 
attributable to the dismal state of physical infrastructures – especially electricity 
production (see figure 3.3) – and limited access to cheap (long-term) credit. Credit 
deprivation is aggravated by large banking system credits to government that 
inadvertently crowds-out the private sector. Figure 3.3 below compares the trends of 
electricity production, capacity utilisation and GDP growth rate. Rising electricity 
production is associated with increasing capacity utilisation which in turn tends to 
cause GDP growth acceleration.  
Figure 3.3: Electricity, Capacity Utilisation and GDP Growth Rate 
 
Data Source: CBN 
Nigeria is characterised by a sizeable informal sector which is widely believed to be 
vibrant and according to CBN/FOS/NISER (2001) to constitute about 37.8 per cent of 
the GDP (Atoloye, 2007).
21,22
 In fact, the sector is commonly acknowledged to play a 
crucial role in the resilience of the Nigerian economy to various shocks (Otu et al., 
2003). Operators of the informal sector are mainly farmers, traders and artisans. 
Activity in this sector cuts across various economic spheres including the financial 
markets. For instance, in the credit and the foreign exchange markets, the informal 
                                            
21 In Nigeria, the informal sector can be said to constitute all small scale economic units whose activities are 
unrecorded, unregistered and unregulated, and who do not remit tax to government largely due to non-existing 
accounts. Given the difficulty in observing, studying and measuring the sector, the statistics for Nigeria are, at best, 
estimates by the authorities (Atoloye, 2007)    
22 This refers to the tripartite study of the informal sector conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 
collaboration with the erstwhile Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) – now National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – and 
the Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER)  
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sector has been known to play significant roles. In the foreign exchange market, 
excessive documentation, restrictions and a high spread between the official and the 
parallel market rates, make small-scale users to source from the informal market. 
Similarly, the ease and speed of accessing credit explains the continued use of 
informal sector lenders. Consequently, the CBN (2007b) stated that this sector 
provides financial services to about 65.0 per cent of the economically active 
population; while Otu et al. (op.cit) estimated that it constitutes about 17.0 per cent of 
the financial sector in Nigeria. Though it provides a veritable source of fund for it 
members, the low linkage with the formal sector constitutes leakage to monetary 
policy and macroeconomic management efforts (Sanusi, 2002).  
The huge dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil and the agricultural sector is 
indicative of the prominence of supply-side factors. Oil prices through their impact on 
government fiscal operations affect inflation and GDP in the country. The sizeable 
contribution of agriculture to GDP and CPI also has significant impact on inflation 
outcomes. Agricultural production and crude oil developments are largely outside the 
control of government. While crude oil development is determined internationally, 
agricultural output in Nigeria is driven principally by natural factors. The inability of 
the policies to effectively curb inflation over time can be attributed to the application 
of demand management techniques on supply-related shocks.  
Overall, the Nigerian economy is subjected to enormous volatility, as indicated by the 
coefficient of variation of GDP growth rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, real 
monetary expansion, capital market indicators, and oil price (see table 3.2). According 
to Batini (2004) Nigeria faces relatively more volatility than other emerging market 
economies like Brazil, Chile, and South Africa. This is essentially due to the 
transmission of oil price instability to the economy. Between 1985 and 2011, the 
growth rate of GDP, inflation rate and exchange rate experienced wild swings. Interest 
rates have remained generally high and have impacted negatively on industrial 
production thereby retarding economic growth. The low level of development of the 
financial sector (as shown by the M2-GDP and Capitalisation-GDP ratios) diminishes 
its ability to effectively transmit monetary policy. Consequently, inflation has 
remained high – within the double-digit range – contrary to the objective of achieving 
a single-digit rate. The largely volatile macroeconomic environment coupled with 
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weak institutions reduces the credibility of macro-policies (Batini, op.cit). Hence, 
general features of the economy which include the prominence of supply-side shocks 
and the weak financial system, among others, do not seem to support the planned 
adoption of IT.   
Table 3.2: Volatility and Averages of Major Macroeconomic Indicators 1985-2011 
  Measures of Volatility   
Averages End 
Period 
(2011:Q4) 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation   
Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
 
Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
GDP Growth Rate 4.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 
  
5.6 6.3 1.9 7.5 7.7 
Unemployment Rate 3.8 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
  
17.9 14.2 20.6 18.1 23.9 
Capacity Utilisation 9.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 
  
43.5 40.8 34.4 50.2 54.5 
Index of Electricity Prod. 45.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 
  
137.9 100.9 114.1 169.6 200.9 
Index of Manufact. Prod. 12.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 
  
87.7 77.9 91.9 89.6 96.2 
Inflation Rate 21.1 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.5 
  
21.7 22.7 36.9 11.9 10.3 
Nominal Exchange Rate 58.3 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.1 
  
67.7 4.5 19.8 126.4 153.7 
Real Exchange Rate 2.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.2 
  
7.1 6.2 5.9 8.2 5.6 
Oil Prices 28.9 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.6 
  
36.5 19.8 18.1 55.5 115.7 
FD-GDP Ratio 6.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 
  
8.0 14.4 10.2 3.8 0.8 
Size of Government 6.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 
  
30.3 34.5 29.0 29.1 28.1 
Monetary Policy Rate 4.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
  
13.8 12.9 15.6 13.2 12.0 
Treasury Bills Rate 5.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 
  
12.6 11.7 15.2 11.4 14.6 
Maximum Lending Rate 5.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
  
21.7 17.4 23.2 22.8 23.3 
Interbank Rate 7.5 0.5 N/A 0.3 0.6 
  
15.5 N/A 19.6 12.6 13.0 
Growth Rate of M2 18.2 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 
  
28.7 18.0 34.9 29.0 15.8 
                  Real M2 19.5 2.7 -3.6 17.6 1.0 
  
7.3 -4.5 1.2 15.6 5.0 
M2-GDP Ratio 7.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
  
24.5 27.2 20.2 26.0 33.1 
Market Cap-GDP Ratio 10.1 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.6 
  
11.9 3.8 7.0 18.6 16.3 
Credit-GDP Ratio 11.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 
  
23.2 36.4 22.9 17.4 30.9 
All Share Index÷100 33.8 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 
  
28.2 0.5 8.1 53.3 48.0 
ASI Growth Rate 35.7 1.3 0.5 0.9 2.0 
  
28.3 29.7 44.1 17.9 -18.2 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Rates and ratios are expressed in percentages, indexes are based on 1990=100, exchange rates are in N/$, while oil prices is 
in $/barrel. Size of government is proxied as the proportion of total government expenditure to GDP.  
3.4 Features of Monetary Policy in Nigeria 
To achieve its monetary policy mandate as specified by its entrusting 1958 Act 
(amended in 1997, 1998 and replaced by the 2007 Act), the CBN relates with the 
federal government (FGN), the banking system and the general economy on different 
fronts. The 1958 and 2007 Acts mandates that the CBN acts as the financial adviser 
and banker to the FGN, ensure a sound financial system and hence act as the lender of 
last resort to the banking system, and engage in developmental activities that would 
further the growth and development of the economy. Consequently, the CBN is 
expected to interact with and impact every segment of the economy.  
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3.4.1 CBN Relationship with the Federal Government  
The relationship of the CBN with the FGN is as specified in the various CBN Acts the 
last of which was enacted in 2007. Accordingly, the Bank acts as the financial 
manager (and adviser) to the government, operates as the banker to the FGN and is, 
thus, required to provide overdraft facility to it. Though the Act accords some measure 
of autonomy to the Bank it, nonetheless, failed to remove the characteristic fiscal 
dominance. The repressive nature of this legislature mandates the CBN to finance FD 
and provide momentary overdraft facility (Ways and Means advances) to government 
up to 5.0 per cent of the preceding year’s total government revenue. In addition, the 
Bank is required to underwrite Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTB) for government, 
thereby taking-up all unallocated bills. This mandate makes it impossible for the CBN 
to refuse credit to government even if such credit will have pro-cyclical and adverse 
effect on the economy. Evidently, Ways and Means advances to government and 
CBN’s holding of NTBs have remained historically high. A huge proportion of FD is 
financed by direct credit from the CBN. Figure 3.4 shows that FD and CBN financing 
do covary somewhat until about 2005. This has grave implications for the ability of 
the Bank to conduct monetary policy.  
Figure 3.4: CBN Financing of Fiscal Deficit 
 
Data Source: CBN 
The CBN-FGN relationship depends critically on the performance of the oil sector and 
the international price of crude oil. Figures 3.1 (oil price and FD) and figure 3.4 (CBN 
financing of FD) jointly illustrate this interdependence. As noted earlier, government 
fiscal operation is contingent on oil price developments. Planned fiscal expenditure is 
based on the forecasts of oil prices and the expected revenue accruable to the 
government therefrom. Given the proportion of oil revenue to total government 
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revenue (see table 1), declining oil price causes a shortfalls in FGN total revenue; 
possibly resulting in increasing FD. Nonetheless, the government in a bid to meet it 
expenditure obligation resorts to the CBN to finance the deficit. Hence, as seen in 
figure 3.1, FD tended to vary inversely with changes in oil price so that rising oil 
prices leads to a decline in the FD-GDP ratio. In figure 3.4, however, FD varied 
sympathetically with CBN financing. These figures imply that CBN financing of FD 
relates inversely with oil price so that in periods when oil prices are rising in the 
international market, the CBN financing of deficits (and provision of Ways and Means 
advances) decline and vice versa.          
Hence, given the dependence of the government on the oil sector, the volatility of the 
international oil market and the absence of an appropriate fiscal rule have resulted in 
huge and unpredictable fluctuations in the Ways and Means account of the FGN. 
Accordingly, these oscillations – via net domestic credits in the monetary survey – 
continually lead to liquidity surfeit and signifiant instability in the financial system. As 
Batini (2004) emphasises, liquidity shocks due to the ability of government to borrow 
from the CBN, debilitated the conduct of  monetary policy and has remained a major 
source of price volatility. Since 2005, however, there has been an increased 
understanding between the fiscal and monetary arms of government on the need to 
restrain Ways and Means advances. Thenceforth, direct CBN FD-financing have 
fallen substantailly. This also followed from the re-introduction of government bonds 
and increased oil revenue inflow since 2004. 
With the inclusion of price-stability as the principal mandate of the Bank, the lack of 
operational autonomy and the consequent fiscal dominance portend the inability of the 
CBN to conduct its policy without interference. The failure to legally constrain 
government’s ability to borrow directly from the banking system continues to pose a 
treat to the economy. Government and its various agencies find it increasingly 
attractive to source credit from the banking sector to the detriment of the private sector. 
Though the proportion of credit to government is on the decline, it has nonetheless 
remained considerably high averaging 35.7 per cent between 1985 and 2011. As 
shown in table 3.3, much of the credit to govenment has been provided by the CBN 
which accounted for over 30.0 per cent of this credit prior to 1999. The banking 
system holding of government domestic debt instruments – NTBs and Bonds – has 
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also remained siginficantly high accounting for 74.7 per cent of total domestic debt 
outstanding in 2008 (CBN, 2009a). Since the turn of the millenium, CBN credit to 
government and holdings of debt instrument have dropped considerably owing mainly 
to the increased oil inflow and the mutual understanding currently existing between 
the Bank and the government.      
Table 3.3: Banking System Credit Structure 
  1985-1990 1991-1998 1999-2011 1985-2011 
% Credit to Govt 48.0 40.3 25.1 35.7 
      % Credit by CBN 30.5 31.3 1.3 18.0 
      % Credit by DMB 17.4 8.9 23.9 17.7 
% Credit to Private Sector 52.0 59.7 74.9 64.3 
% Total Credit 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the CBN 
The proportion of public sector deficits financed by the deposit money banks (DMB), 
however, increased during 1999-2011. This is not surprising since lending to 
government is deemed less risky vis-à-vis the private sector. Given the size of 
government, credit flows to the private sector are constrained, thereby , weakening 
monetary policy effectiveness. Whereas government source credit at relatively 
cheaper rates (even when it can afford higher rates), the private sector borrowers are 
confronted with a higher lending rate. Generally, the spread between NTB rate 
(proxying for government borrowing rate) and the maximum lending rate (which is 
applied to the average private sector borrower) has remained considerbaly high; 
standing at 8.7 percentage points in 2011:Q4. The crowding-out of the private sector 
and its associated high interest rate are effectively transmitted to output and inflation. 
High interest rate constrains credit demand which subsequently leads to low 
investment, reduced profitability and low output supply. This repressed supply results 
in excess demand which eventually drives up prices. Hence, the coexistence of both 
high interest rate and high inflation rate.  
3.4.2 CBN and the Banking System  
3.4.2.1 The Nature of the Banking System 
In Nigeria, the financial system consists of regulatory bodies and operators that can be 
classified as money market, foreign exchange market, capital market and specialised 
development institutions. The money market is further dichotomised into the banking 
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system and non-bank organisations. While the non-bank institutions comprise of 5 
discount houses (introduced in 1993), a total of 24 DMBs having 5,134 branches in 
2008 constitute the banking sytem with CBN as the regulating authority (CBN, 2009a). 
Discounts houses are licensed to transact primarily in NTB and commercial 
instruments like Bankers Acceptances and Commercial Papers on behalf of third-
parties. However, DMBs are licensed as universal banks which, in addition to 
traditional commercial banking functions, can venture into any aspect of the financial 
market including capital market services, insurances services, and financial 
consultancy services among others. As at 2008, these DMBs have a total asset base of 
N15.9 trillion, with total loans and advances, and total deposit liabilities standing at 
N7.6 and N7.9 trillion, respectively (CBN, op.cit). About 0.2 per cent of the credit was 
advanced to small-scale entreprises as at 2008:Q4, while 6.3 per cent were non-
performing (CBN, 2008a; 2009a). On the stock exchange, the banking sector 
constituted 39.0 per cent of market capitalisation and accounted for 70.0 per cent of 
the 20 most capitalised stocks in 2008. According to the CBN (2009a) aggregate 
capital base of the DMBs as at December 2008 stood at N2.8 trillion. Nonetheless, 10 
banks accounted for about 72.0 per cent of the system’s total credit, deposits and 
capital base as at 2008 (CBN, 2008b)   
Given its dominance of the Nigerian financial system, the banking industry is 
strategically important in the economy both as a conduit of funds to the real 
(productive) sector and as the nucleus of monetary policy transmission. This requires 
that the industry as well as individual banks remain healthy and vibrant in order to 
ensure economic and financial stability. However, the banks in Nigeria have 
experienced chronic fragility over the years which has continually threatened the 
fabric of the Nigerian economy and has resulted in the demise of many banks. These 
weaknesses are broadly attributable to negligence, corruption, ineptitude and slack 
control both at bank and regulatory levels. In a recent paper, the current CBN 
governor Sanusi (2010) identified the key causes of banking system fragility as: lack 
of corporate governance; non-transparency among banks; regulatory gaps/slacks; and 
macroeconomic volatility.  
Typically, the health condition of the banks is glimpsed from their balance sheet using 
their deposits, credits and capital to ensure that banks are not overly exposed. 
66 
 
 
 
Important here is the structure of sources and uses of banks’ funds. In Nigeria, banks 
like the rest of the economy are excessively dependent on the oil sector. CBN data 
indicate that the government accounted for approximately 20 per cent of banks’ 
deposits in 2010 while non-financial (including oil-related) corporations accounted for 
about 45 per cent. Given the absence of a fiscal rule, oil price volatilities are reflected 
significantly in banks’ deposits and their liquidity conditions (Sanusi, op.cit). Thus, 
rising oil prices cause excess liquidity in the banking sector and increase the 
availability of loanable funds. According to Sanusi (op.cit, p.6) “bank deposits and 
credit, tracking the price of oil, grew four-fold from 2004-2009 and banking assets 
grew on average at 76 per cent per annum,” highlighting the susceptibility of DMBs to 
the fortunes of the oil sector. Analysis of DMBs’ balance sheet as at mid-2011 also 
indicated, at 96.6 and 65.3 per cent of deposits and credits, respectively, are short-
tenured –i.e. less than one-year maturity (CBN, 2011). This implies that banks’ 
operations are based on unstable liquidity and exhibit high gyration.  
Being oil-sector dependent and short-tenured, the structure and nature of banks’ 
deposit (and its implications for liquidity) inhibits DMBs’ ability to lend long-term to 
real sector of the economy. The policy authorities in Nigeria identify four priority 
sectors for bank lending viz: agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and construction 
sectors. Though these sectors generally required long-term finance, banks have 
favoured short-term lending particularly to government and the service sector. This is 
depicted in figure 3.5 which shows DMBs’ credit structure. Panel (a) of the chart 
shows that DMBs’ credit has been rising nominally for all sectors. However, panel (b) 
indicates that the proportion to the priority sectors have been declining while it has 
been generally rising for services and others (including government) sectors. Among 
the priority sectors in panel (c), credit to agriculture and manufacturing have been 
declining while rising for mining and construction sectors. Given the rising 
importance of the services sector, panel (d) illustrates the structure of credit in that 
sector. It indicates that DMBs’ are becoming increasingly more exposed to financial 
institutions as the proportion of credit to that sub-sector has maintained an upward 
trend since the 1990s. This development reinforced by the dependence on the oil 
sector posed a major threat to the banking industry and the economy as a whole.  
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Increased liquidity from oil revenue are not channelled to the productive (priority) 
sectors but to the services sector in the form of margin lending, to financial institutions, 
to aid equity trading in the capital market (Sanusi, 2010). This caused market 
capitalisation to expand more than five-folds between 2004 and 2007 creating a 
bubble which further increased the DMBs’ credit risks. Prior to 2005, Nigerian banks 
were adjudged weakly capitalised and thus unable to provide long-term finance to the 
priority sector; hence, the reliance on non-priority lending. However, with the 
consolidation exercise in 2005 banks were deemed better capitalised. Nonetheless, 
credit to financial institutions continued to rise whereas within the priority sector only 
the mining sub-sector recorded increased credit flows (figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.5: Structure of DMBs’ Credit in Nigeria  
 
Data Source: CBN 
Over the years, the increasing exposure of DMBs to the financial sector, particularly 
in the form of margin-loans (typically secured on the purchased stocks), remain a 
source of instability and fragility to the banking system. Table 3.4 presents data on 
DMBs performances and weaknesses since 2000. Pre-consolidation, capital was 
largely inadequate, as shown by the comparison of the capital-assets ratio with the 
prescribed threshold of 10 per cent.
23
 During that period the ratio of non-performing 
                                            
23 10 per cent threshold is the prescription of the Nigerian authority. The international threshold prescribed by the 
Bank of International Settlement is 8 per cent. 
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loans to total loans was also very high vis-à-vis its threshold although the liquidity and 
loan-deposit ratios did not indicate over-exposure. In order to strengthen the banking 
industry, the CBN embarked on a consolidation exercise and increased the capital 
requirements of banks from ₦2bn to ₦25bn effective December 2005; thus, forcing a 
number of banks to merge and others to exit the industry. This exercise produced 25 
so-called mega-banks which were deemed to be adequately capitalised. Post-
consolidation, DMBs seemed healthy until 2007 when the liquidity ratio began to 
decline. Between 2009 and 2010 the chronic weaknesses re-emerged in banks as 
capital adequacy crashed to 3.2 per cent in 2010 while the proportion of non-
performing loans and the loan-deposit ratio –standing at 29.1 and 85.7 per cent, 
respectively– surpassed their thresholds in 2009 indicating heightened credit risks.   
Table 3.4: Banking Industry Assessment Ratios 
 
Capital-
Assets Ratio 
Non-performing/ 
Total Loans 
Liquid Reserves-
Assets Ratio 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
Loan-Deposit 
Ratio 
2000 7.40 22.60 20.00 64.10 51.00 
2001 7.50 19.70 22.94 52.90 65.63 
2002 10.70 21.40 22.75 52.45 62.78 
2003 9.60 20.50 20.66 50.90 61.85 
2004 9.90 21.60 17.31 50.48 68.63 
2005 12.40 18.10 20.19 50.18 70.80 
2006 16.00 8.80 14.07 55.70 63.60 
2007 17.00 8.30 9.93 48.75 70.78 
2008 18.50 6.30 8.36 44.25 80.93 
2009 15.20 29.10 5.12 30.70 85.66 
2010 3.20 17.20 5.37 30.43 74.20 
2011 9.90 11.60 12.04 25.79 45.35 
Average 11.44 17.10 14.89 46.39 66.77 
Threshold 10.00 20.00 NA 25.00 80.00 
Sources: CBN and World Development Indicators 
Notes: 1 Liquidity ratio is the ratio of total specified liquid assets to total current liabilities 
            2 Loan-to-deposit ratio is the ratio of total loans and advances to total deposit liabilities 
The performance of the DMBs since 2005 is due to the nature and effect of the 
consolidation exercise, the effect of the global financial crisis and the over-exposure to 
margin-loans. For instance, in order to meet the minimum capital requirement during 
the consolidation exercise, some banks engaged in false accounting, using customers’ 
deposits to create bogus capital-base. Foreign capital inflows during this period also 
boosted banks liquidity and the availability of loanable funds, which inadvertently 
encouraged reckless lending particularly for stock-market trading (Sanusi, 2010). In 
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addition, some banks hid loan losses thence by converting non-performing loans to 
Commercial Papers and Bankers’ Acceptances. However, following the global 
financial crisis in 2007 much of the weaknesses of Nigeria banks were exposed. After 
the crisis, many Nigerian DMBs experienced significant losses given their over-
exposure to margin lending. With the crisis, the Nigerian stock market contracted by 
over 70 per cent in 2009 causing a considerable fall in the viability of collateral for the 
margin loans and consequently a huge increase in proportion of non-performing loans. 
This eventually led the CBN to rescue eight banks in 2009 with about ₦620bn (which 
is equivalent to the total capital requirement for 25 banks). At the end of 2011, banks’ 
capitalisation remained below the domestic threshold even as liquidity adequacy 
declined considerably. However, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
improved to 11.6 per cent in 2011 from 29.1 per cent in 2009 vis-à-vis the threshold of 
20 per cent. This decline is nonetheless not due to improved risk management by 
banks but is rather attributable to the creation on an Asset Management Company 
(AMCON) by the FGN and the CBN to assume DMBs’ non-performing credits.             
3.4.2.2 Relationship with Banking System 
The relationship between the CBN and the banking system is specified in the various 
CBN Acts as well as the Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) of 1991 
as amended. Specifically, the CBN Act charges the Bank to maintain monetary 
stability and to ensure a sound and viable fiancial system. According to the Act, the 
CBN is also to act as the “banker of last resort” to the banking system. Hence, in 
addition to conducting monetary policy, the CBN also performs supervisory functions. 
The monetary policy function is performed using OMO alongside the short-term 
interest rate to manage liquidity, while in the lender of last resort mandate is 
accomplished principally via the discount window operations. Liquidity management 
critically hinges on the relationship between bank reserves and base money, and 
between base money and money supply, and the overall association of these with 
inflation. These monetary variables tend to meander sympathetically (see figure 3.6 
and 3.7). Hence, actions are taken to directly impact on the bank reserves whenever 
the CBN evisages liquidity expansion and inflationary treats. 
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Figure 3.6: Trends in Real Monetary Aggregates (Logarithm) 
 
Data Source: CBN 
OMO, the main instrument of liquidity management, is conducted entirely using 
NTBs which are traded predominantly between the CBN and the DMBs. Currently, 
the CBN performs OMO in two ways viz: direct OMO auctions and the two-way 
quote trading system. Two-way trading is conducted daily whilst direct OMO auctions 
are held whenever crude oil proceeds are monetised by the government. During OMO 
trading, the CBN sells or buys securities in order to affect bank reserves and base 
money. This inadvertently reduces the ability of the banks to create credit; thus, 
dampening overall liquidity. The amount of NTBs the CBN auctions at the OMO 
depends on its liquidity forecasts and expectations. 
The lender of last resort mandate is performed at the discount window operations. 
Banks with short-term liquidity needs approach the CBN through this window to 
finance their deficits. In order to avert unprovoked distress, the CBN is obligated to 
accommodate these banks by extending overnight lending to them. The loan is secured 
by the DMB’s holding of NTBs or other instruments considered eligible by the CBN. 
Before December 2006, banks were charged MRR for borrowing at the window. The 
convenience of borrowing from the CBN undermined the interbank market. Rather 
than trade reserves among themselves, banks prefer to approach the CBN when 
confronted with liquidity shortage. The CBN consequently became the lender of first 
(rather than last) resort for banks.  
With the new framework of monetary policy in 2006, the CBN introduced the 
standing (lending and deposit) facilities. These facilities revolve around the MPR with 
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a band. Banks with excess funds may deposit at the CBN for a rate lower than the 
MPR and those with deficit can borrow at rates above the MPR. This is with a view to 
ensuring that deposits and lending become less attractive at the CBN than at the 
interbank market. The increased trading at the interbank market would deepen the 
market and ensure that monetary policy actions are better transmitted to the economy. 
Changes in the policy rate would immediately affect the interbank rate via the 
standing facility rates and would eventually transmit to the economy through DMBs’ 
deposits and lending rate. The ability of banks to raise funds from the CBN or the 
interbank and the costs of such funds is a necessary determinant of the amount of 
credit they create.   
The depth of the interbank market notwithstanding, the CBN continually takes 
measures to affect the overall reserves of the banking system when necessary. In 
addition to OMO, the reserve requirement is another active money market instrument 
employed by the CBN. It is applied both for liquidity management and prudential 
purposes. Hence, in varying banks’ reserve requirements, the CBN controls the 
amount of liquidity available to them, while ensuring the safety and soundness of the 
system. In Nigeria, the reserve requirements are in two variants: cash reserve ratio 
(CRR) and the liquidity ratio. These ratios represent the percentage of DMBs’ total 
deposits that must be placed with the CBN and the proportion to be kept in liquid 
assets, respectively (Nnanna, 2001). As noted by Saxegaard (2006), “the liquidity 
requirement is satisfied by holding of cash in vault, deposits at the central bank in 
excess of requirements, treasury bills and CBN certificates and placements in discount 
houses and the interbank market” (p.18). 
Bank reserves in Nigeria have continued to grow over time, even in real terms, and 
have tended to oscillate sympathetically with the level of base money. Hence, the 
CBN’s ability to control bank reserves effectively could translate to better anchorage 
of money. While the bank reserves affect base money directly, broad money relates in 
some way with bank reserves through the money multiplier. A stable money multiplier 
is a prerequisite for monetary policy under the monetary targeting framework. 
However, the money multiplier has remained increasingly volatile in Nigeria 
weakening the ability of the CBN to effectively control inflation (Akanji and Ikoku, 
2009; Okafor, 2009; Uchendu, 2009b).  
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Figure 3.7: Real Monetary Aggregates and Inflation Rate 
 
Data Source: CBN 
Monetary aggregates have undoubtedly accommodated inflation dynamics in Nigeria. 
What is, however, unclear is the direction of causation and the transmission 
mechanism. The late-1980s until mid-1990s was a period of high instability and 
accelerating inflation accompanied by large expansions in real money balances 
(Figure 3.7). The moderation in inflation experienced thereafter coincided with a 
slower growth of real monetary base while money supply continued to expand in real 
terms. Consequently, while money may still be important in the dynamics of post-
1990s inflation, the association seem quite weakened by the increasing complexity of 
the Nigerian economy.  However, attempts to control inflation via monetary 
aggregates would be futile given the collapse of the QTM and the fact that monetary 
growth is outside a CB’s control. 
3.4.3  Relationship with the Economy  
Since its inception, the CBN has been charged with developmental functions in 
addition to its mandate of promoting economic growth. Though the weight of this 
function in its overall mandate had declined substantially, the bank is nonetheless 
required to take actions that would promote the general wellbeing of the economy. 
One important way through which the CBN relates with the economy is the through 
the foreign exchange market. The Bank does not interface with the public directly but 
with their respective DMBs. Being the sole recipient of oil dollar inflows, the CBN 
provides most of the foreign exchange needed in the official market, supplying about 
88.6 per cent in 2008 (CBN, 2009a).  
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Its prominent supplier status in the market makes interventions inevitable as the Bank 
strives to maintain exchange rate stability. In order to reduce pressure on the exchange 
rate, strict allocative mechanisms are put in place. These impose limits to the amount 
of foreign exchange that individuals can purchase from the official market for 
personal purposes, while no limit is placed on purchases for commercial purposes. 
Consequent upon these restrictive measures parallel markets emerged. Nigeria is 
characterised by multiple foreign exchange markets broadly classified as the official 
and unofficial markets. The CBN wholesale Dutch auction system (WDAS), the 
interbank market (IFEM), and the bureaux-de-change constitute the official market, 
while the black-market represents the unofficial market. On the whole, the spread 
between these two segments of the market has remained considerably high. While 
activities at the parallel market are unrecorded, the ease of access to foreign exchange 
makes the market a haven for millions of individual users who would rather supply to 
this market at rates higher than those at the official market. Though the parallel market 
is believed to reflect true market conditions, the CBN does not acknowledge it in 
designing policies. Exchange rate pass-through is a very significant determinant of 
inflation and output in Nigeria (Batini, 2004). Hence, the existence of multiple rate 
and markets impinges the goal of price and exchange rate stability. 
Structurally, the financial market in Nigeria is also dichotomised along formal and 
informal lines. DMBs’ inability to perform credit assessment for each micro/small-
scale economic unit given their vast number and its potential cost impedes formal 
credit to them. Hence, these economic units resort to family, friends, money-lenders 
and shylocks for their financing needs, where interest rates can either be as-low-as 
zero or exorbitantly high.  The informal sector, servicing about 65.0 per cent of the 
economically active public, accounts for about 17.0 per cent of the overall financial 
activities in Nigeria (Otu et al., 2003; CBN, 2007b). The continued existence of the 
informal financial credit and deposit market is largely due to the cash-based nature of 
the economy. This is reflected in the large amount of currency in circulation and 
outside the bank system (see table 3.5). Otu et al. (op.cit) observed that currency 
outside banks accounted for about 69.9 per cent of credits allocated within the 
informal sector. In a bid to ensure supervised servicing of this segment of the market, 
a microfinance policy was introduced in 2005 by the CBN. This was intended to 
enable the CBN affect the availability and cost of funds within this sector. The 
74 
 
 
 
microfinance institutions were introduced, by the CBN, mainly to reduce poverty by 
aiding the economically active poor and low-income group. They were obligated to 
become an integral part of the community in which they operate, provide simple-cum-
affordable financial intermediation for low-income groups and lend against character.     
Table 3.5: Monetary System Cash Ratios 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CoB/M2  25.7  24.2  20.8  20.3  20.0  16.2  12.7  9.7  8.6  9.4  9.4  
CiC/M2  30.7  29.0  25.3  24.1  22.8  19.3  16.5  12.5  11.0  12.0  11.8  
CoB/GDP 7.2  5.6  4.9  4.0  3.9  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.7  3.2  3.3  
CiC/GDP 8.5  6.7  5.9  4.8  4.4  4.2  4.7  4.8  4.8  4.1  4.2  
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the CBN 
Note: CiC, CoB and M2 are currency in circulation, currency outside banks and broad money supply, respectively. 
Other specialised financial institutions established, by the federal government, for 
developmental purposes also exist in Nigeria. These development finance institutions 
are funded by the FGN and as such do not source for funds from competitive markets. 
They are generally mandated to provide loans to specific sectors of the economy at 
very concessionary rates of interest. Given that these institutions are non-profit 
oriented, credit decisions are based primarily on their developmental goals. 
Consequently, liquidity management effort of the CBN does not affect the credit 
creating ability of these institutions thereby debilitating monetary policy efforts. 
Though their mandate in some cases requires them to be supportive of monetary 
policy, their core objectives and modus operandi do not support this.    
The impact of the CBN on the economy is also expected to be transmitted via the asset 
price channel. Unlike in advanced countries, the mortgage market is virtually 
inexistence in Nigeria whilst the bond market is at infancy. Hence, the asset price 
effect of policy is believed to be entirely through the equity market. On the average, 
the all share price index (ASI) in Nigeria has tended to vary inversely with changes in 
the policy rate (figure 3.8). Thus, the capital market may be responsive to policy 
actions and may be a potential channel for transmitting monetary policy.
24
  
                                            
24 This is suggestive of possible correlation between the interest rate and ASI. However, there is no documented 
evidence that the changes in ASI have an effect on spending decisions, and consequently on GDP in Nigeria. 
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Figure 3.8: Capital Market Impact of Monetary Policy 
 
Data Source: CBN 
However, the stock market is largely underdeveloped as suggested by the ratio of 
market capitalisation to GDP which averaged 18.6 per cent during 1999-2011 
compared with 48.4, 100.8 and 198.9 percents for Brazil, Chile and South Africa, 
respectively.
25
 This lack of depth can enfeeble the ability of the monetary policy to 
effectively affect inflation through the market. A cursory look at figure 3.9 indicates 
that changes in the share price seem to generally fluctuate with the rate of inflation.  
Figure 3.9: Asset Price and Inflation Rate 
 
Data Source: CBN 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Based on its empowering Act of 2007, the CBN is mandated with the monetary policy 
conduct to broadly achieve both internal and external stability. This requires the Bank 
to relate with various segment of the economy, curtail inflation and promote economic 
and financial development. While it interfaces with the banking system as a regulator, 
                                            
25 See table 3 and World Development Indicators online at http://data.worldbank.org   
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the relationship with the general public is via its influence on the prevailing interest 
rate, the exchange rate, commodity prices and economic condition. So far there is no 
evidence that the CBN has contributed directly to economic growth and development. 
On the whole, the Nigerian economy is characterised by dominant fiscal sector with 
low tax base, low financial deepening, weak linkages between the money and the 
capital market, and dual financial system. In addition, the economy is largely cash-
based, oil dependent and overran with high incidence of unemployment. These 
characteristics have significant implications for monetary policy. Summing it up, 
(Batini, 2004) noted that “monetary policy [in Nigeria] has been complicated 
by...fiscal largesse, lack of operational autonomy of the central bank, insufficient and 
low quality statistics, a weak transmission mechanisms, and a weak financial system” 
(p.4).  
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4: MONETARY POLICY UNDER THE NCM: 
EXAMINING BANKS’ PRICING BEHAVIOUR AND 
ITS EFFECT ON INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Monetary policy, as conducted in many countries, has increasingly followed the 
market oriented approach with the use of the short-term interest rate as primary 
instrument to influence the economy via market determined interest rates. This is 
consistent with the tenets of the NCM. Within the NCM framework, decisions of 
economic agents with regards to credit, investment and consumption are seen as a 
function of the level of (and changes in) interest rates at the money and/or the retail 
markets. The effectiveness of monetary policy conducted in this way depends to a 
large extent on the ability of CBs to influence the decisions of economic agents by 
affecting the real market and retail interest rates. By implication, the transmission 
mechanism is such that changes in the policy rate by CBs would first and foremost 
impact on the interest rates before being conveyed to the final target (say price-
stability). This is based on the assumption of a stable relationship between the 
instrument(s) and final objective(s) of monetary policy (Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 
2003; Bredin et al, 2002; Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.5).  
The NCM framework overlooks possible disparities between changes in policy rate 
vis-à-vis market/retail rates. Thus, analyses are conducted as if changes in these rates 
relate on a one-to-one basis. As Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002) 
pointed out, “all monetary regimes that use interest rates as the operating target must 
naturally assume a fairly ready link between official and market rates” (p.569). A 
complete pass-through can thus be viewed as the first prerequisite for policy 
effectiveness under the NCM. The pattern of pass-through depends on various factors 
including market power of commercial banks, their risk perception, and the level of 
financial development, among others.   
In many economies, the banking system represents an important conduit of monetary 
policy impulses. Hence, the extent of pass-through would be directly related to the 
structure of the banking industry and the pricing behaviour of banks (Heffernan, 2002; 
Gigineishvili, 2011). Like many other firms, banks determine their prices (interest 
4 
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rates) as a mark-up over costs. However, the banking industry could be considered 
atypical given that unlike other firms distinction between a bank’s input and output are 
somewhat unclear since a bank can administer both its selling price (lending rate) and 
buying price (deposit rate) with respect to its customers.
26
 In this regard, the selling 
price would contain a positive mark-up over its average cost of funds (which in this 
case may be the policy rate) while a negative mark-up (discount) would apply to 
deposit rate. Given the importance of mark-up in banks’ pricing behaviour it becomes 
apt to understand the determinants of a bank’s mark-up and how mark-up relates with 
pass-through.   
Essentially, the purpose of this chapter is to provide theoretical discussion on the 
nature, determinants and implications of pass-through especially in a developing 
country. Adequate knowledge of this is important in choosing monetary framework 
(Gigineishvili, 2011). We show that mark-up is directly related to market power 
derived from elasticities and the level of competition. In the presence of market power, 
a bank can change its mark-up (negatively or positively) following a change in the 
policy rate. Generally, a constant mark-up would be associated with complete pass-
through. This implies that by being able to change their mark-up, banks can alter the 
degree of pass-through so that market power becomes a critical determinant of pass-
through (Heffernan, 2002; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009). Market power, in turn, 
derives from the liquidity sufficiency of a bank. Banks with adequate liquidity would 
have the ability to influence prices at the interbank market thereby have an edge over 
weaker banks. The amount of liquidity would also affect the (a)symmetry in the 
pattern of pass-through. A bank with insufficient liquidity would tend to raise deposit 
rates more than lending rates following monetary policy tightening while that with 
liquidity surfeit will behave conversely.  
However, in addition to interbank competition, there may also be competition between 
the banking sector as a whole and non-bank financial service providers. In this regard, 
pass-through would depend on the extent to which there are substitutes to banks’ 
products and services and the degree of substitutability. This has direct implication for 
the pass-through obtainable in developed country compared with that in developing 
                                            
26  There is usually the question of whether deposits are inputs and loans are outputs (or vice-versa), which 
subsequently related to whether banks are regarded as deposit gatherers or loan providers.   
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countries with the latter having a more inexact coefficient. In essence, pass-through 
would depend on the level of liquidity, degree of elasticity, availability of substitutes, 
and the level of financial development.  
Completeness or otherwise of the interest rate pass-through has important implication 
for monetary policy conducted under the NCM. Inexact pass-through diminishes the 
power of monetary policy and can lead to policy indeterminacy (Kwapil and Scharler, 
2006; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; Ozdemir, 2009; Wang and Lee, 2009). For instance, 
under the Taylor rule, and the associated Taylor principle, inexact pass-through may 
lead a CB to adjust the base rate incorrectly thereby exacerbating recession, 
unemployment and inflation volatility (Liu et al., 2008). Overall, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy under the NCM is undermined by inexact pass-through. This may 
even be worse in developing countries with underdeveloped financial markets. In 
these countries, monetary policy under the NCM may not only be ineffective but may 
be complicated due to possible asymmetric pass-through.  
The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. In section two, conceptual and 
theoretical discussions of the interest rate pass-through are provided. The section 
developed practical ideas on the pricing behaviour of banks, the relationship between 
pass-through and mark-up, and the determinants of market power. Section three 
reviews the theoretical literature on the determinants of pass-through. Given the 
idiosyncrasies of developing countries, section three contrasts pass-through in these 
countries with those in developed countries, while section four expounds the 
implications of inexact pass-through for monetary policy conducted under the NCM. 
The chapter is concluded in section six.      
4.2 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Conceptual and Theoretical 
Discussions 
Interest rate pass-through generally refers to the degree of changes in policy rate that 
is transmitted to the markets. A complete pass-through would occur if a 100 per cent 
change in the policy rate is reflected in the response rates, otherwise the pass-through 
may be limited or excessive. In addition to the degree of responsiveness, the speed of 
the response is also immensely important to monetary policy as a quicker pace would 
reduce the overall response lag of policy. The size and speed of adjustment of market 
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and retail rates by the banking system depend on a number of factors including the 
market power of firms, competition, elasticity etc which are discussed later. 
Banks generally face a wide array of interest rates. While the CB’s policy rate (or base 
rate), interbank rate and deposit rates may be considered as costs, the lending rate is 
tantamount to a bank’s selling price. In addition, the first two may be considered 
exogenous and outside the immediate control of commercial banks, while the last two 
could be termed retail rates which are administered by these banks. In setting these 
retail rates, banks would tend to treat the policy and interbank rates as direct costs. 
The lending rate (being the selling price) would be marked-up while deposit rate 
(considered as administered cost) would be marked-down from the exogenous costs to 
satisfy profitability. Therefore, changes in these exogenous/direct costs (policy and 
interbank rates) are expected to reflect directly in banks’ retails rates. Nonetheless, the 
exogenous/direct costs may also interrelate with each other, resulting in a complex 
network of costs transmission. Changes in the policy rate can also affect the interbank 
rate thereby having an indirect effect on the retail rates. Hence, changes in monetary 
policy can have both direct and indirect effect on banks’ retail prices.  
In this regard, Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Kwapil and Scharler (2006), and 
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) observed that the approach to studying the interest 
rate pass-through in literature is dichotomised broadly into the cost of funds approach 
and the monetary policy approach. While the former considers the interbank (or 
money market) rate as the cost of bank pricing (de Bondt, 2002; Biefang-Frisancho 
Mariscal and Howell, 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004), the latter tends to 
investigate the impact of policy rate on the market and/or retail rates (e.g. Hannan and 
Berger, 1991; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; de Bondt, 
2005; Amarasekara, 2005). Ultimately, monetary policy pass-through may occur over 
two stages; first, from policy to market rate and then from market to retail rates (de 
Bondt, 2002; 2005). In the first stage, policy rate reflects the opportunity cost of funds 
in the money market since it is the rate at which CBs would avail reserves to the 
market. In the second stage, the market rate would reflect the average cost at which 
banks determine the retail rates. Combining these, the policy rate can then reflect the 
average cost of retail rates (though indirectly). Thus, this broad dichotomy may be 
relaxed since the policy rate is fundamentally the base rate for all other rates in the 
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economy and can represent the overall cost while retail and market rate can be termed 
the response rates as they contain some form of mark-up (-down) over the base rate. 
This corresponds with the view of Borio and Fritz (1995) who observed that 
“...under certain conditions, [the policy rate] can 
represent the marginal cost of funds for the institution...it 
can be a convenient reference for the setting of rates, as it 
reflects changes in objective, general market conditions 
rather than discretionary decisions on the part of 
individual institutions...when the money market rates are 
particularly volatile, [the policy rate] may be a better 
indicator of their persistent, rather than purely transitory 
movements” (p.8-9).  
Theoretical discussions of the interest rate pass-through in the literature are 
prevalently based on the marginal cost pricing model. This model relates the retail 
interest rate as a mark-up of the marginal cost which may be represented by the policy 
rate (Borio and Fritz, 1995; de Bondt, 2002) and can be expressed as 
                                                                     (4.1) 
where    is the retail bank interest rate and    is the policy rate,   represents the mark-
up and   the slope which captures the degree of pass-through. A complete pass-
through occurs only when     otherwise pass-through may be limited (   ) or 
excessive (   ). 27 
However, equation 4.1 can also be argued to represent an average cost pricing model. 
This is based on the premise that marginal cost is not only unobservable in many 
industries but may also be undefined in the banking industry since funds are not traded 
on a unit-by-unit basis. Important is the fact that the pricing behaviour of banks will 
reflect a mark-up over cost. How this mark-up is determined is an entirely different 
matter. A broad range of pricing theory exist which relates price to costs (whether 
                                            
27 The mark-up model basically suggests that retail rates are determined as     (   )   where      ⁄  is the 
mark-up ratio and pass-through is assumed to be complete. However, given the possibility of incomplete pass-
through this may be re-expressed as     (   )   so that                  where        is the level 
of mark-up.  
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marginal or average) and which may give very similar equations to 4.1 above. Some 
aspects of these, nonetheless, do not explicitly consider pricing behaviour of banks. 
Sawyer (1983) observed that theories of price determination in the literature are akin 
to theories of firms which are used to predict adjustments of prices and output. In the 
banking industry, prices and output may not vary as, largely, predicted by these 
theories. Price does not necessary affect supply in the industry as it would in other 
industries. One important difference though is that for most firms what counts as 
inputs and what counts as outputs is clear; for a bank it is less clear – is it deposits or 
loans or both? Pertaining pass-through, it is also unclear whether a change in the base 
rate would influence the price of inputs, outputs or both (each of which are 
administered by banks). Banks are therefore atypical and the quantity (of funds) 
supplied to the market would depend principally on factors like risk perception, 
liquidity, and economic conditions rather than prices (i.e. interest rates).  
Like other firms, banks are faced with a wide variety of costs some of which are 
directly related to their core business while others are related indirectly. A bank’s total 
cost can then be seen as the sum of indirect and direct costs. Indirect costs would 
include implicit costs like opportunity costs (which may subsequently include 
expected returns/profit), risk premium, overhead cost, rent plus all other costs which 
we can assume do not vary with a bank’s output; hence fixed costs. These would be 
assumed to have incorporated some provisions for normal profit. Correspondingly, 
direct costs are explicit costs and would include the cost of funds (say at the interbank 
market), which may vary depending on the bank’s liquidity needs.  
In this case, a bank may fix price (average revenue) as the sum of averages of indirect 
( ) and direct ( ) costs  
          (  
  
  
)     (    )                                          (4.2) 
which shows price (  ) as a constant mark-up (  ) over average direct costs where 
the subscript j indicates a particular firm in the industry. A change in any of these 
costs or their elements would directly result in a change in price. The question 
however is how changes in a particular cost would affect mark-up (and perhaps pass-
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through) if all other costs are held constant. This would depend on a number of factors 
which are illustrated later in this section.  
For many firms, pricing behaviour and mark-up determination would depend on the 
firm’s objective. The objective of many banks is essentially to maximise profits for 
their shareholders, in the short-term. According to Sawyer (1983), “...profits are linked 
to the ability of firms to achieve a mark-up of price over costs and thereby extract a 
surplus” (p.15). Hence, banks are expected to charge a mark-up over there relevant 
cost. Under the assumption of a profit maximising firm, Sawyer showed that the mark-
up would be determined by elasticity of demand, the degree of concentration, and the 
interdependence of firms, subject to the kind of industry. Generally, this may then 
imply a price-setting behaviour as follows  
    (  
 
(         )
)     (   )                                          (4.3) 
where    is firm j’s own elasticity of demand,    is cross elasticity of demand between 
firm j’s output and the prices charged by other firms within the industry, and D is the 
degree of interdependence (captured by the proportionate change in other firm’s prices 
following a change in j’s price and hence competition).  
While theories of price determination are unanimous in stating price as a mark-up of 
cost, they however differ in the determinants of mark-up in the model as seen in 
equations 4.2 (the full average cost pricing approach) and 4.3 (the profit maximisation 
approach). Given the nature of the banking industry relative to other kinds of 
industries both approaches can be relevant for banks. While the relationship in 
equation 4.2 would describe the determinants of the level of mark-up, that in 4.3 
captured the determinants of the rate of mark-up. Mark-up may be defined in absolute 
term ( )  or in relative term  ( ) . In the case of banks,   would be measured in 
percentage points as the difference between the cost of funds ( ) and the bank’s retail 
rate ( ) while  would be measured as the proportion of   to   at a point in time. This 
can be applied to equations 4.2 and 4.3 to yield  
          (  
  
  
)     (    )                                  (4.2`) 
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and  
    (  
 
(         )
)     (    )                                  (4.3`) 
after substituting               in the equations. Expectedly, a bank would 
change the level of mark-up (  ) if the indirect costs changes while changes in direct 
cost ought not to affect the level of mark-up but can alter the mark-up rate (  ). In 
reality however banks may alter their mark-up even when direct rather than indirect 
cost changes. The ability of banks to do this depends on a number of factors derived 
by equating equations 4.2` and 4.3` as  
(    )   (  
  
  
)     (  
 
(         )
)                              (4.4) 
which implies 
  
  
 
 
(         )
  
 
 
                                               (4.5) 
where              captures elasticity and the extent of market power, which 
are inversely related. If we hold the influence of    exogenous to the bank, then the 
level of mark-up is easily seen to depend on   since 4.5 can be re-arranged as 
    
  
 
                                                        (4.6) 
Then the ability of a bank to change its absolute mark-up level thus depends on 
elasticity and market power. Lower   implies that bank j would incur minimal loss of 
business if it increases its price since its clients and/or competitors are dependent on it. 
Hence, the balance of power in the industry rests with bank j. So alterations in indirect 
(implicit) costs are fully reflected in the price. If the banks have limited power, where 
  is large, then its level of mark-up would be low. Essentially, therefore, while the 
level of mark-up would reflect some cost, the ability to change it reflects market 
power.  
Normally, from equation 4.2` we see that          which indicates that a bank’s 
level of mark-up is not affected by its direct cost of fund. If this is so, then the changes 
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in    is fully reflected in    and pass-through is complete (   ). However, following 
changes in    a bank may be able to adjust     by probably altering the expected profit 
component of implicit cost, depending on its level of market power. If this is so, then 
the level of mark-up may be seen as a function of direct cost      ( ). Hence from 
4.2` we have  
   (  
 ( )
  
)                                                     (4.2``) 
 So that pass-through is given by the total derivative as  
   
   
   
   
   
                                                        (4.7) 
Ability of a bank to alter its level of mark-up would be reflected in its interest rate 
pass-through. The required conditions would be that if   ( )    then      complete 
pass-through; if   ( )    then     , incomplete pass-through; while   ( )    
implies    , and indicates overshooting.  The relationship between pass-through 
and the level of mark-up is depicted in figure 4.1 below. At the initial period, the 
bank’s price is      . If at time    the cost ( ) is changed by a degree of  , then 
pass-through would be complete if the bank adjusts its price by the same degree.  
Figure 4.1: Relationship between Interest Rate Mark-up and Pass-through 
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Hence, if   is adjusted by    degree and      then pass-through is complete 
(since       ⁄   ) and the level of mark-up would remain unchanged at  . If for 
instance there is a pass-through overshoot, then the bank’s price would be adjusted by 
a larger degree than the change in cost so that           ⁄     would hold and the 
mark-up would increase to         where    is positive. For an incomplete pass-
through, price would be adjusted by a lower degree than cost and the level of mark-up 
would be reduced since     . Hence, the extent of a bank’s power as reflected in 
the pass-through is seen in its ability to alter the level of mark-up following a change 
in direct costs. The reasons why a bank may or may not have power over its mark-up 
are discussed later in the chapter. From the foregoing it becomes evident that factors 
which affect pass-through may affect mark-up while changes in mark-up would not 
necessary affect the pass-through.  
Generally, pricing theories can be separated according to those that treat firms as 
price-takers and those where firms are assumed to have some degree of power over 
there prices. The former consist of the neo-classical theory of perfect competition, the 
basis of which is that a firm’s action is incapable of affecting its prices so that 
equilibrium is achieved where price equals costs (marginal and average) and the firm 
makes only normal profit. In the latter, firms have the power to determine and 
administer their own prices; relevant here are the theories of monopoly, oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition. In both cases, the relationship between individual bank’s 
behaviour vis-à-vis the industry is of utmost relevance for the final outcome.  
To understand the pricing behaviour of banks we begin with the theory of perfect 
competition. According to this theory if the banking industry is perfectly competitive 
banks will operate where price equals costs (average and marginal). In line with the 
discussions above, this would be equal to average cost and the banks would only make 
normal profit (equal to opportunity costs). The theory further suggests an infinite 
number of banks in the industry, freedom of entry and exist and a purely homogenous 
product across the industry. Furthermore, banks would face an infinitely elastic 
demand and would lack market power to influence their prices as “they are atomistic 
players in the market” (Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 2003, p.3). From equations 4.5 
and 4.6 we see that infinite elasticity implies low ability to change mark-up and prices 
unilaterally. Banks would, thus, be price-takers and only control quantity. Under these 
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assumptions, therefore, the level of mark-up would be low and invariant to direct cost 
while the pass-through would be complete (and symmetric) for all firms (Hannan and 
Berger, 1991; de Bondt, 2002; 2005; Wang and Lee, 2009). However, from the 
models above, perfect competition can be considered as the limiting case when 
number of firms approaches infinity. 
Practically, banks do not typically operate under perfect competition and the interest 
rate adjustment have been found to be sticky, sluggish and in some cases asymmetry. 
Hoffman and Mizen (2004) argued that banks have some degree of monopoly power 
and at best may be considered as operating under monopolistic competition while 
Hannan and Berger (1991), and Borio and Fritz (1995) viewed the industry as highly 
concentrated and oligopolistic. Whether under monopolistic or oligopolistic structure, 
imperfect competition in the banking industry confers on individual banks some 
measure of power to determine their prices. In this case, prices can be seen as 
administered rather than market determined so that customers are faced with prices as 
set by the firms and have no influence over it, indicating that firms have some 
measure of power over the clients (at least with respect to price). 
More realistically, the banking system can be described as oligopolistic given the 
finite number of firms at any point in time in the industry. This would in turn affect 
the size and speed of interest rate pass-through and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. It also raises question of how prices are set in an oligopolistic situation. The 
terms of entry into the banking industry is immensely relevant in oligopolistic pricing 
given the licensing prerequisite for operation; in effect creating barriers to entry. 
Sawyer (1983, 1985) and Stead et al. (1996) observed the existence of competing 
theories for an oligopolistic industry. Notably however are theories of the kinked 
model and the market leader model. In the kinked demand model, firms would be 
quick to reduce the price than to raise it with a view to attracting clients away from 
their competitors. The leadership model is based on the premise that firms do not bear 
equal weight in the industry so that the firm with the highest industrial weight dictates 
the pace (and has market power over clients and competitors).  
The reality may vary from country to country and from region to region. In many 
cases, rather than one bank, there may be a group of market leaders who direct the 
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pace. Hence, this group may represent those with sufficient liquidity while a group of 
followers may be seen as those with liquidity dearth. From equation 4.3, this 
categorisation would depend on the      term where   is expected to be large for the 
followers’ group. It is expected that the price charged by one bank would depend on 
that charged by others, and price decisions would take into account the perceived 
reactions of other banks. In the context of an oligopolistic banking industry, it may be 
argued that the expectations have built up that each bank will respond to a change in 
the policy rate (direct cost) but to a varying degree. Thus, while the group of followers 
would be less willing to raise prices and more willing to reduce them, the converse 
may be true for the group of market leaders. This implies that between these groups, 
kinked demand model can be applied differently. For the followers it would be in the 
form described by theory (negative asymmetry) while for the leaders it would kink 
outward showing positive asymmetry. The industrial demand curve would depend on 
the weight of the leaders’ group relative to the followers’ group and may have a 
positive, negative or zero kink, as the case may be. This generally indicates that banks 
have some measure of power at administering their own price so that they can change 
the level of their mark-up to meet their immediate objective. If banks possess market 
power over their customers then      and     would hold.  
The industries’ pricing behaviour implied by equation 4.1 can be derived from 
combining 4.2` with 4.7 and calculating the weighted average for the industry 
       ∑      ∑  (       )                                 (4.1`) 
where    is bank j’s industrial weight. The mark-up parameter contains essential 
information on the market power of the firms in the industry as larger values would 
indicate ability to usurp profit even if    . The ability of a bank (or the banking 
industry) to raise its margin depends on its ability to influence relative prices in the 
market without suffering adverse consequences. For the entire industry, this would to 
a large extent further depend on the availability of substitute and the degree of 
substitutability (with other non-bank financial products). The more highly 
differentiated the products are perceived the higher the ability of banks to change 
mark-up. By implication the degree of competition varies inversely with the spread 
between retail interest rates and cost of fund (Bredin et al., 2002). Biefang-Frisancho 
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Mariscal and Howells (2002) argued that the spread ( ) may be a more important 
parameter in the analysis of the interest rate pass-through as it reflects relative prices 
in the market. Though, this is true when comparing interest rates across different 
segments of the market, considering the effect of   in isolation may obscure the 
picture of how banks react to interest changes given the unidirectional relationship 
between pass-through and mark-up mentioned earlier.  
Generally, market power would portend a bank’s ability to affect both its mark-up and 
the pass-through parameter. This is reflected on the extent to which substitutes are 
available to the banks product, the elasticity of demand and the extent of symmetry of 
the bank’s response to changes in policy rate. Asymmetric response to monetary 
policy changes is indicative of market power (Hannan and Berger 1991; Espinosa-
Vega and Rebucci, 2003). This asymmetry may be with respect to product (segment of 
the market) or direction (sign) of change or both. Product asymmetry would occur 
when bank react differently with respect to deposit and lending rate while directional 
asymmetry would occur when the reaction differs depending on whether the change is 
positive or whether it is negative. Provided that banks have market power, both kinds 
of asymmetry may come into play concurrently. For instance, Hannan and Berger 
(1991) indicated that following a positive change in the base rate, all things being 
equal, banks may increase lending rate faster and to a higher degree than they would 
raise deposit rate. Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002) associated this 
asymmetry to the potency of monetary policy. According to them, “...monetary policy 
would be stronger if it could be made to operate upon the loan-deposit spread, rather 
than upon both individual rates equally” (p.574).  
Asymmetry would occur only in the case of inexact pass-through coefficient (i.e. 
where    ). This condition though necessary does not connote that all inexact pass-
through are asymmetric. However, it suggests that if pass-through is complete then 
any asymmetry disappears. By implication, assumption of complete pass-through 
simultaneously connotes symmetry. Figure 4.2 below depict (a)symmetry in the pass-
through in retail rates. The 45
0
 line      shows the case of complete (and symmetric) 
pass-through where a change in policy rate (   
  or    
 ) results in a commensurate 
(positive/negative) change in retail rates. Lines      (and      ) on the other hand 
illustrates symmetric but overshot (incomplete) pass-through. In the presence of 
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market power, as discussed above, banks may change retail rates to varying degree 
depending on whether the impulse is positive or negative. However, it is practically 
possible that pass-through to retail rate is incomplete, yet unequal for lending and 
deposit rate; and also possible that asymmetry occurs in event of overall overshoot.  
Figure 4.2: Asymmetry in Pass-through 
 
The chart in 4.2 nonetheless illustrates a scenario where banks may be more willing to 
raise lending than deposit rate following monetary tightening and less willing to 
reduce lending rate during policy ease vis-à-vis deposit rate. Hence, under asymmetric 
pass-through and in the presence of market power, the solid line      would represent 
a bank’s adjustment to lending rate in response to changes in policy rate. The broken 
line      captures deposit rate adjustments under this scenario. The kink in both lines 
is indicative of asymmetry around a zero threshold. Thus, if banks are able to utilise 
their market power to increase their profit then a tight policy change equivalent to    
  
would induce an increase in lending rate of    
  but only raise deposit rate by 
   
  where     
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would hold instead. Hence, when pass-through is asymmetric with respect to product, 
the change in policy rate would lie between the change in lending and deposit rate.  
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respectively; where    
         
  holds absolutely. Conversely, for deposit rate the 
condition would be such that    
         
  holds in absolute terms.  
For banks, market power and hence the ability to administer prices (on a take or leave 
it basis) would be closely related to their ability to supply loanable funds. In this 
regard, both internal factors (like liquidity) and external factors (like profitability) are 
critical. While liquidity would depend on the bank’s ability to generate needed funds 
and availability of such funds, profitability entails issues of risk perception and 
expected returns from a particular credit. Ordinarily therefore, a bank would make 
loan if it has loanable funds (or access to them), if the risk is low and if the expected 
returns are reasonable. As noted earlier, the level of liquidity a bank has is directly 
related to its market power and would include a bank’s reserves (i.e. vault cash plus 
deposit with the CB) and holdings of government (or other eligible) securities. Banks 
can source liquidity from depositors, the interbank market or the CB with deposits as 
the first resort and the CB as the last resort. Hence, banks with adequate liquidity 
would have more power at the interbank market vis-à-vis those with shortages and 
would dictate the prices at the market. Inadequate liquidity may also mean that such 
banks have insufficient holdings of government securities with which to borrow 
reserves from the CB. Consequently, institutions with liquidity dearth would, as a first 
resort, attempt to attract liquidity by making the interest rates on deposits more 
attractive and would therefore raise those rates. This narrows the loan-deposit spread 
and profit margin. By implication, market power (in the form of sufficient liquidity) 
enables a bank to maintain an ample profit margin; conversely for liquidity deficit.  
The level of liquidity, by affecting market power, would affect the pass-through in 
interest rates. This is illustrated in figure 4.3 which depicts pass-through to lending 
(deposit) rate as a positive (negative) function of liquidity. This implies that the 
negative relationship between pass-through and liquidity reported in the literature (for 
instance by Sørensen and Werner, 2006; and Gigineishvili, 2011) may in fact reflect 
the behaviour of interest earning instruments which would include savings or term 
deposits and government securities. As argued above, as a bank’s liquidity reduces it 
would raise deposit rates to attract more deposit in an attempt to maintain its market 
share. Consequently, following monetary tightening such banks would be more 
willing to raise deposit rate than lending rates thereby reducing profitability. 
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Deposit 
Rate 
Lending 
Rate 
Conversely, those with liquidity surfeit, owing to their market power, would increase 
their profitability by raising lending rates more than deposit rates. Without the 
influence of other outside forces, deposits would move from those with excess 
liquidity to those with shortage until equilibrium is established. However, depositors 
perceive bank’s with adequate liquidity as more solvent and healthier than those 
without. This would thus culminate in depositors keeping faith with the healthier 
banks where they are confident that their money (or life’s savings as the case may be) 
is safer. It can then be argued that depositors would rather accept low deposit rates 
rather than confront the risk of losing their entire (or part of their) savings. 
        Figure 4.3: Pass-through and Liquidity 
                                   
According to the chart above, product asymmetry between deposit and lending rates 
can be attributed to a bank’s liquidity profile. At liquidity level   , a bank would 
experience shortage and pass-through would be higher for deposit than lending rates. 
As liquidity position improves towards level   , the asymmetry begins to disappear. 
Banks operating at level     have liquidity surfeit and would be prone to raise lending 
rates by a greater proportion than deposit rates. Liquidity at level     in this case 
would represent the industrial weighted average so that banks operating at that level 
would have the tendency to maintain their profit margin and raise both deposit and 
lending rates equi-proportionally. If all banks cluster around the industrial average so 
that there is no clear market leader overall pass-through would be symmetric between 
lending and deposit rates in the banking system. Product (a)symmetry on an industrial 
scale would depend on the weight of market leaders (with sufficient liquidity) vis-à-
vis followers. From figure 4.3 this weight can be reflected by the distance of followers 
 
Product 
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 Liquidity 
(excess reserves) 𝜁  𝜁   𝜁  
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93 
 
 
 
(i.e. at point   ) and leaders (at    ) from the industrial average. The farther is    or     
from    the larger would be the respective weights of the followers’ and leaders’ 
groups in the industry. If the followers’ group outweighs the leaders then the 
asymmetry would be such that deposit rates would respond more than lending rates, 
while converse would hold if the leaders outweigh the followers. Pass-through in the 
banking system would be symmetric if both groups have equal weights in the industry. 
The behaviour of market leaders with sufficient liquidity can thus be represented by 
the solid line      in figure 4.2 while for those with shortages pricing behaviour 
would be consistent with the broken line      above.               
4.3 Determinants of Pass-Through: A Review of Theoretical 
Literature 
Given the role of market power in the analysis of pass-through and its significance for 
monetary policy it is apt to understand its determinants. While Biefang-Frisancho 
Mariscal and Howells (2002); Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003) emphasised the 
availability of alternative instrument (i.e. substitutes) as key the determinant of banks’ 
pricing behaviour, Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) and de Bondt (2002, 2005) noted 
the role of elasticity in the pass-through process. These factors, however, are mutually 
reinforcing given that they are offshoots of imperfect competition in the industry. The 
existence of substitutes directly affects the demand elasticity of a product and this 
elasticity increases with the degree of substitutability. Hence, the availability of 
substitutes increases elasticity and competition while reducing banks’ market power. 
This line of argument would suggest that the pass-through would depend on the extent 
to which the financial industry is diversified and depth of the market. Hannan and 
Berger (1991) argued that a lack of market contestability and a high degree of 
financial market underdevelopment limit the substitute for money and credit thereby 
affecting their respective elasticities and the overall monetary policy pass-through. 
The substitutes for money would include the securities, bonds, stocks and financial 
derivative products at the capital and money market. As argued above, contestability 
and competition within the industry would also depend on the liquidity and reserve 
position of individual institutions. Higher liquidity and reserve adequacy boost a 
bank’s power both at the interbank and the retail market. Hence, those institutions that 
are relatively well-off would tend to have more power than those that are deprived in 
usurping profits (and/or market share which in turn begets more power).   
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Market power may not adequately explain the interest rate adjustment behaviour of 
banks. The ability of these banks to transmit base rates changes to their customers 
depends to a large extent on the opportunity cost of making those adjustments. 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) separate these costs into pecuniary costs and non-
pecuniary costs. The former include those shoe leather costs, which are incurred 
directly during information search; and menu costs of adjusting prices, which may 
include costs of labour, computing and notification (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Kwapil 
and Scharler, 2006). The latter includes switching cost of losing clients after 
adjustment of rates and asymmetric information costs which heralds the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (de Bondt, 2005).
28
 In this case, a bank would only 
transmit the changes to its customers if the associated opportunity cost is less than the 
gain, otherwise the bank would absorb such changes. Hence, the existence of 
opportunity costs would increase the stickiness of banks’ retail rates. While pecuniary 
costs are explicit costs (that are displayed in banks’ profit and loss accounts) with 
short- to medium-term consequences, the non-pecuniary costs are implicit and may 
have medium- to long-term effects on banks’ profitability.  
According to Berger and Udell (1992) and Allen and Gale (2004), high switching 
costs would result in limited pass-through occasioned by “implicit contract between 
the bank and its customers, which arises as a consequence of long-term relationships” 
(Kwapil and Scharler, 2006, p.27). In order retain patronage, therefore, banks may be 
willing to protect their customers from adverse interest rate changes and from 
volatility that would arise from frequent adjustments of rate (Hofmann and Mizen, 
2004). In this case, banks absorb the shock and most of the related costs. These costs 
are termed switching costs and would be high if the bank and the customer have 
enjoyed long-term relationship, if the customer is considered a high net-worth client 
and if such customer conducts large or repeated transactions (de Bondt, 2004; Hannan 
and Berger, 1991; Kim et al. 2003; Sharpe, 1997). This cost is also expected to relate 
inversely with the proportion of new customers and directly with the proportion of 
                                            
28 Switching cost and asymmetric information costs can seem to be pecuniary costs as well since they may lead to 
loss of income/profits, even if these are difficult to compute. However, these are costs arising due to potential 
income foregone and are at best implicit costs. Hence, by pecuniary costs we mean explicit costs while non-
pecuniary costs are implicit costs.   
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prime customers. Loss of prime customers may affect banks’ profitability. Therefore, 
banks would rather shield such customers and bear the extra cost.
29
 
Costs arising from information asymmetry reflect the existence of risk and basically 
affect the setting of lending rate by banks. This typically is associated with the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Following a positive change in the 
base rate, banks may encounter these problems if they raise the lending rate. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and de Bondt (2002, 2005) noted that with increases in lending rate, 
banks may attract riskier clients and/or clients may opt for riskier ventures; thereby 
presenting the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively. By 
implication, increases in lending rate may result in higher likelihood of default and 
lower expected earnings on loans (de Bondt, op.cit; Borio and Fritz, 1995).  
To avert these problems and minimise their exposure to risks, Stiglitz and Weiss 
(op.cit) argued that banks would set their interest rate below equilibrium (i.e. the level 
of interest rate if pass-through was complete) and ration credit so that lending rate 
would be sticky upward and the interest rate pass-through would be incomplete. 
However, according to Sander and Kleimeier (2004) when high risk is perceived, 
rather than ration credit, banks may compensate for this by raising lending rate more 
than proportionately (overshoot the pass-through so that     ). In doing so, banks 
may partition borrowers according to their perceived riskiness so that a premium is 
charged on risk-prone borrowers. Hence, the spread between the loan rate charged to 
prime customers and that charged to riskier borrowers may be an indication of the 
degree of risk perception in the two segments of the market. While prime customers 
may be protected from frequent rate changes, the costs arising thereof from may be 
transferred to other customers. Thus, the effect of switching cost may not be fully 
borne by banks.       
Another related factor that may affect monetary policy pass-through is the general risk 
perception of the banks (Borio and Fritz, 1995). This is slightly different from those 
                                            
29 It can be argued that since cost change affects all banks (and if banks believe that others are in a similar situation 
as themselves, then they would expect one another to behave alike so that each bank changes its interest rates and) 
relative prices would change very little. However, it can be counter-argued that while banks may behave alike with 
respect to the ordinary customers, thereby leaving relative prices unchanged, they may be more willing to offer 
concessionary rates to high net-worth customers in order to retain their services or attract them away from their 
current banker. In this case, individual banks would be willing to bear the switching cost rather than raise their rate 
and lose the custom to a competitor. If all banks behave in this way, we can assume that the banking system would 
bear some switching cost. 
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associated with asymmetric information. Gropp et al. (2007) categorised this into 
credit risk – reflecting the risk of loan default; interest rate risk – arising from the 
mismatch of the demand for long-term loan and supply of short-term deposit; and 
liquidity risk – due to inadequate capacity to fulfil deposit withdrawal. Accordingly, 
the higher these risks the lower the pass-through and the larger the spread between 
lending and base rates (Gropp et al., op.cit).   
The degree of anticipated persistence of changes to the base rate also affects the 
adjustment of retail rates (Borio and Fritz, 1995; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; Wang 
and Lee, 2009). Anticipated persistence and expectations generally mute the pass-
through of monetary policy. First, owing to the various costs of adjustment, if banks 
perceive that a change in the base rate is a one-off occurrence, they may absorb the 
impact and protect their (prime) customers. Banks would only have the incentive to 
adjust their prices if they anticipate successive changes in the same direction. Such 
adjustment may be made with a view to minimising cost “by pre-empting the full 
increase or by catching-up with the official rate after the event” (Hoffman and Mizen, 
2004, p.101). Anticipatory increase in this way assumes that banks have adequate 
information regarding the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, in the presence of 
rational expectations, banks may under-adjust their rates since base rate changes may 
have been built into their prices already (Wang and Lee, 2009, Bredin et al., 2002).    
Other factors that affect the pass-through process include structure of the market and 
the level of financial development (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Borio and Fritz, 1995; 
Ozdemir, 2009; Gigineishvili, 2011), and cyclical factors (Borio and Fritz, 1995; 
Bredin et al., 2002). According to Hannan and Berger (1991) and Ozdemir (2009), 
more developed markets are expected to have a variety of financial products and 
derivatives so that there is increased substitutability and higher competition among 
various sources and/or uses of funds. Invariably, the degree of financial development 
should relate directly with the degree of pass-through. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
affirmed that low levels of financial development reduce the size of pass-through in 
the economy while Gropp et al. (2007) argued that financial innovation increases the 
speed of pass-through. However, Gropp’s perspective on financial innovation may be 
seen by some as counter-intuitive. Arguably, innovations would be expected to further 
the degree of product differentiation while reducing substitutability and cross-
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elasticity of product. Thus, innovation can be seen to foster market power which 
inadvertently would then retard the pass-through process or lead to asymmetric pass-
through. Nonetheless, and in fact, innovation can intensify competition in the industry 
(if every institution continues to develop attractive product and/or innovation is 
systemic). In this case financial innovation would expand alternatives and increase 
substitutability thereby supporting Gropp’s argument. In reality, banks financial 
innovation tends to occur on a systemic basis so that the industry becomes 
increasingly sophisticated and developed. On the issue of cyclical factors, Borio and 
Fritz (op.cit) and Bredin et al. (op.cit) stated that banks may be less willing to transmit 
interest rate changes during economic recession vis-à-vis boom. Indeed, Gropp et al. 
(op.cit) found that business cycle have an asymmetric effect on pass-through.  
The importance of all these factors may differ between individual banks and the entire 
industry. Market power would be important both for individual banks and the industry. 
Based on the models of oligopolistic pricing discussed earlier, pass-through would be 
affected by the structure of the banking industry – number of banks, degree of 
collusion between them, etc. This would affect how banks compete within the industry. 
The banking industry would also be seen to compete with other non-bank financial 
institutions so that market power, both intra- and inter-industry, would be important 
for the process of pass-through. As a result, opportunity costs like the switching cost 
may affect the banking industry as a whole given the possible competition from the 
non-bank institutions. Other costs like information asymmetry costs and the associated 
risks would apply on a micro level; the impact of which may cancel out and become 
insignificant for the industry as a whole. Degree of anticipated persistence of the 
change, expectations, financial development and the cyclical factors would be 
expected to affect the banking system as a whole and as such would affect the average 
pass-through of the policy rate.    
4.4 The Atypical Case of Developing Countries 
Pass-through is expected to vary across countries and regions depending on the level 
of financial and/or economic development of a country (Masih and Hamda, 2008). As 
observed in chapter two, institutional arrangements and country idiosyncrasies have a 
significant effect on policy effectiveness. All other things assumed equal therefore, the 
degree and pattern of monetary policy pass-through would be higher in advanced 
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countries (with more developed/sophisticated financial market and are characterised 
by regular tranches of systemic financial innovations) than in less developed countries 
with weak and largely rudimentary financial markets (Weeks, 2009; 2010). In 
developed market, contestability and substitutability is higher between bank and non-
bank financial instruments than in less developed ones (Gigineishvili, 2011). This has 
implication for (average) pass-through in the entire banking industry. To demonstrate 
this, we begin by re-writing equation 4.1` to depict the average (banking system) 
interest rate as  
   ∑  (       )  (  
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)                        (4.1``) 
where    and      represent banking system’s own (average) elasticity and cross 
elasticity vis-à-vis non-bank financial products. In advanced countries with developed 
market, elasticities and interdependence (  )  are expected to be higher than in 
developing market due to a dearth of alternatives in the latter. This connotes low 
substitutability in developing countries, so that the banking system may have more 
power over clients than in advanced countries. Thus, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy would depend on both inter- and intra-industry competition as well as on the 
viability of the market for securities.  
The argument can be elucidated by allowing the mark-up component of equation 4.1`` 
to vary with the base rate (consistent with discussions preceding equation 4.2``). 
Accordingly, equation 4.1`` can be expressed as   
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which yields the banking system average pass-through as  
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Combining this with 4.7 and re-arranging after applying the relevant weights implies 
that 
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The term (     ⁄ )  (   ( )⁄ )  is an elasticity measure which captures the 
responsiveness of banks’ market power to policy rate. Hence, the ability of the 
banking system to adjust its mark-up following a change in the policy rate depends on 
the dynamics of own- and cross-elasticity. In developed countries, interdependence 
between banks and non-bank financial institutions is expected to be high so that with 
stiff competition the banking system does not gain market power. Elasticity would in 
this case be high and may even be increasing. Therefore, we can expect that the 
condition       be satisfied among developed countries. In countries with 
underdeveloped financial market, we would expect that the inability of non-bank 
institutions to compete with the banking system in the market increases the power of 
banks generally. Hence,       would be expected to hold in developing countries. 
This would lead to a further reduction in the value of     and as bank products become 
less elastic the market power of banks continues to rise. Lack of inter-industry 
competition may be due to the institutional features of a country especially with 
regards to licensing, legislation and the mandate of the financial institutions. For 
instance, in Nigeria while banks are licensed to venture into any type of financial 
business (under the universal banking law), other financial institutions are restricted 
on the kind of business they can venture into. Hence, the banking industry would 
always have the competitive edge over other providers of financial services. This then 
increase their power over both competitors and customers.   
In many developing countries like those of sub-Saharan Africa, the dearth of viable 
and/or admissible instruments/securities further compounds this problem. This is 
reflected in the excessive dominance of the market for government securities. For 
instance, in Nigeria, FGN bond accounts for 94.8 per cent share of the bond market, 
while corporate bonds accounts for a paltry 0.48 per cent (VETIVA, 2010). This does 
not only limit the functioning of the financial market it also expands the power of 
banks in another direction. Banks may have other avenues to earn profit (returns) 
rather than from lending. Particularly in developing countries, these banks may prefer 
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negligible risk to higher returns and ration credit in a way which is unrelated to the 
problem of adverse selection. Even when lending portends low risks banks may opt 
for risk-free income in the form of government securities. Thus, given the viability of 
the market for government securities and its risk-free nature, banks in developing 
countries are rather more willing to hold government securities even at low yield than 
to lend to the private sector at a higher rate (Weeks, 2009; 2010). Since FGN bonds 
may not respond to policy in the same measure as corporate bonds, owing partly to 
market underdevelopment, the pass-through process would be impeded. Due to the 
dominance of a segment of the financial market by some operators, therefore, 
imperfect competition would also affect the pass-through process. In the Nigerian 
banking sector, twenty four DMBs (commercial banks) account for over 95 per cent of 
entire financial market, while only ten banks account for over 70 per cent of the 
banking sector (CBN, 2008b). This oligopolistic structure has considerable 
implication for the entire monetary policy process. As banks become more powerful 
vis-à-vis the customers, the elasticities for loans and deposits declines and banks can 
alter the level of mark-up without deterring profitability.   
4.5 Quantitative Estimates of Pass-through 
The preceding sections generally imply that the pattern of interest rate pass-through in 
any economy depends on the structure and nature of that country’s financial system 
over time. In many developing countries, like Nigeria, the banking system dominates 
the financial system – engaging in both core intermediation and non-core financial 
services (Gigineishvili, 2011). However, Heffernan (2002), IMF (2008), and Fuertes 
and Heffernan (2009) indicate that non-bank financial institutions play key roles in 
developed countries, as banks withdraw from core intermediation activities and 
increasingly engage in market financing. The resultant imperfectly competitive 
financial system accords firms some market power in determining their price. 
Studying the UK, Heffernan (op.cit), provided evidence of significantly high 
administrative cost – i.e. mark-up – in a monopolistically competitive financial system 
where pricing behaviour is product dependent, and non-identical for lending and 
deposit rates. The extent of market competition (and the associated market power), as 
we discussed earlier, have implications for the size and symmetry of pass-through 
across products, markets or countries/regions. 
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Quantitative evidence of the effect of competition on pass-through is provided by 
Heffernan (op.cit) and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008).
30
 Investigating eight Euro-area 
countries, van Leuvensteijn et al. (op.cit) estimated retail market pass-through within 
the range 0.06-1.34 and found that competition increases the lending rates pass-
through coefficient by about 0.05 points but lowers the deposit rates pass-through by 
approximately 0.2 points. Comparably, Heffernan (op.cit) showed that declining 
competiveness between 1989 and 1998 reduced the UK mortgage market pass-through 
by about 0.1 points to a range of 0.71-0.85. UK savings deposits, however, recorded 
an increase of about 0.14 points to a range of 0.63-0.70 indicating better market 
contestability for reserves and liquidity. In a cross-country study, Gigineishvili (2011) 
showed that improved liquidity position lowers lending rate pass-through by 0.32 
points. Generally, while the degree of competition and market power affects banks’ 
pricing behaviour, the size of the estimated pass-through varies across countries and 
study. A survey of these estimates (in table 4.1) generally indicates heterogeneity of 
interest rate pass-through among countries; and a considerable difference between 
advanced and developing countries.         
For developed countries, Borio and Fritz (1995), Greenwood-nimmo et al. (2010), 
IMF (2008) and Kaufmann and Scharler (2006) investigated the heterogeneity of pass-
through between the USA and Europe and recorded higher coefficients for the USA.  
For instance, Kaufmann and Scharler (op.cit) provided estimates of lending rate pass-
through for nine Euro-area countries and the USA ranging from 0.23 (for Portugal) to 
0.92 (for the USA) with a Euro-area pass-through of 0.48. Similarly, Greenwood-
nimmo et al. (2010) estimated long-run pass-through within 0.29-0.62 for Germany 
and 0.60-1.64 for USA. The heterogeneity in the pass-through between the USA and 
the Euro-area was attributed to the dissimilarities in the financial structure of both 
groups – where a vibrant capital market deepens competition in the USA but the bank 
dominated European financial system is less competitive. The findings in IMF (2008) 
did not only confirm the heterogeneity between the USA and the Euro-area, but 
indicated that the pass-through coefficient has weakened over the years (especially in 
the USA) – thus, undermining the transmission of monetary policy less certain. This is 
due mainly to the financial crisis reinforced by the changing structure of financial 
                                            
30 Detailed discussion of empirically issues in pass-through is provided in chapter 5.  
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system given the rising importance of “near-bank” financial institutions in financial 
intermediation and increased focus of banks on non-core (and less reliable) market 
financing – away from core deposit mobilisation  (IMF, op.cit). 
Table 4.1: Summary of the Empirical Estimates of Pass-through 
Authors 
Country/ 
Region 
Deposit Rate Lending rate 
Pass-through  
Complete 
Asymmetric 
Pass-through 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Advanced Economies 
Borio and Fritz (1995) 
USA; 
EU; 
- - 0.11-1.03 0.70-1.27 NO YES NO 
Kaufmann and Scharler 
(2006) 
USA; 
Euro-area - - 0.23-0.92 - NO - YES 
IMF (2008) 
USA; 
Euro-area 0.06-0.21 0.97-1.66 0.09-0.51 0.24-2.35 NO YES YES 
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. 
(2010) 
USA; 
Germany 
- - - 0.29-1.64 - - YES 
Aggelis (2005) Euro-area 0.07-0.12 0.67-1.01 0.13-0.48 0.39-1.02 NO YES - 
de Bondt (2002) Euro-area 0.01-0.47 0.18-0.76 0.08-0.55 0.61-1.04 NO YES - 
de Bondt (2005) Euro-area 0.02-0.35 0.35-0.98 0.13-0.54 0.92-1.53 NO YES YES 
Sander and Kleimeier (2004) Euro-area 0.10-0.45 0.25-0.80 0.25-0.45 0.65-0.75 NO NO - 
van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) Euro-area - 0.06-0.99 - 0.41-1.34 - - - 
Liu et al. (2008) 
New 
Zealand 
0.43 0.83-0.91 0.19-0.93 0.15-1.12 YES YES NO 
Burgstaller and Scharler 
(2010) 
UK - - 0.22-0.36 0.80-0.85 NO YES - 
Heffernan (1997) UK 0.21-0.53 0.48-0.97 0.17-0.53 0.93-1.02 NO YES - 
Hoffman and Mizen (2004) UK 0.15-0.78 1.00 0.13-0.25 0.81-0.91 NO YES YES 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2003) 
OECD 0.27-1.13 0.60-1.00 0.18-0.86 0.24-1.00 NO YES - 
Emerging/Developing Economies 
Égert et al (2007) CEE - 0.01-0.95 - 0.07-1.28 - NO - 
Cas et al. (2011) CLA - - 0.05-0.80 0.22-1.19 NO NO - 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2003) 
Chile 0.19-0.68 0.39-0.68 0.18-0.63 0.45-0.88 NO YES - 
Kovanen (2011) Ghana 0.06-0.31 0.71-1.09 0.08-0.31 0.64-1.16 NO NO - 
Zulkhibri (2012) Malaysia 0.02-0.29 0.33-1.12 0.01-0.09 0.17-1.00 NO NO YES 
Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) 
South  
Africa 
0.01-0.81 0.49-1.03 0.40-1.00 0.93-1.04 NO YES YES 
Amarasekara (2005) Sri Lanka 0.01-0.05 0.06-0.37 0.51 0.76-0.81 NO NO - 
Ozdemir (2009) Turkey 0.23-0.45 1.05 0.26-0.74 1.19 NO YES NO 
Notes:  (1) CLA represents Central and Latin America. 
            (2) CEE is Central and Eastern European Countries 
This heterogeneity is not only between the Euro-area and USA but also among Euro-
area countries and between products. For instance, Bernhofer and van Treeck (2011) 
estimated lower pass-through coefficients of 0.11-1.06 for deposit rates vis-à-vis 0.18-
1.57 for lending rates, which ranged from 0.11 in Spain to 1.57 in Finland. For the UK, 
Burgstaller and Scharler (2010), Hoffman and Mizen (2004), and Heffernan (1997), 
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respectively, documented the lending rate pass-through as 0.22-0.36, 0.13-0.25 and 
0.17-0.53 in the short-run but 0.80-0.85, 0.81-0.91 and 0.48-1.02 in the long-run. 
Their estimates were usually larger for lending rates than deposit rates. 
Comparing Chile with a group of advanced economies, Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2003) documented homogeneity in the estimated coefficients. However, in a cross-
country analysis, Gigineishvili (2011) showed that pass-through was about 0.12 points 
lower for developing countries vis-à-vis advanced countries. Some country specific 
studies also indicated lower pass-through. For instance, in Sri Lanka, Amarasekara 
(2005) found sluggish and incomplete pass-through ranging from 0.01-0.51 in the 
short-run to 0.06-0.81 in the long-run. Kovanen (2011) estimated pass-through in 
Ghana and found incomplete coefficients both in the short- and long-run as 0.06-0.31 
and 0.64-1.19, respectively. The observed sluggishness and incomplete pass-through 
in developing countries were attributed mainly to a non-competitive financial system 
and inelasticity of demand for banking products. 
4.6 Implications of Inexact Pass-Through for Monetary Policy 
Under the NCM, monetary policy is conducted with the notion that pass-through is 
complete. Hence, the momentum of a change in policy rate would be maintained in 
the retail/market rates until it impacts on real economic variables. Inexactness in this 
momentum during transmission may result to a missed target. Thus, the degree of 
interest rate pass-through has important implications for the economy. While 
excessive pass-through would expose the economy to increased volatility, limited 
pass-through can be seen to shield the economy from volatile interest rates and interest 
rate shocks (Kwapil and Scharler, 2006; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004). In the case of 
limited pass-through, if banks protect their long-standing clients from frequent interest 
changes, the effects of financial market shocks on economic agents are moderated.  
However, in situations where loan interest rates are variable and fully based on the 
policy rate, volatilities (or changes) in policy are fully reflected in the lending rate so 
that pass-through is complete. According to Kwapil and Scharler (op.cit) this 
argument may be more applicable in bank-based economics vis-à-vis market-based 
ones. This is because in bank-based economies, the retail interest rate (which may 
have some elements of prime customers’ protection) would bear a substantially high 
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weight in the economy while in market-based economy money (and capital) market 
returns would be considered more important. However, inexact pass-through 
diminishes the power of monetary policy since the effects of policy-induced 
adjustments in the base rate on the real economy are either muted (for incomplete) or 
exaggerated (for overshoot) (Kwapil and Scharler, op.cit; Hoffman and Mizen, op.cit; 
Ozdemir, 2009; Wang and Lee, 2009). Hence, inexact pass-through poses a significant 
threat to the determinacy of optimal policy actions.  
Any monetary policy (or policy rule) which seeks to use interest rates to influence 
level of demand, rate of inflation or asset prices would face this problem of 
indeterminacy. For instance, under the Taylor rule, given a CB’s reaction function and 
the associated Taylor principle, limited pass-through or inadequate knowledge of it 
may lead the CB to adjust base rate incorrectly.
31
 The Taylor rule is built on the 
assumption that the pass-through from policy to retail rates is complete. If this 
assumption is violated (and pass-through is for instance incomplete) then the CB may 
have to increase the policy rate by even more than proportionately to have any effect 
on the real economy (Kwapil and Scharler, op.cit). There is, however, the risk that this 
more than proportionate change may lead to indeterminate equilibrium and economic 
instability. For instance, an excessive tighten of monetary conditions aimed at 
combating inflation may put pressure on the real sector thereby exacerbating recession, 
unemployment and inflation volatility (Liu et al., 2008). Hence, by altering the Taylor 
principle, incomplete pass-through affects the trade-off between inflation and output 
in an economy. This may derail the stabilising role of monetary policy while making it 
to be more accommodating to inflation (Kwapil and Scharler, op.cit). The converse 
can also be argued for pass-through overshoot. In this case, an inadequate tightening 
of policy may end up not having the desired effect on AD and inflation thus rendering 
the policy ineffective. Further tightening in an attempt to correct this may exert undue 
pressure on the economy tipping it into recession. 
Rather than assume complete pass-through, adequate knowledge of it is essential for 
an NCM-type monetary policy to effectively combat inflation. If pass-through is 
known to be complete for any particular economy, then ceteris paribus, the NCM may 
                                            
31 The Taylor principle states policy rate should rise by more than one-to-one in response to inflationary pressure. 
In other words, following a one percentage point rise in inflation rate CBs should raise the short-term nominal 
interest rate by more than one percentage point in order to ensure a stable equilibrium. 
105 
 
 
 
have the desired effect depending also on other features of that economy. Inexact 
pass-through (or the inadequate knowledge of it) does not only affect the size of 
impact but may also affect the relationship between inflation and economic growth; 
hence, the cost of disinflation. Given that under the NCM the CB’s primary objective 
is price-stability (and output growth is considered secondary), policy would always 
focus on the expected effect on inflation with less consideration for the real economy. 
When pass-through is limited, the CB may change the policy rate more than 
proportionate to the Taylor principle, thereby reducing output by more than 
commensurate with inflation. If on the other hand pass-through is excessive, policy 
rate may be changed in line with the Taylor principle but the overshoot means that 
output would still fall by more than is necessary. It is important to note that the 
relationship between output and inflation is nonlinear (though the NCM 
representations suggests linearity) so that the cost of disinflation would depend on the 
current level of economic growth and amount by which it is changed. Sizeable 
pressures on output which can emanate from inexact pass-through, given the 
aforementioned nonlinearity, would increase the cost of disinflation.      
The existence of asymmetry in the pass-through process also would have implication 
for policy. As noted earlier, asymmetry may be in terms of product or policy stance. In 
the presence of asymmetry, CBs may need to change policy rate by a different amount 
depending on whether policy is easing or tightening. This implies that the Taylor 
principle would again be violated in one or both policy stances. Besides, considering 
that some economies may be savings-driven while others are credit-driven, product 
asymmetry may lead to wrong outcomes of policy targets. Assuming that the tenets of 
the NCM with regards to inflation being an AD phenomenon is correct, then the 
ability of a CB to control inflation would be hinged on its influence on consumption 
and investment decisions of economic agents. In credit-driven economies, it would be 
the case that a large proportion of agents maintain bank credit either for consumption 
or investment purposes so that changes in lending rates affect AD significantly. In 
savings-led economies, economic agents (especially households) consume from 
savings rather than from credits. Consequently, changes in deposit rate would 
determine inter-temporal consumption behaviour and AD. Thus, widening of the loan-
deposit rate spread, following a change in base rate, might make policy more effective 
if the economy is relatively credit-driven but would worsen outcome if the economy 
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was savings-driven. Narrowing of the spread may be more relevant for savings-led 
economies.  
4.7 Conclusion  
The effectiveness of monetary policy under the NCM would at the first instance 
depend on the degree of interest rate pass-through. This subsequently depends on 
liquidity and elasticities as well as competition within the banking sector and that 
between the sector and entire financial industry. Inexact pass-through (and adequate 
knowledge of it) automatically undermines the effectiveness of monetary policy. In 
many developing countries with weak and rudimentary financial market, pass-through 
would be far from complete and may even be asymmetric. Thus, in these countries, 
monetary policy under the NCM may not only be ineffective and complicated but may 
also result to an increasing cost of disinflation. Again, product asymmetry may be 
important depending on whether the economy is credit- or savings-driven. For a 
credit-based economy, asymmetry which widens the loan-deposit rate spread, 
following monetary policy tightening, would make policy more effective while for a 
savings-led economy policy would be effective if the spread is narrowed. 
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5: INTEREST RATE CHANNEL OF MONETARY 
POLICY: ANALYSIS OF THE PASS-THROUGH 
IN NIGERIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The transmission of monetary policy to the final objective occurs in different stages 
and over various channels. Key among these channels is the interest rate channel 
which “transmits changes in policy rates to [retail] rates via the money markets” 
(Gigineishvili, 2011, p.4).  Hence, the interest rate channel can be broken down with 
respect to the link between policy and market (or interbank) rate, on the one hand and 
between market and retail rates on the other hand. At each stage, the pass-through in 
these interest rates is usually assumed to be complete; thus, implying that 100 per cent 
of the changes in policy rate is reflected in the response rates. Effectiveness of the 
interest rate channel requires that pass-through is not only complete but relatively fast, 
as a quicker response rate reduces the overall response lag of monetary policy. This 
channel is believed to be dominant in countries with advanced and sophisticated 
financial market vis-à-vis those with underdeveloped markets (Gigineishvili, op.cit). 
Thus, for developing countries with weak and rudimentary financial markets monetary 
policy, via this channel, may be less effective (Weeks, 2009; 2010).   
In Nigeria, the interbank market is considered focal in the monetary policy process. 
The CBN regularly monitors the interest rates in this market to surmise developments 
in the retail market and the economy. Hence, efforts are continually made by the CBN 
to anchor the interbank rate to the policy rate. For instance, the reform of the monetary 
policy framework in December 2006 was undertaken in this respect. An offshoot of 
this reform was the creation of lending and deposit facilities at the CBN which 
bounded the policy rate from above and below, respectively, with a view to making 
the interbank market more attractive to banks. A necessary condition for monetary 
policy effectiveness, therefore, is an adequate link between policy and retail rates via 
the interbank. The dynamics of pass-through in the short- and long-run and the 
associated response lags also have implications for monetary policy effectiveness. 
Under the interest rate channel, the pass-through from policy rate may differ over time, 
between rates, markets, maturities and depend on the direction of the policy change. 
5 
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The size and speed of pass-through may vary inter-temporally so that at some points 
in time, monetary policy may be more effective than at others. Hence, the purpose of 
this chapter is to investigate the pattern of pass-through in Nigeria starting from 
policy-to-market (cum policy-to-retail) and subsequently market-to-retail rates. The 
methodologies adopted include the autoregressive distrusted lag models (ARDL) and 
the state-space analysis which allowed the concurrent determination of the size, speed, 
and time-path of the interest rate pass-through in the short- and long-run. The ARDL 
is used, in line with the standard literature, to investigate the linearity and nonlinearity 
in the pass-through process both in the short- and the long-run. However, unlike other 
studies in the literature which rely solely on structural dummies to examine the 
possible changes in pass-through over time, this study uses the state-space modelling 
approach to estimate the course of pass-through over the sample period. Empirical 
investigation is conducted to capture the practicalities of monetary policy in Nigeria 
using monthly data, which at the longest covered the period 1985:M1 to 2011:M1 for 
all interest rates except for the interbank rate which spanned the period 1996:M1-
2011:M1. Eleven interest rates variables are mostly utilised, including the policy rate, 
the interbank rate, two lending rates, and seven different deposit rates. A proxy to 
capture financial (under)development is also included in the analysis. 
In general, the results suggest that the link between interbank and retail rates is weak 
(given the low pass-through) while pass-through from policy rate is higher, thereby 
supporting the findings of Sanders and Kleimeier (2004). Short-run pass-through is 
also found to be more sluggish than its long-run counterpart, which was consistent 
with the findings of Mojon (2000), de Bondt (2002, 2005) and Gropp et al. (2007) 
among others. In addition, we find downward structural shifts in the long-run pass-
through and a persistent decline in the short-run pass-through over time. In fact, the 
introduction of the interbank market, in 1996, heralded a decline in pass-through 
thereby suggesting that transmission of monetary policy had been debilitated. The 
declining size of pass-through indicated reducing potency of policy both in size and in 
response lag (determined by the means adjustment lag) and can be attributable to 
financial underdevelopment and the considerable market power of commercial banks. 
Significant market power can be deduced from the asymmetry found between lending 
and deposit rate, and between positive and negative changes. The results show that not 
only is pass-through higher for lending rates vis-à-vis deposit rates, they also exhibit 
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positive long-run asymmetry in lending while deposit rates respond symmetrically. 
Thus, banks are more willing to raise lending rates following monetary policy 
tightening and less willing to lower them when rates fall thereby ensuring non-
reducible profit mark-up. 
These findings may imply ineffectiveness in the conduct of monetary policy given that 
the CBN attempts to influence retail rates via the interbank market in the short-term. 
Nonetheless, while the inability of the interbank to anchor retail rates may weaken the 
transmission mechanism, the considerable adverse effects of the market power of 
commercial banks in price determination may deteriorate it further. This may be 
reflective of the inadvertent exclusion of non-bank private sector from the money 
market and the dearth of viable securities and instruments in the market. In essence, 
given the weak market-to-retail (vis-à-vis policy-to-retail) pass-through, the CBN may 
need to de-emphasise the focus on the interbank market as it is more-or-less redundant 
in the monetary policy transmission process and focus directly on the retail rates. 
There is also the need to reduce market power by ensuring enhanced depth of financial 
markets (so that all players and agents have considerable access to the market) and 
that there is a wide array of instruments and securities to choose from.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, section two 
reviews the empirical literature with respect to issues, methodologies and findings. 
Data and stylised facts about the relevant interest rates, in Nigeria, are presented in 
section three. Section four specifies the empirical model to be analysed and expounds 
our methodology as well as econometric framework. In section five, empirical 
analysis of the results are conducted, presented and discussed while section six 
contains the conclusion.      
5.2 Empirical Literature 
Monetary policy changes can be transmitted to retail rate over two phases: first is the 
policy-to-market; then the market-to-retail pass-through (de Bondt, 2005). 
Investigations of the patterns of interest pass-through in the literature have tended to 
concentrate on either one or both of these phases. Hannan and Berger (1991), 
Hoffman and Mizen (2004), Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002, 2010), 
Aggelis (2005), Amarasekara (2009), Greenwood- Nimmo et al. (2010), and 
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Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) examined pass-through directly from policy rate to 
money market and retail rates of various maturities. However, de Bondt (2002), 
Bredin et al. (2002), Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003), Kwapil and Scharler (2006), 
Sørensen and Werner (2006), Liu et al. (2008), and Wang and Lee (2009) focused on 
the pass-through from money market to retail rate. Borio and Fritz (1995), Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004), and de Bondt (2005) estimated and compared the pass-through in 
both phases of the process. While many of these studies documented enormous 
evidences of interest rate stickiness, the findings nonetheless indicated considerable 
heterogeneity with regards to maturity structure, market segment, country etc. 
Comparing both phases in the Euro area, Sander and Kleimeier (op.cit) found that 
pass-through from policy rate was generally higher than that from market rates. For 
Sri Lanka, Amarasekara (op.cit) documented a fast and near complete pass-through 
from policy rate to money market rate. A similar result was derived for the Euro area 
by de Bondt (2005) who found significantly high (in some cases complete) pass-
through from policy to retail rates via short-term money market rate while the pass-
through from long-term money market rate was somewhat lower. This, he stated, 
indicated that monetary policy fully controls the short-end of the yield curve 
A comparable study on interest rates of various maturities in New Zealand was 
conducted by Liu et al. (2008) in which they found faster and higher degree of pass-
through to short-term rates than for long-term rates. In contrast, Kwapil and Scharler 
(2006) found short-term sluggishness in deposit rates across the Euro area vis-à-vis 
long-term rates. This result has implications for monetary policy. Monetary policy is 
usually designed to affects both ends of the market; it is nonetheless assumed to 
impact quickly on the short-end of the market while it affects the long-end more 
slowly. Whereas household decisions are expected to be influenced by instruments of 
short-term maturities investments are largely determined by long-term rates. Biefang-
Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002) argued that for monetary policy to be 
effective it should affect the relative prices of money, loan and bonds which 
eventually influence savings, consumption and investment. They found that increases 
in the official rate widened the spread between short-term lending and bonds rates but 
had no significant effect on the spread between bond and deposit rate. 
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The speed and size of pass-through may vary between the short-run and the long-run. 
The lag in the impact of policy changes is a function of the rate at which these changes 
are conveyed to the money and financial markets. Monetary policy would be more 
effective if it had huge and immediate effect on the retail interest rates. More 
importantly even if pass-through is not complete in the short-run (i.e. immediate pass-
through), effectiveness requires that it be fast and complete in the long-run. Empirical 
studies in the literature provide diverse results on the rate of pass-through in the short- 
and long-run. For instance, while Mojon (2000), Gropp et al. (2007) and Aggelis 
(2005) found short-run stickiness, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) using both the 
monetary policy and the cost of funds approach documented long-run rigidity vis-à-vis 
the short-run though pass-through was limited in both horizons. Other studies 
including Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002), de Bondt (2002, 2005), 
Aggelis (2005), Ozdemir (2009), Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010), and Aziakpono 
and Wilson (2010) are almost unanimous in their finding of higher pass-through in the 
long-run compared to the short-run. According to Kwapil and Scharler (2006), this 
implies “that the adjustment of retail rates to changes in [base] rate does need some 
time and does not occur instantaneously” (p.30). This notwithstanding, long-run pass-
through was scarcely found to be complete in these studies suggesting that banks may 
indeed be insulating their clients from interest rate volatility. 
Whether in the short- or long-run, monetary policy may have different effects on the 
cost of borrowing vis-à-vis money’s own rate so that pass-through would differ in 
retail market between deposit and lending rates. Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and 
Howells (2002) studied the ability of policy to alter relative prices in the form of loan-
deposit spread. They found that following an interest rate hike, the spread between 
lending and deposit rate widened indicating that lending rate responded more than 
deposit rate. This is comparable to the findings of Hoffman and Mizen (2004), de 
Bondt (2005), Sørensen and Werner (2006), Gropp et al. (2007), Ozdemir (2009), and 
Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) who also found evidence of higher pass-through to 
lending rate compared to deposit rate. This may be indicative of market power as 
banks are able to increase their profit by raising the mark-up of loan-deposit rate. The 
contrast may be the case in Malaysia as Zulkhibri (2012) found higher stickiness of 
the lending rate vis-à-vis deposit rate, though pass-through was limited for all retail 
rates.  
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A strand of the theoretical literature suggested that in order not to lose their patronage, 
banks would insulate elite customers from interest volatility while passing the cost to 
ordinary and lower-grade clients. Yet another bloc argued that, owing to risk 
perception, banks may prefer not to raise lending rate so as to prevent the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Empirical evidence from Bredin et al. (2000) and 
Amarasekara (2009) indicated that for Ireland and Sri Lanka, respectively, pass-
through was higher for prime lending rates than for all other retail rates. Similarly, 
Kwapil and Scharler (2006) showed that for the Euro-area the lending rate to 
businesses was adjusted more than the interest rate on household loans. Thus, banks 
may actually increase their expected earnings by raising the interest rate on less risky 
and better secured loans to credit worthy customers while rationing loans to 
households and non-premium customers. 
Monetary policy may have different effects on the retail rates depending on whether 
the policy rate was adjusted upward (contractionary) or downward (expansionary). 
Asymmetric response had been studied in the literature in terms of size of adjustment 
(Greenwood-Nimmo et al., 2010), probability of adjustment (Hannan and Berger, 
1991) and speed of adjustment (Borio and Fritz, 1995; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 2003; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; and Liu et al., 2008). 
Expectedly banks would be more likely to raise lending rate faster than deposit rates 
following monetary tightening and behave conversely during monetary ease; thus, 
widening the loan-deposit rate spread. While this is intuitively plausible, studies like 
Borio and Fritz (1995), Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003), Liu et al. (2008), 
Amarasekara (2009), and Ozdemir (2009) found no statistically significant evidence 
of asymmetry in the speed of adjustment in retail rates following a change in the base 
rate. Comparing the USA with nine Asian countries, Wang and Lee (2009), however, 
reported asymmetry in eight countries including the USA.  
Other studies that found asymmetry in speed of adjustment included Hoffman and 
Mizen (2004) who found evidence that pass-through is faster for retail rates when the 
spread with policy rate is wide but sluggish when the spread is small. In a study of 
South Africa, Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) found asymmetry in the form of upward 
rigidity in both lending and deposit rates. According to them, this showed increased 
competition and insulation of customers to changes in lending rates but 
113 
 
 
 
simultaneously indicated collusive behaviour in the setting of deposit rates. Zulkhibri 
(2012) also documented significant asymmetry as they found that all retail rates adjust 
more sluggishly during monetary tightening than during ease in Malaysia, thereby 
leaving the loan-deposit spread unaltered. However, Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and 
Howells (2010) provided evidence to the contrary showing that for the UK, monetary 
tightening narrows the spread while it is widened by monetary ease. This provides 
confirmation that while retail rates may be rigid, the extent and/or direction of 
stickiness would differ between deposit and lending rates. For instance, Hannan and 
Berger (1991) found that deposit rates were upwardly rigid during monetary 
tightening. In addition to upward rigidity in deposit rates, Sander and Kleimeier 
(2004), Gropp et al. (2007), and Wang and Lee (2009) found that lending rate were 
sticky downward.  
While the preceding studies investigated asymmetry in the long-run adjustment of 
various response rates to the base rate, Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) studied the 
size of asymmetric response both in the short- and long-run. They found that loan and 
bonds rates of long-maturities are downwardly rigid in the short-run (positive 
asymmetry) but upwardly rigid in the long-run (negative asymmetry).
32
 This indicated 
that following monetary tightening banks would increase lending rate more than they 
would do for monetary ease in the short-run but in the long-run they may be more 
willing to retain their “well-informed and foot-loose” customers. Another kind of 
asymmetry found in the literature was institutional, according to Zulkhibri (2012), 
who found that finance companies adjusted deposit rates faster than commercial banks 
following changes in the base rate. This may imply, firstly, that commercial banks 
have more market power than finance companies and, secondly, may be more willing 
to shield their patrons from interest rate volatility. 
The patterns of pass-through are affected by various exogenous factors as discussed in 
the preceding chapter. Besides market power, structural and regime changes in the 
conduct of monetary policy can also have considerable effect on the sign and speed of 
                                            
32 Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2009) defined positive asymmetry as a situation where interest rate responded more to 
increases in policy rate than to decreases while negative asymmetry occurred when the response to monetary ease 
exceeded that of monetary tightening. They interpreted their finding of positive short-run asymmetry as up-holding 
“the view that monetary policy is like a string that can be pulled but not pushed” while the negative long-run 
asymmetry was reflective of financial innovations as well as lower inflation expectation due to globalisation and 
financial liberalisation (p.3).  
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pass-through. In Ireland, New Zealand and the Euro area for instance, Bredin et al. 
(2002), Liu et al. (2008), and Sander and Kleimeier (2004), respectively, found that 
structural changes had a significant positive effect on the pass-through process.  
Correspondingly, de Bondt (2002, 2005) found that the speed of pass-through had 
improved significantly since the introduction of the Euro. Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2003), however, found that structural factors like changes in monetary policy regime 
had no effect on the pass-through in Chile while factors like the Asian crisis had a 
significant negative impact. Similarly, Gropp et al. (2007) provided empirical 
evidence suggesting that the level of bank soundness, credit risk and interest rate risk 
limits pass-through considerably. This can be construed as supporting the findings of 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (op.cit) that financial crisis increases interest rate rigidity. 
Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2010) analysed the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis on the pass-through in the UK. They found that although the crisis 
failed to change the spread for most retail rates, pass-through was higher for deposit 
rates than for loan rates after the crisis.  
Financial crisis may affect pass-through directly or indirectly through the business 
cycle. Fluctuations in the business cycle may determine how banks adjust their prices 
during economic boom vis-à-vis recession. Conducting a cross-country analysis, Borio 
and Fritz (1995) could, however, not find evidence to support this hypothesis. Instead, 
the effect of other exogenous factors such as market power, competition and financial 
innovation were found to be substantial (Gropp et al., 2007; Borio and Fritz, op.cit). 
Similarly, Hannan and Berger (1991) documented evidence which indicated that 
interest rates would be more rigid in markets characterised by higher degrees of 
concentration. Imperfect competition and a high degree of market concentration may 
be typified by information asymmetry which may subsequently lead to some measure 
of interest rate volatility. Empirical evidence from Wang and Lee (2009) indicated that 
such volatility (from information asymmetry) diminished pass-through. 
Country specific factors and heterogeneity are important in the determining the size 
and speed of pass-through and the effectiveness of monetary policy. All the empirical 
literature discussed above examined pass-through for different countries (or regions) 
and in some cases conducted cross-country analyses. Investigating the pass-through 
process in the USA and Germany, Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) noted that pass-
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through may depend on whether a country is market-based (like the USA) or bank-
based (like Germany and the Euro area). The higher pass-through usually found in the 
USA vis-à-vis the Euro area and other countries may be attributed to this kind of 
distinction. Wang and Lee (2009) examined interest rate adjustments in the USA and 
nine Asian countries and found complete pass-through only for the USA. Conversely, 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2003) found incomplete pass-through for the countries 
they surveyed (including the USA) but faster adjustment in the USA and Chile than 
the other countries. In a cross-country comparative study, Borio and Fritz (1995) 
observed that the size and speed of pass-through varies considerably across the 
surveyed countries. While it was full and immediate in the short- and long-run for the 
UK and the Netherlands it was not for others. Sørensen and Werner (2006), Kwapil 
and Scharler (2006) equally documented a high degree of heterogeneity in the pattern 
of pass-through among Euro area countries. Thus, Aggelis (2005) concluded that 
stickiness of pass-through depends on the institutional idiosyncrasies of individual 
countries.  
The heterogeneity of empirical findings is attributable to the kind of data utilised, the 
sample period or the methodology adopted. In order to derive estimates of the speed 
and size of pass-through as well as make comparison between the short- and long-run, 
most of the studies conducted cointegration and error correction analyses in different 
forms either using single equations or vector approaches. Generally, a single equation 
based technique is attractive given the advantage of economically interpretable 
coefficients while a vector based method provides super-consistent estimates and is 
desirable since it does not impose inappropriate cointegrating relations (de Bondt, 
2005). Popular methodologies in the literature included Johansen’s vector error 
correction method (VECM) and ARDL. The estimated models also differed in the 
degree of linearity assumed and the type of asymmetry considered. For instance, in 
order to model the size of short- and long-run asymmetry coherently, Greenwood-
Nimmo et al. (2010) estimated a nonlinear-ARDL model which decomposed policy 
adjustments into positive and negative changes. However, other models of nonlinear-
ARDL in the literature captured asymmetry in the speed of adjustment via asymmetric 
mean adjustment lag which decomposes the error correction mechanism according to 
positive or negative policy change. 
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A fairly common trend in these empirical studies is the observation that pass-through 
may vary inter-temporally due to a collection of factors. A number of these studies 
including de Bondt (2002), Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002) and 
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) estimated the coefficient over the entire sample as 
well as shorter sample periods with a view to comparing their outcomes. Others like 
Bredin et al. (2002), Hoffman and Mizen, 2004), Liu et al. (2008) identified possible 
periods of structural breaks and included various dummies to determine the effects on 
the slope and intercept of the models. However, as Sander and Kleimeier (2004) noted, 
the documented structural breaks and/or changes in the coefficients may not coincide 
with the exogenously imposed break-points and may occur much earlier or much later. 
They therefore endogenously determined the appropriateness of structural break via a 
rolling search of its occurrence and timing.
33
   
These studies point to the fact that the estimated parameter may be time-varying so 
that the eventual coefficient estimated either for the entire model or for the sub-
periods may be misleading. Though, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) attempted an 
endogenous search of break-points, their efforts still required exogenous impositions 
of potential breaks used in the Chow-test. A modelling framework which 
endogenously determines the time path of the parameter over the entire sample would 
be a superior and more appropriate alternative. Accordingly, this chapter attempts to 
fill this gap. Thus, besides an ARDL approach, nonlinearity in pass-through is 
determined via a state-space modelling framework which allows the estimation of 
time-varying parameters. Hence, rather than compare coefficients over two or three 
sub-samples, comparison is made over the entire sample (relating estimated 
parameters to possible structural factors). 
5.3 Data and Stylised Considerations 
5.3.1 Data 
The dataset used in this chapter is of monthly frequency. At the longest, the data 
covered the 1985:M1-2011:M1 period except for the interbank interest rate which 
spanned 1996:M1-2011:M1. This is because the interbank market officially began in 
Nigeria circa mid-1990s. The entire dataset was sourced directly from the CBN. 
                                            
33  To estimate breaks they conducted supremum F-test using Chow-tests for various exogenously identified 
potential break-points. The sup-F is the largest F-statistic from these Chow-tests. 
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Twelve different interest rate variables, predominantly of short-term nature, were 
included in the sample. These comprise various deposit rates (savings, 7-day, 1-month, 
3-month, 6-month, 12-month, and over 12-month), lending rates (prime and 
maximum), interbank rate and official rates (Treasury Bills and monetary policy rates). 
The monetary policy rate is here regarded as base rate for the analysis. Though the use 
of frequently changing “official rates” is widespread in the literature, the policy rate is 
preferred as the base rate in this chapter. This is informed by our underlying objective 
of deducing market reaction to changes in the CBN policy stance – following 
intermittent base rate adjustments. Furthermore, this is supported by the arguments of 
Borio and Fritz (1995) who pointed out that “revisions in infrequently changed rates 
on official standing facilities generally speed up the adjustment of loan rates” (p.7). 
Under oligopolistic market conditions or money market volatility, they opined that the 
policy rate becomes a better indicator of policy objective “as it reflects changes 
in...general market conditions rather than discretionary decisions...of individual 
institutions” (p.9).  
All the interest rates analysed were reported as monthly averages. The base rate is the 
minimum rediscount rate (MRR) before December 2006 and monetary policy rate 
(MPR) thereafter. Both the (erstwhile) MRR and MPR represented, albeit to some 
extent, the rate at which the CBN provides reserves to banks. Hence, for the purpose 
of this study the CBN interest rate is generically referred to as the MPR. Wherever 
used, the Treasury Bills rate (TBR) is the average monthly rate on 91-day T-Bills of 
the Nigerian government. The interbank rate (IBR) is the overnight call rate at the 
Nigeria interbank offer (NIBOR) market. Retail rates are those obtainable from 
commercial banks. Deposit rates (DR) consist of the savings (SDR) and term-deposit 
(TDR) interest rates as shown above. Lending rates (LR) constitute maximum lending 
rate (MLR) and prime lending rate (PLR) – charged, respectively, to ordinary and high 
net-worth customers. Over the years, the number of commercial banks in Nigeria had 
fluctuated reaching 90 in 2001 before dropping to 24 in 2007 (due to the 2005 
consolidation exercise). The universal banking system introduced in 2001 saw 
transformation of all the merchant banks to commercial banks. The deposit and 
lending rates thus used were the weighted average rate on existing and licensed 
commercial banks for the various years. 
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5.3.2 Stylised Analysis 
Prior to the mid-1980s the interest rates in Nigeria were administratively fixed. The 
CBN determined both the MRR and retail rates. Then, the spreads between these rates 
were kept as low as possible. Following the reforms and financial liberalisation of the 
mid-1980s, retail rates were decoupled from official rates. Both MRR and the retail 
rates ascended continuously, albeit at different speeds, for about a decade. 
Theoretically, it is expected that, in a free market condition, MPR would lie between 
LR and DR. This would allow the CB to be the “lender of last resort” rather than 
“lender of first resort” to commercial banks. As shown in figure 5.1, this pattern was, 
however, indiscernible in the first decade of financial liberalisation as TDR was 
between MPR and MLR in a number of cases during this period. Additional reforms 
and the introduction of the interbank market in 1996 heralded further decoupling so 
that MPR began to look more like a penal rate as desired. The trends in figure 5.1 
show that while SDR declined in the late-1990s, MLR initially rose and maintained a 
widened spread for about five years but declined gradually, thereafter. Though usually 
high and around 20 per cent, MLR fluctuate more sympathetically with MPR than 
SDR but less-so vis-à-vis TDR. Hence, savings-deposit may be less elastic to policy 
changes than term-deposits. This is intuitive as customers maintain savings account 
primarily as a safeguard mechanism (given the flexible drawdown) while term-
deposits are kept to earn interest on funds not required immediately.    
Figure 5.1: Interest Rate Trends in Nigeria
    
Data Source: CBN 
With the MPR reform in 2006, the inter-relationship changed somewhat. TDR thence 
surpassed MPR while the MLR-MPR spread widened. This may be connected to the 
deposit and lending facilities introduced during the reform. With these facilities banks 
with excess reserves at the CBN receive interest payment (equivalent to a mark-down 
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of the MPR) while those with liquidity deficit are charged a mark-up on the MPR. 
Though the band was intended to promote interbank trading, it nonetheless seemed to 
encourage banks with excess reserves to seek risk-free returns from the CBN; thus, 
creating liquidity dearth at the interbank market. Concurrently, banks with reserve 
shortages would raise DR higher in order to attract deposits. 
Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2002) argued that monetary policy 
effectiveness depends on its ability to influence the LR-DR spread. Nonetheless, these 
spreads are continually changing; fluctuations that may not always be attributable to 
monetary policy. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 depict the spreads between various interest rates 
in the dataset. Panels (a) and (b) of figure 5.2 show the MPR-DR spreads. Prior the 
mid-1990s, the MPR-SDR spread moved almost in tandem with those of other deposit 
rates. Thenceforth, as shown in panel (a), these trends were uncoupled and the size of 
spread tended to diminish with maturity; MPR-SDR spread being highest. Nonetheless, 
apart from the 7-day maturity, most TDRs showed fairly similar attributes regarding 
the trend and size of their spread with the policy rate.    
Figure 5.2: Deposit Rates Spreads versus Policy and Lending Rates
 
Data Source: CBN 
Panels (c) and (d) of figure 5.2 present the MLR-DR spreads. These are generally 
characterised by an upward long-run trend. As in the previous case, the traverses of 
MLR-SDR and MLR-TDR spreads were comparable before mid-1990s but divergent 
afterwards. These were nonetheless high – with MLR-SDR spread reaching 28.69 
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percentage points in 2002 – and were usually about 10 percentage points above the 
MPR-DR spread. The widening of the LR-DR spread is indicative of increasing 
market power of the commercial banks that are able to increase their profitability in 
the process of financial intermediation.   
Comparing the mark-up (mark-down) over MPR, MLR-MPR spread was larger vis-à-
vis other rates (see figure 5.3). In addition to denoting commercial banks’ market 
power, it may also be an indication of their risk perception. The MLR-DR and MLR-
PLR spreads can each represent risk perception. Ceteris paribus, banks would raise 
the LR-DR spread in order to accommodate perceived risk. However, a better measure 
of risk perception may be the MLR-PLR spread which shows the difference between 
rates on loans that are presumably safe and those that are risky. MLR is charged on the 
riskiest loans while PLR applies to the least risky credits. In Nigeria, the LR-DR 
spread considerably surpasses the MLR-PLR margin indicating that profitability rather 
than risk perception is the main driver of commercial bank price-setting behaviour.   
Figure 5.3: Analysis of Retail and Market Interest Rates Spreads 
Data Source: CBN 
Banks can usually source liquidity from depositors, the CB or the interbank market 
while lending same to borrowers for a margin. The interbank market being the most 
competitive source, IBR oscillates with larger amplitudes than MPR and DR (see 
panel (d) above). Consequently, the MLR-IBR spread fluctuated more than other 
MLR spreads and was on average lower than the MLR-MPR margin. This implies 
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larger uncertainty in the profitability of funds from the interbank market which 
captures market conditions and the true costs of funds as allocated by the market.   
Monetary policy is designed to influence inflation and output via its influence on 
market and retail rates. The first point of impact of monetary policy is expected to be 
the money market before it is transmitted to the retail rates. This drives the 
implementation of monetary policy in Nigeria where MPR adjustments are expected 
to impact initially on IBR and the retail rates thereafter. The interbank represents an 
important reference market in the Nigerian policy arena and money market activities 
are conducted along this line. The first indication of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy is the analysis of the correlation between policy rate, interbank rate and the 
retail rates. Table 5.1 presents the dynamic correlation of these rates over a six-period 
horizon of lags and leads. This is performed to capture the effects of both forward and 
backward expectations. 
The first half of the table shows the dynamic correlation of policy rate with the other 
rates in the dataset. Importantly, all the correlation coefficients are positively signed as 
expected. High contemporaneous correlation of 0.94 observed between MPR and TBR 
reflects the official nature of both rates. With the exception of SDR with 0.44, the 
contemporaneous coefficients of other rates exceeded 0.60. Average-LR, at 0.75, 
displayed higher correlation than IBR (0.67), average-DR (0.68), and average-TDR 
(0.72).
34
 The low MPR-IBR correlation is attributable to the large fluctuations in the 
interbank market. This may provide justification for Borio and Fritz (1995) arguments 
that policy rate may impact more directly on retail rates when markets are volatile. 
More interestingly however, the dynamic correlations showed that over comparable 
distances the coefficients are on average larger for leads than lags except for LR. This 
may indicate that expected changes have more impact than past changes and implies 
that banks look more with foresight than hindsight when adjusting DR but conversely 
for LR. Nonetheless, contemporaneous correlations are generally higher than inter-
temporal ones, suggesting that actual policy changes have more impact than expected 
changes. This is at variance with Hoffman and Mizen (2004) who suggested that 
expected changes are a more significant driver of pass-through than actual changes. 
                                            
34 SDR is included in the computation of average-DR but excluded from average-TDR. 
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Table 5.1: Dynamic Correlation of Policy Rate and the Interbank Rate with other            
Interest Rates (1985:M1-2011:M1) 
  Correlation of Policy Rate at time (t+k) with other Interest Rate 
  -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Policy Rate 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.78 
Treasury Bill 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.80 
Interbank 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 
              
Deposit Rate 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.53 
Savings 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39 
7-Day  0.51 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.54 
1-Month 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.50 
3-Month 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.58 
6-Month 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.59 
12-Month 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.63 0.59 
 > 12-Month 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.53 
Term-Deposits  0.55 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.55 
                            
Lending Rate 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.59 0.57 
Prime  0.67 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.62 0.59 
Maximum 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.55 
                            
  Correlation of Interbank Rate at time (t+k) with other Interest Rate 
  -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Policy Rate 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.52 
Treasury Bill 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.56 0.55 
Interbank 0.54 0.60 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.54 
                            
Deposit Rate  0.64 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.27 
Savings 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.13 
7-Day  0.74 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.62 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.32 
1-Month 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.57 0.51 0.46 0.39 0.31 0.24 0.18 
3-Month 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.32 0.26 
6-Month 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.30 
12-Month 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.32 
 > 12-Month 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.43 0.39 0.36 
Term-Deposits 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.58 0.53 0.47 0.41 0.35 0.29 
                            
Lending Rate 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.42 
Prime  0.73 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.39 
Maximum 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.45 
Source: Author's computations based on data from the CBN 
Note: Given that the interbank data series starts from January 1996, the correlation coefficients between the interbank rate and all other 
rates are computed for sample period 1996:M1-2011:M1.  
  
  
  
  
  
 
In the second half of the table, the correlations of IBR with the other rates are 
presented. The highest contemporaneous correlation is with the TBR (0.72) while the 
lowest is with the SDR (0.33). Average-TDR exhibited a slightly higher correlation 
(0.64) than average-LR (0.61). This is congruous with the view that high IBR drives 
reserve deficient banks to raise DR so as to attract liquidity. Dynamic analyses show 
that, contrary to the first half, coefficients are higher for lags than contemporaneous 
and lead correlations. Thus, banks would adjust their prices based on the historical 
trends in the interbank market.  
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Over the two halves of the table, PLR showed higher correlation coefficient than the 
MLR. This tended to contradict the argument that banks would protect their prime 
customers from market volatility more than they would shield other customers. 
Comparing both halves of the table, contemporaneous correlations are higher in the 
upper half than in the lower one. This may suggest that pass-through from policy rate 
to retail rates are higher than that from interbank (money market) rate to retail market 
rates. Thus, banks probably adjust their rates following policy pronouncements more 
than they respond to changes in the money market. If this is so, then the money market 
may not be an effective conduit of monetary policy decisions to the economy.  
5.4 Methodology and Econometric Framework 
Monetary policy may have both short- and long-run implications for an economy.
35
 
Hence, it is desirable to utilize a modelling framework that provides information for 
both horizons. For simplicity, we begin by assuming a linear econometric relationship. 
From equation 4.1 in the preceding chapter, the long-run model relating retail and base 
rates is  
                                                                  (5.1) 
where    is the stochastic error term,    is the retail interest rate,    is the policy rate,   
represents the mark-up and   reflects the size of pass-through. A complete pass-
through requires that     holds otherwise pass-through may be deemed 
incomplete (   ) or overshot (   ). The subscript t indicates that the variables 
are stochastic processes observed inter-temporally; hence, time-series. The 
characteristics of   are empirically investigated using both ARDL and state-space 
models.  
5.4.1 The ARDL Model 
A fundamental issue in time-series analysis relates to the concept of stationarity which 
supposes that the means and variances of variables are time independent. Variables 
that satisfy this condition are stationary and therefore integrated of order zero,  ( ), 
otherwise they are integrated of a higher order  ,  ( ). Where          denotes the 
number of times such variables need to be differenced to become stationary. Empirical 
                                            
35 This derives from the discussions in chapter one on the non-neutrality of monetary policy based on the possible 
impact of policy on the potential output and /or the existence of an oblique long-run Phillips curve.   
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evidence from the literature suggests that the interest rate variables are usually non-
stationary and are  ( ).36 When variables are non-stationary any analysis conducted 
with them would be economically meaningless. Hence, to avoid the problem of 
spurious regression, equation 5.1 may be re-expressed in first differences as  
                                                               (5.2) 
where    and    are short-run parameters,    is an error term and Δ is the difference 
operator. While this circumvents spuriousness in the relationship it is nonetheless 
devoid of long-run information and captures only short-run dynamics. Analysis of the 
long-run relationship requires that the variables be cointegrated so that, even if they 
are individually integrated, their linear combination (           ) is stationary. 
Incorporating this into equation 5.2, a simple error correction model is derived as 
              (            )          (5.3) 
where   is the error correction parameter, which captures the speed of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium after a shock and satisfies       ,  and    is an error 
term which is assumedly     (    
 ). The error correction term is expected to be 
negatively signed which would indicate that the system is mean-reverting.  
Hoffman and Mizen (2004) provided substantial evidence of the time dynamics on the 
pass-through process with respect to forward and backward expectations. This 
reinforces the notion that in time-series analysis, regressors may influence regressands 
with a lag while contemporaneous values of the regressand may correlate with its past 
values. Hence, lag effects may exist in the relationship between policy and retail rates. 
Given these consideration, the specifications may be augmented with lags so that the 
baseline equation thus becomes an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL(p,q)) model 
as follows   
 ( )      ( )                                                       (5.4) 
with 
 ( )    ∑    
  
                                                        (5.5) 
 ( )    ∑    
  
                                                         (5.6) 
                                            
36 See for instance Hoffman and Mizen (2004), Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and Liu et al. (2008) 
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where  ( )  and  ( )  are lag polynomials in the regressand and regressors,  
respectively, and    is an error term. Pesaran and Shin (1998), showed that by simple 
iterative process equation 5.4 can be transformed into an unrestricted ARDL error 
correction model of the form 
                  ∑        
   
    ∑        
   
             (5.7) 
where   is the intercept,   is the error correction parameter earlier defined. The term 
  nests the long-run parameter ( ), while    are short-run dynamic parameters that 
capture the extent of pass-through at the     lag. Hence,    is the impact parameter 
indicating immediate pass-through within the contemporaneous month (and thus 
defines our short-run pass-through). Inertial effects are measured by the dynamic 
adjustment parameters (  ). Given the error correction parameter,  , and the impact 
parameter,   , the mean adjustment lag (M.A.L) are derived, following Hendry (1995), 
to indicate the number of months required for complete adjustments to long-run 
equilibrium. This is computed as  
      
     
  
                                                        (5.8) 
If the rates are cointegrated the long-run pass-through parameter ( ) can be retrieved 
directly from equation 5.7 as      ⁄ .
37
 Complete pass-through exists when    . 
This restriction is investigated via the Wald-test with the null hypothesis of complete 
pass-through.  
Whether pass-through is complete or not, Pesaran and Shin (op.cit) stated that 
estimator of the cointegrating parameter thus derived is both Gaussian and efficient. 
However, to forestall the problem of autocorrelation it is essential to choose the 
correct number of lags using appropriate criteria such as the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC). As a single equation error correction model, the ARDL has the 
desirable benefit of economically interpretable coefficients. Furthermore, the 
estimators of long-run parameters has the limiting normal distribution and are super-
consistent which makes them computationally equivalent to a vector based approach. 
                                            
37  From equation 5.3 the long-run component is   (            )                 . The error 
correction model can, thus, be expressed as                                 which implies     
(     )                       . Parameters of equation 5.3 and 5.7 are, therefore, trivially equivalent 
since       ;        
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Moreover, even in the presence of non-stationarity of variables, estimators of the 
short-run parameters in the ARDL are consistent.  
Test of cointegration in the ARDL is conducted using the PSS bounds-testing 
approach advanced by Pesaran et al. (2001).
38
 The test is applicable regardless of 
whether the variables are stationary or not and irrespective of their order of integration. 
Assuming an unrestricted intercept, the test of long-run relationship using the PSS 
approach is performed, under the (joint) null of no cointegration as  
                                                                 (5.9) 
The test is conducted using standard F-test. Pesaran et al. (op.cit), however, observed 
the existence of non-standard asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic regardless of 
the order of integration of the variables. They therefore provided two sets of 
asymptotic critical values with which the calculated F-statistic are compared. The first 
set of critical value assumes that all variables are non-stationary while the second set 
assumes stationarity of all variables. As long as the computed statistic lies outside the 
critical value bounds a conclusive inference can be drawn otherwise inference would 
be inconclusive and tests of stationarity for individual variables become necessary.  
Given the possible asymmetry in the relationship between retail rate and policy rate 
the assumption of linearity can be relaxed. Hence, following Greenwood-Nimmo et al. 
(2010), an asymmetric ARDL proposed by Shin et al. (2009) is derived by splitting 
MPR into positive and negative changes so that the long-run equation is written as  
      
   
      
                                             (5.10) 
where    and    may be I(1) variables and    is partitioned as  
        
    
                                                    (5.11) 
where   
  and   
  constitute the partial sum processes of the positive and negative 
changes in    derived as 
  
  ∑        
  ∑     (         ),      
  ∑        
  ∑     (     )  
 
      (5.12) 
                                            
38 This is the approach developed in the study by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) which has been commonly 
termed the PSS approach in econometric literature. 
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  and    are asymmetric parameters of the long-run pass-through. Accordingly, 
equation 5.10 can be integrated with 5.7 to obtain the nonlinear-ARDL model as 
follows     
                      
     
        
           
  ∑        
   
    ∑ (  
      
    
      
 )                         (5.13) 
Short-run asymmetric parameters are   
  and   
  while the long-run asymmetric 
parameters are obtained as        ⁄   and        ⁄ . In addition to testing for 
completeness, the Wald-test for       is used to investigate asymmetry in response. 
Asymmetric M.A.L for positive and negative changes are derived, respectively, as 
       
     
  
  
  ;            
     
  
  
                                      (5.14) 
These reflect the asymmetry in the speed of adjustment obtained directly from the 
asymmetry in the size of the impact multiplier.  
A test of long-run relationships can be performed, on equation 5.13 (after adjusting 
equation 5.9 for asymmetry) as        
      , using a standard F-test 
compared against the asymptotic critical values from the PSS bounds test. 
The effects of exogenous variables in the pass-through process are recognised in the 
literature. These, if incorporated into the model, may provide more appropriate 
estimates of pass-through. Hence, the linear and nonlinear-ARDL models in equations 
5.7 and 5.13 can be re-written, respectively, to incorporate exogenous factors as 
follows  
                  ∑        
   
    ∑        
   
                (5.15) 
and 
                 
  ∑        
   
    ∑       
    
                        (5.16) 
where    is a     vector of exogenous parameters and    is a     vector of 
exogenous variables. For convenience, the short- and long-run asymmetric relations 
are compacted to  
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    ; 
∑       
    
    ∑   
      
    
    ∑   
      
    
                         (5.17) 
The parameters in equations 5.15 and 5.16 can be estimated consistently with the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. We expect that    be orthogonal to the error 
term to ensure consistency. Nonetheless, violation of this assumption may not 
invalidate ARDL estimates. Given that financial time-series such as interest rates are 
volatile and may be path-dependent, OLS estimation may be confronted with the 
problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Adequate lag augmentation should 
eliminate any endogeneity bias and autocorrelation that are inherent in the data 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Nonetheless, we obtain robust OLS estimates using the 
Newey-West method. This provides heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) standard errors which allow for valid inferences even in the presence of the 
classical problems. Our preferential choice between the linear (equation 5.15) and 
nonlinear (equation 5.16) models is broadly based on the AIC. For instance, from 
among a class of models with the same dependent variable, the one with the least AIC 
is preferred.   
5.4.2 The State-Space Model 
As observed in the various empirical literatures, the pattern of pass-through may be 
changing over time. In the conduct of monetary policy, the changing perspective of 
policymakers and the continuing evolution of their relationship with economic agents 
and financial market have implication for policy outcome. Citing McNees (1986), 
Kim and Nelson (1999) observed that “...a policy reaction function is likely to be a 
fragile creature. Over time...the importance attached to the conflicting objectives may 
change, [policymakers’] views on the structure of the economy may change” (p.45). 
This argument is relevant from the perspective of both the policymaker and economic 
agent, so that reactions (or its size) may change over time. Hence, the pass-through 
parameter may be time-varying. To understand the time path of the parameter, 
equations 5.15 and 5.16 can be modelled in state-space form, estimated via a 
maximum likelihood method and analysed using the Kalman filter recursive algorithm. 
The key advantage of specifying dynamic systems or relationships in a state-space 
form is that it permits the inclusion and concurrent estimation of both unobserved 
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(state) and observed variables in a model. In state-space models, therefore, the 
dynamics of the system is represented by a series of state variables e.g.      related to 
a series of observations e.g. {    } for           . According to Durbin and 
Koopman (2001), the relationship between      and     } is equivalent to a linear 
regression of        on       where      is the time-varying vector of coefficients 
consistent with a Gaussian first-order vector autoregression. The state-space model, 
thus allows us to infer the important properties of      based on knowledge of {   } 
where the behaviour of       is captured in the signal equation and the evolution of 
     is modelled in a state equation. 
For simplicity, only the symmetric pass-through is modelled in this study (although it 
can also be applied to the asymmetric case). In a simple state-space form, the ARDL 
of equation 5.15 is expressed as 
                        ∑      
   
        ∑      
   
                  (5.18) 
where the subscript t attached to the parameters indicate that these are time-varying. 
Equation 5.18 is the signal (or observation) equation. In order to show the associated 
state (or transition) equations, we formalised equation 5.18 in matrix form as 
       [
 
         ∑      
   
   ∑      
   
    
 
] 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
    
      
 
]
 
 
 
 
              (5.19) 
and rationalised it into a state-space model as  
                    ;                   (   )                  (5.20) 
                ;                        (   )                  (5.21) 
This specification allows us to estimate the time path of both long- and short-run pass-
through. Equations 5.20 and 5.21 are the signal and state equations, respectively. 
Associated with these equations are random disturbance vectors    and    which are 
assumed to be serially orthogonal; hence, white noise. The parameter   is the variance 
of the signal disturbance and   is a symmetric variance matrix of the state 
disturbances with dimension (   )  where   (       )  is the order of 
ARDL. The variance structure of the model is therefore represented as  
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     [
 
 
  
  
 
 
]  [
 
  
   
 
 
]                                         (5.22) 
where   is a matrix of covariances which can be restricted to zero. In state-space 
modelling, estimation and inferences about      conditional on available information 
at time t is usually made under the assumption of a complete knowledge of all the 
hyperparameters (  ,   ,  , and ) of the model. If some of these are unknown they 
are estimated (by maximum likelihood) before making inferences (see appendix 5.1).  
In estimating time-varying coefficients of the state-space model, the Kalman filter 
enhances the understanding of how rational economic agents update their inferences 
when new information becomes available following uncertainties connected with 
regime shifts (Kim and Nelson, 1999). Uncertainty about the regression coefficient 
leads to changing outcomes of the conditional variance which is adequately captured 
by prediction error variance  ( ̃ ). The structure of the variance matrix  ( )of the 
disturbance term and its underlying assumptions play an important role. For the state-
space equations (5.20-5.21) a number of addition assumptions or restrictions are made. 
First,  (    )    is assumed. This implies imposing zero values on the covariance 
matrix so that   . Second, the  matrix of state disturbances is assumed diagonal, 
thereby restricting all covariances to zero. Following Kim and Nelson (1999) and 
Commandeur and Koopman (2007) the state equations may be specified as a random 
walk so that the vector of intercepts is null (    ) and the     parameter matrix is 
an identity (     ). However, we assume that the long-run components of the state 
equations (             ) are stochastic processes while short-run components (     
and     ) are recursive. This is because short-run reaction can be predicted from past 
values with negligible errors while long-run reaction would contain some random 
errors. The model is evaluated via standard coefficient tests on the predicted errors. 
5.5 Empirical Analysis and Discussions 
Although the empirical literature on the interest rate pass-through suggest that time-
series data on interest rates are commonly  ( ), empirical analyses in this section, 
nonetheless, begin by investigating the time-series properties of the various interest 
rate.  The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwaitkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) tests of stationarity are conducted. The ADF is performed under the null 
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of unit root while the KPSS test had a null of stationarity. Visual inspection of the 
series revealed no obvious trends, hence, the tests are conducted with intercept but no 
trend. The results, presented in table 5.2 below, indicated that all the interest rates in 
the analyses, except lending rates, are  ( ) as suggested by the literature. PLR and 
MLR are however   ( ), indicating stationarity. Nonetheless, these results pose no 
inconvenience for the estimation of long-run pass-through since the ARDL and the 
PSS-test are valid irrespective of whether the variables are  ( ),  ( ) or mutually 
cointegrated. It would also not affect the estimation of dynamic pass-through because, 
according to Commandeur and Koopman (2007), “[in] state-space methods, 
stationarity of the time-series is not required” since the model allows for concurrent 
decomposition and diagnosis of the dynamics of time-series data (p.134). 
Table 5.2: Tests of Stationarity of Time-Series Variables 
 ADF  KPSS 
 Levels 1st-Diff. Characteristic  Levels 1st-Diff. Characteristic 
Policy rate -1.96 - 6.12***  ( )  0.44* 0.13  ( ) 
Interbank -2.56 -20.79***  ( )  0.70** 0.04  ( ) 
Savings -0.96 -17.25***  ( )  1.57*** 0.11  ( ) 
7-Day  -1.17 -16.75***  ( )  1.22*** 0.12  ( ) 
1-Month -2.26 -19.03***  ( )  0.43* 0.10  ( ) 
3-Month -2.07 -20.91***  ( )  0.39* 0.10  ( ) 
6-Month -2.25 -20.31***  ( )  0.51** 0.11  ( ) 
12-Month -2.17 -19.12***  ( )  0.58** 0.12  ( ) 
 >12-Month -2.45 -21.63***  ( )  0.66** 0.08  ( ) 
Prime  -2.89** -20.01***  ( )  0.27 0.12  ( ) 
Maximum -2.97** -10.03***  ( )  0.34 0.08  ( ) 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The ADF-test was conducted under the null hypothesis 
of a unit root with MacKinnon critical values, respectively, at -3.45, -2.87, and -2.57 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, while 
the KPSS-test was performed under the null of stationarity with corresponding asymptotic critical values of 0.73, 0.46, and 0.34. 
5.5.1 The Linear Model 
Sequel to earlier discussions, empirical investigation is conducted in two phases. In 
the first phase the policy-to-interbank and policy-to-retail pass-through are examined 
while the second phase estimates interbank-to-retail pass-through. This is because, in 
Nigeria, policy rate changes are expected to transmit to the retail rates via the 
interbank rate while retail rates can also respond directly to the policy rate. 
Estimations are conducted by initially over-parameterising the model with twelve lags 
of     and     . A parsimonious model is obtained by sequentially removing 
insignificant coefficients, complemented with the AIC. Among a class of possible 
parsimonious options, the model with the least AIC value is preferred. Analysis in this 
section is largely focused on the error correction parameter ( ), the long-run pass-
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through  ( ), and the immediate (or short-run) pass-through  (  ). Where reported, 
inertial effect is  ∑   
  
   ;       . Similarly, overall short-run pass-through 
is  ∑   
  
   ;         (although we focus on     – the immediate pass-through). All 
restriction and model evaluation tests are conducted at the 5 per cent level of 
significance.   
5.5.1.1 Results of Symmetric Policy-to-Market and Policy-to-Retail Pass-through 
Tables 5.3–5.5 present results of three variants of the ARDL model (exclusive and 
inclusive of exogenous variables). Result without exogenous variables is reported in 
table 5.3. Pass-through is investigated for ten interest rates types including IBR, seven 
DRs, and two LRs. All coefficients in the table are found to be correctly signed as the 
intercept, short- and long-run pass-through and inertial coefficients bear positive signs 
and the error correction term is negatively signed. In addition, the variables of interest 
(      ) are predominantly rightly sized and lied (in absolute terms) between one and 
zero as expected. For IBR all variables are statistically significant except the intercept 
term. The table indicated a complete pass-through in the long-run while immediate 
pass-through is approximately 61 per cent. The error correction term indicated an 
adjustment speed of about 37 per cent monthly per disequilibrium. These jointly show 
an M.A.L of one month for full adjustment.
39
 
The results for deposit rates are somewhat different. While there are no significant 
long-run pass-through to SDR and 7-day-TDR, the immediate multipliers are 
significant. The low cum insignificant speed of adjustment meant an M.A.L of 2–7 
years for SDR and 7-day-TDR. Other TDRs (1-month up to over-12-month) showed 
remarkably better results. All coefficients in this group are statistically significant, the 
pass-through coefficient ranged 38–61 per cent and 61–74 per cent for short-run and 
long-run, respectively. Though the error correction term showed a low speed of 
adjustment of between 7–12 per cent monthly, the M.A.L is modest vis-à-vis SDR and 
7-day-TDR and ranging between 3–9 months. The LRs showed statistically significant 
and higher pass-through both in the short- and long-run than DRs. Again, the error 
correction term is low; although, at approximately 3 months, the M.A.L showed faster 
adjustment time than most DRs. The Wald-test of complete long-run pass-through is 
                                            
39 See appendix 5.2 
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statistically significant for all the interest rate except for SDR, 7-day, and 3-month 
rates. The performance of the models is evaluated using the adjusted R-squared ( ̅ ) 
and the PSS F-test. The  ̅  is generally low for all models ranging from 12–35 per 
cent while the PSS-test could only confirm cointegration for IBR and over-12-month 
rate.  
Table 5.3: Linear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through 
(Excluding Exogenous Variables) 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr > 1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
0.12 
(0.86) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.27) 
0.49 
(0.37) 
0.23 
(0.28) 
0.32 
(0.27) 
0.40 
(0.32) 
 
0.67** 
(0.31) 
0.80** 
(0.39) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
   
1.00*** 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.76) 
0.61 
(0.42) 
0.70*** 
(0.24) 
0.61*** 
(0.19) 
0.74*** 
(0.23) 
0.68*** 
(0.19) 
0.72*** 
(0.16) 
 
0.84*** 
(0.20) 
0.82*** 
(0.33) 
    
0.61* 
(0.36) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.11) 
0.38*** 
(0.14) 
0.51*** 
(0.16) 
0.45*** 
(0.12) 
0.47*** 
(0.12) 
0.60*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
0.79*** 
(0.26) 
 ̅  0.21 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.22  0.34 0.31 
F-Test(PSS) 9.48
** 1.16 2.09 4.30 3.68 2.92 4.46 6.56**  4.61 3.06 
    YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES  YES YES 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).  
Albeit marginally, IBR outperformed most retail rates regarding the size and speed of 
pass-through and general model evaluations. Intuitively, these results may not be 
comparable given that the interbank series started much later than the others and the 
introduction of the interbank market could have impacted on the pattern of pass 
through. Hence, to allow for comparability and also capture the impact of the 
interbank system (introduced in 1996), a dummy variable is included in the model. 
This takes the value of zero pre-1996:M1 and unity thenceforth. Both intercept and 
slope dummies are used; to capture regime shifts and changing patterns, respectively. 
Results of the re-estimated model are reported in table 5.4 which indicated that the 
inclusion of the 1996-dummies had a significant effect on the models. While all slope-
dummies are significant at the 5 per cent level, only SDR intercept-dummy is 
significant at that level. Intercept-dummies for 7-day and 1-month rates are significant 
only at 10 per cent while those on other retail rates are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, although the coefficients are higher than those in the preceding model, 
analyses suggest that the introduction of the interbank reduced the size and speed 
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pass-through.
40
 However, all relevant parameter estimates are statistically significant. 
For SDR the long-run pass-through is about 54 per cent while the immediate pass-
through is only 35 per cent. The error correction term indicated an adjustment speed of 
about 43 per cent while the M.A.L is 1.5 months. For TDRs, pass-through increased 
with the term of maturity. The estimates ranged 49–86 per cent and 81–106 per cent 
(7-day: lowest and over-12-month: highest) for the short-run and long-run, 
respectively. Adjustments speeds are within 48–79 per cent monthly, with M.A.L of 
0.2–1.1 months.  
Table 5.4: Linear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through Including 1996-Dummies   
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
0.12 
(0.86) 
2.31** 
(0.96) 
0.85 
(0.55) 
1.08 
(0.67) 
1.37 
(0.97) 
0.33 
(0.88) 
0.59 
(0.83) 
0.50 
(0.72) 
 
-0.50 
(0.68) 
-1.12 
(0.80) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.43*** 
(0.16) 
-0.47*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.66*** 
(0.15) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.78*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.27*** 
(0.07) 
-0.40*** 
(0.09) 
   
1.00*** 
(0.16) 
0.54*** 
(0.13) 
0.80*** 
(0.07) 
0.88*** 
(0.07) 
0.87*** 
(0.10) 
1.03*** 
(0.09) 
1.02*** 
(0.08) 
1.06*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.46*** 
(0.16) 
1.59*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.61* 
(0.36) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
0.63*** 
(0.09) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.81*** 
(0.08) 
0.79*** 
(0.07) 
0.85*** 
(0.73) 
 
0.85*** 
(0.21) 
1.02*** 
(0.22) 
 Φ-Dummy  
-2.27** 
(0.96) 
-0.95* 
(0.55) 
-1.09* 
(0.66) 
-1.25 
(0.88) 
-0.31 
(0.91) 
-0.69 
(0.85) 
-0.65 
(0.75) 
 
-0.08 
(0.72) 
0.81 
(0.86) 
α-Dummy  
0.44*** 
(0.16) 
0.50*** 
(0.12) 
0.66*** 
(0.10) 
0.63*** 
(0.10) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.70*** 
(0.09) 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.07) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.24** 
(0.11) 
-0.39*** 
(0.10) 
-0.58*** 
(0.11) 
-0.55*** 
(0.11) 
-0.70*** 
(0.15) 
-0.70*** 
(0.13) 
-0.86*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.41*** 
(0.11) 
-0.67*** 
(0.16) 
 ̅  0.21 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.80  0.44 0.50 
F-Test(PSS) 9.48
** 3.60 7.36** 15.78** 15.00** 16.34** 19.84*** 42.02**  6.23** 9.95** 
     YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).  
Again, as in the previous case, LRs are less rigid than DRs both in the long- and short-
run and have (approximately) complete short-run pass-through but significant long-
run overshoot. Pass-through is higher for MLR than PLR. While the speed coefficients 
are modest, the M.A.L indicated swift adjustment periods -0.1 and 0.5 months, 
respectively. The negative coefficient for MLR could reflect pre-emptive changes 
ahead of a change in the policy rate. Further analyses indicated that besides the 
                                            
40 While it may be intuitive to interpret positive coefficients as indicating increases, it is nonetheless converse for 
coefficients whose a priori sign expectations are negative. The coefficient of the speed variable is expected to be 
negative so that an increase requires it to be more negative. The slope dummy for the speed being positive reduces 
the size of the negative, thus, reduces the speed.  
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overshoot in LR, pass-through to SDR and 7-day rate are incomplete, while those for 
other TDRs are statistically unity. The  ̅  showed considerable improvement vis-à-vis 
the previous table and was within 45–80 per cent. In addition, the reduced values of 
AIC suggested that models with dummies are superior to those without. The PSS-test 
also showed improvement, confirming cointegration at 5 per cent for all variables 
except SDR. 
Given the broad objectives of this thesis, one of which is to ascertain the effectiveness 
of monetary policy in a developing country, a proxy for financial development is 
included in the analysis. We expect that increased developments and innovations in 
the financial market would enhance pass-through. The variable is introduced directly 
in order to control for its impact on the level and speed of pass-through. The results 
presented in table 5.5, showed that the proxy for financial development is statistically 
significant in the analysis albeit weakly in some cases. It is, however, not significant 
for over-12-month rate. 
While financial development reduced the margin on retail rates it nonetheless had a 
positive impact on the interbank mark-up. The coefficients of pass-through were 
generally moderated for retail rates, in the short- and long-run relative to the previous 
models, though it increased slightly (in the short-run) for LR. Pass-through to IBR 
increased substantially, indicating long-run overshoot with an instantaneous pass-
through of 79 per cent. The error correction term also showed further improvement 
while the M.A.L was generally below 2 months though remaining negative for MLR. 
The  ̅  indicate increased explanatory power of the model while the AIC suggested 
superiority over the preceding model. Furthermore, the PSS-test confirmed 
cointegration for the models; although at 10 per cent for SDR. The Wald-test indicated 
incomplete pass-through for SDR, 7-day and 1-month rates; overshoot for LRs and 
IBR; and complete for the rest. 
Overall, the model suggested that the introduction of the interbank market and the 
level of financial development helped to explain the pattern of pass-through in Nigeria. 
Changes in MPR are significantly passed-through to retail and market rates. In the 
short-run, pass-through is incomplete for all rates except MLR. However, long-run 
pass-through is either complete or overshot except for SDR, 7-day, and 1-month rates. 
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IBR has the highest long-run pass-through while SDR has the lowest. Hence, we can 
deduce that changes in market rates are not entirely transmitted to retail rates. 
Furthermore, pass-through is higher for LRs than DRs. This could indicate banks’ use 
of market power to influence their mark-up profit. The general finding of higher pass-
through to MLR vis-à-vis PLR could mean that banks protected esteemed customers 
from volatility more than ordinary customers.   
Table 5.5: Linear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through 
Including 1996-Dummies and M2/GDP 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
-6.33** 
(3.05) 
3.00*** 
(0.85) 
1.61** 
(0.55) 
2.09** 
(0.82) 
2.46** 
(1.10) 
1.39 
(1.14) 
1.59 
(1.07) 
1.37 
(1.01) 
 
0.52 
(0.82) 
0.62 
(0.90) 
     
-0.43*** 
(0.09) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.63*** 
(0.10) 
-0.64*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.78*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
   
1.52*** 
(0.23) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.09) 
0.99*** 
(0.09) 
0.99*** 
(0.08) 
1.03*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.42*** 
(0.12) 
1.51*** 
(0.10) 
    
0.78* 
(0.45) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.48*** 
(0.09) 
0.65*** 
(0.09) 
0.73*** 
(0.09) 
0.81*** 
(0.09) 
0.77*** 
(0.07) 
0.84*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.86*** 
(0.18) 
1.02*** 
(0.20) 
 Φ-Dummy  
-2.14** 
(0.88) 
-0.97* 
(0.54) 
-1.12* 
(0.58) 
-1.14 
(0.78) 
-0.33 
(080) 
-0.54 
(0.73) 
-0.59 
(0.67) 
 
-0.36 
(0.84) 
0.07 
(0.88) 
α-Dummy  
0.43*** 
(0.14) 
0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(010) 
0.68*** 
(0.09) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.73*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.41*** 
(0.08) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
-0.62*** 
(0.09) 
-0.61*** 
(0.09) 
-0.73*** 
(0.14) 
-0.74*** 
(0.11) 
-0.88*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.53*** 
(0.11) 
-0.84*** 
(0.15) 
M2/GDP 
13.99** 
(6.55) 
-1.79** 
(0.72) 
-1.67** 
(0.81) 
-2.62* 
(1.47) 
-3.12** 
(1.50) 
-2.94* 
(1.61) 
-2.96* 
(1.59) 
-2.41 
(1.69) 
 
-3.96*** 
(1.50) 
-5.32*** 
(1.39) 
 ̅  0.23 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.80  0.45 0.53 
F-Test(PSS) 11.19
** 5.58* 9.82** 18.82** 18.41** 16.31** 23.78** 52.26**  9.18** 17.44** 
    NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).  
5.5.1.2 Results of Symmetric Interbank-to-Retail Pass-through 
The results of the pass-through from interbank-to-retail rates are contained in tables 
5.6–5.7 below. Table 5.6 presents the results of the models without exogenous 
variables. Parameters in the SDR equation are statistically significant, at least, at 10 
per cent except the intercept term. Long-run pass-through to SDR is approximately 13 
per cent with an adjustment speed of 9 per cent monthly. Instantaneous pass-through 
is 3 per cent, thus, indicating an M.A.L of 11 months. The 7-day and the 1-month rates, 
however, indicated no significant pass-through in the short-run, while long-run pass-
through, at 31 and 45 per cent, respectively, are significant. With adjustment speed of 
about 17 per cent, in both cases, the M.A.L is approximately 6 months apiece.    
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Other TDRs showed comparable results and had statistically significant coefficients. 
Long-run pass-through is within 34–42 per cent (with 3-month rate having the highest 
coefficient). Immediate pass-through and the adjustment speed, respectively, ranged 
4–12 per cent and 16–35 per cent (the highest values being over-12-month rate). The 
M.A.L spanned approximately 3–6 months (lowest: over-12-month and highest: 3-
month). Thus, for TDRs, long-run pass-through decayed with maturity while the 
impact multiplier and the adjustment speed increased with maturity analysis. 
Table 5.6: Linear-ARDL Results for Interbank Rate Pass-through 
(Excluding Exogenous Variables) 
 Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   0.19 
(0.16) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
0.73** 
(0.34) 
0.97*** 
(0.30) 
1.39*** 
(0.49) 
1.18*** 
(0.38) 
2.33*** 
(0.68)  
1.17** 
(0.49) 
1.25*** 
(0.38) 
     -0.09
** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.051 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.06) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.35*** 
(0.08)  
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
   0.13
* 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.39*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.06)  
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
0.54*** 
(0.13) 
    0.03
** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.04)  
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 ̅   0.09 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.26  0.08 0.12 
F-Test(PSS) 2.66 8.89
** 6.97** 11.29** 6.83** 10.35** 10.55**  8.11** 5.20* 
    NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).  
IBR pass-through to LR is also low. Short-run pass-through is found to be either 
weakly significant (at 10 per cent for PLR) or insignificant (for MLR). However, at 40 
and 54 per cent, long-run pass-through to PLR and MLR are, respectively, statistically 
significant. Again, these results may indicate protection of prime customers from 
market volatility. With the error correction at about 8 per cent monthly, the M.A.L is 
approximately twelve months each. Compared with the DR, pattern of pass-through is 
considerably different for MLR but marginally dissimilar for PLR. As expected, MLR 
displayed higher pass-through in the long-run than DR indicating changing profit 
spreads and relative prices. Model evaluations suggest poor market-to-retail pass-
through. Generally, the  ̅  is low for all rates ranging from 9–26 per cent. The Wald-
test rejected the null (of    ) indicating incomplete interbank-to-retail pass-through. 
The PSS-test, however, could not reject the null for SDR but confirmed long-run 
relationship for other rates. 
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The role of financial development in the pass-through process is again investigated by 
including a proxy in the model. This had marginal effects and is statistically 
significant in the SDR, 7-day and MLR equations but insignificant for other rates. 
While it varied inversely with SDR and 7-day rates, it varied directly with the rest. As 
in the previous model, low and incomplete pass-through is recorded; albeit higher for 
LR than for most DRs. Adjustment lags ranged about 2–12 months (highest for PLR). 
Again, the PSS-test confirmed cointegration for all rates except SDR while the  ̅  is 
generally less than 30 per cent. The AIC, however, suggested that the proxy cannot be 
discarded across all the models. Specifically, equations with statistically significant 
proxy have lower AIC than counterparts in the preceding table. Hence, the models for 
SDR, 7-day and MLR are preferred with the inclusion of proxy while those for other 
rates are better without it. The impact of financial development on interbank pass-
through cannot therefore be generalised for all retail rates. 
Table 5.7: Linear-ARDL Results for Interbank Rate Pass-through Including M2/GDP 
 Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
0.64* 
(0.38) 
0.73*** 
(0.23) 
0.60 
(0.39) 
0.88** 
(0.38) 
1.32*** 
(0.49) 
1.13** 
(0.48) 
2.03*** 
(0.65) 
 
1.05** 
(0.48) 
0.99** 
(0.41) 
     
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.35*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
   
0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
M2/GDP 
-1.27* 
(0.71) 
-0.95** 
(0.47 
0.62 
(1.22) 
0.34 
(0.96) 
0.27 
(1.41) 
0.18 
(1.25) 
1.16 
(1.69) 
 
0.36 
(0.48) 
1.52*** 
(0.49) 
 ̅   0.10 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.26  0.08 0.14 
F-Test(PSS) 2.20 8.50
** 8.61** 11.18** 6.50** 9.55** 9.87**  8.04** 7.69** 
    NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).  
5.5.1.3 Stylised Deductions from the Linear Models 
The analyses revealed a number of outcomes. Most of these are related to the size and 
speed of pass-through across transmission phases and interest categories. Some of 
these are congruous with the stylised analyses conducted in section 5.3. From the 
analyses in the foregoing (sub-)sections, the findings from linear pass-through models 
are enumerated as follows. 
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(1) Higher pass-through from policy rate. First and foremost, pass-through is 
generally complete and higher for policy-to-market/retail than market-to-retail phase. 
This can imply a possible weakening of monetary policy transmission as the CBN 
attempt to influence the retail interest rates via the interbank market. However, retail 
rates adjust directly to policy changes suggesting that policy may nevertheless be 
effective. In Nigeria with the pronouncement of policy changes in the interest rate, 
banks may adjust their retail rates since customers may already be aware of the policy 
changes. The higher policy-to-retail pass-through (vis-à-vis market-to-retail) reflects 
the frequent (sometimes daily) fluctuation of IBR while retail rates are infrequently 
adjusted given the associated opportunity costs. Furthermore, banks may prefer to 
restrain market volatility from their customers. The seldom fine-tuned retail rates 
would thus covary prominently with the policy rate which also changes infrequently. 
This is consistent with Borio and Fristz (1995), who opined that in the face of a 
volatile money market the policy rate would anchor retail rates better, since it reflects 
stable rather than momentary adjustments. So the two phases of money policy may not 
be statistically relevant to the Nigerian case, and there may just be one phase. 
(2) Lower pass-through since 1996. Results in tables 5.3–5.5 suggest that pass-
through was affected by the introduction of the interbank market. Pass-through is 
generally lower in table 5.3 than in 5.4 and 5.5. The inclusion of 1996 dummies in the 
latter tables indicated that pass-through was considerable higher pre-1996 and reduced 
afterwards. In fact, linear addition of the coefficient of slope dummies in these tables 
indicated that pass-through was closer to those of table 5.3 (without dummies). This 
finding can be supported by the graphical presentations in section 5.3 which showed 
close movements of rates before mid-1990s and a decoupling thereafter. The reduced 
pass-through may be attributable to increased power of banks bestowed by the 
interbank market – following the further liberalisation of the financial system. This 
may seem counter-intuitive as the interbank market was intended to deepen the 
financial market and aid the transmission of money policy. However, the introduction 
of the interbank market opened a further avenue for banks to source (and possibly use 
excess) reserve thereby weakening the link between CBN borrowing and retail lending. 
Hence, commercial banks ceased to depend solely on the CBN (and retail deposits) for 
their sources while quitting prominent reliance on retail lending for their use. This 
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increased the power of banks (over their clients) and their ability to set rates slightly 
differently from what was obtainable before the interbank.    
(3) Financial underdevelopment increases mark-up. The level of financial 
development has a significant effect on the pattern of policy-to-retail pass-through but 
a moderate effect for market-to-retail pass-through. However, in most cases when it is 
significant, accelerated financial development lowered the intercept term and hence, 
the mark-up. This is not surprising as the mark-up are indicative, among other things, 
of market risks and the profit appetite of the banks. In developed markets, risks are 
better analysed and incorporated marginally into mark-up relative to underdeveloped 
markets. Besides, underdeveloped markets are more susceptible to the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazards. Hence, rather than ration credit, banks may 
incorporate risk premium into their prices as observed by Sander and Kleimeier (2004) 
and Gropp et al (2007). 
(4) Short-run stickiness relative to long-run. In all the models, immediate pass-
through is uniformly lower than the long-run counterpart. This is consistent with the 
findings of Mojon (2000), de Bondt (2002, 2005) and Gropp et al. (2007) among 
others. Policy would be deemed more effective if immediate pass-through were large. 
While instantaneous pass-through is fairly large in some cases it is nonetheless below 
unity, on average. This indicates rigidity of the short-run pass-through. Conversely, 
the long-run pass-through is somewhat complete for most retail and market rates, 
except for savings and 7-day rates. Hence, the analyses suggest the existence of short-
run rigidity and partial long-run flexibility. Pass-through is, therefore, generally higher 
in the long- than short-run. Complete long-run pass-through is suggestive of the 
monetary policy efficacy. However, this further requires a high adjustment speed of 
short- to long-run pass-through. On the average, the M.A.L is about eight months for 
DR, three months for LR and one month for IBR. This indicates that the difference 
between short- and long-run pass-through is highest for DR and lowest for IBR. Thus, 
as Kwapil and Scharler (2006) pointed out, retail rates do not adjust instantaneously to 
policy rate variations but requires a lag.            
(5) Higher pass-through to lending rate vis-à-vis deposit rates. In the different models 
presented above, adjustments are generally higher for LR than DR. This finding is 
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consistent with Hoffman and Mizen (2004), de Bondt (2005), Sørensen and Werner 
(2006), and Gropp et al. (2007). Again, this is further indicative of banks’ market 
power, which allows them to adjust LR more than DR following monetary tightening. 
Indeed, significant pass-through overshoot is observed for LR in some cases. This 
unequal response would alter relative prices (between cost of borrowing and money’s 
own rate) and the associated spread. Since monetary policy in Nigerian is largely 
aimed at controlling domestic credit, the ability to influence LR more than DR may be 
construed, in line with the views of Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howell (2002), to 
imply monetary policy effectiveness. However, the lower gap between the lending-
deposit rate pass-through in the short-run may suggest a weaker effect of policy.   
(6) Higher pass-through to maximum vis-à-vis prime lending rate. Monetary policy 
changes also altered the MLR-PLR differential. Pass-through is consistently higher in 
the short- and long-run for MLR than PLR. Theoretical discussions in the literature 
suggest that banks protect prominent clients from market volatility than typical 
customers. Though pass-through to both MLR and PLR are high (relative to other 
retail rates) it is higher for MLR; thereby supporting this argument. The higher pass-
through to MLR may also reflect market risks. The MLR-PLR spread signifies the risk 
premium which banks incorporated over and above normal PLR mark-up. In some 
cases, estimated pass-through coefficient overshot for both PLR and MLR. While PLR 
overshoot indicated market power and banks’ ability to charge excess mark-up even 
on relatively less risky credit, MLR incorporated risk premium in addition to excess 
mark-up. 
(7) Pass-through increases with terms of maturity. DRs with higher maturity tended to 
exhibit higher pass-through from policy rate both in the short- and the long-run. 
Comparing all DRs, pass-through is least for SDR followed by 7-day rate and is 
highest for over-12-month rates. This is comparable to Kwapil and Sharler (2006) who 
found short-term sluggishness in DR vis-à-vis long-term rates but contrasts the 
findings of Liu et al. (2008). While these studies examined short- versus long-term 
pass-through, we basically investigated pass-through among short-term rates. The 
higher past-through on deposits with longer maturity may indicate banks’ desire to 
generate stable deposits and protect themselves from future uncertainties regarding 
inflation, interest rate and monetary policy actions.   
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 5.5.2 The Nonlinear Model: Examining the Asymmetry in Pass-through 
Theoretical and empirical discussions in the literature suggested that banks’ pricing 
behaviour would differ between expansionary and contractionary monetary policy. 
Most empirical studies investigated this asymmetry in terms of the speed of pass-
through. Following Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010), however, this section examines 
nonlinearity in the size of pass-through (with a cursory consideration of asymmetry in 
speed). As in the previous sub-section, empirical analysis is conducted in two phases: 
policy-to-market and market-to-retail pass-through. By extricating negative from 
positive MPR changes, the analysis encapsulates possible asymmetry in the pass-
through process.
41
 Positive asymmetry occurs if contractionary MPR changes induced 
larger adjustment than expansionary changes while asymmetry is negative if response 
is higher for expansionary than contractionary stance. Again, we adopt a general-to-
specific approach by including twelve lags of the cardinal variables and achieving 
parsimony as earlier described. All computations and tests are conducted in line with 
those in the preceding sub-section.  
5.5.2.1 Result of Asymmetric Policy-to-Market and Policy-to-Retail Pass-through 
Tables 5.8–5.10 present the results of the asymmetric pass-through from policy rate to 
interbank and retail rates. In table 5.8, the results exclude exogenous variables 
(comparable to table 5.3). Most coefficients in the interbank equation are statistically 
significant except for the intercept and the short-run negative pass-though. Pass-
through is found to be complete and symmetric in the long-run while exhibiting short-
run positive asymmetry. The M.A.L also showed asymmetry in the speed of 
adjustment as MPR increases are immediately transmitted while reductions have two 
months lag. SDR and 7-day rates showed sluggishness in both the short- and long-run 
but negative asymmetry in the short-run. Long-run pass-through to SDR, though not 
statistically significant, is symmetric. Negative asymmetry is recorded for 7-day rate 
both in the short- and long-run. Other TDRs, however, generally exhibited long-run 
stickiness during tightening but complete pass-through during ease. For these rates 
pass-through had an overall negative asymmetry both in the short- and long-run. This 
shows that banks are more willing to lower deposit rates than raise them in response to 
                                            
41 See section 5.4.1 
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monetary policy changes; thus, indicating the pricing power of banks and their 
appetite for profit.  
For LRs, pass-through is complete in the long-run both for positive and negative 
changes and is symmetric. In the short-run, however, both lending rates showed 
negative asymmetry which may mean that banks may prefer to ration credit in the 
short-run to avoid the problems of adverse selection and/or moral hazards. For all 
retail rates, adjustments to positive changes are slower than those for negative changes 
as shown by the asymmetric M.A.L. The  ̅  is generally low and ranging 14–40 per 
cent. The PSS-test could only confirm the existence of long-run relationship for 
interbank thereby implying that the above results may be spurious. Again, to correct 
the anomalies and allow for comparability with the interbank equation, the model is 
re-estimated to incorporate 1996-intercept- (and -slope)-dummies.  
Table 5.8: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through  
(Excluding Exogenous Variables) 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
3.47 
(2.21) 
0.54*** 
(0.19) 
0.61*** 
(0.18) 
0.92*** 
(0.28) 
1.24*** 
(0.42) 
1.30*** 
(0.43) 
1.29*** 
(0.35) 
1.84*** 
(0.58) 
 
1.28*** 
(0.45) 
1.23*** 
(0.45) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
    
1.11*** 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
0.61*** 
(0.22) 
0.61*** 
(0.21) 
0.61*** 
(0.20) 
0.63*** 
(0.20) 
0.67*** 
(0.19 
 
0.99*** 
(0.24) 
1.13*** 
(0.32) 
    
1.11*** 
(0.19) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
0.70*** 
(0.24) 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
0.73*** 
(0.20) 
0.76*** 
(0.21) 
0.78*** 
(019) 
 
0.94*** 
(0.23) 
0.98** 
(0.25) 
  
   
1.00** 
(0.50) 
0.15** 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.32*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.31** 
(0.11) 
  
   
0.14 
(0.45) 
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
0.50*** 
(0.14) 
0.69*** 
(0.13) 
0.56*** 
(0.10) 
0.55*** 
(0.14) 
0.75*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.94*** 
(0.19) 
1.05*** 
(0.25) 
 ̅   0.18 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.22  0.40 0.38 
F-Test(PSS) 6.02
** 2.64 4.07 3.77 3.00 2.97 4.38 4.05  2.29 2.38 
      YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  YES YES 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
      YES YES                          YES YES 
  
    
                          YES              
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of 
asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and 
negative asymmetry, respectively).  
The results presented in table 5.9 showed improvement from that in the previous table 
as all re-estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Again, the slope-dummies 
indicated a significant reduction in the size of long-run pass-through after 1996. SDR 
and 7-day displayed rigidity while other TDRs showed a somewhat complete pass-
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through. Asymmetries in the short- and long-run for all deposit rates are either 
negative or insignificant. For LRs, long-run pass-through is significantly overshot 
both for positive and negative changes. In the long-run, however, LR is positively 
asymmetric having switched from negative asymmetry in the short-run. The M.A.L 
indicates that MPR changes are fully incorporated into retail rates within two months; 
though, faster for negative than positive adjustments. The   ̅  show increased 
explanatory ability of the models ranging 43–80 per cent. For all equations except the 
SDR, the PSS-test confirmed long-run relationship. Correspondingly, lower AICs are 
recorded vis-à-vis the preceding model indicating the superiority of the re-estimated 
model. Overall, the introduction of the interbank market had a significant effect on the 
pattern of interest pass-through in Nigeria.         
 
Table 5.9: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through Including 1996 Dummies 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   3.47 
(2.21) 
4.63*** 
(1.51) 
5.05*** 
(1.28) 
6.42*** 
(1.20) 
6.60*** 
(1.21) 
6.73*** 
(1.30) 
7.48*** 
(1.11) 
8.74*** 
(0.94) 
 
3.62*** 
(1.13) 
5.67*** 
(1.06) 
     -0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.43*** 
(0.14) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
-0.62*** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.11) 
-0.77*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.28*** 
(0.09) 
-0.41*** 
(0.08) 
    1.11*** 
(0.29) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.78*** 
(0.07) 
0.92*** 
(0.07) 
0.92*** 
(0.09) 
1.10*** 
(0.09) 
1.06*** 
(0.08) 
1.09*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.46*** 
(0.14) 
1.48*** 
(0.12) 
    1.11*** 
(0.18) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.79*** 
(0.06) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.96*** 
(0.09) 
1.14*** 
(0.10) 
1.10*** 
(0.08) 
1.13*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.39*** 
(0.14) 
1.13*** 
(0.12) 
  
   1.00** 
(0.50) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
0.44*** 
(0.14) 
0.51*** 
(0.13) 
0.73*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
0.70*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.61*** 
(0.12) 
  
   0.14 
(0.45) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.89*** 
(0.06) 
0.88*** 
(0.11) 
0.86*** 
(0.06) 
0.98*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.05*** 
(0.12) 
1.18*** 
(0.13) 
Φ-Dummy  
 
-2.08** 
(1.02) 
-1.01* 
(0.58) 
-0.03 
(0.69) 
-0.27 
(0.83) 
0.95 
(1.03) 
0.62 
(0.82) 
0.73 
(0.69) 
 
-0.85 
(0.75) 
-0.27 
(0.74) 
 α-Dummy  
 
0.43*** 
(0.15) 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
0.67*** 
(0.11) 
0.65*** 
(0.10) 
0.69*** 
(0.12) 
0.73*** 
(0.12) 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.08) 
0.41*** 
(0.07) 
δ-Dummy  
 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
-0.62*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.75 
(0.17) 
-0.78*** 
(0.13) 
-0.91*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.39*** 
(0.10) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
 ̅  0.18 0.43 0.56 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.80  0.51 0.60 
F-Test(PSS) 6.02
** 3.15 5.05** 11.28** 12.79** 8.87** 15.81** 29.73**  4.62* 9.19** 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES NO  NO NO 
      YES YES YES YES YES YES YES              
  
    
      YES             YES YES               
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of 
asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and 
negative asymmetry, respectively).  
The impact of financial development on pass-through is again investigated by 
incorporating a proxy to control for its role. This is found to be statistically significant 
in the equations for IBR, SDR, 3-month, PLR and MLR. As in the previous models, 
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the increases in the level of financial development lowered the spread and possibly the 
level of interest rates in the retail market though it showed considerably positive 
correlation with the interbank rate. The size of the coefficients are marginally different 
from those in the preceding table except, again, for IBR which showed non-negligible 
changes. Short-run positive pass-through in the IBR equation increased substantially 
and indicated an overshoot; higher than its long-run and short-run negative 
counterparts. In the long-run, pass-through is complete for positive but overshot for 
negative changes. The long-run thus displayed negative asymmetry while in the short-
run there is positive asymmetry.  
Table 5.10: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Policy Rate Pass-through 
Including 1996-Dummies and M2/GDP 
 
IBR 
Deposit  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
3.96** 
(1.92) 
5.23*** 
(1.41) 
5.49*** 
(1.13) 
6.99*** 
(1.01) 
7.31*** 
(1.04) 
7.38*** 
(1.15) 
8.01*** 
(0.97) 
9.16*** 
(0.77) 
 
5.55*** 
(1.24) 
7.73*** 
(1.00) 
     
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.50*** 
(0.12) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
-0.62*** 
(0.12) 
-0.66*** 
(0.10) 
-0.77*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.34*** 
(0.09) 
-0.45*** 
(0.07) 
    
1.20*** 
(0.21) 
0.55*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.90*** 
(0.06) 
0.90*** 
(0.08) 
1.07*** 
(0.09) 
1.04*** 
(0.07) 
1.08*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.37*** 
(1.10) 
1.39*** 
(0.10) 
    
1.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.56*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.93*** 
(0.06) 
0.93*** 
(0.08) 
1.11*** 
(0.09) 
1.08*** 
(0.07) 
1.11*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.27*** 
(0.10) 
1.31*** 
(0.10) 
  
   
1.40** 
(0.56) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
0.45*** 
(0.14) 
0.53*** 
(0.13) 
0.74*** 
(0.11) 
0.72*** 
(0.12) 
0.70*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.54*** 
(0.15) 
0.65*** 
(0.12) 
  
   
0.42 
(0.34) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.05) 
0.72*** 
(0.06) 
0.88*** 
(0.05) 
0.87*** 
(0.11) 
0.85*** 
(0.06) 
0.96*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.03*** 
(0.10) 
1.15*** 
(0.11) 
Φ-Dummy   
-1.96* 
(1.08) 
-1.07* 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
(0.70) 
-0.32 
(0.83) 
0.86 
(1.03) 
0.59 
(0.85) 
0.64 
(0.76) 
 
-1.81** 
(0.77) 
-1.52** 
(068) 
 α-Dummy   
0.43*** 
(0.15) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
0.69*** 
(0.10) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.71*** 
(0.11) 
0.74*** 
(0.09) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.53*** 
(0.07) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.27*** 
(0.09) 
-0.41*** 
(0.10) 
-0.63*** 
(0.10) 
-0.64*** 
(0.09) 
-0.77*** 
(0.15) 
-0.80*** 
(0.12) 
-0.92*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.52*** 
(0.11) 
-0.73*** 
(0.11) 
M2/GDP 
20.94*** 
(7.44) 
-1.51** 
(0.67) 
-1.25 
(0.86) 
-2.05 
(1.39) 
-2.49* 
(1.43) 
-2.44 
(1.60) 
-2.10 
(1.55) 
-1.76 
(1.70) 
 
-4.52*** 
(1.33) 
-6.13*** 
(1.15) 
 ̅  0.21 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.80  0.52 0.64 
F-Test(PSS) 8.57
** 4.14* 5.61** 11.16** 12.51** 9.48** 15.91** 29.24**  5.86** 14.27** 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
      NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES              
  
    
      YES     YES     YES YES              
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of 
asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and 
negative asymmetry, respectively).  
For the retail rates, pass-through is generally higher in the long- than the short-run. 
Again, SDR and 7-day showed sluggishness both in the short- and long-run. However, 
while SDR showed no evidence of asymmetry, 7-day exhibited short-run negative 
asymmetry. Other TDRs suggested complete (and symmetric) pass-through except for 
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the over-12-month rate with statistically significant negative overshoot in the long-run 
and negative asymmetry both in the short- and the long-run. For LRs, short-run 
positive pass-through is sluggish compared with a complete negative pass-through. In 
the long-run, the Wald-test showed a significantly overshot pass-through in either 
stances and for both rates. Test of asymmetry also rejected the null of symmetry for 
each LR in the short- and long-run. Consequently, the short-run displayed negative 
asymmetry which switches to positive asymmetry in the long-run.  
Controlling for financial development in the model improved the model diagnostics. 
First, the  ̅  was slightly higher than those in the previous model. The PSS-test now 
confirmed the existence of a long-run relationship in all equations; including SDR. 
The M.A.L suggested a full adjustment to the long-run level in less than two months in 
all cases. The negative M.A.L may also imply the role of expectation and the pre-
emptitive nature of banks. The re-specified models also had lower AIC than those in 
the preceding table thereby indicating that these were better than the earlier models. 
5.5.2.2 Results of Asymmetric Interbank-to-Retail Pass-through 
Asymmetry in the second phase of pass-through (i.e. market-to-retail) is investigated 
in this section and reported in tables 5.11 and 5.12. According to table 5.11, positive 
and negative changes in the IBR, are not transmitted to SDR whether in the short- or 
long-run. Indeed, significant short-run pass-through for positive IBR changes is only 
confirmed for TDRs of maturity between 3-months and over-12-months; for negative 
changes, pass-through holds only for over-12-month TDR in the short-run. In the 
long-run, all retail rates except SDR exhibit significant pass-through both for positive 
and negative changes. However, the pass-through is in most cases incomplete and 
symmetric (in size and speed) both in the short- and long-run. Generally, the models 
recorded low explanatory power with   ̅  of about 10–31 per cent, while PSS-test 
provided evidence (albeit weakly in some cases) of long-run relationship for most 
rates. Controlling for financial development again showed that its overall effect on the 
models is marginal with regards to asymmetry, size, sign and statistical significance of 
pass-through. Financial development, proxied by the ratio of broad money (M2) to 
GDP is weakly significant for LRs, and for 7-day to 3-month rates. While its 
coefficient bear negative signs for DRs, it nonetheless varied positively with LRs. 
Similar to the previous model, pass-through is generally low and significantly 
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incomplete for all rates both for positive and negative changes in the short- and long-
run.  
Table 5.11: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Interbank Rate Pass-through  
(Excluding Exogenous Variables) 
 Deposits   Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
1.01** 
(0.46) 
1.82*** 
(0.55) 
2.04*** 
(0.68) 
1.99*** 
(0.57) 
2.71*** 
(0.95) 
2.66*** 
(0.73) 
4.68*** 
(1.01) 
 
1.67*** 
(0.56) 
1.86*** 
(0.52) 
     
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
    
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.43*** 
(0.07) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.48*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 ̅  0.10 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.31  0.11 0.14 
F-Test(PSS) 2.16 5.79
** 4.29* 5.91** 3.81 5.53** 8.23**  5.64** 4.94** 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
  
    
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of 
asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and 
negative asymmetry, respectively).  
The Wald-test for asymmetric pass-through could not reject the null of symmetry in 
the short- and long-run for all retail rates. There is also no evidence of asymmetry in 
the M.A.L in all cases. However, the PSS-test confirmed long-run relationship for all 
rates except 1- and 6-month rates. Though the  ̅  showed substantial improvement for 
SDR, it is generally below 40 per cent. The AIC coefficient however suggested that 
the model without the proxy are not better especially for LRs as well as SDR, 7-day 
and 3-month rates. Once again, the impact of financial development on pass-through 
of the interbank rate cannot be generalised for all retail rates.  
5.5.2.3 Stylised Deductions from the Nonlinear Models 
The deductions from the nonlinear models are similar to those derived from the linear 
models. The common findings include higher pass-through from MPR versus IBR, 
declining pass-through post-1996, financial underdevelopment increases mark-up, 
short-run stickiness relative to long-run, higher pass-through to LR vis-à-vis DR, 
higher pass-through to MLR than PLR, and pass-through increases with terms of 
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maturity. However, further deductions can be made in terms of the asymmetry in the 
pattern of pass-through. These are listed below.  
(1) Overall sluggish pass-through from the interbank rate. Similar to the case in the 
linear model, pass-through from IBR is never complete whether for positive or 
negative changes both in the short- and long-run. For the MPR, however, pass-through 
is incomplete only for SDR and 7-day rates; although it overshot for the negative 
changes to over-12-month and the LRs.  
(2) No evidence of asymmetry in the interbank market. Pass-through from the 
interbank-to-retail rates is symmetric both in the short- and long-run, except for SDR 
where it exhibited negative long-run asymmetry. Conversely, there are evidences of 
asymmetric MPR pass-through to IBR and some retail rates in the short- and long-run. 
Hence, in response to changes in the policy rate, banks would adjust LR and DR 
differently depending on policy stance.  
Table 5.12: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Interbank Rate Pass-through Including M2/GDP 
 Deposits   Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
3.26*** 
(0.66) 
2.27*** 
(0.70) 
2.88*** 
(0.88) 
2.54*** 
(0.63) 
3.15*** 
(1.01) 
3.05*** 
(0.74) 
4.69*** 
(0.99) 
 
1.49*** 
(0.53) 
1.84*** 
(0.46) 
     
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
    
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.53*** 
(0.08) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.48*** 
(0.09) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
    
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.44*** 
(0.07) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.45*** 
(0.09) 
  
   
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
M2/GDP 
-0.43 
(0.81) 
-1.91* 
(1.13) 
-3.76* 
(1.90) 
-2.41* 
(1.39) 
-2.25 
(1.84) 
-2.16 
(1.72) 
-0.04 
(2.32) 
 
1.16* 
(0.70) 
2.76*** 
(0.65) 
 ̅  0.35 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.30  0.11 0.17 
F-Test(PSS) 8.01
** 5.53** 4.02 6.30** 3.53 5.84** 8.21**  6.87** 8.35** 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
  
    
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. F-test(PSS) is the 
cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of 
asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and 
negative asymmetry, respectively).  
(3) Positive long-run asymmetry for lending rates but symmetric pass-through to 
deposit rates. The LRs displayed positive asymmetry in the long-run, which indicated 
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that banks tend to increase them during contractionary policy but are less willing to 
lower them when MPR falls. Long-run pass-through is, however, symmetric for most 
DRs. The only DR which indicated long- (and short-run) negative asymmetry is the 
over-12-month rate. Overall, these imply that Nigerian banks are more willing to raise 
LR than DR thereby maintaining their profit mark-up. They further confirm banks’ 
power in administering prices, and possible inelasticity of deposits and loans activities 
(given the underdeveloped financial market and dearth of viable substitutes to bank-
products). Nonetheless, most retail rates are negatively asymmetric in the short-run 
indicating upward rigidity which could mean that while banks lowered rates almost 
instantaneously they transmit increased cost belatedly. 
These deductions and those from section 5.5.1.3 are summarised in tables 5.13 and 
5.14 below.  Overall, the tables show that pass-through from the interbank market is 
incomplete while direct adjustment is considerably higher after policy changes. Hence, 
the link from the interbank market to the retail rates is considerably weak. Pass-
through also reduced with the introduction of the interbank market suggesting 
diminished monetary policy transmission following market liberalisation. LRs respond 
more to policy changes than DRs. In the long-run, this response exhibit positive 
asymmetry for LR but symmetry for DR, indicating that banks are more probable to 
incorporate monetary tightening into LR than DR. The negative short-run asymmetry 
connote that even while lowering rates instantaneously (and raising them belatedly) 
banks are able to simultaneously maintain profitability and reduce default risk. In the 
second transmission phase, pass-through from the interbank market is generally low 
and symmetric. Hence, IBR pass-through is substantially sluggish and linear while 
that of MPR is, on average, higher and nonlinear. The higher pass-through from the 
policy rate vis-à-vis the interbank rate corroborates the findings of Sanders and 
Kleimeier (2004). 
The behaviour of LR suggests that banks may ration credit in the short-run but not in 
the long-run. This follows the upward LR rigidity in the short-run and the incomplete 
pass-through of the positive changes in the policy rate as seen in tables 5.13 below. 
This finding is intuitively plausible as banks would be weary of non-performing loans 
and its costs in the short-run. In the long-run banks compensate for this risk by 
overshooting the pass-through and raising mark-up further. 
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5.5.3 The State-space Model: Analysis of the Dynamic Pass-Through 
The estimation of the time-varying pass-through within a state-space framework is 
conducted only for symmetric MPR adjustments. The dynamics of interbank-to-retail 
pass-through is disregarded given its poor performance in the preceding ARDL 
models while we concentrate on linear analysis for simplicity. The model is estimated 
by setting the lag length at    in order to ensure a manageable parameterisation 
and simplify the model further. However, to allow for flexibility and ensure an 
optimal/robust outcome, different combinations of the variances   and  matrices are 
systematically assumed in our models. This enables us to determine the best 
specification as follows. First, the models are estimated with general non-negativity 
constraints in both matrices, and then re-estimated when   and/or the diagonal 
elements of the   matrix are restricted to zero or unity. This is conducted for two 
cases: (1) where the long- and short-run components of the state equation are allowed 
Table 5.13: Summary of Pass-through from Policy Rate to Retail Rates  
 Linear (Symmetric) Model Nonlinear (Asymmetric) Model 
 
SR-PT 
   
LR-PT 
  
Speed 
  
Complete 
 =   
Short-run PT Long-run PT Speed Complete Asymmetry 
  
+   
   +       + =     =    SR LR 
Interbank 0.61 - 0.79 1.01 - 1.52 0.37 - 0.43 YES* 1.00 - 1.40 0.14 - 0.45 1.11 - 1.21 1.11 -1.60 0.37 - 0.44 YES* YES* +ve NO 
Deposits Rates              
Savings 0.24 - 0.36 0.15 - 0.55 0.01 - 0.46 NO 0.15 - 0.30 0.21 - 0.41 0.03 - 0.57 0.31 - 0.57 0.04 - 0.45 NO NO NO NO 
7-Day  0.36 - 0.49 0.61 - 0.81 0.02 - 0.51 NO 0.11 - 0.35 0.42 - 0.57 0.30 - 0.78 0.51 - 0.79 0.05 - 0.50 NO NO -ve NO 
1-Month 0.38 - 0.65 0.71 - 0.88 0.07 - 0.66 YES 0.09 - 0.45 0.50 - 0.74 0.60 - 0.92 0.70 - 0.96 0.08 - 0.61 YES YES -ve NO 
3-Month 0.51 - 0.73 0.61 - 0.87 0.11 - 0.63 YES 0.16 - 0.54 0.69 - 0.90 0.63 - 0.93 0.69 - 0.96 0.10 - 0.61 YES YES -ve NO 
6-Month 0.45 - 0.82 0.74 - 1.04 0.08 - 0.66 YES 0.23 - 0.74 0.55 - 0.89 0.61 - 1.10 0.73 - 1.14 0.10 - 0.63 YES YES NO NO 
12-Month 0.47 - 0.79 0.68 - 1.03 0.09 - 0.66 YES 0.33 - 0.72 0.55 - 0.87 0.63 - 1.06 0.76 - 1.10 0.10 - 0.66 YES YES NO NO 
 >12-Month 0.61 - 0.86 0.72 - 1.06 0.12 -0 .79 YES 0.32 - 0.71 0.75 - 0.98 0.67 - 1.10 0.78 - 1.13 0.14 - 0.78 YES YES* -ve -ve 
Lending Rate              
Prime  0.70 - 0.87 0.86 - 1.46 0.09 - 0.30 YES* 0.28 - 0.55 0.94 - 1.06 0.99 - 1.47 0.94 - 1.39 0.08 - 0.35 YES* YES* -ve +ve 
Maximum 0.80 - 1.02 0.82 - 1.60 0.07 - 0.44 YES* 0.32 - 0.65 1.06 - 1.19 1.14 - 1.49 0.98 - 1.39 0.08 - 0.45 YES* YES* -ve +ve 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Figures represent the lower and upper range of estimates extracted from tables 5.3–5.12. SR-PT and LR-PT stand for short- and long-run pass-through, respectively. Figures under speed are reported in absolute 
values. Complete measures the extent of pass-through: NO, YES and YES
*
 indicate incomplete, complete, and overshoot, respectively. Asymmetry tests for possible lopsidedness in response: NO, +ve, and –ve indicate 
symmetry, positive asymmetry, and negative asymmetry, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 5.14: Summary of Pass-through from Interbank Rate to Retail Rates  
 Linear (Symmetric) Model Nonlinear (Asymmetric) Model 
 
SR-PT 
   
LR-PT 
  
Speed 
  
Complete 
 =   
Short-run PT Long-run PT Speed Complete Asymmetry 
  
+   
   +       + =     =    SR LR 
Deposits Rates              
Savings 0.02 - 0.03 0.10 - 0.14 0.09 - 0.12 NO 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.02 - 0.04 0.15 - 0.54 NO NO NO -ve 
7-Day  0.01 - 0.02 0.29 - 0.31 0.18 - 0.19 NO 0.01 - 0.02 0.02 - 0.04 0.31 - 0.33 0.31 - 0.33 0.23 - 0.25 NO NO NO NO 
1-Month 0.01 - 0.02 0.44 - 0.45 0.16 - 0.16 NO 0.03 - 0.04 0.01 - 0.04 0.50 - 0.54 0.48 - 0.50 0.19 - 0.22 NO NO NO NO 
3-Month 0.03 - 0.04 0.41 - 0.42 0.16 - 0.17 NO 0.06 - 0.07 0.02 - 0.04 0.47 - 0.50 0.45 - 0.48 0.16 - 0.18 NO NO NO NO 
6-Month 0.04 - 0.05 0.40 - 0.41 0.23 - 0.24 NO 0.06 - 0.07 0.04 - 0.06 0.43 - 0.46 0.42 - 0.44 0.23 - 0.24 NO NO NO NO 
12-Month 0.05 - 0.06 0.39 - 0.40 0.20 - 0.21 NO 0.06 - 0.07 0.07 - 0.09 0.45 - 0.48 0.44 - 0.46 0.20 - 0.22 NO NO NO NO 
 >12-Month 0.11 - 0.12 0.33 - 0.35 0.35 - 0.36 NO 0.07 - 0.17 0.19 - 0.20 0.35 - 0.36 0.34 - 0.35 0.37 - 0.38 NO NO NO NO 
Lending Rate              
Prime  0.01 - 0.02 0.39 - 0.41 0.08 - 0.09 NO 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.35 - 0.39 0.36 - 0.39 0.08 - 0.09 NO NO NO NO 
Maximum 0.01 - 0.02 0.54 - 0.57 0.08 - 0.09 NO 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.43 - 0.54 0.45 - 0.54 0.08 - 0.09 NO NO NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Figures represent the lower and upper range of estimates extracted from tables 5.3–5.12. SR-PT and LR-PT stand for short- and long-run pass-through, respectively. Figures under speed are reported in absolute 
values. Complete measures the extent of pass-through: NO, YES and YES
*
 indicate incomplete, complete, and overshoot, respectively. Asymmetry tests for possible lopsidedness in response: NO, +ve, and –ve indicate 
symmetry, positive asymmetry, and negative asymmetry, respectively. 
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to be stochastic; and (2) where the short-run component is forced to be recursive.  
Converging models with the smallest AIC statistic is selected as the preferred model.  
Generally, our analysis selected the second case so that we specific the long-run 
component of the state equation as stochastic processes and the short-run component 
as recursive processes.   
Analyses in this section focus on the dynamics of the long-run      and the 
immediate {    } pass-through.
42
 The matrix of exogenous variables (  ) included a 
proxy for the level of financial development {    } computed, again, as the ratio of 
broad money (M2) to GDP and a dummy variable {    } that took the value of zero 
pre-1996 and unity thereafter. The dummy allows for comparability of the interbank 
equation vis-à-vis the other rates. To ensure robust and valid inferences, model 
diagnostics are performed on the predicted residual series and evaluated at the 5 per 
cent level of significance.  
Results of the estimated parameters are presented in table 5.15 below.  The estimated 
variances reported are for the random disturbances of the signal equation (   (  )  
     
 ), and those of the estimated parameters      and     , where    (    )     
  
and    (    )     
 , respectively. The figures suggest low variances in all cases, 
which exceeded unity only for the over-12-month rate. Table 5.15 also showed the 
final state of the stochastic and recursive parameters (i.e. the estimated coefficients as 
at the last data observation, 2011:M1). The first three parameters (i.e. the long-run 
components) are specified as stochastic processes while the short-run parameters are 
recursive. In January 2011, 7-day rate showed the weakest long-run pass-through at 3 
per cent while MLR with a 38 per cent overshoot is strongest. Immediate pass-through 
is generally low and ranging 21–64 per cent (lowest: SDR, highest: IBR).     
The table further indicated that the intercept term is significant in almost all equations 
except IBR, 12-month and over-12-month rates. These are higher for LR than DR with 
IBR in-between. This is reflective of banks’ pricing behaviour where LR is marked-up 
more than DR. Results of the fixed parameters also showed that financial development 
is somewhat important in the pass-through process; being statistically significant in six 
                                            
42 Where           
        as earlier defined 
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equations. Furthermore, similar to deductions in the preceding section, financial 
development varied inversely with mark-up (by reducing banks’ power). The last of 
the fixed level coefficients, the 1996 intercept dummy, is generally not significant in 
the model indicating that introduction of the interbank rate had not affected the mark-
up. Thus, the results for retail rates can be simply compared with those of the IBR 
without loss of information.  
Table 5.15: Estimated Parameters of the State-Space Models 
 
IBR SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr PLR MLR 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
var(ηt) 0.99 0.02 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.99 1.33 0.00 0.00 
var(υ1t) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
var(υ2t) 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Final State of Stochastic and Recursive Parameters 
α -1.16 -1.08 -0.50 -0.99 -0.97 -0.96 -0.38 -0.76 -0.82 -0.84 
δ 0.65 0.22 0.01 0.61 0.51 0.04 0.26 0.39 0.47 1.16 
β 0.56 0.21 0.03 0.62 0.53 0.04 0.68 0.52 0.56 1.38 
γ0  0.63 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.51 0.53 0.56 
γ1  -0.79 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 
γ2 -0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.01 
ψ1 0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 
ψ2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.00 -0.03 
Fixed Level Parameters 
Φ 
7.06 
(9.61) 
4.54*** 
(1.22) 
4.09*** 
(1.32) 
5.93** 
(2.31) 
3.12*  
(1.63) 
6.88**   
(3.48) 
3.33 
(2.19) 
4.15 
(2.97) 
12.94*** 
(1.45) 
12.85*** 
(1.86) 
Ξ1 
-0.48*** 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09**   
(0.04) 
-0.07*   
(0.04) 
-0.07  
(0.05) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Ξ2  
-0.82* 
(0.46) 
-0.32 
(0.86) 
-0.69   
(1.31) 
-0.95   
(1.02) 
-0.24 
(2.74) 
-0.41 
(1.69) 
0.15 
(2.23) 
-0.06 
(2.60) 
0.45 
(1.49) 
LL -558.6 -363.4 -414.4 -500.1 -518.2 -545.9 -568.6 -623.7 -483.9 -520.9 
AIC 6.29 2.37 2.70 3.26 3.37 3.54 3.69 4.04 3.14 3.38 
Qk=12 
4.58 
[0.97] 
21.25* 
[0.06] 
9.40  
[0.66] 
13.00 
[0.36] 
14.98 
[0.24] 
11.30 
[0.50] 
11.20  
[0.51] 
13.62 
[0.32] 
24.33** 
[0.04] 
13.47 
[0.33] 
ARh=12 
0.15  
[0.99] 
34.01** 
[0.02] 
1.72  
[0.98] 
32.35 
[0.05] 
18.90 
[0.28] 
30.40 
[0.07] 
20.22 
[0.18] 
20.37 
[0.17] 
14.02 
[0.41] 
18.61 
[0.27] 
J-B 
(     ) 
2.51*** 
[0.00] 
2.02*** 
[0.00] 
5.26*** 
[0.00] 
1.27*** 
[0.00] 
0.83*** 
[0.00] 
1.04*** 
[0.00] 
0.16*** 
[0.00] 
0.43*** 
[0.00] 
3.08*** 
[0.00] 
7.03*** 
[0.00] 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) and [  ] correspond to standard errors and 
p-values.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. var(ηt) and var(υit) represent the estimated error variances for the 
signal and state equations, respectively while Ξ is the matrix of coefficients of the exogenous variables.  LL and AIC stand for log 
likelihood and Akaike information criterion, respectively. Qk is the Q-statistic for testing k
th
 lag serial-correlation while J-B is the Jarque-
Bera test for normality. ARh is the ARCH(h) correlogram Q-test of squared residuals for evaluating heteroskedasticity in h lags.   
Robustness analysis is conducted on the predicted residual of the signal equation. 
According to Commandeur and Koopman (2007), the assumption of independence is 
considered most important, followed by that of identical distribution. The assumption 
of normality, though desirable, is the least important the violation of which does not 
undermine our inferences. To test independence, the Q-test of serial-correlation is 
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conducted on the predicted residuals with lag       . The null of no serial-
correlation up to the twelfth lag is only rejected for PLR. Heteroskedasticity is 
investigated via an ARCH(h) test of squared predicted residuals with      while 
normality is tested using the Jarque-Bera statistic. Overall, the diagnostic results for 
the equations showed that in virtually all cases the models are independently and 
identically but not normally distributed. Thus, while they may pass as white noise they 
are nonetheless generally non-Gaussian.    
Analysis of the dynamic pass-through of      is depicted in figure 5.4. The plot 
depicts the traverse of      together with ±2 standard errors. For most of the series, 
pass-through tended to be relatively stable until 1986 when the first phase of financial 
liberalisation commenced. Furthermore, pass-through generally seemed to be 
statistically complete until 1990s (though it remained above 0.5 afterwards). For SDR 
and 7-day rates, the series are significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level 
prior 1996 but became statistically insignificant, thenceforth. This indicated that SDR 
and 7-day rates had not responded to MPR changes since 1996. Most other rates, 
however, showed statistically significant pass-through throughout the sample period 
with occasional blips of insignificance (or overshoot). IBR exhibited more volatility in 
the      traverse than other rates; though with complete pass-through in general. The 
results presented in figure 5.4 are comparable with those contained in table 5.3 (which 
is also uncorrected for slope-dummies). In both sets of results, pass-through to SDR 
and 7-day rates are largely insignificant but is significant for other retail rates ranging 
0.5–1.0 in most cases. Again, pass-through is also higher for LR than DR and has 
generally diminished most recently.   
However, the plots indicated some level of uniformity in the trends of the dynamic 
pass-through.  Over time,      tended to rise and fall at approximately the same time; 
thereby suggesting regime shifts. This observation is more discernible in figure 5.5. 
Three distinct regimes are identifiable viz: 1986, 1996, and 2006. This implied a 
considerable regime shift every decade. Before 1986, the pass-through coefficients 
were relatively stable owing largely to the prevalent practice of administratively fixing 
interest rates during that period. The CBN literally set banks’ retail rates then. 
Following liberalisation, banks could freely fix interest rates at their desired levels. 
Hence, the pass-through coefficients jumped considerably in the retail rates but 
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declined sharply almost immediately. Thereafter, pass-through tended to meander 
within the 0.5–1.0 band until 1996 when it again diminished rapidly. The 1996 
structural break coincided with the introduction of the interbank system which enabled 
banks to trade among themselves thereby creating another avenue for sourcing reserve 
aside the central bank. This meant that banks reacted less to MPR, at least for some 
time, since there now existed another market for reserves.  
Figure 5.4: Long-run Dynamics of Policy Rate Pass-Through 
 
 
Circa December 2006, another general shift in the pattern of pass-through occurred, 
which coincided with the MPR reform aimed at ensuring effective anchorage of retail 
and market rates. Correspondingly, the pass-through coefficient displayed a sudden 
rise in most rates, causing overshoot in some cases. This suggests that the introduction 
of the new framework in December 2006 had the desired effect on the retail rates as it 
elicited higher responses from banks following policy actions. However, this was 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for Savings Deposit Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for 7-Day Deposit Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for 1-Month Deposit Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for 3-Month Deposit Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for 6-Month Deposit Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for12-Month Deposit Rate Rate
±2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for Over-12 Month Deposit Rate
±2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for Prime Lending Rate 
±2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Pass-Through Beta for Maximum Lending Rate
±2 Standard Errors
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Pass-Through Beta for Interbank Rate
± 2 Standard Errors
155 
 
 
 
short-lived. A fourth period of shift (though not highlighted in figure 5.5) was the 
universal plunge noticeable in 2009. This regime break can be attributed to the 
concurrent global financial crisis and/or the near collapse of about 40 per cent of 
Nigerian DMBs due to malpractice, poor corporate governance, and inadequate 
regulation of the banking system. Besides, this decline corroborated the views of 
Gropp et al. (1995) and Bredin et al. (2002) that pass-through diminishes with 
recessions.  
Figure 5.5: Structural Shifts in Policy Rate Pass-through  
 
  
While the long-run pass-through had largely fluctuated over time, the short-run (i.e. 
instantaneous) pass-through had maintained a downward trend. The path of short-run 
pass-through is depicted in figure 5.6. Apart from the one-off jump at about the 
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beginning of the sample, the coefficients of the short-run pass-through showed steady 
decline. Furthermore, the short-run pass-through coefficients are lower than those in 
the long-run and are generally incomplete. As noted earlier, the lower short-run pass-
through vis-à-vis the long-run suggests that commercial banks do not fully adjust to 
policy changes instantaneously but rather over a lag. The continued fall in the short-
run coefficient can thus imply an ever widening monetary policy lag. This is 
consistent with the findings in the ADRL estimations. Hence, this state-space analysis 
confirms short-run rigidity albeit at an increasing rate.   
Figure 5.6: Time Dynamics of Short-run Pass-Through 
 
  
Overall, the results from the state-space model do not differ substantially from those 
of the linear and nonlinear-ARDL models. Thus, general deductions are identical to 
those in section 5.5.1.3 where pass-through is found to be comparatively higher for 
LR than DR, among other findings. However, in addition to these, results from the 
state-space analysis suggested that monetary policy had become less potent over the 
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sample period (apart from the three years between December 2006 and December 
2009). This is made obvious by the downward structural shifts of 1986, 1996 and 
2009. Monetary policy effectiveness was further debilitated by the low and reducing 
level of the short-run pass-through, which increased the outside lag of policy changes.     
5.6 Conclusion  
In recent times, monetary policy in Nigeria has evolved to the use of the short-term 
interest rate to moderate inflation. This is thought to be transmitted via a number of 
channels including the interest rate channel which describes the responsiveness of 
market and retail rates to policy rate. Transmission under this channel can be divided 
into two stages viz:  policy-to-market and market-to-retail (de Bondt, 2005). The 
design of this form of monetary policy assumes a complete pass-through at each stage 
of transmission. However, the robustness of the interest rate channel in an economy is 
directly related to the level of development of the financial market (Gigineishvili, 
2011). For developing countries with weak and unsophisticated financial markets 
monetary policy, via this channel, may be less effective (Weeks, 2009; 2010). Hence, 
the structure of the interbank market would play a key role in the monetary policy 
process. In Nigeria, the interbank market is pivotal in the monetary policy design. The 
CBN regularly monitors this market to conjecture developments in the retail market 
and state of the real economy in general. Hence, efforts are continually made to 
effectively anchor IBR to MPR. However, even if these were properly linked, a 
necessary condition for effectiveness of this type of monetary policy is that retail rates 
be adequately anchored as well.  
Under the interest rate channel, the pass-through from policy rate may differ between 
rates, markets, maturity and policy stance. Furthermore, the size and speed of pass-
through may change over time so that in some periods, monetary policy may be more 
effective than in others. This chapter investigated the pattern of policy-to-market (and 
-to-retail) and market-to-retail pass-through in Nigeria. The methodologies adopted 
allowed us to determine the size, speed, and time-path of interest rate pass-through in 
the short- and long-run. Empirical investigation was conducted to capture the 
practicalities of monetary policy in Nigeria. Thus, the analyses tested the transmission 
from policy to interbank and then to retail rates while including a proxy to control for 
the impact of financial (under)development.   
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Among the key findings was that the link between interbank and retail rates is weak 
while pass-through from policy rate is higher. This can reduce the effectiveness of 
monetary policy since the CBN attempt to influence retail rates via the interbank 
market. The fact that retail rates responded directly to policy changes suggested that 
policy may nevertheless be effective and that the CBN may have to de-emphasise its 
focus on the interbank market. The current practice of deducing the course of the real 
economy from the performance of the interbank market alone may be misguiding and 
may lead to wrong policy outcomes. Arguably, the weak market-to-retail link is 
attributable to sharp (daily) fluctuations of IBR, reflecting market conditions, relative 
to infrequent (monthly or sometime quarterly) adjustment of retail rates. The 
infrequently altered retail rates would thus associate more with the policy rate which 
also changes occasionally. This was hinted by Borio and Fristz (1995) who opined 
that in the face of a volatile money market the policy rate may explain changes in the 
retail rates better. Therefore, the two phases of monetary policy may not be 
statistically relevant to the Nigerian case and there may just be one phase which the 
CBN ought to monitor. 
In fact, not only is the pass-through from IBR low, the introduction of the interbank 
market itself had a diminishing effect on the pass-through process. The market was 
introduced in 1996 to, among other things, deepen the financial market and enhance 
the transmission of monetary policy. Financial deepening, generally, should afford 
economic agents (banks, households, and enterprises) alternative avenues for sourcing 
and investing their funds. However, the interbank market only granted this access to 
banks and, inevitably, increased their market power over retail customers thereby 
debilitating the transmission process. The actions of the CBN, in 2006, aimed at 
improving the link between policy, interbank and retail rates had a temporary positive 
impact which tapered-off after three years. Financial development was found to have a 
significant effect on the pattern of pass-through from policy rate to retail rate but a 
moderate effect on the pass-through from IBR. It nonetheless reduced the mark-up in 
most interest rates. The continued shallowness of the Nigerian money market may be 
connected to the dominance of government securities over corporate securities and the 
crowding-out of non-bank public by the banking system. This then have the overall 
effect of putting bank customers in a disadvantaged position, increasing banks’ power 
and undermining the pass-through.   
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Another important finding is the existence of short-run stickiness relative to the long-
run, which is consistent with the findings of Mojon (2000), de Bondt (2002, 2005) and 
Gropp et al. (2007) among others. As observed earlier, policy would be more effective 
if immediate pass-through is large. While short-run pass-through was fairly large in 
some cases it was nonetheless incomplete in most cases and was consistently less than 
the long-run coefficient. The time-varying analyses further revealed that the short-run 
coefficient had a downward trend. This indicated that monetary policy was becoming 
less effective with time; because as the immediate response diminishes, the full 
adjustment lag would be elongating ceteris paribus. On the average, the M.A.L of the 
ARDL models suggested that monetary policy changes were completed within eight 
months for most DRs, three months for LRs and one month for IBR. The continued 
decline of the short-run pass-through means that the lags can get even longer. If it 
takes three to eight months (or more) for the interest rates to fully adjust, then it would 
take even longer for policy to impact on the real economy. Again, this has 
implications for the overall effectiveness of monetary policy.               
The low level of financial development which limits the access of non-bank private 
sector to the market tilts market power in favour of the banks vis-à-vis their retail 
customers and weakens the transmission process. Empirical analysis provided further 
evidence of increased market power of banks in the system. First, pass-through was 
higher to LRs than DRs; consistent with de Bondt (2005), Gropp et al. (2007), 
Hoffman and Mizen (2004), and Sørensen and Werner (2006). This unequal response 
would affect the relative prices between cost of borrowing and money’s own rate 
thereby altering the spread. According to Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howell 
(2002) this ought to make monetary policy more effective. This would be true for a 
credit-driven economy while it would indicate ineffectiveness in a savings-based one. 
Given that NCM model is derived from household inter-temporal optimisation of 
consumption (and savings), the result can portend overall ineffectiveness. Second, 
pass-through to retail rates is in part asymmetric. While LRs exhibited positive long-
run asymmetry, DRs responded symmetrically. Thus, banks are willing to raise LRs 
following monetary tightening but reluctant to lower them during ease; thus, 
maintaining high profit mark-up. This is indicative of inelasticity of retail customers to 
both deposits and loans, which is again attributable to financial underdevelopment and 
dearth of viable substitutes for bank products. 
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Furthermore, Nigeria banks are not risk-neutral as indicated by the consistently higher 
pass-through to MLR than PLR (both in the short- and long-run). Theoretical 
discussions in the literature suggest that banks would protect their prime customers 
from volatility in the market while conveying more of the changes to ordinary 
customers. In addition, underdeveloped markets may be more exposed to the problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazards. Hence, rather than ration credit banks may 
incorporate risk premium into the interest rates they charge (Sander and Kleimeier, 
2004; Gropp et al., 2007). However, our finding of negative asymmetry, 
instantaneously, suggests the possibility of rationing at least in the short-run. The 
higher pass-through to MLR may be indicative of the risky nature of the market, so 
that the MLR-PLR spread reflects the risk premium which banks charged over and 
above the normal mark-up on PLR. In some cases, overshot pass-through is estimated 
for LRs. The PLR overshoot showed banks’ market power and ability to charge excess 
mark-up even on relatively less risky loans while MLR incorporated risk premium in 
addition to the excess mark-up. 
Overall, the analysis indicated that pass-through is stronger from policy to retail rates. 
However, the size of pass-through both in the short- and long-run had diminished over 
time. Thus, monetary policy (in the form of interest rate policy) had become weaker 
with time and the response lag of policy is increasing. While the inability of IBR to 
anchor retail rates may essentially pose no threat, the considerable market power of 
DMBs in price determination had an adverse effect on the pass-through process. This 
may be reflective of the inadvertent exclusion of non-bank private sector from the 
money market and low substitutability to DMBs’ products. In essence, for interest rate 
policy to be effective in Nigeria there may be the need to ensure that financial markets 
are deepened, so that all players and agents have considerable access to the market, 
and there is a wide array of instruments and securities to choose from. Secondly, the 
CBN may need to de-emphasise the focus on the interbank market as it is more-or-less 
redundant in the monetary policy transmission process.  
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6: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY 
IN NIGERIA: HOW RESPONSIVE IS PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
While pass-through to retail rates assumedly reflects the first effect of monetary policy, 
the intermediate effect is captured in the reaction of AD and/or its components.  For 
many developing countries like Nigeria, the understanding of this responsiveness 
remains inadequate. Monetary policy effects may differ among AD and its 
components. These differences may even be wider, depending on the country’s level 
of financial and real development, thus, culminating in ambiguous policy outcome 
under IT and NCM framework. Key components of AD usually considered here are 
consumption and investment although the NCM model places emphasis, almost 
exclusively, on consumption. Given the nature of the Nigerian economy and the 
importance of financial markets for investment, this chapter focuses on the 
responsiveness of investments to monetary policy changes in the interest rate.  
Changes in monetary policy stances may affect investment via two main channels: the 
credit and the interest rate channel. This is so because the ability of CBs to change the 
short-term nominal interest rates enables them to influence the conditions in the credit 
market (Fontana, 2009b) and the viability of investment projects (Stiglitz and 
Greenwald, 2003). Thus, monetary policy would have both price and quantity impacts 
on investment. Increases in the interest rate will increase the cost of capital, reduce the 
viability of projects, increases uncertainty and risks associated with investments, and 
reduce the amount of finance (both internally and externally) committed to 
investments. Credit demand and total investments would thus be reduced. By the same 
token, the risk and uncertainties of investments impedes banks’ willingness to lend 
(given the possibility of lower expected profits if the borrowers default). Thus, credit 
rationing and/or reduced demand for loans lower the overall credit allocated to the 
private sector, which subsequently leads to reduced investment. However, even when 
credits are unconstrained, changes in the interest rate may have an overriding impact 
on investment. Traditionally the relationship between investment and interest rates are 
deemed inverse, although recent empirical and theoretical studies have shown that the 
relationship can be rather complex and dependent on a number of conditions.   
6 
162 
 
 
 
For developing countries with unsophisticated institutions and markets, investments 
may depend more on other factors than those related to monetary policy. In these 
countries, firms would rely more on internal financing rather than external sources 
(Fry, 1995). This is because large informal sector and underdeveloped money markets 
leads to the financial exclusion of many potential investors both from the capital and 
the money markets. Another critical determinant relevant for developing countries is 
the scale of public sector investments in infrastructure and amenities. In this regards, 
public investment, rather than crowd-out private investment, would complement it by 
providing a favourable investment field (Greene and Villanueva, 1991).   
Though the focus of this chapter is to investigate the effect of monetary policy 
(particularly interest rates) on investment, the empirical analysis is conducted to 
estimate, as extensively as possible, the impact of other important determinants. The 
analysis is conducted using quarterly data spanning 1985:Q1–2011:Q2 for a number 
of variables including average lending rates, private and public sector investments, 
and GDP, among others. A total of fourteen explanatory variables entered the initial 
empirical framework but were later pruned to six by using various tests to eliminate 
highly collinear or redundant variables. Econometric estimations of the relevant 
elasticities followed an ARDL cointegration framework, to accommodate the non-
stationarity of economic variables. This enabled us to investigate possible nonlinearity 
in the interest-rate-investment relationship. Given the dichotomy of the Nigerian 
economy, the analysis is conducted for oil, non-oil and total investments.  
The results generally indicate a monotonic but nonlinear relationship between the 
interest rate and investments in Nigeria. This nonlinearity does not depend on the level 
of interest rate, but rather on the size of change and stance of monetary policy. 
Essentially, large changes (of about 150 basis points or more) in monetary policy rates 
induce a sizeable inverse effect on investment while the effects of moderate changes 
are ambiguous. These effects are larger for the non-oil sector (which may be 
financially constrained) than the oil sector (which is deemed to always have sufficient 
financing). The results also indicate that credit availability have a positive effect in the 
short-run but reduce investments in the long-run. This may be due to the practice of 
short-term (rather than long-term) lending among Nigerian banks. Political and 
economic uncertainties are also found to lower long-run investments. Overall, 
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government investment is found to be the most important determinant of investment in 
the long-run, where it showed a complementary effect; although in the short-run, it 
tended to crowd-out private investment. The long-run complementarity may be due to 
the provision of enabling business/investment environment, while the short-run 
substitutability is attributable to excessive competition for external funds with the 
private sector. In general, the results suggest that as long as monetary policy changes 
are sizeable (and affect the credit availability) it may be able to control investment and 
AD. However, given that the recent monetary policy norm is to adjust policy rates by 
between 25-50 basis points, this implied that policy would be ineffective in achieving 
its objective and can even cause distortions to the system. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into ten sections. In section two, following this 
introduction, a brief justification is provided for studying the investment component of 
AD rather than the consumption component which is the core of the NCM derivation 
of AD. Section three contains theoretical and practical discussions of the impact of 
monetary policy on investment particularly with regards to the price and quantity 
effects. A general outline of the competing standard theories of investments is 
conducted in section four, while the discussion is narrowed to developing countries in 
section five. Sources and types of data as well as stylised analysis are presented in 
section six, while section seven shows the methodology and presents the model 
specification. In section eight, econometric analysis is conducted; the results and 
implications of which are then discussed in section nine. The chapter concludes in 
section ten.   
6.2 Monetary Policy and Aggregate Demand: Why Study 
Investment? 
In the NCM model, monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule (like the 
Taylor rule) the effect of which is transmitted through an IS-type AD equation to the 
overall target of inflation (Arestis, 2007; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008b; Clarida et al., 
1999; and Meyer, 2001).
43
 It is implicitly assumed, within this model, that policy 
induced changes in interest rates would impact on the components of AD, especially 
consumption and investment. Responses of these components would then be reflected 
                                            
43 In the literature, the NCM model is also variously referred to as the new-Keynesian or new neoclassical synthesis 
models. 
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in the AD. However, the degree or pattern of responsiveness of individual components 
may (or may not) differ comparatively. In some economies, it may be possible that 
investments respond more to interest changes than consumption, while the converse 
may hold for other economies. It may also be possible that these components respond 
equally to policy changes, or do not respond at all.  
Many academics and policymakers recognise the significance of investment in the 
monetary transmission process through the AD channel (Emmons and Schmid, 2004). 
Yet, according to Arestis and Sawyer (2008a, 2008b), most recent researches on the 
NCM model (as expounded for instance in Galí (2008), Walsh (2003,ch.5) and 
Woodford (2003,ch.4)) have focused on the link between inter-temporal household 
consumption and AD. Thus, implying that monetary policy affects AD solely through 
households’ decision to consume or save. In these works, the direct effects of interest 
rate through the investment expenditure are usually overlooked and are surmised via 
the savings channel. McCallum and Nelson (1997) somewhat justified the exclusion 
of investment from the AD framework and argued that  
“there is very little connection at cyclical frequencies 
between capital stock movements and those in aggregate 
output and consumption variables. In large part this is 
because a typical year's investment is very small in 
relation to the existing stock of capital” (p.7). 
However, AD is determined by investment flows rather than stock of capital 
(Baddeley, 2003). Thus, as noted by Dupor (2001) this line of argument mislays the 
raison d'être for endogenising investment in the NCM framework – not only is 
investment a substantial part of GDP, it is also the most volatile component of AD (e.g. 
it more than quadrupled consumption volatility in the USA). Baumann and Price 
(2007) equally observed that, in the UK, investment accounted significantly for 
oscillations in AD and is twice more volatile than other components. According to 
Fazzari et al. (2010), the absence of an explicit analysis of investment behaviour is 
puzzling. They noted that  
“[w]hile abstracting from investment [in the NCM model] 
may improve tractability, this modelling choice 
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eliminates a cyclically volatile component of [AD], an 
important channel through which interest rates affect 
demand, and the most widely studied linkage between 
financial markets and macroeconomic performance” 
(p.2010).   
Their analysis showed that the interest rate elasticity of investment is more important 
in explaining monetary policy transmission than the usually preferred elasticity of 
consumption. This is consistent with the view of Modigliani (2003) who opined that 
the interest rate elasticity of consumption would generally be less significant than that 
of investment. Furthermore, Angeloni et al. (2003) and Peersman and Smets (2003) 
provided evidence that monetary policy effect of AD in the Euro area is 
predominantly driven by investment rather than consumption. In addition, Dupor 
(2001) and Fazzari et al. (2010) suggested that accounting for the elasticity of 
investment in the NCM framework enhances stability and determinacy of the model. 
These studies, therefore, represent a compelling rationale for studying the monetary 
policy effect of investment in a NCM framework. Nonetheless, studying both 
investment and consumption, concurrently presents a challenge in terms of thorough 
treatment of the subject and lack of proper focus. Hence, one may decide to conduct 
separate but detailed analysis of both components. For reasons of space and given that 
the overall focus of the study is for a developing country, Nigeria, the analysis of AD 
would be conducted only for investment.   
For developing countries, there may be other far reaching reasons to concentrate on 
investment rather than consumption. This is centred on poverty and its effect on 
consumption and savings. For many poor people, inter-temporal consumption is 
quixotic as all their income is consumed contemporaneously on necessities and 
consumption is irresponsive to interest rate changes. However, the NCM model 
assumes that all households are not only rational but able to choose between 
contemporaneous consumption and saving depending on interest rate dynamics. This 
implicitly assumes generally well-to-do households with a conventional liquidity 
preference. Rising interest rates, thus, increases the opportunity cost of consumption 
and households would prefer to save by channelling their money into interest bearing 
deposits and deferring consumption. According to Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), the 
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effectiveness of interest rate in this case, however, depends on the level of income and 
the marginal propensity to spend. Higher consumption propensity implies smaller 
savings, while at the same time lower levels of income heightens propensity. 
Essentially, interest rate elasticity of household decisions diminishes with 
consumption propensity. Implicitly, the NCM assumes that propensity to consume out 
of current income is always significantly less than unity, so that household 
consumption decisions are interest rate elastic. In many poor developing countries, 
this assumption maybe violated since overall consumption propensity would be near 
unity. This would lead to a collapse of the inter-temporal optimisation analysis, thus 
enfeebling the core of the NCM-based monetary policy. For Nigeria particularly, the 
NBS (2010b) reported that up to 83.1 per cent of household disposable income was 
consumed between 2007 and 2010, suggesting a propensity of 0.83 overall. This 
presents a strong indication of possible inelastic response of household to monetary 
policy changes in the interest rates. However, the aggregate impact would depend on 
other characteristics of the country e.g. the incidence of poverty.    
Developing countries have many poor people. The World Bank defines poverty “as 
not having enough today in some dimension of well-being” like income or 
consumption.
44
 In very poor societies, household’s propensity to consume would be 
extremely high so that saving is on the average very low. Poverty and underdeveloped 
financial markets mean that access to consumer credits in developing countries is 
limited – since poverty would usually connote lack of adequate/acceptable collateral. 
With the inability to save and the lack of consumer credit, consumption will not 
respond to interest rate changes.
45
 Nigeria is characterised as a developing country 
with a high incidence of poverty. According to information on the World Bank 
website, the 2004 poverty headcount shows that about 83.9 per cent of Nigerians live 
below $2.00/day, while 64.4 per cent are below $1.25/day. Given this substantial level 
of poverty and the high propensity to consume, it therefore can be deduced that 
quantitative interest rate interaction with (inter-temporal) consumption would be 
minimal. Thus, the interest rate effect of AD in Nigeria can be augmented via its 
                                            
44  See discussions on Measuring Poverty: Defining Welfare Measures from the World Bank website: 
http://web.worldbank.org/... accessed October 7, 2011.  
 
45 Elasticity generally depends on the proportion of income spent on a particular commodity and the degree of 
substitutability. For poor people, who often spend almost all their income on food which has no close substitutes, 
the interest rate elasticity of consumption (of such a necessity) would thus be zero.   
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investment component. This chapter would consequently concentrate on the 
responsiveness of investments to changes in the interest rate.     
6.3 Competing Theories on the Determinant of Investment 
While economists agree on the importance of investment in an economy there are, 
however, divergent views on its core determinants. The different theories discussed in 
the literature include the neoclassical, accelerator, Tobin’s-q, real options, post-
Keynesian, and Kaldorian/Kaleckian models, among others. A brief discussion on 
these theories is provided in this section.  
6.3.1 The Neoclassical Theories 
As stated earlier, the neoclassical theory generally derived from the works of Fisher 
(1930), Jorgenson (1963) and Modigliani and Miller (1958). It is hinged on the 
assumptions of a perfect capital market cum a rational and profit maximising 
investor.
46
 There is also the assumption of an optimal capital stock towards which the 
firm adjusts so that investment is based on the desire to attain this optimal level of 
capital stock. In general, investments are considered reversible and instantaneous – i.e. 
without adjustment costs (Munthali, 2008).
47
 Jorgenson’s contribution to neoclassical 
analysis includes the assertion of perfect capital-labour substitutability and the 
incorporation of taxes and relative prices into the user cost that determines optimal 
capital. Neoclassical analyses emphasise the role of the interest rate (or the user cost 
of capital) in the investment process and suggest an inverse investment-interest rate 
function. They also recognise the accelerating effect of output in the investment model.  
However, neoclassical theories have been criticised for a number of their assumptions. 
These criticisms centre on the non-recognition of the adjustment costs and delivery 
lags as well as the assumption of independence between investment and financing 
decisions (Baddeley, 2003).
48
    
6.3.2 The Accelerator Theories 
Different versions of the accelerator theories have been developed over time. The crux 
of these is, however, the assumption that growth of output demand/sales is the key 
                                            
46 Modigliani and Miller further assumed that the cost of capital is independent of source of the capital. 
47 According to Munthali (2008) neoclassical analysis assumes the existence of a perfect second hand market for 
capital goods so that if fixed investment becomes non-viable firms can easily dispose of such capital goods at no 
cost.    
48 See Baddeley (2003) for a full treatment of these criticisms.  
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driver of fixed investment. By emphasising output rather than cost effect, accelerator 
theories are based on a Keynesian sticky price framework (Baddeley, op.cit). The 
theories assume the existence of an optimal/desired capital stock adjustment which 
determines the evolution of investment. Like the neoclassicals, initial accelerator 
models supposed immediate adjustments of capital stock and static expectations; an 
assumption that was corrected in later models. However, accelerator models assume a 
fixed capital-labour ratio in contrast to the flexible ratio of the neoclassical model. The 
various accelerator models are discussed below. 
6.3.2.1  Fixed Accelerator  
The fixed (or simple) accelerator model represents the earliest version of the models 
and is considered in some sense naive due to its underlying assumption. It is 
essentially based on the Keynesian framework of fixed-prices with no factor 
substitutability and the absence of dynamics in adjustment and expectation (Baddeley, 
op.cit). The implied instant adjustment of capital stock imposed by the model is an 
unjustifiable restriction (Erdinc, 1997). This is because lags are fundamental to the 
investment process since decisions taken in previous periods affect current investment 
spending. Simple accelerator models, in addition to the theoretical shortcomings, also 
lack empirical support in the literature especially due to the absence of lags.  
6.3.2.2  Flexible Accelerator  
Given the inability of the simple model to effectively explain capital adjustments, the 
flexible model was developed. This introduced distributed lags structures into the 
models using Koyck’s transformation (Munthali, op.cit). According to Baddeley 
(op.cit) the introduction of dynamic lags into the model was essential to the 
understanding of capital adjustment as this portrays the partial adjustment process 
inherent in the investment process. Lags are important because they capture delays in 
investment decisions, ordering, installation, etc. The introduction of lags also 
encapsulates the effect of expectations in the investment process. Unlike the simple 
version, flexible accelerator models found more empirical support in the literature. 
However, lack of a priori knowledge of the optimal lag length meant that its 
introduction was ad hoc. This, together with the retained assumption of a fixed 
capital-labour ratio, formed the main criticism of the flexible accelerator model. 
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6.3.2.2  Financial Accelerator  
Technically, the financial accelerator theory differs from the previous variants in that 
it links macroeconomic changes in output (i.e. AD) to microeconomic (i.e. firm level) 
investment decision through the financial markets, while the previous variants 
associated a firm’s demand with its investment. It is based on the crucial role of 
external finance in investment in an imperfect credit/capital market. The ability of 
firms to borrow from the financial market depends on the net-value of their assets. In 
the presence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers (and the 
associated problems of moral hazard and adverse selection), credit worthiness is 
assessed mainly by the net-worth of a borrower’s collateral. Borrowers with more 
collateral have higher net-worth and can access external finance more cheaply 
(Peersman and Smets, 2001). Thus, financial accelerator principle is due to the 
dependence of external financing cost on the borrower’s net-worth (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989). The principle suggests that declines in aggregate output would reduce 
investment, since asset prices deteriorate with recession. This reduces net-worth, 
worsens financing condition, raises the cost of capital and increases credit rationing. 
The inability to generate sufficient funds affects investment expenditure adversely. 
Inadequate investment, in turn leads to lower economic activity which furthers the 
recession. The effect continues in a loop and ceases only when an appropriate 
exogenous shock ensues. A basic limitation of this principle is that this financial 
acceleration may be propagated differently during recession than during boom an 
effect not captured adequately by the model. 
6.3.3 Tobin’s-   Model 
An important feature of the neoclassical and accelerator theories is the omission of the 
roles of uncertainty, expectations and adjustment costs in the investment process. The 
q-theories that emerged, consequently, tried to capture these directly via a dynamic 
optimisation analysis (Baddeley, op.cit). Q-theories infer expectations and uncertainty 
from the stock market information and distinguish between internal and external 
adjustment costs; the former affecting only the (representative) firm, while the latter 
affect the entire industry/macro-economy. In the Tobin’s-  model, investment by a 
profit maximising firm is decided by weighing the market value of capital (mv) against 
its replacement cost (rc) [i.e.         ], assuming a perfect capital market. 
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Investment is postulated as a positive function of   and is undertaken only if    . 
Though, the  -theories have some empirical success, they are nonetheless fraught with 
a number of problems both practical and econometric. Citing Turner (1993), Munthali 
(op.cit) noted the practical difficulty of accurately pinpointing a firm’s return from 
stock market data. Baddeley (op.cit) annotated the problems of serial-correlation 
which has bedevilled the theory due probably to the inability of the stock market data 
to adequately capture of uncertainty.    
6.3.4 The Real Option Theories 
All the investment theories presented so far inadequately incorporated uncertainty and 
inherently assumed reversible investments. The real options theories posit that in the 
real world investment in fixed assets are irreversible. This is because investment 
involves a sunk cost and market for second hand capital goods is limited. Inability to 
reverse investment (i.e. disposing existing capital at no cost) inflicts further cost on the 
firm when such investment loses viability (Baddeley, op.cit). In an uncertain world the 
probability of success or failure of an investment venture in the future is unknown. A 
combination of uncertainty and irreversibility of investment forms the basis of the real 
options theories as exposited by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The theory postulates an 
inverse relationship between investment and uncertainty for rational profit maximising 
investors. Essentially, in the presence of uncertainty it pays a firm to delay investment 
and wait for additional information. This additional information may be the only 
difference between the success and failure of investment. Accordingly, without 
acknowledging the opportunity cost associated with the option to investment, using 
the standard discount rate analysis may lead to over-investment. In real options 
analysis, uncertainty is treated as measurable and is usually proxied in empirical 
studies by the variance(s) of some macroeconomic variables. 
6.3.5 Post-Keynesians Theories 
Post-Keynesian analysts of the determinants of investment reject the assumption of 
rational expectation and profit maximisation which underlies some of the other 
theories discussed so far. They also contest the measurability of uncertainty as 
expounded by the real options model while concurring with its inverse effect on 
investment. Following Keynes, they emphasise the importance of psychological 
factors (like animal spirit and herd behaviour) on investments as against rationality. 
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Post-Keynesians theories are hinged on the “limits to rationality, the importance of 
profits and the effects of money and finance on investment activity” (Baddeley, op.cit, 
p.133). They also reject the Modigliani and Miller (1958) assertion of financing 
inconsequentiality and argue that costs would vary with sources of finance as financial 
markets are imperfect. For instance, they highlighted the distinction between the cost 
of internal versus external financing of investment. The analyses of internal versus 
external financing by Michal Kalecki and Nicholas Kaldor are prominent in this area 
of the post-Keynesian theories.  
Kaleckian/Kaldorian theories analyse the importance of profit/cash-flow in the capital 
accumulation process. According to these, a profitable firm would access external 
finance cheaper than a less profitable firm. Moreover, profit relates positively with 
cash-flow and increases institutional savings. A firm with high retained profits can 
finance more investments internally at zero interest rate. Indeed, profit reduces the 
cost of investment in two ways: it increases the proportion of zero-cost internal 
finance; and, it enhances the ability of firms to borrow cheaply (since it raises the net-
value of the firm). Investment is therefore postulated to vary positively with 
profitability. Kaleckian/Kaldorian approach, nonetheless, recognises the bi-directional 
relationship that existed between investment and profit. In addition to profit, 
Kaleckians emphasise the significance of capacity utilisation to investment and 
postulate a positive relationship. Thus, investment would only be undertaken when a 
firm’s expected demand/sales exceeds its installed capacity (Sawyer, 1982; 1999; 
Fazzari and Mott, 1986). Capacity utilisation and/or its changes are considered critical 
for investment. Investment under the Kaleckian/Kaldorian approached is thus 
determined by profits/cash-flow, corporate savings (or retained profits), and capacity 
utilisation (or expected demand/sales).
49
 Generally, post-Keynesians also advocate the 
role of government in curbing financial markets speculations thereby reducing the 
concomitant uncertainty.    
6.4 Monetary Policy and Private Investment 
According to Fontana (2009b), “by adjusting the short-run nominal interest rates, 
[CBs] are able to affect lending conditions in the credit market and, more generally, to 
                                            
49 There are a number of differences between Kalecki’s and Kaldor’s treatment for instance on issues of savings, 
retained profits and distribution at macro and/or micro levels. However, we provide only a peripheral and brief 
discussion of their views of what factors they generally considered important.  
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determine the cost and availability of liquidity throughout the economy” (p.110). 
Monetary policy changes in the interest rate would have both price and quantity 
effects on banks’ behaviour which are conveyed to investors directly or indirectly. The 
price effect is seen through the pass-through to banks’ interest rates while the quantity 
effect comes via the amount of credits available to private investors. This credit 
channel may be seen as the indirect route through which monetary policy affects 
investment, while a more direct effect is associated with the hurdle rate for 
discounting investment. Changes in interest rate, vis-à-vis this hurdle discount rate, 
directly determine whether an investment retains or loses its viability. For projects that 
are considered profitable, investors’ expected returns are high and investments are 
undertaken using either internal or external finance. When investors depend largely on 
external finance, this can be sourced either through bank loans or equity. The 
monetary policy effect, coming through the credit channel, would thus depend on the 
demand (depending on investors expected return) and supply (depending on banks’ 
expected return) of credits. In this section, the monetary policy effects of investment 
are discussed first for the impact of credit, and then the role of the interest rate.        
6.4.1 The Credit Effect of Monetary Policy on Investment 
Finance – its availability and cost – is extremely critical for investment; given the 
underlying quantity and price factors that influence investors’ decisions. Naturally, 
increased availability of finance is expected to boost investments, while increased 
costs may retard it. Whereas the interest rate (the price factor) embeds the cost of 
finance and the hurdle rate for discounting investment, availability (the quantity factor) 
refers to the amount, source and type of finance. For any investment, firms may source 
funds internally (savings, retained profits, etc) or externally (bank debt or equity). 
Each of these sources has its associated costs which are either implicit (in terms of 
interest income foregone by using internal finance) or explicit (in terms of interest 
charges or capital market costs of external financing). Though these are all affected 
directly or indirectly by monetary policy, our emphasis in this section is on bank debt 
financing. Given that higher quantity of finance increases investment, bank credit 
would be expected to correlate positively with investment. So that the more credit a 
firm secures the more investment it is able to undertake; thereby suggesting the 
importance of the credit channel.           
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Under the credit channel, monetary policy is transmitted to the real sector of the 
economy through the demand or supply of credit. The former depending on the 
expected profitability of investment, while the latter relates to credit rationing due to 
banks’ expected profit from lending. The interaction of the demand and supply factors 
determines the amount of banking system’s credits to the private sector. Transmission 
of monetary policy through the credit channel occurs through two separate but 
sometimes reinforcing routes: the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel. 
The bank lending channel emphasises the effect of monetary policy on banks’ reserves 
and their credit creating ability, while the balance sheet channel highlights the effect 
of policy on borrowers’ balance sheet, collateral and the associated risk perceptions. 
With regards to the former, post-Keynesian analysis (under the endogenous money 
framework) indicate that the banking system creates credit ex nihilo (irrespective of 
reserve restrictions) and is essentially a price-maker but quantity-taker (Fontana, 
2009b). Thus, banks are able to accommodate all credit demand at any given price. 
This ability notwithstanding, banks’ willingness to lend would depend on 
creditworthiness of borrowers which in turn depends on risk perception and 
availability of acceptable collateral. This rationing, is to some extent, derivable from 
the effects of the balance sheet channel; which highlights impact of monetary policy 
on borrowers’ financial assets, their wealth, the value of their collateral and their risk 
attribute. 
Monetary policy stance basically depends on the business cycle; tightening is favoured 
in periods of expansion while a lose policy is apt during contraction. During economic 
expansion, tight monetary policy causes interest rates to rise. However, as noted by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), rising interest rates 
generally increases borrowers’ risk (for both new and outstanding loans), while 
reducing banks’ expected returns; it also lowers the expected returns on projects and 
encourages risky investments with potentially high payoffs. Concurrently, the 
resultant increase in the risk content of both new and outstanding loan causes the level 
of banks’ liquidity to decline (Fontana, 2009b). This thus makes banks to tighten both 
price and non-price requirements, irrespective of credit demand.        
Lavoie (2009) separated credit demand into notional demand (which is the total 
demand for loans) and effective demand (which captures the demand by creditworthy 
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clients); the difference of which represents credit rationing. Banks’ decision to ration 
credit may be due to the problem of information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
or the principle of increasing risk (Kalecki, 1937; see also Lavoie (op.cit), and 
Fontana (op.cit)). The former emphasises rationing among otherwise observationally 
indistinguishable borrowers while the latter is based on discrimination among 
distinguishable groups. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) analysis of credit rationing posits 
that following a tight monetary policy, since banks would prefer a higher expected 
profits, they would refuse credits to borrowers who are willing to pay higher rates 
because such borrowers may also be willing to invest in high-risk projects. Thus, 
banks would maximise their profits by lending at a lower rate to those with less 
default risk. Hence, a rise in monetary policy rate increases the pool of high-risk 
borrowers and reduces banks’ willingness to lend. 
Post-Keynesian analysis of credit rationing using the principle of increasing risk goes 
beyond this argument by suggesting that banks would partition borrowers according to 
their observable risk profiles. Such partitioning may be based on observable 
characteristic like debt-load, possession of acceptable collateral, borrowers’ track 
record, etc. The price and quantity of credits determination then follows a step-
function where observationally indistinguishable borrowers within groups are offered 
similar price (subject to other issues relating to information asymmetry). Between 
groups, lower risk premium (and more favourable terms) is offered to creditworthy 
borrowers and this premium increases with borrowers’ risk profile; hence, the 
principle of increasing risk (Lavoie, op.cit; Fontana, op.cit). Banks may, therefore, 
place credit restrictions among identical borrowers (subject to the problem of moral 
hazard and adverse selection due to information asymmetry) or between borrowers 
with identifiable risk attributes. In general, what is important is that rising interest rate 
increases borrowers’ risk, reduces viability of projects, increases probability of default, 
may lower banks’ expected returns, and would cause credit rationing among 
borrowers. The converse is also true in periods of loose monetary policy.  
Changes in monetary policy by affecting the level of banks’ liquidity would also affect 
their liquidity preference. For instance, monetary policy increases in interest rates, 
which are expected to cause a general increase in the market and retail interest rates, 
would again heighten borrowers’ risks. Given the increased risks of default, the lower 
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expected return for banks, and the increased yield from relatively risk-free 
government securities, banks would be better-off if they channel funds away from 
risky private sector lending into risk-free government financial assets. This portfolio 
re-arrangement ensures that the expected returns of banks are increased even during 
tight monetary policy and effectively limits lending only to those with the lowest 
default risks. According to Weeks (2009, 2010), this portfolio induced rationing is 
endemic among developing countries, especially those of the sub-Saharan region. 
Since the perceived risk-free profile of government debt allows the public sector to 
usurp the available funds, this may result in a form of crowding-out of private sector 
credit.  
The amount of credit to the private sector observed at any time thus reflects firms’ 
demand for loans (willingness to borrow) and banks’ supply of credit (credit 
rationing). Given the increased risks and uncertainties and the resultant lack of 
confidence banks may, in addition to discriminating against borrowers, also 
discriminate between loan tenures; favouring short-term rather than long-term credits. 
This would lead to the dichotomy of type of finance into construction finance and 
investment finance à la Davidson (1982) and Graziani (2003) as cited in Lavoie 
(2009). The former fundamentally captures initial finance for short-term bridging 
purposes while the latter refers to final finance for long-term investment purposes. 
Lavoie (op.cit) suggested that initial finance is sourced from banks for covering, 
among others, employees’ wages/salaries and suppliers cost while final finance is used 
to acquire capital goods. Where long-term credits by banks are absent, firms may only 
obtain short-term finance for construction while they would rely on other 
sources/types of finance for investment. In this case, since most of the credit to private 
sector would have a short-term feature, the relationship between investment and credit 
may be positive only in the short-run but undefined in the long-run.  
Overall, the volume of credit to the private sector is determined by both the demand 
for and the supply of credit. Monetary policy increases in interest rates may tip 
projects, which were hitherto profitable, into becoming unprofitable. This diminishes 
the amount of investments which firms would undertake; thus, firms’ demand for 
credit financing would also be reduced. The reduced demand notwithstanding, the 
overall quantity of credits would also depend on bank willingness to lend. The 
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increased uncertainty about firms’ true value, the increased risk of default and reduced 
expected returns/profits (for banks and firms) which accompanies tight monetary 
policy affects banks’ liquidity preference and results in credit rationing. This reduced 
lending further diminishes investment. Thus, a tight monetary policy would, through 
the credit channel, affect investment by reducing the demand and supply of private 
sector credits. The effect of private sector credit on investment would now depend on 
whether the finance is short- or long-term. Empirical analysis by Calomiris and 
Hubbard (1989) showed that credit constraints explained significantly the fluctuations 
in AD (or investment). Similarly, Aghion et al. (2005) using a panel of countries, 
showed that credit rationing increases the volatility but lowers the mean of investment, 
particularly for long-term investment.    
6.4.2 The Price Effect: Relationship between Interest rate and Investment 
Irrespective of the availability of finance, interest rates play an important role in the 
investment process. According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), small changes in 
interest rate (of about twenty-five or fifty basis points) will have significant effects on 
investment, even if firms do not face any financing constraints. Changes in interest 
rate will not only affect the discount rate for investment – which determines the 
expected profitability – it will also affect the liquidity preference. In a world of 
imperfect information, changes in interest rates affect uncertainty with respect to the 
success of investment so that firms may prefer to enhance their expected returns by 
channelling their investible funds into interest bearing financial assets rather than in 
physical capital. Interest rate may thus affect investment through a number of medium 
which may present a rather complex interrelation between both variables.   
Though the relationship between investment and interest rate is important in economic 
theory, knowledge of its characteristics remains inadequate (Beccarini, 2007); given 
the diverse (sometimes perverse/atypical) and somewhat difficult to reconcile results 
from various empirical researches. The conditions under which some of these findings 
are obtainable are yet to be fully understood. According to Baddeley (2003), 
theoretical analysis of the investment-interest rate link can be traced back to the 
seminal works of Irvin Fisher and Maynard Keynes in the early 1900s.
50
 In his 1930 
book titled The Theory of Interest, Fisher postulated that investment would occur until 
                                            
50 The discussions in this paragraph and the next are based largely on Baddeley (2003). 
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expected return on investment coincides with the prevailing level of interest rate 
(Baddeley, op.cit). This was analogous to Keynes’s analysis of marginal efficiency of 
capital in The General Theory of employment, Interest and Money of 1936. Fisher’s 
expected return on investment and Keynes’s marginal efficiency of capital both 
represent the discount rate for evaluating investment. Fundamentally, investment is 
considered viable only if this discount rate surpasses or equates the contemporaneous 
market interest rate.
51
 If the prevailing interest rate rises above the discount rate, 
ceteris paribus, investment becomes less profitable and should not be undertaken. 
This is based on the premise that the opportunity cost of investment (i.e. the interest 
income foregone by committing funds to investment) rises.
52
 Both Fisher and Keynes 
postulate an inverse relationship between investment and the real interest rate. While 
Fisher’s analysis concentrated on mathematical (or objective) importance of the role 
of interest rate, Keynes’s recognised the additional influence of other subjective 
factors like uncertainty, expectations and animal spirit (Baddeley, op.cit). Fisher’s 
analyses forms the bedrock of most investment theories including the neoclassical 
theories while Keynes’s with emphasis on subjective factors foreshadows the post-
Keynesians’ and the real options models.  
Baddeley (op.cit) again observed that Fisher’s work was advanced by Jorgenson (1963) 
who showed that investment (i.e. adjustment to capital stock) would continue until 
marginal benefit equals marginal cost for rational profit maximising firms operating 
under perfect competition. The marginal cost is the user cost of capital which 
incorporates depreciation and price of capital goods to the Fisherian real interest rate 
while the marginal benefit is defined as the increment to the expected future output. 
Jorgenson’s model assumes perfect substitutability between capital and labour (based 
on a Cobb-Douglas production function) so that elasticity of factor substitution is 
negative-unity with respect to the user cost and positive-unity with respect to output. 
This directly implies a unit long-run user cost elasticity of capital stock. Jorgenson 
(op.cit) nonetheless suggests an interest rate elasticity of investment less than unity. 
                                            
51 The discount rate is used henceforth to represent the hurdle rate at which firms evaluate investment. In the 
literature various terms have been adopted including expected rate of return, internal rate of return, net present 
value (NPV) rate, expected cost of capital, marginal cost of capital, etc. 
52 This also reflects the liquidity preference of firms with regards to either making financial investment or physical 
investment. See also Lavoie (2009) and Fontana (2009b) 
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Like Fisher’s (and Keynes’s), Jorgenson’s analysis indicates an inverse relationship 
between (opportunity) cost of capital and investment.  
Under the NCM, the expected monetary policy effect on investment is based on this 
inverse relationship emphasised by neoclassical theories. However, under certain 
conditions the relationship between investment and interest rates may become 
complex and non-negative (Rose, 2000). In this regards, recent studies have suggested 
that investment may not always be monotonically decreasing in the interest rate due to 
factors like uncertainty which were earlier described by Keynes. As observed by 
Emmons and Schmid (2004), a probable shortcoming of many theoretical models 
relating monetary policy to investment is the inadequate incorporation of the timing 
option (or other important factors) that may characterise investment decisions. The 
non-inclusion of these factors also explains why a number of empirical studies have 
sought for an inverse investment-interest rate relationship unsuccessfully.  
Nonetheless, changes in the monetary policy rate would affect investment (inversely 
or otherwise) by first-and-foremost affecting the prevailing market interest rates. 
Changes in these interest rates would affect investment both directly through the 
opportunity cum user cost (the interest rate channel) and/or indirectly through its 
regulating effect on credit availability (the credit channel).  
Many recent studies of the interest rate effect of investment have followed Jorgenson 
(1963) approach and have investigated the size of user cost elasticity of capital. 
However, the results differ across studies and countries although they mainly reported 
an inverse relationship. Mojon et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between 
investment, monetary policy and the interest rate for the euro area using Jorgenson’s 
cost of capital approach. Their result upheld the Cobb-Douglas specification having 
found the long-run elasticities of user cost of capital and the output (proxied by sales) 
to be negative and positive unity, respectively.
53
 For the USA, the elasticity of 
investment to user cost was within a range of –0.50 to –1.00 (Hasset and Hubbard, 
1997). Baumann and Price (2007) rejected the result of a one-to-one relationship 
between the user cost and investment having found an elasticity of about –0.40 in the 
                                            
53 Most studies using the Cobb-Douglas production function are associated with high user cost elasticities. See 
Chirinko et al. (1999) for discussion.  
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UK. Similarly, Chirinko et al. (1999) estimated a low elasticity of –0.25 which they 
suggested implied a weakening of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
It is worth mentioning that the sensitivity of investment to user cost would be different 
from the interest rate elasticity as contained in Jorgenson (1963). This is irrespective 
of the fact that the user cost embeds the interest rate. The responsiveness to user cost – 
which incorporates interest rate, taxes, relative prices and depreciation – is pertinent in 
the controversies about the nature of the transmission mechanism (Chirinko et al., 
op.cit). Significant elasticities of the user cost (vis-à-vis the interest rate) may actually 
be due to its non-interest rate components. Furthermore, other factors (especially data 
related) can obscure the detection of the true investment-interest rate relationship. The 
results in Chirinko et al. (op.cit), Hasset and Hubbard (op.cit), Mojon et al. (op.cit) 
were based on micro-level data analysis of user cost. However, with aggregated data it 
had been difficult to detect a significant interest rate effect of investment (Blanchard, 
1986; Mojon et al., op.cit). As Bakhshi et al. (2003) showed, this may be due to mis-
measurement associated with the typical index of user cost when using aggregate-level 
data. It may also be due to the violation of the assumption of a monotonic inverse 
relationship as investment may have non-negative or even nonlinear responses.   
Another reason for the weak evidence of interest rate elasticity, according to Chirinko 
et al. (op.cit), is the inherent simultaneity bias in the relationship, capital market 
frictions or firm heterogeneity. Simultaneity bias emanates from the fact that some 
explanatory variables in investment models are themselves endogenous within the 
model, thereby concealing the actual relationship and biasing the inferences thereof.  
The problem of capital market frictions relate to the functioning of the market so that 
glitches (e.g. market and/or economic underdevelopment or recessions) that affect 
market confidence may weaken the investment-interest rate relationship. Firm 
heterogeneity would undermine the relationship, if investments by some group of 
firms respond in one way to interest rate changes while the response of others are in 
the opposite direction; thus, cancelling each other out.  
This kind of outcome was investigated by Mojon et al. (2002) and Gaiotti and 
Generale (2002), among others. While Mojon et al. did not find evidence of firm 
heterogeneity in interest rate sensitivity between large and small firm’s investments, 
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Gaiotti and Generale found that monetary policy changes of user costs affect larger 
firms less than smaller ones. According to Beccarini (2007), heterogeneity of firms 
complicates the relationship further as it introduces nonlinearity in the investment-
interest rate function. Thus, using linear estimation methods, as in Mojon et al., may 
not capture the true relationship. Asymmetric/nonlinear relationship between the 
interest rate (or the user cost) and investment has been suggested in the literature by 
Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), Weise (1999) and Capozza and Li (2001) among 
others.   
Weise (1999) opined that asymmetries are due to uncertainty and rigidities such as 
irreversibility and indivisibility of investment. Irreversibility occurs when investment 
decisions by firms cannot be retracted at zero cost. In many cases investments are 
characterised by technological and/or market induced irreversibility (Caballero et al., 
1995). According to the real options theories, uncertainty and irreversibility cause 
asymmetry by creating a positive benefit for delaying investments. In the presence of 
uncertain payoffs, lower interest rates, rather than spur investment would make 
deferral more appealing (Rose, 2000; Capozza and Li, 2001; Emmons and Schmid, 
2004; and Chetty, 2007).
54
 Thus, under certain conditions, in the real options models, 
investment and interest rates may correlate positively. Capozza and Li (op.cit) showed 
that high uncertainty (about future cash flow, high growth rate, high interest rate 
volatility) or very low levels of interest rate are sufficient to cause positive investment 
responses. Their result suggests a nonlinear relationship since high interest rates 
would, thus, induce an inverse response of investment.   
Such possible nonlinearity was proposed by Chetty (2007) who showed that interest 
rates may under some conditions yield a backward bending investment function. 
Under the real options theories, Chetty opined that deferred investment may increase 
the interest expense of a firm because of the associated delay of cash-inflow. Higher 
interest rate heightens the debt burden thereby compelling the firm to expedite 
investment (rather than defer) in order to raise cash-flow to offset outstanding loan 
obligations; thus, generating a positive investment response. Hence, increases in 
interest rate would have both the typical neoclassical inverse effect by increasing the 
                                            
54 Low(er than average) interest rates are usually associated with weakening economy in need of stimulus. The 
inherent poor outlook in this circumstances and the reduced profitability of projects during such periods make 
investment an unattractive option.  
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discount rate and an atypical effect which combine to create a backward bending 
function. Principally, Chetty argued “that at low rates, an increase in interest rate 
increase investment demand by enlarging the set of projects for which the discount 
rate exceeds the returns to delay” (p.84). 
Capozza and Li (2001) and Beccarini (2007) suggested that high interest rate volatility 
may also cause nonlinearity in the investment-interest rate relationship; creating a 
Chetty-type backward bending investment function. This, according to Beccarini 
(op.cit), is because interest rate volatility relates positively with both investment and 
the level of interest rate. Hence, the level of interest rate may indirectly (through its 
variance) be positively correlated with investment, though this is thought to occur only 
when the interest rate variance is considerably high. Invariably, nonlinearity depends 
on the level of interest rate uncertainty. However, high uncertainty in interest rate may 
also increase the benefits of delayed investment so that essentially asymmetry reverts 
to the timing of investment. Capozza and Li (op.cit), Beccarini (op.cit) and Chetty 
(op.cit) all suggested that relationship between investment and interest rate would 
differ depending on whether the level of interest rate was high or low. This can be 
compared somewhat with Rose (2000) who showed that the investment would tend to 
zero at extremely high or extremely low levels of interest rate.  
In the above studies, the threshold for the backward bending function is based on the 
relative sizes of growth rate and interest rate. Capozza and Li (op.cit) suggested that 
positive region would emerge when growth rates are high or when interest rates are 
very low. This, according to Chetty (op.cit), is because at low level of interest rates, 
growth rate is likely to be higher than the interest rate. This implies that when growth 
rates surpass interest rates a positive relationship would exist, while the relationship 
would be negative when interest rate exceed growth rate. Thus, the threshold would be 
at the point where the growth rate balances the prevailing interest rate. The 
relationship between growth and interest rates, according to Capozza and Li (op.cit), is 
based on the premise that in periods of high growth, projects become more viable 
since project internal rate of return (IRR) rises faster than hurdle discount rate.     
Other forms of nonlinearity discussed in the literature include the business cycle 
asymmetry suggested by Weise (1999) and Peersman and Smets (2001). These studies 
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argued that monetary policy changes in interest rates would have stronger effect in 
periods of recession vis-à-vis booms based on the financial accelerator model. 
Essentially during recession firms’ cash-flows dwindle, internal finance declines and 
firms require more external finance. The recession and the increased external finance 
requirement depresses the net-worth of firms and the value of their collateral thereby 
leading to an increase in the cost of external finance. This would nonetheless depend 
on the policy stance. For instance, policy ease may have weaker effect than tightening 
during booms but a converse outcome in recessions. Kieler and Saarenheimo (2001) 
also showed that nonlinearity may occur depending on the structure/level of financial 
market development. They opined that monetary policy may have higher impact for 
variable-rate financing than for fixed-rate financing. 
In some cases, it is argued that the investment-interest rate relationship may be 
monotonically increasing. As Munthali (2008) observed, in developing countries the 
relationship between investment and interest rate may be positive. This is based on the 
popular McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) postulation of a positive relationship 
between private investment and real money balances in these countries. According to 
Munthali (op.cit), restricted access to credit and capital market by many firms in 
developing countries culminates in the accumulation of cash balances prior to 
investment. Thus, investment and cash balances would correlate positively. Cash 
balances are postulated to relate directly with deposit rates so that, by transitivity, 
deposit rates and investment would correlate positively. Thus, if policy rate increases 
are passed-through to deposit rates, investments could increase. 
Atypical or perverse investment-interest rate relationships have important implications 
for monetary policy. Generally, monetary policy is designed under the neoclassical 
assumptions of a monotonically decreasing investment function which may actually 
be incorrect. The relationship may be non-negative under certain conditions. Given the 
diverging effects of probable positive and negative responses of investment to interest 
rate, the overall impact of monetary policy action can be ambiguous (Emmons and 
Schmid, 2004). According to Capozza and Li (2001), “if increases in the interest rate 
can accelerate investment spending, then extreme care must be taken when monetary 
decisions are designed to transmit restraint to the economy through their effect on 
investment” (p.518). Consequently, it is of paramount importance for monetary 
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policymakers and/or researchers to recognize the conditions for this atypical 
relationship.   
The theoretical relationship between investment and interest rate (typical or atypical) 
are in most cases derived at firm level. On an aggregate level, this becomes even more 
complicated. Though it would usually be intuitively convenient to assume that all 
firms would act alike on the average, so that the aggregate relationship would be a 
simple integration of all firms, in reality firms’ behaviours differ. As noted earlier, 
firm heterogeneity may be a source of asymmetry in the relationship given that at 
different levels of interest rates, firms of different sizes, types or sectors may conduct, 
expedite or defer investments as the case may be.
55
 Monetary policy is expected to 
have a general effect on the aggregate economy rather than few firms so that the 
inability to correctly determine the expected policy outcome poses a threat to policy 
objective and the well-being of the overall economy. While some (category of) firms 
may behave typically others may be perverse/atypical. The overall effect would then 
depend on the relative weight of each group’s investment in the whole. 
In Nigeria, firm heterogeneity may be considered between the oil and non-oil sector. 
This is for two reasons. First, it captures the somewhat lopsided dependence of the 
economy on oil. Secondly, it can separate firms into large (oil sector) and not-so-large 
(non-oil sector) categories. This does not mean that non-oil sector firms are 
necessarily small, but rather implies that oil sector firms are more-or-less large. 
Besides, oil sector firms are hardly affected by domestic macroeconomic policies but 
by international developments. Such disaggregation may allow policy to focus on the 
more desirable effect on the non-oil sector. Again, while an inverse relationship is 
usually expected on the aggregate, a positive relationship may sometimes ensue over 
the course of the business cycle. This is because when the economy is booming, 
investments increases and interest rates can rise through the central bank’s non-
accommodating policy stance. However, such tight monetary policy is expected to 
decelerate investment. This kind of outcome may also be different among categories 
of firms. Overall, the aggregate impact of interest rate would depend on its effect on 
the investments of the dominant sector (or group(s) of firms).    
                                            
55 In particular, firms differ in their profitability and the availability of internal funds. 
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6.5 Private Investment in Developing Countries 
High investment-GDP ratios are features of industrialised and affluent developing 
countries rather than poorer ones suggesting a developmental role of private 
investment (Greene and Villanueva, 1991). Investment is important in every country 
particularly developing ones. Yet its determinants in these countries remain to be fully 
understood as no coherent theory of investment in developing countries exists (Soyibo, 
1996). The various theories (of the determinants of investment) discussed above have 
become conventional and used extensively to understand investment behaviour in 
many applied research. Fundamentally, the theoretical and empirical analyses which 
underlied the proposition of these theories are founded on market dynamics in 
advanced economies. Institutional structures are essentially different between 
developed and developing countries so that the determinants of investment in these 
countries may differ considerably. Generally, the conventional theories postulate that 
investments are affected by key macroeconomic and financial variables. However, 
while some of these variables like interest rate (or cost of capital), output (i.e. 
economic) growth, demand/sales/capacity utilisation and macroeconomic uncertainty 
are generally important, other variables (like public investments, political conditions, 
etc) omitted in these models are critical for developing countries. Thus, the underlying 
assumptions of these theories may be untenable in developing countries. As observed 
by Greene and Villanueva (op.cit),  
“it [is] generally...hard to test this model[s] in developing 
countries, because key assumptions (such as perfect 
capital markets and little or no government investment) 
are inapplicable, and data for certain variables (capital 
stock, real wages, and real financing rates for debt and 
equity) are normally either unavailable or inadequate” 
(p.39). 
Similarly, Blejer and Khan (1984) argued that “institutional and structural factors 
present in most developing countries – such as the absence of a well-functioning 
financial markets...” makes such models unsuitable (p.380). Again, Kieler and 
Saarenheimo (2001) underscored the importance of the structure cum level of financial 
market development in this regard. Financial, money and capital markets are typically 
185 
 
 
 
unsophisticated and vestigial in developing vis-à-vis advanced countries; thus, 
escalating market imperfection. This imperfection means that market coordination of 
economic activities via the prices mechanism may allocate resources inefficiently. 
Again, the problems of information asymmetry may be deeper in developing countries, 
thereby furthering the existence/emergence of informal/shadow financial markets and 
its inherent leakage. Low net-worth firms who are unable to access the financial 
markets resort to informal sector for funds, even at rates higher than that obtainable at 
the formal markets. Hence, availability rather than cost (of capital) may become 
critical for private investment in developing countries. Given the indivisibility of 
investment, firms who are unable to borrow externally from the financial markets may 
have to accumulate inside money to fund investment (Fry, 1995). This is akin to the 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analyses that hypothesise accumulation of real 
money balances as a key determinant of investment in these countries. It is also 
consistent with post-Keynesian highlight of the importance of internal finance by 
emphasising that agents would amass cash/funds to finance investment due to high 
cost or dearth of external finance.  
Developing countries, like Nigeria, are characterised by large number of micro, small 
and medium scale enterprises operating in the informal sector. These are usually 
classified as risky and are placed on the lower rung of the creditworthiness continuum 
due to the problem of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Thus, 
enormous external finance constraints confront these businesses as they are too small 
to access equity finance via the capital market and are considered risky for bank credit.  
High cost and dearth of investible funds are more constraining for this group than any 
other in the economy so that their investment is usually aligned to savings and internal 
funds. Yenturk et al. (2009) provided, somewhat, an evidence of the investment effect 
of savings in Turkey. Conducting a study of private investment behaviour for a small 
numbers of firms in Nigeria, Soyibo (1996) documented the dominant influence of 
internal over external finance (i.e. debt and/or equity). Soyibo also opined that 
consistent with McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, investment would vary directly with 
domestic (deposit) interest rate in Nigeria.     
The postulated positive correlation in the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is based on an 
assumed direct relationship between deposit rate and money balances which 
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subsequently culminates in a positive investment-interest rate and investment-savings 
relationship. Essentially, under the McKinnon-Shaw approach, with interest rates 
restricted below equilibrium, investment is deemed to be constrained by savings, so 
that an increase in interest rate would lead to higher savings and then to higher 
investments. A positive investment-interest rate relationship has implications for 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, policy induced changes in interest rates can affect retail 
rates and investment via two means: by affecting the cost of credit (lending rates) or 
the opportunity cost of holding money (deposit rates). Increasing deposit rates would, 
however, affect firms’ investment if the prevailing returns on deposits exceed returns 
of contemporaneous investment and if such investment can be delayed at no cost. 
Whether the prevailing relationship between investment and interest rate is inverse (as 
per the neoclassical theory) or direct (as in McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis) may also 
depend on the contribution of blue-chip companies vis-à-vis smaller enterprises to 
aggregate investment in developing countries. Based on the premise that internal 
funds are more important for smaller enterprises, a negative relationship may suggest 
that most investments are conducted by large firms. This nonetheless would not affect 
the expected positive relationship between investment and internal funds. Greene and 
Villanueva (1991) performing analysis for 23 developing countries found evidence of 
negative interest rate effect and rejected the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, while 
Hassan and Salim (2011) found no evidence of interest rate effect in Bangladesh. 
Market underdevelopment, imperfection and failure in developing countries increase 
the role of government in these economies. Consequently, public expenditure and 
public debt (burden) are identified in the literature as affecting investment. 
Government capital expenditure and debt are connected to public investment which in 
turn relate with private investment. Greene and Villanueva (op.cit) suggested that 
periods of substantial debt crisis tend to correlate with lower private investment. The 
theoretical relationship between public and private investment in developing countries 
is undefined. Neoclassical analyses argue that government investment (and domestic 
credit) would crowd-out or substitute private investment (and credit). However, public 
investment is a policy variable used in the provision of infrastructure and public goods 
so that it may complement, boost and crowd-in private investments (Greene and 
Villanueva, op.cit; Munthali, 2008). Accordingly crowding-out would occur only 
when government spending leads to high cost or dearth of capital. Pastor and Maxfield 
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(1999) posited that crowding-in effect would be dominant in developing countries; a 
premise that was empirically supported in Greene and Villanueva (op.cit). Similarly, 
Blejer and Khan (1984) found complementary private-public-investments relationship 
in the long-run, but short-run substitutability while Hassan and Salim (2011) 
documented crowding-out effect in Bangladesh. The long-run complementarily 
reflects the supportive role of infrastructural spending.  
Usually, governments borrow to finance long-term spending on infrastructures. Thus, 
the effect of debt burden comes through its impact on future capital expenditure. High 
debt-burden, thenceforward, reduces public expenditure on infrastructures and 
amenities, increases macroeconomic uncertainty, and reduces private investment. If so, 
private investment in Nigeria would be expected to have risen following the country’s 
exit of external debt-burden in 2004. The interrelationship between investments 
(public/private) and debt is nonetheless complex. Thus, including both public 
investment and external-debt as regressors in an empirical model may lead to the 
problem of multicollinearity. This problem may even be deepened by crude oil 
dynamics. In Nigeria, oil plays a big role in the economy and influences the pattern of 
government expenditure. As expounded in chapter three, rising oil revenue reduces 
government debt needs, increases expenditure and consequently lowers budget deficits. 
Budget deficit can thus reflect the effects of oil, public expenditure and debt. Oil price 
changes would also capture the trends in government expenditure and debt burden. 
Rather than include all variables, for tractability, an omnibus proxy (e.g. oil prices or 
budget deficit) may be considered for the public sector effect of investment in the case 
of Nigeria.  
Real options theorist emphasised the importance of uncertainty given the irreversible 
nature of investment. This uncertainty is usually discussed within the realm of 
economic uncertainty captured mainly be volatilities in some economic variables. 
However, in addition to economic uncertainty, developing countries are also fraught 
with political uncertainty. Munthali (2008) and Hassan and Salim (2011) observed 
that political instability deters private investment in many developing African 
countries. This effect is seen both in the inflow of foreign direct investment and in 
domestic investment. Political uncertainty can emanate from different factors like non-
accountability and/or non-transparency of government and its officials, non-provision 
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of socio-political and economic (property) rights, dictatorial and/or non-democratic 
governance, violence and insecurity, bumpy regime changes or elections. It may also 
be associated with political intrusion of economic policies e.g. a non-independent 
central bank (Pastor and Maxfield, 1999). Perceived uncertainty would shift the 
objectives of firms from investment and profit maximisation to the provision of 
security and stability (Baddeley, 2003). Hence, subsistence of any of these factors 
would repress investment. In Nigeria, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
autocratic military rule; a period often associated with uneasiness and trepidation. 
Since the advent democratic governance in 1999, political scepticism has moderated 
substantially and is somewhat confined to election years.        
Nigeria is an oil dependent developing country with a large government sector, 
inherently vibrant informal sector, and relatively unsophisticated financial market. 
Hence, there exists a large pool of potential determinants of investment in the country. 
While studies on developing countries (e.g. Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Yenturk et 
al., 2009; Hassan and Salim, 2011), focused primarily on the roles of government and 
savings most other studies of investment have been based on the more formal theories 
discussed in the preceding section. Since both approaches have merits, Baddeley 
(2003) noted “that concentrating on one specification of investment models to the 
exclusion of others may lead to an omission of factors that are central to the 
determinant of investment behaviour” (p.146). Consequently, we would consider an 
eclectic model of investment which focuses on the effect of monetary policy while 
taking account of the various theories discussed above.  
6.6 Pattern and Trend of Investment in Nigeria: Data and Stylised 
Analysis 
6.6.1 Data 
This chapter utilises quarterly data from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2 sourced from the CBN 
and the NBS. The dataset include interest rates (capturing cost of capital), capital 
stock(K), investment(I), consumption(C), GDP(Y), GDP gap(Yg), consumer price 
index(CPI), inflation(∆CPI=π), private sector credits(CPS), capacity utilisation(CU), 
corporate profits(PF), exchange rate(NER), crude oil price(PO), government 
investment(GI), fiscal deficit(FD) and total debt stock(TDS). Variables for 
macroeconomic and political uncertainties are also included. In the absence of 
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reported data some variables (like capital stock and uncertainty) are derived using 
basic techniques which are described later in this section. 
Cost of capital is proxied by the interest rate for two reasons. First is the fact that the 
study is on the investment effect of interest rate. Second, cost of capital, for instance 
in Fazzari et al. (2010) and Mojon et al. (2002) are computed from a suite of data 
including interest rate, relative prices of capital, tax rate and depreciation rate. 
However, Blejer and Khan (1984) observed that “in the absence of information on real 
financing and rates (debt and equity) it is not possible to calculate the service price or 
user cost of capital” (p.380). Apart from interest rate data, no comprehensive 
collection of the others is available for Nigeria. Although, this chapter intended to 
understand the impact of monetary policy on investment, the cost of capital is 
principally represented by the average lending rate (ALR) rather than the monetary 
policy rate (MPR). This is because private investors do not incur the MPR (which is 
only an indicative rate) but are confronted with the retail rates. Nonetheless, the role 
of MPR is subtly incorporated into our analysis. Average deposit rate (ADR)is also 
utilised in the preliminary data analysis essentially to investigate the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis. ALR is defined as the quarterly averages of prime and maximum lending 
rates while ADR is the average of term deposits of 3-12 months maturity. All the 
interest rates are in real term derived by deflating the nominal rates using the 
conventional Fisherian equation  
   (
    
    
)                                                           6.1 
where   ,   , and    are, respectively, the real and the nominal interest rates, and the 
inflation rate. Real GDP and its components are at 1990 constant prices. GDP gap is 
the log-difference of actual and trend GDP – the latter derived via the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter. Investment is the gross fixed capital formation of the private 
sector while consumption is the final consumption expenditure of households and non-
profit firms. Given the non-availability of capital stock data, it was derived by 
assuming capital dynamics of the form 
      (    )                                                    6.2 
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where    is depreciation rate and        represents contemporaneous capital 
consumption. Capital stock is disaggregated into oil and non-oil components. Given 
that unavailability of sectoral data for        it was split linearly using the quarterly 
weights of oil vis-à-vis non-oil investments. Initial levels of capital (i.e. the 1985 level) 
for the three variants were obtained from the CBN macroeconomic model. However, 
given the extent of extrapolation involved, inferences based on the capital stock data 
may undermine our overall analysis. Hence, extreme care must be dully observed 
when interpreting the results. Credit availability is represented by total banking system 
credit to the private sector. GDP, investment, capital stock and (private sector) credit 
data are subdivided into oil and non-oil to capture the structure of the Nigerian 
economy. Corporate profit is the aggregate operating surplus derived from the GDP 
spreadsheet while capacity utilisation is the percentage of installed capacity of the 
manufacturing sector used during the period. Oil price is the quarterly average of the 
dollar per barrel price of bonny light (Nigeria’s crude petroleum), while the nominal 
exchange rate is in naira per dollar. Where utilised, the real exchange rate is derived 
using the USA consumer price index sourced from the Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
All variables except the interest rates are in logarithm. 
As discussed earlier, we identify both macroeconomic and political uncertainties as 
potential deterrents of investment in Nigeria. Many previous studies on investments, 
considering macroeconomic uncertainty, either used a single proxy of volatility 
(usually inflation, GDP growth or exchange rates variances) to measure uncertainty or 
employed a summary measure which aggregates various candidate variables 
(Munthali, 2008). In this chapter, macroeconomic uncertainty (EV) is derived by 
combining the volatilities of GDP growth, inflation and exchange rates using a 
principal component analysis (PCA). Two approaches are evaluated for generating 
these volatilities: a GARCH(1,1) and an implicit equation; preferring the one with the 
better PCA. Implicit volatility is derived as  
                   [
 
  
(    ̅)
 ]
   
                                                   6.3 
where    (      ⁄ )    is growth rate,  ̅  is its mean,     to ensure non-
negativity, and   is standard deviation. The implicit volatility measures deviation of 
individual observations from the mean, normalised by the standard deviation. This 
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formula is applied separately to the output growth, inflation and exchange rates. The 
PCA is then employed to linearly transform and combine the observations (separately 
for the GARCH(1,1) and implicit equation) into a single variable which accounts for 
most variability in the original set. The variable thus generated is used to represent 
macroeconomic volatility. Political uncertainty (PV) is proxied by a dummy variable 
which captures military/autocratic rule and elections. This is because military rules are 
associated with dictatorship and suppression while elections in Nigeria are 
characterised by pre- and post- tensions. This dummy takes the value of unity for 
military and/or election years and zero otherwise.  
6.6.2 Preliminary and Stylised Analysis 
In conducting monetary policy, CBs expect interest rate rises to reduce AD via its 
components. Preliminary analysis in this section suggests that the correlation of 
interest rate and AD variables in Nigeria may not be inverse, at least 
contemporaneously. Table 6.1 contains contemporaneous correlations between 
investment related variables and the core determinants discussed earlier. First, 
contrasting neoclassical views, ALR correlation with capital stock and investment 
were low and positive. However, investment-GDP ratio correlated inversely with ALR 
consistent with findings in many studies for instance Greene and Villanueva (1991). 
This negative correlation does not however necessarily connote that increases in 
interest rate reduces investment, it may only show that GDP increases more than 
investment following to ALR changes. This is confirmed by the higher GDP-ALR 
correlation. So, while ALR raises investment it reduces investment/GDP ratio by 
raising the GDP to a larger degree. Not only does ALR increase GDP, in contrast to 
the NCM framework, it also increases the overall GDP gap although non-oil gap 
contracts. The ADR nonetheless correlated positively in all cases which may be a 
validation of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Overall, ALR have a higher (absolute) 
impact on investment than ADR. 
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Table 6.1: Partial Cross Correlation of Investment with Selected Determinants 
 Interest Rates 
CPI 
Private Sector Credit 
CU        Profit 
Output Growth Oil 
Price 
NER 
 ADR ALR Total N-Oil Oil Total N-Oil Oil 
Capital Stock 0.13 0.29 -0.23 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.18 -0.23 0.20 0.25 -0.16 0.32 -0.35 
     Non-Oil  0.14 0.30 -0.24 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.18 -0.24 0.21 0.26 -0.16 0.32 -0.35 
     Oil  0.11 0.28 -0.20 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.19 -0.21 0.18 0.23 -0.15 0.33 -0.34 
              
Inv/Capital 0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.30 -0.24 -0.01 -0.07 -0.14 0.16 -0.34 0.29 
     Non-Oil  0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.31 -0.24 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 0.14 -0.34 0.29 
     Oil  0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.27 -0.23 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 0.18 -0.35 0.29 
              
Investment 0.20 0.26 -0.29 0.20 0.21 0.00 -0.07 -0.33 0.23 0.21 -0.02 0.14 -0.26 
     Non-Oil  0.20 0.27 -0.30 0.22 0.23 0.03 -0.03 -0.33 0.25 0.26 -0.07 0.15 -0.27 
     Oil  0.15 0.18 -0.20 0.06 0.08 -0.14 -0.23 -0.28 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.10 -0.18 
Consumption  0.23 0.34 -0.33 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.40 -0.15 0.20 -0.36 
              
Inv/GDP 0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.12 -0.10 -0.33 -0.36 -0.10 -0.17 -0.26 0.14 -0.22 0.20 
     Non-Oil  0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.31 -0.36 -0.09 -0.20 -0.27 0.14 -0.25 0.22 
     Oil  0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.11 -0.33 -0.31 -0.14 -0.07 -0.16 0.15 -0.13 0.12 
Cons/GDP 0.11 0.11 -0.11 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.34 -0.28 0.09 0.20 -0.13 -0.28 -0.05 
              
GDP 0.21 0.33 -0.33 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.15 -0.27 0.34 0.37 -0.11 0.28 -0.37 
     Non-Oil  0.21 0.32 -0.32 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.16 -0.27 0.34 0.39 -0.14 0.27 -0.35 
     Oil  0.21 0.33 -0.28 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.12 -0.23 0.27 0.23 0.06 0.32 -0.40 
              
GDP GAP 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.27 0.18 0.23 -0.05 -0.11 
     Non-Oil  0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.28 0.27 0.09 -0.08 -0.04 
     Oil  0.12 0.11 -0.13 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.05 -0.10 0.30 0.03 -0.16 
Source: Author's computations based on data from the CBN and NBS. 
Note: Row variables are growth rates except interest rates which are averages. ADR and ALR represent average deposit and lending rates, 
respectively. CU is capacity utilisation and NER is nominal N/$ exchange rate. 
While the table shows the relationship between the interest rate and the level of 
investment, figure 6.1 shows the relationship with investment growth rate. Again, the 
relationship is positive both for deposit and lending rate (horizontal axis) even when 
investment (vertical axis) is disaggregated into oil and non-oil. Like in the table, the 
size of correlation is low though slightly higher for lending than deposit rate and for 
non-oil than oil investment. The larger non-oil correlation may be due to the fact that 
the oil sector does not react to monetary policy but to other international (and 
domestic) crude oil developments. Monetary policy in Nigeria is expected to affect the 
non-oil sector which react more to domestic conditions and policies.  
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 Figure 6.1: Real Interest Rate versus Investment Growth Rate 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
A positive investment-interest-rate relationship justified variously in the literature for 
developing countries (in line with McKinnon and Shaw) has been due to the 
importance of savings (or accumulation of money balances) for investment. However, 
positive correlation may arise over a region due to nonlinearity in the investment- 
interest rate relationship. Cappoza and Li (2001), and Chetty (2007) indicated that this 
region would emerge when interest rates are low and below growth. Low interest rates 
would normally be below a firm’s hurdle discount rate, thereby making investment 
viable even if rates were rising. Furthermore, higher output growth levels are 
associated with higher project IRR, thereby increasing investment viability. Thus, low 
interest rates reinforces higher IRR (via higher growth rates) to boost investment.  
For Nigeria, real interest rates are usually low (in many cases negative) and are below 
GDP growth rate. This is seen in figure 6.2 which shows the trends in real interest and 
expenditure growth rates. Panel (a) shows that for most portion real interest rates are 
negative while for the rest they are mostly close to zero. The sample means for deposit 
and lending rates are -5.2 and 1.2 per cent respectively. Visual inspection of panel (b) 
seems to support the backward bending hypothesis especially between 1993 and 2003.  
This thus provides an alternative explanation to the positive relationship vis-à-vis that 
of the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. 
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Figure 6.2: Trends in Real Interest and Expenditure Growth Rates 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
However, this positive relationship does not hold continuously across time and differs 
both for investment and consumption. The inter-temporal relationship between interest 
rate and private expenditure is shown in figure 6.3 below. Panels (a), (b), and (d) 
showed that the relationship is stronger for non-oil than oil investments, and mostly 
highest for consumption. While expenditures varied positively with past and 
contemporaneous interest rate, generally, the relationship tended to become negative 
between current investment and expected interest rate. Essentially, prevailing interest 
rate do not reduce investments but expected interest rate changes would reduce 
planned investments. The effect of interest rate expectation however depends on time. 
Total (and non-oil) investment would only correlate negative with five-quarter-ahead 
interest rate expectations while oil investment would react to two-quarter-ahead 
expectations, suggesting that non-oil drives total investment. Thus, future interest rate 
hikes increases uncertainty which lowers the rate of investment, particularly in the oil 
sector. The negative reaction to future interest rates is one quarter earlier for monetary 
policy rate indicating a probable pass-through lag of 3 months.  
As noted earlier, NCM model are based on the inter-temporal relationship between 
consumption and interest rate. Generally, the relationship between interest rate and 
consumption does not vary with time and is fairly constant across lags and leads, even 
as consumption in Nigerian largely constitutes necessities like food with low elasticity. 
The continued positive inter-temporal correlation for consumption may, however, 
connote that interest rate increases household’s income. This would imply that 
individual had accumulated financial assets the return of which finances their 
consumption. Given the high incidence of poverty in Nigeria, this may imply that rich 
households enjoy substantial rentier income.  
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Figure 6.3: Inter-Temporal Relationship between Real and Financial Variables 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
Over the entire sample period investment grew faster, on the average, than 
consumption expenditure and is twice as fast for the 1999-2011 period particularly for 
non-oil investments (see table 6.2).  Investment is also more volatile than consumption 
as shown by the standard deviations of their respective growth rates, consistent with 
the views of Baumann and Price (2007) and Dupor (2001) for the UK and USA, 
respectively. Fluctuations in average investment growth rates and volatility are also in 
tandem with overall GDP’s vis-à-vis consumption growth rate.  
Table 6.2: Growth Volatilities and Averages for GDP and its Components 
 Average End 
Period 
(2011:Q2) 
Standard Deviation 
 Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
Consumption  6.55 5.81 6.06 7.22 21.51 17.01 14.67 9.19 21.56 
Gross Investment  8.46 12.62 -2.88 13.72 0.39 23.20 27.37 16.88 22.37 
     Non-Oil  9.06 11.67 -2.23 15.04 1.10 22.16 25.94 16.94 20.77 
     Oil  7.70 14.87 -4.06 11.79 -2.52 30.47 32.04 17.22 34.46 
Government  14.69 -6.87 28.07 16.47 -25.20 55.60 20.94 69.66 54.79 
Net Exports 47.06 86.27 -30.06 77.59 -9.66 145.90 150.86 80.88 158.76 
     Exports 15.27 36.29 2.98 13.05 -17.94 36.47 56.15 27.12 24.18 
     Imports 15.89 23.28 13.68 13.77 -21.05 32.95 18.93 21.46 42.81 
Total GDP 5.81 6.58 1.91 7.94 7.72 5.28 4.60 1.58 5.77 
     Non-Oil  7.02 6.24 2.70 10.16 8.82 6.70 3.43 0.87 8.22 
     Oil  2.67 7.41 0.55 1.76 1.81 8.71 10.11 4.45 9.35 
Source: Author's computations based on data from the CBN and NBS 
These notwithstanding, analysis of contributions to GDP, in table 6.3, showed that 
consumption had more weight than investment in Nigeria. Consumption accounted for 
about 70 per cent of total income while investment had only a 10 per cent weight. Of 
this, non-oil investment accounted for 7 per cent while 3 per cent went to oil 
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investment. The high weight of consumption reflects the high propensity to consume 
out of income (noted earlier in the chapter). The high weight of consumption to AD 
was also reflected in its contribution to demand growth where it appeared to be the 
major driver of GDP. A careful look at the table, however, reveals that though 
consumption contributes more to growth, investment drives growth dynamics. This is 
because increased growth rate is only recorded when investment accelerates and falls 
when investment slows down.     
Table 6.3: Average Contribution of Components to Level and Growth of GDP 
 Relative Weights  Contribution to Growth 
 
Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
End 
Period 
(2011:Q2) 
Whole 
Sample 
1985-
1990 
1991-
1998 
1999-
2011 
End 
Period 
(2011:Q2) 
Consumption  0.69 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.66 3.79 3.20 4.08 3.89 12.64 
Gross 
Investment  
0.10 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.61 1.15 -0.56 1.10 0.05 
     Non-Oil  0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.51 0.71 -0.32 0.95 0.12 
     Oil  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.43 -0.24 0.15 -0.07 
Government  0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.46 -0.85 1.34 0.53 -3.74 
Net Exports 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.95 3.08 -2.95 2.43 -1.23 
     Exports 0.35 0.27 0.35 0.39 0.36 3.13 5.61 -0.05 3.98 -8.39 
     Imports 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.25 2.18 2.54 2.90 1.55 -7.16 
Total GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.81 6.58 1.91 7.94 7.72 
     Non-Oil  0.71 0.66 0.66 0.76 0.85 5.02 4.10 1.77 7.54 7.43 
     Oil  0.29 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.15 0.80 2.48 0.14 0.40 0.28 
Source: Author's computations based on data from the CBN and NBS 
Overall, it can be seen from the various tables and charts that while consumption is 
larger than investment (and other GDP components), volatilities and oscillations of 
AD are due essentially to investment dynamics. The high weight of consumption 
reflects the high degree of privation in the country and the accompanying high 
marginal propensity to consume. Most of this consumption expenditure goes to 
necessities and basics like food which are highly interest rate inelastic. Thus, 
monetary policy may be unable to affect the larger part of demand. The above analysis 
also shows that although oil is a major aspect of the Nigerian economy, it is the non-
oil sector that drives investment and GDP. Our analysis would, thus, concentrate on 
the impact of monetary policy changes in interest rate on non-oil investments in 
Nigeria.    
A cursory analysis of other determinants of investment is also provided (see table 6.1). 
Though most correlation coefficients in the table are low, a priori sign expectations 
(vis-à-vis investment) are satisfied for output growth, inflation, credit availability, oil 
price changes, and exchange rates. However, a puzzle emerges with the profit growth 
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which related inversely with investment and AD variables in contrast to 
Kaleckian/Kaldorian view. Theoretically, increases in profit raise (corporate) savings 
and investment. The negative sign may mean that most firms do not retain and 
reinvest profits. Perhaps larger proportions of earnings are paid out as dividend to 
shareholders who redirect those funds into financial savings assets and consumption.  
Capacity utilisation is also found to contrast the theoretically postulated direction. 
Post-Keynesian analysis suggests a positive investment effect of capacity utilisation. 
However, these were found to correlate inversely for Nigeria. This may be due to the 
fact that capacity utilisation in Nigeria is not entirely demand driven, but essentially 
reflects infrastructural deficiencies. For instance, firms have to generate their own 
electricity and provide their own security. The cost of these causes a decline in 
demand, sales and capacity utilisation. In Nigeria, capacity utilisation is very low – 
hovering around 43.5 per cent (see table 3.2) – so that increases in demand/sales does 
not cause an excess over installed capacity and as such does not prompt machinery 
procurement. Since new machineries are not required to meet increased demand, new 
investments are not undertaken and the relationship between capacity utilisation and 
investment thus becomes non-positive.  Investments in machinery may thus not be due 
to increased capacity but probably due to other factors like technological advances. 
Capacity utilisation may therefore not constitute a viable determinant of investment in 
Nigeria.     
6.7 Methodology and Model Specification 
The theoretical determinants of investment are numerous and they vary with schools 
of thought. Though our focus in this study is on the monetary policy effect of 
investment, the roles of other relevant factors are also examined in order to ensure 
completeness. Monetary policy would affect investment through the user cost of 
capital – particularly retail interest rates. Many investment literature threat this 
relationship either as linear or monotonic while in reality it may not only be nonlinear 
but also non-monotonic. However, a good starting point would be to assume linearity 
and monotonicity for simplicity. Hence, the basic model is expressed as  
                                                                            (6.4) 
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where    is the log of real investment,    is the real retail interest rate (i.e. ALR),    is 
a      vector of   non-cost determinants of investments and    is the stochastic error 
term which is assumedly    (    
 ). The subscript t indicates that the variables are 
time-series while   ,a     are the (conforming vectors of) long-run parameters to be 
estimated. The    vector can contain any combination of determinants for the various 
schools discussed earlier thereby leading to a potentially large dimension of  . This 
has implications for the degrees of freedom and the validity of our inferences. Besides, 
some of these factors may be correlated among themselves. Hence, the first task is to 
prune the dimension of   . This is achieved by conducting a preliminary analysis in 
which all potential variables are allowed into an over-parameterised model of    on    
alone. This model is then reduced using a combination of criteria. Highly collinear or 
redundant variables are deleted from the model leaving few variables that optimised 
the  ̅  and AIC. Multicollinearity is investigated via the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
and coefficient variance decomposition while redundancy is examined with the 
conventional likelihood-ratio test.
56
  
Given that most economic variables are inherently non-stationary a cointegration 
analysis is conducted using the ARDL model à la Pesaran and Shin (1998) discussed 
in chapter five. Thus, equation 6.4 is rewritten in ARDL form to derive our benchmark 
model as 
                         ( )     ( )     ( )              (6.5) 
where   is the intercept,   is the error correction parameter,   nests the long-run 
interest rate multiplier,   is a vector which embeds the long-run elasticities of non-
cost determinants and    is an error term assumed    (    
 ). The long-run multipliers 
are derived as      ⁄  and      ⁄  as explained previously.  ( ) ,  ( )  and 
 ( )  are lag polynomials in the short-run variables with    and   as short-run 
dynamic parameters. This specification enables the concurrent estimation of the short- 
and long-run effects of the determinants on investment. Again, the lag augmentation 
allowed the modelling of the possible delays between impulse, planning and actual 
investment.  
                                            
56 The VIF threshold was set to 2 implying a tolerance of 0.5. Tolerance=1/VIF and range from 0-to-1 for high-to-
low multicollinearity, respectively. Our threshold thus represents the moderate scenario.    
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However, Capozza and Li (2001), Chetty (2007), Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) and 
Weiss (1999), inter alia, showed that the path of investment may be nonlinear so that 
the linear model in 6.5 becomes inadequate in capturing the relationship. Given our 
focus, we thus modelled the nonlinearity in the investment-cost relationship. A 
threshold in the relationship was suggested by Capozza and Li (op.cit) and Chetty 
(op.cit) with output growth as the transition variable. However, monetary policy can 
have asymmetric impact on investment depending on the size and direction of change. 
Consequently, we specify two different threshold-ARDL (T-ARDL) models in order 
to capture these asymmetries. The first is a simple threshold model that tested the 
presence of Chetty’s backward bending function using the level of growth rate as 
threshold, while the second is a momentum based threshold model which investigated 
the convexity of the function where changes in monetary policy rate is the transition 
variable.  
The asymmetric ARDL model of Shin et al. (2009) discussed in the previous chapter 
partitioned the variable by assuming a single known zero threshold. However, 
threshold may be non-zero, multiple and generally unknown. To test the backward 
bending function we utilise a single, known, but non-zero threshold,    – which is the 
growth rate at time t. Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) showed that in this case the 
asymmetric regressor,   , can be partitioned as  
        
( )    
( )
                                                   (6.6) 
where   
( )
 and   
( )
 constitute the partial sum processes of the changes in    in 
regime_1 (     ) and regime_2 (     ), respectively, and is derived as 
  
( )  ∑                 ,    
( )  ∑                                       (6.7) 
where         is an indicator function that took the value of unity when the argument is 
true and zero otherwise. Thus, the simple T-ARDL[1] models is specified as  
                                  
( )    
( )   ( )    
( )         
  ( )     
( )( )   
( )   ( )( )   
( )   ( )                      (6.8) 
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where  ( )and ( )  are asymmetric parameters which nest the asymmetric long-run 
multipliers ( ( )     ( )) , while  ( )  and  ( )  are the short-run parameters in 
regime_1 and _2, respectively. A test of asymmetry is conducted using the Wald-test 
for     
( )   ( ) and      
( )   ( ) for the long- and short-run, respectively. 
To conduct the momentum based analysis, the possibility of multiple thresholds in the 
interest-rate-investment relationship is recognised. Changes in monetary policy rate 
may have different effect on investment depending on the size of the change or the 
stance of policy. Hence, the objective of the analysis in this case is twofold. First, to 
determine whether larger absolute changes in MPR affected investment more than 
smaller ones. Second, to investigate the effect of positive vis-à-vis negative nominal 
MPR changes on investment. Consequently, two unknown thresholds ( ( )) are 
specified leading to three possible regimes. The first threshold ( ( )) defined the 
upper regime for large positive changes while the other ( ( )) captured the lower 
regime for large negative changes. The middle regime denoted moderate (or zero) 
change regime. The analysis is designed to determine the effect of ALR on investment 
in different policy regimes. Hence, the momentum of MPR (i.e. ΔMPR) becomes the 
transition variable while the ALR is the regressor to be split, thereby reflecting the 
effect of retail lending rate on investment given changes in MPR.  
In this case, the asymmetric regressor    is partitioned as  
        
( )    
( )    
( )
                                             (6.9) 
where   
( ) is the partial sum process for the changes in    in the  
   regime defined as  
  
( )  ∑          {         ( )}  
    
( )  ∑          { ( )          ( )}                                     (6.10) 
  
( )  ∑          {         ( )}  
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where  {       ( )}  is an indicator function that equals unity when the condition is 
satisfied and zero otherwise.     is the delay parameter reflecting the possible lag 
effect of monetary policy. The momentum T-ARDL[2] is thus specified as 
            ∑ 
( )    
( )         ( )    ∑ 
( )( )   
( )   ( )         (6.11) 
where   [     ] represents the respective regimes. Again,  ( )  are the asymmetric 
parameters containing the asymmetric long-run multipliers ( ( )) while  ( )  are the 
short-run parameters. Test of asymmetry is again based on the Wald-test for 
    
( )     ( )    , and     
( )     ( )    , in the long- and short-run, 
respectively. The stochastic and unknown thresholds are estimated by conducting a 
grid search and selecting the pair (   ) that minimises the residual sum of squares 
(   ) as follows 
               ̂  
      [           ]
             
   (   )                                            (6.12) 
where     is derived from OLS regressions of equation 6.11 for different values of 
     , and   is the set of all possible values of the transition variable after 
removing observations in the top and bottom 15th-percentile. The search is conducted 
sequentially in increments of 25 basis points for changes in MPR while limiting the 
delay to       given the quarterly frequency of our data.57 A likelihood-ratio test 
is used to test the validity of the estimated thresholds.  
The ARDL equations 6.5, 6.8 and 6.11 are estimated using the OLS technique. 
Generally, an OLS estimation of an investment model based on its various 
determinants may be characterised by a number of problems like endogeneity bias, 
autocorrelation, and non-stationary of variables. Endogeneity bias results from the fact 
that many determinants of investment (e.g. output, profit, etc) are endogenous 
regressor which relate bi-directionally with investment and thus correlate with the 
error. The potential problem of serial-correlation is due to time-series nature of the 
data and the inherent time dependence of financial variables. While non-stationary is 
based on the fact that most economic data are  ( ), where    . These can lead to 
the problem of spurious analysis and could invalidate our inferences. However, 
                                            
57 The search sequence is based on the monetary policy norm of adjusting base rate in multiples of 25 basis points.  
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according to Pesaran and Shin (1998), the ARDL approach has the advantage of 
producing consistent parameters estimate in the presence of these problems and 
irrespective of the mixture of  ( ) or  ( ) variables (see chapter 5). They also showed 
that adequate lag augmentation concurrently eliminates the problems of 
autocorrelation and endogeneity bias. To ensure valid inferences, it is essential to 
choose the correct order of the ARDL using appropriate criteria like the AIC. 
Pesaran and Shin (op.cit) indicated that the estimators of the cointegrating parameters 
of the ARDL are Gaussian and efficient. These estimators also have the limiting 
normal distribution and are super-consistent, while estimators of the short-run 
parameters are consistent even in the presence of non-stationary variables. 
Furthermore, the ARDL approach produces economically interpretable cointegrating 
coefficients. As in the previous chapter, test of cointegration is conducted using the 
PSS bounds F-test which is applicable irrespective of the orders of integration of the 
variables. Assuming an unrestricted intercept, the PSS F-test of long-run relationships 
is performed, under the (joint) null of no cointegration as  
      
( )                                                              (6.13) 
where   [     ]  is the respective regimes in the three ARDL variants. The F-
statistic is then compared with the asymptotic critical values provided in Pesaran et al. 
(2001) as discussed in the preceding chapter. Following Shin et al. (2009), cumulative 
dynamic multipliers in these models are computed to analyse adjustment path to 
steady-state equilibrium after an impulse to regressors. This is derived as 
  
( )  ∑
     
   
( )
 
                                                         (6.14) 
where   [     ] for the corresponding regime. The dynamic multipliers  
( )
 tend to 
 ( ) as    . The duration of full adjustment (  
( )   ( )) is captured by   which 
is plotted against  
( )
 for the various models to show the adjustment traverses. In 
nonlinear models,   
( )    
( )    
( )
 may hold, suggesting asymmetric 
adjustment in the various regimes. 
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Again, as in the preceding chapter, robust OLS analysis is conducted using the 
Newey-West method to provide HAC standard errors which ensures the validity of 
our inferences even in the presence of the classical problems. We evaluate the stability 
and correctness of our model specification using Ramsey’s RESET with the null of no 
specification error. All restrictions and models evaluations are, again, conducted at the 
5 per cent level of significance. 
6.8 Empirical Analysis 
To ensure a robust model of investment, empirical analysis begin with an eclectic 
over-parameterised equation and a search for important determinants. Twelve 
variables [including                  (
  
 
)
 
 (
   
 
)
 
                      ] featured 
in the search. Interest rates are excluded from the search since they constitute the 
focus of the overall analysis. Tests of multicollinearity and redundancy, pruned the 
variables to four [consisting                ] which are used as the main components 
of the   vector. Nonetheless,    is attached to the model as a dummy variable while 
    is appended to the oil equation. Of the two definitions of    , the GARCH(1,1) 
version is preferred given its superior performance in the preliminary search. Besides, 
the first principal component for the GARCH(1,1) explained about 50 per cent of the 
variances in the three series compared with 39 per cent explained by the implicit 
volatility version. 
As in the preceding chapter, test of stationarity is conducted to investigate the time-
series properties of (all admissible) variables using both the ADF and the KPSS tests. 
According to these, most variables are  ( ) apart from ALR and    which are  ( ). 
Both tests, however, presented conflicting results for the oil investment (   ) and oil 
output (   ) (see table 6.4). The mixture of   ( ) and  ( ) variables, as underscored 
earlier, would not affect the validity of our analysis given that the ARDL model and 
the PSS F-test remain valid even under this condition.   
The ARDL model is estimated for total (   ), non-oil (   ) and oil (   ) investments. 
A general to specific modelling approach is adopted with an over-parameterisation of 
four lags for the regressors and the regressand. The optimal lag-length of four is based 
on the AIC from a search of between one-to-eight lags. A parsimonious model is 
thereafter obtained by deleting insignificant dynamic regressors from the model 
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complemented with the AIC criterion. For any set of potential parsimonious models, 
that with the least AIC is selected. Where variables are insignificant both in the long- 
and short-run, such variables are completed deleted from the model. Coefficients of 
the remaining significant short-run variables in the models are summed-up to derive 
the short-run dynamic parameter for the respective variables. 
Table 6.4: Stationarity Test for Candidate Variables 
 ADF  KPSS 
 Levels 1st-Diff. Decision  Levels 1st–Diff. Decision 
Private Investment (I_T) -1.79 -5.21***  ( )  0.23*** 0.06  ( ) 
     Non-Oil (I_N) -1.21 -5.18***  ( )  0.25*** 0.06  ( ) 
     Oil (I_O) -3.46** -4.58***  ( )  0.16** 0.05  ( ) 
Lending Rate (ALR) -4.05*** -7.84***  ( )  0.08 0.03  ( ) 
Private Credit (CPS) -1.18 -9.96***  ( )  0.29*** 0.05  ( ) 
     Non-Oil (CPS_N) -1.16 -9.93***  ( )  0.29*** 0.05  ( ) 
     Oil (CPS_O) -2.17 -13.25***  ( )  0.17** 0.07  ( ) 
GDP (Y) -1.30 -4.04**  ( )  0.24*** 0.07  ( ) 
     Non-Oil (Y_N) -1.30 -4.04**  ( )  0.26*** 0.08  ( ) 
     Oil (Y_O) -2.61 -4.73***  ( )  0.11 0.06  ( ) 
Public Investment (GI) -1.61 -10.04***  ( )  0.25*** 0.04  ( ) 
Economic Volatility (EV) -6.13*** -8.58***  ( )  0.13* 0.12*  ( ) 
Oil Prices (PO) -2.51 -8.88  ( )  0.28*** 0.04  ( ) 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN and NBS. 
Note: The ADF-test was conducted under the null hypothesis of unit root using MacKinnon critical values of      ,      and      for 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively, while the KPSS-test was performed under the null hypothesis of stationarity with 
corresponding asymptotic critical values of 0.21, 0.14 and 0.11. 
6.8.1 The Linear-ARDL Model 
An abridged result of the symmetric ARDL is contained in panel (A) of table 6.5 
below.
58 
Column (1) presents the results for the total investment model, while non-oil 
and oil results are contained in the columns (2) and (3), respectively. All variables in 
the long-run portion of the columns are rightly signed except for the CPS, while in the 
short-run section ALR coefficient is positively signed. The results indicated a 
significant and substantial error correction mechanism ( ) with quarterly adjustment 
speeds ranging from 22 to 53 per cent for     and    , respectively. The long-run 
ALR multipliers indicate a negative relationship with investments which is stronger 
for non-oil than for oil investments. It indicated that a 1-percentage point change in 
ALR reduces     ,     and     by 0.4, 0.5 and 0.2 per cent, respectively. The 
coefficient of     is not only least but also insignificant, while     and     are 
significant at 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. In the short-run, all three are 
significantly positive with     having the largest coefficient. The negative long-run 
but positive short-run coefficients could indicate that interest rates changes do not 
                                            
58  Given the length of the original table an abridged version is presented in the main text containing the 
relationships of interest. The full table is however presented in the appendix. 
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deter investments which have already been ratified while planned investments can be 
altered by these. This finding is consistent with the earlier stylised analysis. 
Credit availability, proxied by CPS, also showed a perverse but significantly negative 
long-run effect and significantly positive short-run coefficient for all three. This may 
be due to the reluctance of Nigerian banks to grant long-term loans and their 
preference for short-term bridge-finance loans. In many cases, banks in Nigeria try to 
limit the tenure of their loans to one year. The   ̅  at 0.91, suggested that the     
model captured most variation in the regressand. This is, however, lower for     (0.79) 
and lowest for     (0.67). The PSS F-test confirmed the presence of a long-run 
relationship in the variables at the 5 per cent level.    
6.8.2 The Simple T-ARDL[1] Model: Analyses of the Backward Bending 
Function  
To test the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship, the investment function is re-
estimated using the (nonlinear) threshold-ARDL with one threshold (T-ARDL[1]). 
Consistent with Capozza and Li (2001) and Chetty (2007) the threshold variable in 
this analysis is the real growth rate of output. This threshold represented the level at 
which real interest rates either lied above or below growth rate. Consequently, the 
threshold is given and required no estimation. For levels of interest rates above growth 
rate, the a priori expectation is a negative relationship, while below it we expect a 
positive relationship in order to confirm the backward bending curve.  
The results of T-ARDL[1] are contained  in panel (B) of table 6.5, where columns (5), 
(6) and (7) present models for total, non-oil and oil investments, respectively. Again, 
the ECM parameter ( ) showed considerable adjustment speed for    , vis-à-vis the 
other models, and is correctly signed in all cases. The long-run coefficients of ALR 
are insignificantly positively signed in all three cases for rates above threshold 
(regime_1) but are negative for rates below the threshold (regime_2). These results 
could not confirm the presence of a backward bending curve as suggested by Capozza 
and Li (op.cit) and Chetty (op.cit). It instead presented evidence, albeit weakly, of a 
forward bending (non-monotonic) curve. The insignificance of regime_1 coefficients 
supported the findings of Rose (2000), who showed that investment-interest rate 
relationship diminishes at high interest rates. Sectoral comparison, again, indicated 
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that interest rate changes do not affect oil sector significantly while the effect is 
significantly negative for     and     in regime_2. The Wald-test suggests long-run 
nonlinearity for     and     while     exhibited long-run symmetry. 
Table 6.5: Result ARDL Model of Investment: Monetary Policy Effects 
 (A) ARDL Model (B) T-ARDL[1] Model (C) T-ARDL[2] Model 
 I_T I_N I_O I_T I_N I_O I_T I_N I_O 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
1.12*** 
(0.30) 
1.19*** 
0.30 
-2.21* 
(1.15) 
1.37*** 
(0.38) 
1.53*** 
(0.27) 
-0.22 
(0.90) 
2.98*** 
(0.52) 
2.14*** 
(0.29) 
0.80 
(1.40) 
   
-0.21*** 
(0.04) 
-0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.52*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.40*** 
(0.04) 
-0.47*** 
(0.09) 
-0.49*** 
(0.07) 
-0.59*** 
(0.05) 
-0.50*** 
(0.13) 
 ( )  
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.36*** 
(0.06) 
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
 ( )     
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.20*** 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
 ( )        
-1.12*** 
(0.23) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
-1.02*** 
(0.36) 
 ( )  
-0.37* 
(0.19) 
-0.50** 
(0.19) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.33) 
-0.73*** 
(0.10) 
-0.90*** 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.21) 
 ( )     
-0.74*** 
(0.22) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
 ( )        
-2.27*** 
(0.44) 
-0.67*** 
(0.17) 
-2.03** 
(0.81) 
 [      ]  
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
 [      ]  
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.27*** 
(0.08) 
-0.17*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
∑      
( ) 
     
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.23 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
∑      
( ) 
        
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
0.56*** 
(0.14) 
0.74*** 
(0.15) 
0.41*** 
(0.11) 
∑      
( ) 
           
0.64** 
(0.28) 
-0.48*** 
(0.13) 
1.05* 
(0.57) 
∑      
 
     
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.08) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
0.62*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.08) 
0.61*** 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
∑        
 
     
0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
 ̅   0.91 0.79 0.66 0.91 0.86 0.68 0.96 0.91 0.71 
RSS 0.10 0.25 0.71 0.10 0.17 0.72 0.03 0.10 0.66 
AIC -3.60 -2.76 -1.62 -3.59 -3.02 -1.67 -4.20 -3.30 -1.69 
F-Test(PSS) 6.09
** 
10.31
** 
8.94
** 
4.87
** 
18.67
** 
4.79
** 
10.58
**
 21.37
** 
3.82
** 
RESET 3.11
*
 
[0.06] 
3.95
**
 
[0.03] 
3.01
*
 
[0.09] 
0.02 
[0.89] 
3.53
*
 
[0.06] 
0.06 
[0.81] 
0.27 
[0.43] 
0.08 
[0.72] 
0.08 
[0.77] 
LR-Sym(1) 
   (    )    NO NO YES NO NO NO 
LR-Sym(2) 
            NO NO NO 
SR-Sym(1) 
   (     )    YES YES NO NO NO NO 
SR-Sym(2) 
      
 
     NO NO NO 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN and NBS. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2. Figures in ( ) are 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. RSS means residual sum of squares while AIC is 
the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case 
III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of 
Ramsey’s specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ]. LR-Sym(∙) and SR-Sym(∙) are Wald-tests for 
asymmetric multipliers in the long- and short-run, respectively, where test(1) investigates asymmetry in all regimes in a given model and 
test(2) is for positive or negative asymmetry in model C. 
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In the short-run, the coefficients are negatively signed in regime_1 but positive in 
regime_2. This may suggest that the backward bending curve may only be obtainable 
in the short- rather than the long-run. The coefficients are, nonetheless, insignificant 
for non-oil in both regimes but significant for oil only in the lower regime. The Wald-
test indicated short-run symmetry for total and non-oil but asymmetry for oil 
investments. Private sector credit is, again, negatively signed in the long-run but is 
positive in the short-run. Though, the  ̅  and the AIC changed marginally for     
and    , vis-à-vis the linear model, they improved reasonably for     to 0.86 and -
3.03, respectively. Again, the PSS F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent 
level in all sectors. Comparing the ARDL with the T-ARDL[1] models suggested only 
a marginal improvement in the latter.   
6.8.3 The Momentum T-ARDL[2] Model: Analyses of the Monetary Policy 
Effect  
The T-ARDL[2] model contained two unknown thresholds ( ( )     ( )) which 
are estimated by searching sequentially over the grid set which contained the middle 
70th-percentile of nominal         over the sample period. The search is conducted 
first for the positive threshold  ( )  and then holding this constant,  ( )is estimated; 
after which we re-estimated   ( ) . This search is conducted simultaneously for the 
thresholds ( ( )) and the delay parameter ( )   Following several iterations, we found 
 ( )          and  ( )           for     and     . However, for     , the 
results indicated  ( )          and  ( )          . We also found a global 
single threshold of            for     and    , while for     it is         
 . The single threshold model is, nonetheless, not analysed further in this study as we 
focused on the double threshold model. The validity of these thresholds are confirmed 
via a likelihood-ratio test, à la Hansen (2000), computed from the sum of squared 
residuals of the (unrestricted) linear-ARDL model, the restricted single (unknown) 
threshold model, and the restricted double (unknown) T-ARDL[2] model. This 
enables us to investigate the robustness of the threshold models and thus, ascertain 
that our results are not due to outliers. 
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Columns (8), (9) and (10) in panel (C) of table 6.5 contain the result of the T-ARDL[2] 
model for total, non-oil and oil investments, respectively. The speed of adjustment ( ) 
is correctly sized and signed in all equations. It is also generally higher than those in 
the T-ARDL[1] model while a sectoral analysis indicated it is highest for     at 60 
per cent vis-à-vis 49 and 51 per cent for     and    , respectively. The long-run 
multipliers are higher, in absolute value, for high momentum regimes ( ( )and  ( )) 
than for the low momentum –corridor– regime ( ( )) in all cases. Basically, interest 
rates relate somewhat directly with investment when monetary policy changes are 
moderate, but inversely for sizeable policy changes (see figure 6.4). For     and    , 
accelerated monetary ease boosted investment substantially more than investment is 
retarded by increased monetary tightening. The converse holds for    . Hence, the 
multipliers are (absolutely) higher in regime_3 than in regime_2 for     and     but 
not    .   
Figure 6.4: Fitted Long-run Investment-Interest-Rate Relationship 
 
During accelerated monetary ease, an extra 1-percentage point fall in market rates 
increases    ,     and     by 2.2, 0.7 and 2.0 per cent, while equally sized rise retards 
investments by 0.7, 0.9 and 0.2 per cent, respectively. The fall in     is nonetheless, 
not significant implying that regimes of substantial monetary policy tightening retards 
    significantly but has little effect on     . In the middle regime of moderate 
monetary policy changes, the multipliers are non-negative; being significantly positive 
for     and    , but insignificant for    . The Wald-test of asymmetry rejected the 
Expected 
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null hypothesis of symmetry among the three regimes in all equations. Similarly, the 
test found asymmetry between accelerated monetary tightening and ease in all cases.  
In the short-run, accelerated tightening have a generally weak effect on investments. 
This may probably be due to long-term planning of investments. For     and    , the 
short-run multipliers suggested that a 1-percentage point fall in rates lowers 
investments, by 0.56 and 0.42 per cent in the median regime and 0.64 and 1.05 per 
cent in regime_3, respectively. However, the results indicated that     are lowered in 
the median regime but boosted in regime_3. This implied that sharp expansionary 
policies have significant short-term effects on     . The multipliers in the middle 
regime are significantly positive in all sectors. Other results showed that CPS 
coefficients remained negative in the long-run but are positive in the short-run. The T-
ARDL[2] models showed a considerable better fit than the T-ARDL[1] as the   ̅  
increased to 0.97, 0.91 and 0.71 for    ,     and     , respectively. This indicated 
that the models explained a substantial amount of variations in the investments in 
Nigeria. In addition, the AIC also selected these models over the preceding one while 
the PSS F-test again confirmed the existence of a long-run relationship among the 
variables in all cases. 
The results in the three linear and nonlinear-ARDL are also illustrated in the 
cumulative dynamic multipliers in figure 6.5. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show the results of 
the linear, T-ARDL[1], and T-ARDL[2] models, respectively, while the various 
aggregations of investments are contained in the rows. Cumulative dynamic 
multipliers, according to Shin et al. (2009), depict the adjustment trajectory, via short-
run disequilibrium, to the long-run equilibrium when regressors of interest are 
shocked. The patterns in figure 6.5 suggested that, in the linear model, positive shocks 
to lending rates lower investment in all three investment aggregates, albeit, 
significantly for    . Furthermore, it takes approximately two years to revert to 
equilibrium for     and    , though the effects are insignificant almost throughout the 
life of the shock, while non-oil shocks required a longer time, about five years to 
eventually flatten out.  
In the nonlinear model of T-ARDL[1], the asymmetric dynamic multipliers suggested 
that significant asymmetry in the responses as seen in the “difference” series which 
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lay between regimes_1 and _2.  For total and non-oil investments, this showed that 
when interest rates are below growth rate, shocks to the system are significantly 
negative and are persistent. Adjustments to the long-run equilibrium are, again, about 
three years for total and five years for non-oil investments. However, at higher levels 
of interest rate the response is insignificantly positive. For the oil sector, the response 
is generally muted and symmetric. Column 3 contains the traverse for the momentum 
threshold model. This showed that regimes of accelerated tightening have a persistent 
negative impact on domestic investments generally. Essentially, the effects of large 
ease and moderate stance disappeared after two years, while that of large hikes 
persisted and taking about four years to flatten out. This inverse effect is considerably 
larger for non-oil than for oil investments.   
Figure 6.5: Cumulative Dynamic Multipliers 
 
6.9 Discussions and Findings 
The empirical analysis presented in table 6.5 and figures 6.4/6.5 contain a number of 
findings on the relationship between investments and interest rate and the role of 
monetary policy. Nonetheless, investment is determined by a battery of factors other 
than the interest rate (or monetary policy). Knowledge of the relative importance of 
interest rate in the investment process is also germane to the design of monetary 
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policy. Our findings are thus presented in two folds: first, the effects of monetary 
policy on investment, and next, relative effects of other determinants. 
6.9.1 Monetary Policy Effects 
The investment-interest-rate relationship presented above has important long-term 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy and the Nigerian economy. Although 
an inverse relationship was suggested on the average by all models, our analysis found 
significant differences among sectors and models. Several key findings can be 
deduced from the result but the discussions would focus on the most important ones. 
First, we find that the relationship is inherently nonlinear given the superiority of the 
nonlinear models and the significant asymmetry confirmed by the Wald-test. Thus, the 
interest-rate-investment relationship is better explained by a nonlinear rather than a 
linear model; consistent with the views of Fazzari et al. (2010), and Kieler and 
Saarenheimo (1998), inter alia. However, this nonlinearity may not be due to the level 
interest rate vis-à-vis growth rate as suggested by Chetty (2007) and Capozza and Li 
(2001), at least for Nigeria. The T-ARDL[1] model showed that at higher interest rate 
the relationship becomes insignificant. This finding, by showing that the relationship 
diminished at high levels, contradicted that of Capozza and Li (op.cit) but supported 
that of Rose (2000). Again, the results do not provide strong evidence of non-
monotonicity, which in this case showed the inappropriateness of output growth as a 
threshold variable. Hence, the relationship is nonlinear but monotonic. Comparing the 
T-ARDL[1] with the T-ARDL[2] suggested that the latter captured the dynamics 
better than the former. The preferred three regime T-ARDL[2] model, thus, suggested 
that it is changes, rather than the levels of interest rates that are most important in 
determining investment and capturing the nonlinearities in the relationship (see figure 
6.4). This finding was pre-empted by Fazzari et al. (op.cit) when they argued that “the 
investment component of [AD] depends on the change in real rates” rather than its 
levels (p.2013). Hence, irrespective of the level of interest rate, the responsiveness of 
investments to interest rates depends on nominal changes in the transition variable, the 
monetary policy rate. The investment-interest rate function is therefore asymmetric 
around changes in policy rate.  
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Second, the results (and figure 6.5) showed that the interest rate effect on investment 
is highest in regimes with strong monetary policy rate adjustments. In these extreme 
regimes, the interest rate effect is also inverse, in line with the neoclassical theories. 
However, in the corridor regime – with moderate monetary policy stance – the 
relationship between investment and market rates is positive and sometimes 
insignificant, thus perverse. In contrast to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), this implied 
that changing policy rates by between 25-50 basis points would be ineffective in 
achieving its objective and can even cause distortions to the system. Capozza and Li 
(2001) underscored the implications of this kind of perverse outcome for worsening 
long-run economic performance. More importantly, interest rate had no effect on non-
oil investment in Nigeria, when policy changes are within the corridor. This has other 
implications given that policies are targeted at this sector; with the assumed inability 
to affect the oil sector. The reason for this result may be that moderate changes in 
policy rate would have limited impact on discount rate and planned investment, but 
may affect a projects’ IRR and the option value of delay (Capozza and Li, op.cit). At 
best, the overall effect of interest rate on investment within this corridor regime is 
ambiguous.  
The general implication of this is that interest and investments in Nigeria would relate 
inversely in the long-run, as long as changes in the policy rate are outside the perverse 
corridor. This long-run relationship is validated by the PSS F-test. Given our 
estimated thresholds, the effect of monetary policy would also differ between extreme 
regimes depending on whether the policy stance is expansionary or contractionary. 
The results also differed among investment types. Nonetheless, we find that monetary 
tightening would have a significant effect on all investment types when the hike 
surpassed (or equalled) 125 basis points. In regimes of loose policy, the effect 
becomes meaningful for rate eases of 150 basis points (or more) for total and oil while 
the threshold for non-oil is 100 basis points. Hence, while the thresholds for 
contractionary stance are the same, those for expansionary stance are different. If the 
policy objective is to encourage non-oil rather than oil investment then the reduction 
in policy rates should be              for the outcome to be effective. 
Again, tight policy would affect the non-oil sector more than the oil sector. This is not 
unexpected. The results nonetheless suggested that tight monetary policy may have 
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larger adverse effect on non-oil investment than can be reversed by loose policy, while 
the converse holds for the oil sector. It is easier to lower non-oil investments than to 
increase them, while oil investments are easier to raise than to lower. This is shown by 
the larger long-run multiplier in regime_1 than regime_3, for non-oil investments and 
larger regime_3 multiplier than regime_1 in the case of oil investments. Essentially, as 
shown in table 6.5, every extra 1-percentage point rise in interest rate, in regime_1, 
slows non-oil investments by 0.9 per cent but a policy reversal of equal size can only 
boost investment by 0.7 per cent implying a long-term loss of 0.2 per cent. This result 
is also confirmed in figure 6.5, which shows large and sustained inverse effect of large 
rates hikes on non-oil investments but lesser and transitory improvements when rates 
are falling fast. While low changes may not affect non-oil investment, accelerated 
changes may have more reducing effect in the long-run. The implication of this for 
monetary policy under the NCM is that, in aggressive drive to control inflation, the 
growth path of an economy might be lowered permanently. For a developing country 
like Nigeria, this would further retard the development prospect for any given 
investment multiplier. 
This implication may be obscured by the results of total investment which suggested 
that total investment is boosted more than it is deterred by monetary policy in extreme 
regimes. Such outcome was nonetheless due the synchronised movements of total and 
oil sector multipliers (in model (C) of the table), which can indicate that oil 
investments are important in the system. However, given the overdependence of the 
Nigerian economy on the oil sector and the government’s desire to reduce its 
significant vis-à-vis the non-oil sector, care must be taken in this regard. Though 
domestic factors are important for oil investment, the most important determinants of 
developments in that sector are international (supported somewhat by the lower  ̅  in 
the oil models than others). Given the international dimension of the oil market, 
investors in the oil sector are not deterred by adverse domestic conditions like rate 
hikes but are quick to enjoy the benefits of rate falls. With the supposed inability to 
effectively influence oil sector, the focus of monetary policy in Nigeria should remain 
the non-oil sector, which responds more to domestic developments, but with the view 
to encouraging economic development rather than diminishing the long-run path.  
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With regards to the relationship between monetary policy rate and the retail lending 
rate, the delay parameter can connote the response lag. A possible deduction is that the 
delay parameter of one period found in some models may reflect a quarter lag in pass-
through from policy to lending rates when rates when rates are falling. The delay of 
zero would thus connote a faster adjustment of lending rates in periods of tight 
monetary policy.  This result is consistent with our findings in chapter five, which 
suggested that banks increased lending rates faster than they reduced them.  
The analysis also revealed the effect of the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Credit availability is found to retard investments in the long-run but to 
boost them in the short-run. In all three ARDL models, the boost is larger for the non-
oil sector than the oil sector. Although the negative long-run effect is puzzling, it may 
however be attributable to the practice of short-term lending among Nigerian banks. 
Generally, banks prefer to provide short-tenured facilities to their clients, which may 
be rolled-over for another short-term if the bank is satisfied. This notwithstanding, 
Nigerian banks have sometimes, though rarely, provided medium term loans of up to 
five years but hardly ever exceeded that tenure for any single transaction. This 
behaviour may be due to uncertainty about the long-run course of the economy, 
coupled with the standard risk of default which thus increases the overall riskiness of 
credits. The short-tenure allowed banks to re-appraise credits regularly without getting 
locked-in to long-term risks. Consequently, in the short-run when credits are more 
available investments relate directly and significantly with CPS. This confirmed the 
importance of credit for investment and indicates that if more long-term credits were 
available, the long-run relationship may be positive. The monetary authorities may 
intervene by guaranteeing long-term credits which had been duly assessed for default 
risks attributable to macroeconomic uncertainties. This is particularly more important 
for the non-oil sector the elasticity of which was higher.     
Overall, this shows that NCM-type monetary policy may hurt economic growth in the 
presence of IT. First, combining the results of the T-ARDL[1] and T-ARDL[2] 
presents a dilemma for the CBN. Given that the effect is only significant if the level of 
interest rates are low or if the size of changes are high, effective monetary policy may 
require the doubling or halving of rates, as the case may be. If this is so, monetary 
policy may have the unsavoury consequence of creating distortions and uncertainties 
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in the country. Second, the nature of the sectoral differences in the response of 
investment is a source of concern. This is based on the finding that policy affects non-
oil more than the oil sector coupled with the fact that contractionary policy lowers 
non-oil investments in the long-run more than expansionary policy can stimulate it. 
That non-oil investment responds to monetary policy adjustments more than oil 
investment, is by itself not an inconvenience; rather the problem lies in the form of 
asymmetric response to various policy stances. The finding that non-oil investment is 
quicker to decline than to rise following policy adjustment means that policy would 
have an overriding adverse consequence in Nigeria. Essentially, the net-effect of a 1-
percentage point increase in policy rate, even if reversed immediate, would be 
negative. This implies that monetary policy would necessarily reduce the supply 
capacity in Nigeria, thereby constraining long-term economic well-being. Being a 
developing country, Nigeria, may therefore be careful in implementing this kind of 
policy as the growth prospect may be considerably and permanently impeded. 
6.9.2 The Effects of Other Determinants: Examining the Standardised 
Coefficients  
In tables 6.5 and the preceding analysis, while focusing on monetary variables, the 
effects of other determinants are subdued, although they had considerable influences 
on investments. The scaled coefficients are computed to indicate the relative 
importance of monetary variables vis-à-vis these other variables. Empirically, scaled 
coefficients are estimated for variables which are standardized to have variances equal 
unity in order to eliminate the unit of measurement. In this analysis, we estimated the 
scaled coefficient by multiplying the originally estimated coefficients with the ratio of 
the standard deviations for the regressand and regressor. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present the 
computed scaled coefficients for the long- and short-run, respectively. The results 
showed that the important non-monetary policy determinants for total and non-oil 
investments are output (sales), government investment, economic and political 
uncertainties, while oil prices replaces political uncertainty in the oil sector model.  
In the long-run, we found no output effect (but only in the short-run) for all 
investment types indicating that accelerator principles may be weak in Nigeria. 
Comparing the relative importance of all coefficients, table 6.6 shows that output is 
the least important, while government investment is the most significant determinant 
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of private investment. The results indicated long-run complementarity but short-run 
substitutability between private and public investments, especially for non-oil 
investment. This is consistent with the overall findings of Blejer and Khan (1984) who 
examined 24 developing countries. This short-run crowding-out indicated competition 
between public and private sector for available domestic credit, while the long-run 
crowding-in suggested the importance of infrastructures and enabling environment 
(provided by government) for long-term planning and investment. According to Blejer 
and Khan (op.cit), the short-run substitutability can, however, connote the 
countercyclical nature of public investment rather than pure crowding-out. Relative to 
interest rate, which had maximum long-run elasticity of -0.2 per cent, public 
investment had elasticity slightly higher than unity. The interest rate elasticity is 
comparable to the user cost elasticity of -0.25 found in Chirinko et al. (1999). 
Although the actual point estimate of our significant interest rate elasticity ranged 
between -0.7 and -0.9 for non-oil and -0.7 to -2.3 for total investments, compared with 
the range of -0.5 to -1.0 found by Hasset and Hubbard (1997) for the USA and -0.4 
suggested by Baumann and Price (2007) for the UK. 
        Table 6.6: Scaled Long-run Coefficient of Determinants  
  (A)    ARDL Model (B)      T-ARDL[1] Model (C)    T-ARDL[2] Model 
  I  I_N I_O I I_N I_O I I_N I_O 
 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
( )  -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 
 ( )  
   
-0.22 -0.13 -0.04 0.10 0.02 0.10 
 ( )  
      
-0.19 -0.13 -0.22 
 [   ]  -0.32 -0.18 -0.30 -0.43 -0.23 -0.51 -0.22 -0.21 -0.47 
 [ ]  0.01 0.17 0.60 -0.09 0.14 0.35 -0.05 0.06 0.21 
 [  ] 1.12 0.88 1.26 1.12 0.80 1.19 1.00 1.01 1.13 
 [  ] -0.22 -0.18 -0.17 -0.22 -0.06 -0.21 -0.26 -0.16 -0.26 
 [  ] -0.21 -0.15 
 
0.02 -0.11 
 
-0.14 -0.12 
 
 [  ] 
  
-0.47 
  
-0.49 
  
-0.42 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN and NBS. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2.Scaled coefficients are 
standardised from point estimates of parameters by multiplying estimated coefficient of a regressor by the standard deviation of the 
regressand and scaling by the standard deviation of the regressor.  
Using model C as the benchmark, macroeconomic uncertainty is found as another 
important determinant of investment in the long-run with an elasticity of over -0.2 per 
cent. The effect of interest rates is comparable with most other determinants the 
elasticity of which generally hovered around 0.2 per cent (in absolute value). In the 
short-run, the most important determinant of investment is output while interest rates 
and credits are the least important factors. Economic volatility did not however deter 
217 
 
 
 
investment in the short-run. For oil investments, the price of oil is germane while 
government investments have complementary effects. This can either connote that the 
oil sector can compete effectively with public sector for available domestic credits or 
that a substantial portion of government investment is used to provide oil installation 
and/or infrastructures that would encourage the influx of oil investors into the country.      
Table 6.7: Scaled Short-run Coefficient of Determinants 
  (A)    ARDL Model (B)      T-ARDL[1] Model (C)    T-ARDL[2] Model 
 
I I_N I_O I I_N I_O I I_N I_O 
 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
∑      
( ) 
     0.08 0.08 0.12 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 
∑      
( ) 
     
   
0.05 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.30 0.14 
∑      
( ) 
     
      
0.08 -0.00 0.09 
∑      
 
     0.26 0.34 0.16 0.41 0.61 0.27 0.39 0.60 0.24 
∑        
 
     0.13 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.22 -0.03 0.12 0.32 0.11 
∑      
 
     0.77 0.44 0.65 0.42 0.54 0.50 1.47 1.25 0.59 
∑       
 
     0.38 0.43 0.40 0.28 0.10 0.47 -0.36 -0.59 0.47 
∑       
 
     -0.06 -0.07 -0.16 0.05 -0.10 -0.08 0.45 0.28 -0.06 
∑       
 
     
  
0.48 
  
0.42 
  
0.48 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN and NBS. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2.Scaled coefficients are 
standardised from point estimates of parameters by multiplying estimated coefficient of a regressor by the standard deviation of the 
regressand and scaling by the standard deviation of the regressor. 
Overall, the analyses of the standardised coefficients indicated that while interest rate 
is not the most important determinant of investment in the long-run, it is nonetheless 
key in the investment process. Apart from public investment with extremely large 
scaled coefficient, all other determinants have an average absolute elasticity of about 
0.2 per cent while interest rates in the high and low regimes of panel C also have 
average absolute elasticity of 0.2 which is very comparable to the others. In the short-
run, however, interest rates are seen as a weak determinant of investments vis-à-vis 
other variables. 
6.10 Conclusion 
In the NCM model, monetary policy depicts CBs’ use of short-term interest rate to 
control inflation by influencing AD – through household consumption (Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2008b). The effects of interest rate through investment expenditure are 
usually overlooked within this model and at best are surmised through savings. 
However, investments constitute a substantial part of GDP, are its most volatile 
component, and provide the linkage between financial markets and the economy 
(Dulpor, 2001; Fazzari et al., 2010). Exclusion of investments would, thus, inhibit 
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model stability and determinacy. Furthermore, in developing countries like Nigeria, 
with high incidence of poverty, consumption – largely of necessities – would be 
inelastic to price changes, including interest rate changes.   
The relationship between investment and interest rates are in many cases expected to 
be inverse, in line with the neoclassical framework. In many empirical works, it has 
become difficult to find a significant inverse relationship when using aggregate data 
(Blanchard, 1986; Mojon et al., 2002). Other theoretical schools have proposed, 
however, that under certain condition a possible positive relationship may be expected. 
For instance under the McKinnon-Shaw framework of financial repression, low 
(deposit) interest rate are postulated to restrict savings which subsequently constraints 
investment; thereby supposing that investment are driven mainly by savings dynamics 
(Fry, 1995; Munthali, 2008). However, real options theories posit a positive 
relationship based on uncertainty and the options value to delay. Generally, in this 
setting uncertainty increases the benefit of delay. This is expected to hold at higher 
levels of interest rates, where an inverse relationship holds. When rates are low 
relative to GDP growth, expected returns on projects become higher than estimated 
risks so that even with rising interest rates firms continue to undertake investment 
(Capozza and Li, 2001; Chetty, 2007). Generally, this theory suggests a (non-
monotonic) backward-bending investment function. Nonetheless, nonlinearity may 
exist in the investment-interest rate relationship for other reasons: heterogeneity of 
firms, lumpiness of investment, business cycles and monetary policy stance. These 
have implications for monetary policy. A positive relationship implies that monetary 
policy would have perverse effects. Nonlinearity may also mean that the relationship 
might differ between policy stances. 
Monetary policy effect can also be transmitted through the credit channel. Generally, 
banks classify their borrowers according to risk categories and either charge a risk 
premium or ration credit (or both) to the riskiest borrowers. Hence, monetary policy 
may change the cost and credit availability. Credit constraint is, thus, a very important 
determinant which is expected to relate positively with investment. The link between 
monetary policy, credit and investment is seen through the risk-return relationship. 
During tight policy, increases are supposedly passed-through to lending rates, which 
are in turn reflected in discount rates. Investments with low expected returns become 
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unviable, while those with high expected returns remain profitable and, thus, are 
undeterred by the increased lending rates. Given the direct risk-return relationship 
banks perceive these projects as highly risky and would not lend if the probability of 
default is considered high. In this regards, even a risk premium may become 
ineffective and banks would ration credits. The reduced availability of credit would 
thus deter further investments.  
In Nigeria, banks seem too wary of lending given the continual perception of 
economic risk. Generally, loans are limited to short-term finances (up to two years), 
which are rolled-over upon maturity if they are properly serviced. Long-term loans 
(over five or ten years) are very rarely undertaken. This suggests that most investment 
would be financed by internal sources – savings and/or retained profits. Many 
potential determinants of investment are identified in the literature from various 
schools. The choice of which is most important would vary across countries and 
would depend on the characteristics of particular countries. Essentially, it has been 
argued that determinants of investments would vary between developed and 
developing countries.  
In this chapter, we investigated the effectiveness of an NCM-type monetary policy 
framework on AD – proxied by investment. Monetary policy effect is captured 
essentially by interest rate changes, though the role of credit is also considered. In 
addition, we examined the potential effect of other determinants in an eclectic 
modelling framework in order to identify the most important factors. Empirical 
analysis is variously conducted to test for possible nonlinearity using threshold models. 
The possibility of non-monotonicity is also investigated. Overall, we tested whether 
monetary policy would have different effect in regimes of sharp expansions, sharp 
contractions, or moderate adjustments. Data for the analysis are of quarterly frequency 
spanning 1985:Q1-2011:Q2.   
The main findings indicated, inter alia, that the relationship between investment and 
interest rates is nonlinear but monotonic. This nonlinearity depended on the size of 
change in monetary policy rate and not the level of interest rates. Sharp changes have 
larger and archetypical neoclassical effects while moderate changes elicited atypical 
responses which may cause indeterminacy. The interest rate effect of monetary policy 
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is found to generally affect the non-oil more than the oil sector. Essentially, non-oil 
investments are easier to influence by strong policy contractions rather than strong 
expansions in the long-run. In the short-run however, investments are not deterred by 
policy rate although they are boosted by sharp expansionary stances. Thus, interest 
rate may generally not reduce current investment but may lower planned investment. 
Again, we found that the availability of credit have important implications for 
investment. Lack of adequate long-term credit lowers investments in the long-run. 
However, in the short-run when short-term external financing options are available the 
relationship becomes positive. This may be reflective of the notion of construction 
(initial) financing and investment (final) financing discussed in Davidson (1982), 
Graziani (2003) and Lavoie (2009), and may be underpinned by the fact that Nigerian 
banks are willing to provide short-term financing rather than long-term credits.  
Considering the effects of other, non-monetary policy determinants, government 
investment is found to be (in general) the most important determinant of investment in 
the long-run where it showed a complementary effect. In the short-run, it tended to 
crowd-out private investment. The long-run complementarity may be due to the 
provision of enabling business/investment opportunity while the short-run 
substitutability may be due to the excessive competition for external funds with the 
private sector. Output growth is, however, the most important determinant of 
investment in the short-run. Oil prices are important only in the short-run for boosting 
oil investment. Political and economic uncertainties reduce long-run investments 
significantly. No evidence of the impact of profits (internal funds) and capacity 
utilisation is found in the analysis.    
The implications of the results for monetary policy are critical. Nonlinearity in the 
relationship between interest rate and investment suggests that policy may have 
perverse and undesirable impact on investment, AD and the economy in general; 
especially if the thresholds for this nonlinearity are inadequately understood. Given 
that archetypical response is only possible when the MPR is adjusted by a minimum 
of about 150 basis points (in some cases), it means that if the CBN conformed with 
common practice of policy smoothening – with moderate/gradual adjustments (say by 
about 25-50 basis points) – then monetary policy would have ambiguous effects. 
However, a ‘cold-turkey’-type large changes in MPR possess other challenges for the 
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economy as it can increase uncertainties, financial fragility and undesirable effects in 
other sectors of the economy; thereby constituting a dilemma for the CBN.  
Again, the fact that monetary policy affected the non-oil sector more than the oil 
sector is not surprising, as oil sector investments might relate more with 
external/international developments. What is rather disturbing is that monetary policy 
is able to reduce non-oil investment much more than it can boost it, so that the net-
effect of policy in Nigeria would be adverse. In essence, monetary policy may lower 
the supply capacity, and thus reduce the developmental path of Nigeria. Nonetheless, 
the overall effect of policy on AD depends considerably on the relative sizes of these 
sectors. Though, the non-oil sector had more weight, both in terms of investment and 
GDP, the fact that oil drives government revenue (and by implication government 
expenditure) in Nigeria, suggest that changes in oil receipts (due to increased 
investment among other reasons) would affect public investment which would 
subsequently affect private investment and AD. This presents a rather complex picture 
of the interaction between oil, non-oil and government investments which the CBN 
may need to understand. Nonetheless, the CBN may focus on its ability to control 
non-oil investments subject to other factors although the outcome of such policy 
would be highly indeterminate.      
Overall, NCM-type (inflation targeting) monetary policy may hurt economic growth. 
Synthesising the results of the T-ARDL[1] and T-ARDL[2] presents a dilemma for the 
CBN. Given that the effect is only significant if the level of interest rates are low or if 
the size of changes are high, effective monetary policy may require the doubling or 
halving of rates, as the case may be. If this is so, monetary policy can create 
distortions and uncertainties in the economy. Besides, the nature of the sectoral 
differences in the response of investment is a source of concern. That non-oil 
investment responds more to monetary policy than oil investment, is by itself not an 
inconvenience; rather the problem lies in the form of asymmetric response to various 
policy stances. The finding that non-oil investment is quicker to decline than to rise 
following policy adjustments means that policy would have an overriding adverse 
consequence in Nigeria. Essentially, the net-effect of a 1-percentage point increase in 
policy rate, even if reversed immediate, would be negative. Monetary policy would 
reduce the supply capacity in Nigeria and implying long-term sacrifices/costs. Being a 
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developing country, Nigeria, may therefore be careful in implementing this kind of 
policy as the growth prospect may be considerably and permanently impeded. 
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7: INFLATION AND OUTPUT IN NIGERIA: THE 
RELATIONSHIP AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MONETARY POLICY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Should central banks (CBs) be aggressively anti-inflation? Inflation is innately 
undesirable and costly: creating money illusion, uncertainties, relative prices 
distortions, and market inefficiency (Heintz and Ndikumana, 2011; Mishkin, 2007). 
Given the adverse consequences of inflation, the aforementioned question ought to be 
inconsequential and answered affirmatively except that disinflation also comes at a 
cost. The costs can vary across countries, business cycle, or time and can be 
considerable. Output losses and increased unemployment are some of the widely 
researched costs of disinflation usually captured by the PC. The cost of disinflation 
would depend on the slope and curvature of the PC. Contrary to the standard 
assumption of the NCM framework, the LR-PC may be non-vertical and nonlinear so 
that disinflation would have a long-run implication for output and unemployment. 
Inflation and disinflation would thus have adverse ramifications for social welfare so 
that task of policymakers would be to choose the option with the highest net benefit.  
In this chapter, we analyse the implication of disinflationary policy for Nigeria 
following an NCM-PC. This is reflected in the relationship between inflation and 
output gap; with gap defined as the deviation of realised output from its potential. 
Econometric estimations are conducted using the ARDL cointegration framework 
given the possible non-stationarity inherent in economic variables. Following Shin et 
al. (2009) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) linear and nonlinear-ARDL models 
are estimated in order to investigate the existence and degree of convexity or 
concavity of the PC. Given the dichotomy of the Nigerian economy, the analysis is 
conducted for oil, non-oil and total output gaps with a dataset spanning 1985:Q1–
2011:Q4. To capture the effect of non-demand factors a supply-augmented PC is 
estimated by including exchange rate, oil prices, import prices and domestic spare 
capacity. 
Our result indicated that LR-PC is not vertical but somewhat horizontal. This implies 
that irrespective of the level of output gap, inflationary pressures may persist or 
7 
7 
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dissipate due to other non-demand factors. Hence, inflation in Nigeria is not an AD 
but rather an AS phenomenon (or may be driven by external factors such as global 
inflation). We also find negative sign on output gap coefficients further implying that 
supply shocks are more prominent than demand shocks. Generally, supply factors 
especially exchange rate and excess capacity were found to be the most important 
drivers in the long-run while import prices and excess capacity are the key 
determinants in the short-run. The finding on the excess capacity, has very important 
ramification for policy. Macroeconomic policies should endeavour to boost capacity 
utilisation. Since, the low capacity utilisation may be traced to the inadequate supply 
of public infrastructure which has the attendant effect of increasing cost of production, 
monetary policy should aim to reduce cost by ensuring lower lending rates and 
increased availability of credits to the productive sector. This would not only increase 
supply but would also ensure that domestic products can compete with imported 
counterparts. The offshoot of this is the reduced unemployment and enhanced social 
welfare. Basically attainment of higher social welfare would be Pareto efficient since 
the inflation-output trade-off is non-existent from the results.  
The policy implication of the NCM is that CBs should focus on long-run price-
stability and short-run output stabilisation. This implies an optimisation procedure 
with inflation minimisation as the objective function and output as the constraint. 
However, our findings suggests that for a developing countries like Nigeria, it may be 
more beneficial if the role is defined the other way round so that output growth 
maximisation becomes the long-run objective and inflation the short-run constraint. In 
this regard, CBs’ role should be to encourage economic expansion and employment 
creation in the long-run while reducing inflation variability in the short-run.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction, section two 
provides a general discussion on the inflation-output relationship and considers the 
costs of disinflationary policies and its implications for developing countries. Section 
three narrows the discussion down to the relationship and welfare implications for 
Nigeria. Model specification, methodology and data are described in section four 
while empirical results and findings are presented in section five. The implications of 
these findings are analysed and discussed in section six while the chapter concludes 
with section seven   
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7.2  The Inflation-Output Nexus 
According to the NCM model, price-stability should constitute the overriding 
objective of monetary policy. The consensus definition of price-stability implies an 
inflation rate around 2 per cent. This is usually justified on the proposition that 
inflation places a substantial penalty on the economy in terms of increased opportunity 
costs of holding money, relative price distortions and inefficient allocation of 
resources; all of which reduces economic wellbeing (Hagen and Hoffman, 2004). 
Under the NCM, inflation is an AD phenomenon, while supply-side factors are 
random and transitory. Hence, price-stability is accomplished by controlling AD 
irrespective of the source or cause of inflation. However, critics of the NCM argue 
that cost-pull inflation can be considerable and permanent which is worsened by the 
presence of hysteresis, so that contractionary policy can culminate into a permanent 
loss of output and a real welfare cost to the economy (Fontana, 2009a, Davidson, 
2006). In essence, both inflation and disinflation can post an enormous cost on an 
economy, thereby posing a dilemma for policymakers. At any point, it would be apt to 
understand and compare the costs of disinflation with its benefit with a view to 
choosing a socially optimal option. The nature of the relationship between inflation 
and output, the cost (and benefits) of disinflation, and the implication of disinflation 
for developing countries vis-à-vis advanced countries are presented in this section. 
7.2.1 The Phillips Curve 
59
 
Theoretical relationship between inflation and output is depicted by the PC. The 
relationship is based on the existence of the potential (or natural) level of output 
towards which the economy gravitates. This potential output is achieved if the 
economy uses all its resources efficiently; hence, at full employment. It thus 
represents the level of output that is obtainable when the economy is at the NAIRU. 
The existence of the NAIRU and the associated potential level of output are the 
bedrock of the NCM. At these natural levels of unemployment and output, there are 
no inflationary pressures and inflation is purported to be at an optimally targeted level. 
Output above the potential level creates a positive gap depicting excess demand that 
exerts inflationary pressures on the economy, while negative gaps produce 
deflationary pressures. Hence, the potential output represents the AS determined 
                                            
59 This sub-section derives largely from earlier discussions in section 1.3, some of which are reiterated to facilitate 
the arguments and flow of this chapter.  
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equilibrium level of output for the economy. As shown in chapter one, the second 
equation of the NCM is a PC (that is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis and) 
which describes the inflation-output relationship as 
                      (    ̅)                                         (7.1) 
where   is the rate of inflation,     ̅  is the output gap showing the difference 
between actual output (  ) and potential output ( ̅); thus, reflecting the AD effect. In 
this regard, policy goal is to achieve     ̅    which ensures price-stability. Supply 
shocks are captured by the random disturbance term       (    
 )   Equation 7.1 
differs from the standard neoclassical synthesis PC by relating output gap, rather than 
actual output, with contemporaneous inflation (Fontana, 2009a). It also incorporates 
new-classical feature of rational expectation captured by the current expectations of 
future inflation (      )  as well as the new-Keynesian notion of price rigidities 
captured by inflation inertia (    ) . These forward and backward expectational 
characteristics are based on the arguments that workers build expectations into wage 
bargaining while markets may not clear continuously. Price rigidities are posited to be 
restricted to the short-run while continuous market clearing is obtainable in the long-
run. Given the transience of price and wage rigidities in an economy, the inflation-
output trade-off only exists in the short-run, thereby ensuring an oblique SR-PC. This 
is so because changes in prices and/or wages alter relative prices in the short-run, so 
that the short-run AS reacts to fluctuations in AD.  
In the long-run, however, these market failures disappear leaving all prices and wages 
flexible so that relative prices are constant and AS does not respond to AD changes. 
The assumption of rational expectation coupled with the continuous market clearing in 
the long-run results in vertical LR-PC at the natural level of output around which the 
economy oscillates. In this regards, the condition          is assumed to hold in 
equation 7.1, implying that expectations are met alongside continuous market clearing 
and “providing a mechanism that ensures a transition to the long-run classic 
equilibrium” thereby eliminating the trade-off in the long-run (Meyer, 2001, p.3). The 
NCM-PC depicts that, “[AD] has [only] a transitory role in determining the 
equilibrium level of output and employment in the economy” (Fontana, 2009a, p.191). 
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This assertion formed the basis of the long-run neutrality of monetary policy and the 
postulation of low inflation as the long-run objective.  
In the presence of shocks (whether from supply or demand factors) that take the 
economy away from its natural level of output and inflation away from its target, the 
central bank is expected – via the effect of short-term interest rate on AD – to re-align 
inflation with its long-run target. This policy stance is based on the assumption that 
supply shocks are random, transitory and with zero mean; thus, inconsequential for 
inflation or inflation expectations (Arestis and Sawyer, 2006). The assumption of 
random supply shocks with zero mean complements the premise of a constant NAIRU 
so that the natural level of output is unaffected by monetary policy shocks (Gali, 2008). 
Monetary policies are, thus, steered at demand shocks in order influence economic 
activity and rein-in inflation (Smith and Wickens, 2007). Hence, the final impact of 
monetary policy is on the rate of inflation and as such this should constitute the policy 
target. The fundamental trust of the NCM is that short-term interest rate management 
would only be effective (i.e. affect the rate inflation) if it impacts on the level of AD 
(Bain and Howells, 2009,ch.8). By assuming that inflation is a demand phenomenon, 
the NCM critically undermines other sources of inflation particularly cost related 
factors (Gnos and Rochon, 2007). 
7.2.2 The Cost of Disinflation 
The NCM-PC in 7.1 suggests linearity and symmetry in the inflation-output trade-off. 
Inflation responds identically to changes in output irrespective of whether it is above 
or below potential. Hence, during economic expansions, reductions in AD to combat 
inflation can be completely reversed without any permanent loss, when inflation 
returns to target. This linearity and the absence of long-run trade-off in the PC, 
connotes that the costs of disinflation is only temporary while the benefits are 
permanent. Violation of one or both of these assumptions would affect the cost-benefit 
analysis of disinflation and would have enormous ramifications for monetary policy. 
The trade-off inherent in the PC implies that disinflation leads to output losses which, 
ceteris paribus, results in increased unemployment. Correspondingly, attempts to 
reduce unemployment and expand output raises inflation which distorts inter-temporal 
decision and increases uncertainties in the economy. Hence, both inflation and 
unemployment (or output contraction) are undesirable in an economy as they can both 
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lower welfare. The welfare analysis should thus favour that which provides net 
welfare benefit over that which represents net costs.   
Economists do not dispute the existence of costs for disinflation, but the argument 
between proponents and critics of the NCM is based on the nature and lifespan of the 
costs. While the advocates argue that output loss is only temporary with a permanent 
benefit of lower inflation, critics are of the view that output loss has time-dependent 
effect which lowers the growth path of the economy permanently indicative of a 
hysteresis effect. Under the NCM, provided that the economy has not achieved price-
stability, there exists the propensity to keep unemployment (output) above (below) the 
natural level; hence, the so called unemployment bias. The unemployment bias 
combined with the hysteresis may ensnare the economy in some form of vicious circle 
which requires continued contractionary policies to lower inflation (Fontana, 2009c). 
By proposing that the natural level of output is not independent of changes in actual 
output, the existence of hysteresis effect dismantles the argument of long-run 
inconsequentiality of AD. However, while the implications of hysteresis are clear for 
contractionary policies, they are less defined during expansions. This implies that 
while output contractions would lower the long-run growth path reversal of such 
contractions may not completely restore the economy back to its original trajectory 
thereby culminating in a permanent loss of growth. Thus, existence of hysteresis effect 
as well as its potentially different implications during booms and recession is a key 
source of nonlinearity and asymmetry in the inflation-output trade-off (Dwyer et al., 
2010). These nonlinearity and asymmetry have implications for the costs of 
disinflation both in the short- and long-run. 
Post-Keynesian disagreement with the NCM-PC model is based on the implications of 
contractionary bias for the economy in the long-run. Essentially, the conclusions of 
the NCM school that disinflation has no long-run cost rest critically on its assumptions 
of a natural level of output and a vertical LR-PC. The assumption of a linear and 
symmetric non-vertical SR-PC ensures that trade-offs are transitory and costless. 
Violation of any of these assumptions has grave implications for the costs of monetary 
policy. For instance, Davidson (2006) and Setterfield (2006) posited that in the 
absence of a natural level of activity, the argument of long-run neutrality of monetary 
policy collapses and the notion of overriding objective of price-stability falls apart. 
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Davidson (op.cit) thus described the assumption of a natural level of output and 
unemployment as superficial, while Setterfield (op.cit) showed that the long-run cost 
of disinflation becomes significant without such assumption.  
For some post-Keynesians, the issue is not essentially that of the existence of a natural 
level of activity but that of the nature and definition of this notion. These accept the 
existence of some natural level at a point in time which is determined by product 
market conditions and productive capacity, rather than by labour market conditions as 
proposed by the NAIRU. By implication rather than a vague and immeasurable 
concept of NAIRU, a country’s potential should be indicative of its productive 
capacity – measured by its human and physical capital. This natural level is envisaged 
to be continuously changing and path dependent; and does not act as a strong attractor 
for the actual level of unemployment. In essence actual activities drive the natural 
levels contrary to the NCM view. This is consistent with premise of a hysteresis effect. 
Basically, a contractionary policy lowers AD in the product market which causes 
firms to reduce investment and layoff some workers. These may result in diminished 
human capital which combines with retarded investment to lower the overall capital 
stock and the productive capacity in the long-run (Arestis and Sawyer, 2003; 2008a). 
The lost capacity further diminishes AS, re-opening an excess demand gap, which 
induces further depression of AD. 
For the purpose of this study, discussions on the existence and nature of the natural 
level are not pursued. Rather we assume that the natural level exists and can be 
proxied by some kind of trend. Nonetheless, the issue of the costs of monetary policy 
still subsists and lies in the imposed shapes (and slopes) of the SR-PC and LR-PC. 
The vertical LR-PC implies that changes in monetary policy do not have any long-run 
effect on real output and that AS determines the equilibrium. If the LR-PC is non-
vertical then attempts to disinflate would be non-neutral and can induce a permanent 
output loss. In the long-run, the NCM-PC also assumes fully realised expectations and 
no policy surprises or money illusion; hence,          . In addition, prices and 
wages are completely flexible in the long-run, so that         . These two 
assumptions jointly suggest that in the steady-state equation 7.1 becomes  
             (   ̅)                                             (7.2) 
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so that 
   (   ̅)    ;         
 
(       )
                                    (7.3) 
The parameter in equation 7.3 is immensely important for the LR-PC. Given the 
usually assumed         , a vertical PC connotes           so that the 
parameter ( ) becomes infinite at any given level of output gap. This would confirm 
the long-run neutrality of monetary policy. However, if     then     suggesting 
inflation neutrality to output gap. The NCM-PC would thus be horizontal and 
monetary policy is unable to control inflation in the long-run but can only influence 
the real economy. Thus, this kind of result with a flat PC, demolishes the argument for 
IT. The two extreme cases show disinflation as absolutely costless and totally 
beneficial when PC is vertical, but non-beneficial and extremely costly, when it is 
horizontal. In both cases there is no trade-off. Between these extremes,       
holds and the LR-PC becomes oblique thereby indicating a long-run trade-off. In this 
case, disinflation becomes non-costless and monetary policy is non-neutral.  
The output cost of disinflation would depend on the size of  . A smaller size indicates 
that disinflation is more costly as the PC becomes flatter while a large size shows 
beneficial disinflation as the PC is steeper and output loss smaller. Effectively, 
therefore, the cost of disinflation is evaluated by the reciprocal,  ⁄ , which indicates 
the response of output to unit changes in inflation (Turner, 1995). However, if     
then the NCM-PC breaks down as inflation becomes not a demand factor but a 
supply-side phenomenon. Contractionary policies are, thus, confronted with the 
dilemma of falling output and rising inflation. Irrespective of the size of   in this case, 
disinflation becomes absolutely and extremely costly as policy can be caught in a 
vicious circle of contractions. 
Evidence of flattening PC was provided by Dwyer et al. (2010), Kromphardt and 
Logeay (2011), and Rumler and Valderrama (2008) who investigated the long-run 
output-inflation relationship in various European countries and the USA. For the Euro 
area, Rumler and Valderrama (op.cit) estimated both a traditional and new-Keynesian 
PC and documented evidence of significant but diminishing relationship between 
inflation and output gap for all countries except Austria and the Netherlands. They 
conclude that this implies a weakening of anti-inflationary monetary policy approach. 
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Similarly, Kromphardt and Logeay (op.cit) investigated the relationship for four euro-
zone countries, the UK and the USA. They found an oblique LR-PC which had 
flattened  over the last two decades and consequently opined that the ECB should 
pursue expansionary policies notwithstanding the “unfounded fears of accelerating 
inflation” (p.59). Dwyer et al. (op.cit) used a graphical approach to plot the 
relationship between inflation and unemployment since the 1970s and showed a 
flattening of the PC since 1992. They attributed this to the change in monetary policy 
framework, while citing Bean (2006) who attributed the flattening to globalisation and 
world output gap. These studies indicated that flattening PC weakens the effectiveness 
of anti-inflationary policies since inflationary pressures might be due to factors other 
than domestic AD.  
Irrespective of the degree of flatness or steepness, a positively-sloped LR-PC implies 
that a lower level of inflation can only be achieved at a lower level of output. Hence, 
the goal of price-stability would mean accepting a lower level of growth and a higher 
level of unemployment. The PC in equation 7.3, being linear and symmetric, 
nonetheless suggests that by choosing to revert to the original level of inflation, 
policymakers can restore output and employment back to their original level at no 
extra (or permanent) costs. By implication, the response of inflation to the output gap 
is identical irrespective of the sign and size of output gap. However, the PC whether in 
the short- or long-run can be asymmetric (i.e. sign dependent) or nonlinear (i.e. size 
dependent). Hence, inflation can respond differently between recession and 
expansions as well as between large and small recessions/expansions. The relationship 
between inflation and real economic activity may also depend on the level of inflation. 
For instance, Akerlof et al. (2000) show that the inflation-unemployment relationship 
is backward bending due to imperfect rational expectations; hence, nominal wage 
rigidity. At very high rates the PC is vertical, for moderate rates it is positively sloped 
and negatively sloped for low rates. Akerlof et al. (op.cit) thus observed that 
expectations are realised when inflation rates are high than when they are low. This 
would imply that when inflation rates are significantly high disinflation can be 
achieved at minimal cost but that a trade-off exists at low levels of inflation (Hagen 
and Hoffman, 2004).  
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Nonlinearity and/or asymmetry in the relationship may also be due to economic 
activity. In this regard, the PC in equation 7.3 rather than being obliquely linear may 
be convex, concave or kinked. A convex curve implies that inflation responds less to 
negative gaps than positive gaps, and conversely for concave curves. Clark et al. 
(1996) observed that with a convex PC proactive policy which prevents the economy 
from overheating is less costly than reactive policies. Basically the convex curve 
implies that allowing positive gaps to emerge would require larger negative gaps to 
offset the consequent inflation; thus leaving the economy with permanent output loss. 
This thus shows that the cost of disinflation is less than the benefit of re-inflation. If 
the curve is concave, however, then proactive policies would be sub-optimal and 
costlier than reactive policies and essentially disinflation would be very costly as it 
would lead to permanent output loss. Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) and Filardo 
(1998) noted that a convex PC is likely in economy with constrained capacity (rather 
than those with excess capacity that can flexibly adjust to increased AD), while 
Stiglitz (1997) posited that due to asymmetric price adjustment, a concave curve is 
more probable in economies with imperfectly competitive firms. By operating near 
installed capacity, firms’ become unable to react to increased demand during 
economic expansion particularly if they are uncertain that the expansion is permanent. 
Thus, since supply does not react adequately to higher demand, inflation becomes 
increasingly sensitive and the PC convex. In an economy with monopolistically 
competitive or oligopolistic firms with pricing power, a concave curve can emerge 
since these firms would be reluctant to raise prices (in order not to lose market share 
and turnover) in the face of economic expansion.  
A number of studies (including Clark et al., 1996; Dwyer et al., 2010; Eisner, 1997; 
Filardo, 1998; and Turner, 1995) investigated and provided mixed evidence on the 
nature of nonlinearity and asymmetry in the inflation-output nexus especially for 
major developed countries. For instance, studying seven major OECD countries, 
Turner (op.cit) found that inflationary effects of positive gaps quadrupled the 
deflationary effects indicative of convex PC. Similarly, Dwyer et al. (op.cit) found 
evidence of a larger effect for positive gaps in the UK. However, Eisner (1997) 
showed results of a concave PC and concluded that as an economy grows increased 
efficiency prevents wages and inflation from rising which may indicate lack of 
capacity constraints. Complex nonlinearity has also been documented. For instance, 
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employing a three-regime specification, Filardo (op.cit) found that overheating exerted 
more significant effect on inflation than slumps, while moderate gaps were 
insignificant. Thus, the PC is convex during overheating and concave at weak times. 
Similarly, adopting nonparametric methods, Baghli et al. (2007), reported an “S-
shaped” PC for euro-zone countries which they observed reconciled the convexity 
versus concavity found in the literature. They nonetheless argued that this implied that 
large positive gaps are more inflationary than negative gaps are deflationary and that 
the central bank should act expeditiously when there is excess demand in order to 
avert any long-term costs.  
Rather than incorporating nonlinearity into a PC, some studies investigated the cost of 
disinflation using atheoretical methods to compute the sacrifice ratio. This ratio 
measures the cumulative output gap, divided by change in trend inflation during a 
particular disinflation episode which shows the amount of output sacrificed per point 
disinflation. A very influential and seminal contribution by Ball (1994) estimated the 
sacrifice ratio for 65 disinflation episodes (between 1960 and 1991) in nineteen OECD 
countries and found it ranging between 0.75–2.92 with an average ratio of 1.40 overall. 
Ball thus generally opined that “disinflation is almost always costly” (p.167) and “a 
major cause of recession in modern economies” (p.155). Extending Ball’s data, 
Caporale and Caporale (2007) found an average ratio of 1.46 ranging -0.85 to 10.35 
and concluded that the sacrifice ratios had risen considerably, especially in the 1990s.  
In addition to time variation, the sacrifice ratio may also differ depending on the 
monetary policy framework of countries. For instance, for 30 OECD countries, 
Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) found a considerable 5.6 per cent fall in GDP (vis-à-
vis its potential) per point decline in inflation and also that IT reduced this loss (by 7.0 
per cent) to 5.2 per cent. Though this cost remained high, the authors concluded that 
inflation targeters were able to disinflate at reduced cost compared to non-targeters. 
However, Brito (2010) showed that adjusting for the Maastricht Treaty (among other 
assumptions) considerably changed the result in Gonçalves and Carvalho (op.cit). He 
concluded that there is no efficiency gain from adopting IT and “that inflation 
targeters even suffered bigger losses during disinflation when compared to non-
targeters” (p.1686).     
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7.2.3 Considerations for Developing Countries 
For many countries, an oblique and/or nonlinear LR-PC has serious ramifications for 
monetary policy; more-so for developing countries. There is no doubt that inflation is 
undesirable but the degree of inflation aversion should depend on the source of 
inflation and the level of development of a particular country. A number of studies 
have documented the existence of some country specific level of inflation, consistent 
with sustainable rates of growth and unemployment. For developed countries, an 
optimal inflation rate of 1.0-3.4 per cent is estimated to maintain the lowest 
sustainable rate of unemployment, while for developing countries a range of 11-18 per 
cent is suggested (see Akerlof et al., 2000; Khan and Senhadji, 2001; and Pollin and 
Zhu, 2006). These studies show that the level is lower for industrialised than 
developing countries. Hence, attempts to adopt advanced countries’ view of optimal 
inflation and subsequent disinflation would increase the loss for developing countries 
irrespective of the nature of the PC. This further diminishes the justification of an 
NCM framework in developing countries which experience moderate levels of 
inflation. Hence, Fontana (2009a) observed that “the NCM is...a fair weather model, 
which may have some application in low and stable inflation environment, but is 
increasingly...less relevant in the current economic climate of highly unstable inflation, 
deep financial crisis and serious economic recession” (p.197). Given the inflation 
volatility and dislocated financial system that characterise most developing countries, 
the applicability of the NCM model in these countries becomes even more impractical 
and contentious. 
If monetary policy is to enhance overall welfare then developing countries’ CBs 
should choose a framework that maximises welfare. Cukierman (2002) and Feldstein 
(1997) conducted a welfare analysis of disinflation under an IT framework and 
showed that inflation and inflation expectations lower welfare. They thus argued that 
disinflation is less costly since CB’s independence would increase welfare 
(Cukierman, op.cit) and the resultant unemployment is transitory (Feldstein, op.cit). 
Since inflation or unemployment can result in reduced welfare in the long-run, the 
question should be: which one of these is the cheaper option (in the presence of trade-
off)? In a recent paper, Blanchflower (2007) applied the concept of happiness 
economics in studying the social welfare impact of inflation and unemployment in 
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both developed and developed countries. He found that unemployment generally 
lowered happiness more than inflation and that the least educated and the old were 
more concerned with unemployment, while young and educated people are happier 
with low inflation. However, rather than suffer unemployment jointly with lower 
inflation, people may prefer employment with higher inflation. Therefore, analysing, 
the cost-benefit implications of monetary policy, Blanchflower concluded that 
unemployment depresses wellbeing more and is thus costlier than inflation. 
Comparing industrialised and developing countries, he found support for the Easterlin 
hypothesis that faster growth increased wellbeing in developing countries more than it 
does in developed ones. Thus, the general implication is that, disinflation is not only 
costly, but may even be costlier for developing countries. 
A key feature of developing countries is the existence of allocative and cost 
inefficiencies which are overlooked in NCM analysis. Nonetheless, assuming an 
efficiently functioning economy, social welfare can be analysed using either the 
Pareto optimality or the Kaldor (1939) compensation principle. The former states that 
policies are desirable if no one is made worse-off while the other chooses policies that 
provide huge gains for the better-off which more than offsets the loses by the worse-
off. Under the Pareto principle expansionary policy is optimal if it can increase output 
without causing inflation; hence, no inflation-output trade-off. These would be the 
case if inflation is supply-side driven as envisaged for many developing countries. 
However, in the Kaldor criterion a trade-off exists. Higher welfare is attained if 
gainers are hypothetically able to compensate losers costlessly such that everyone is 
better-off. In essence, the net benefit of policy should be positive for it to increase 
social welfare. The inflation-output trade-off produces both gainers and losers 
notwithstanding the level of inflation aversion. Given that welfare loss from inflation 
affects everyone while that from unemployment is limited to a group, it would seem 
appealing for governments to limit the loss to a group of unemployed while 
redistributing the gain via social/unemployment allowances.  
A segment of the literature argued that such unemployment benefits can reinforce 
hysteresis effect and increase long-term unemployment permanently. For instance, 
Ball (1997) analysed the impact of disinflation on the NAIRU and found that not only 
is disinflation very costly in the long-run, the costs increases with unemployment 
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allowances. This is because the unemployed may accept the lifestyle of receiving 
benefit, lose motivation to search for job, lose their skills and disconnect permanently 
from the workforce. From Ball’s findings it can be deduced that as long as benefits are 
transient and do not discourage search for employment, the redistribution would make 
IT less costly. Even if one was willing to accept these deductions, it may be untenable 
for developing countries since most lack the institutional framework to collect and/or 
distribute taxes or benefits. Besides these economies do not function efficiently and 
inflation may be due to productivity slack. The resultant disappearance of the 
inflation-output trade-off effectively implies that expansionary policy is Pareto 
optimal creating no welfare losses.    
One reason why disinflation would be costlier in developing than developed countries 
is due to the fact that these countries may have slack capacities (as opposed to 
capacity constraint in more advanced countries). This is coupled also with the fact that 
supply shocks may be more prominent than demand shocks in these countries. Again, 
given the evidence in some studies that the gap between richer and poorer countries is 
in many cases widening (see Parkin et al., 2012, p.511), the need for developing 
countries to adopt pro-growth policies is even more warranted. Hence, disinflationary 
policies that lower employment and output (and its growth rate) would depress income 
and further leave these countries behind. Besides, the existence of slack capacity 
imply that there is no over production or over employment but the converse so that 
inflation would definitely in most cases not be due to excess demand. Thus, the 
parameter ( ) in equation 7.3 may be expected to be less significant in developing 
countries than developed ones.  
7.3 The Case of Nigeria 
Like in many developing countries, the inflation-output relationship in Nigeria may 
differ from those assumed under the NCM. The Nigerian economy is largely 
dependent on the agricultural sector and imports for consumption and the oil sector for 
government revenue and investment. These are, by-and-large, supply-related factors. 
Food constitutes over 60 per cent of the CPI basket, while food and energy (non-core 
CPI) comprise almost 70 per cent of the basket. In addition, the exchange rate and 
import prices are deemed important drivers of the inflationary process in Nigeria 
(Aliyu et al., 2010; Oyinlola and Egwaikhide, 2011). Data from the CBN also suggest 
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that capacity utilisation was 54.5 per cent in 2011 and averaged 43.5 between 1985 
and 2011. These figures suggest that AS, rather than demand, is dominant in the 
inflationary process, so that AD management may not be the ideal policy. 
60
  
The emphasis of the NCM on the natural rate hypothesis, the supply-determined 
equilibrium and the resultant long-run neutrality of monetary policy can lead to policy 
misdiagnosis. Stiglitz (1997) observed that the natural rate hypothesises implies that 
inflation is essentially a labour market phenomenon, so that inflationary changes is 
well predicted by unemployment which explains substantial amount of its variation.
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Hence, during economic expansion when unemployment is low (and below the 
NAIRU), real wages are higher than equilibrium, and inflationary pressure emerges. 
The converse holds during recession. This implies that the solution for rising inflation 
is to deflate the economy and reduce employment. But how does one justify this 
assertion in a developing country particularly those afflicted with considerable levels 
of unemployment as well as moderately high levels of inflation. For instance, in 
Nigeria, the NBS (2011) reported that the unemployment rate was 19.7, 21.1 and 23.9 
per cent in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The corresponding GDP growth rates 
were 6.9, 7.9, and 7.3 per cent while relatively moderate inflation rates of 13.9, 11.8 
and 10.3 per cent were recorded, respectively. With such high levels of unemployment 
what is the justification for disinflation. Given these data, anti-inflationary policy of 
the NCM model may suggest an unacceptable NAIRU of about 25 per cent or more 
for Nigeria. Inflation in this case may not be due to excess demand but rather to under-
production and under-employment; thereby reinforcing the view that inflation is 
supply rather than demand determined in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, the NBS Report indicate that most of the unemployed were young, 
showing rates of 22.4-37.7 per cent and 18.0-21.4 per cent for age groups below 44 
years and those above it, respectively. The increasing unemployment was attributed to 
the rising number of new entrant into the labour force; indicating a widening between 
the growth in the economies’ human capital capacity and the actual utilisation of 
human capital. The question then is: why are firms not hiring given that the economy 
                                            
60 It may also suggest that ‘potential output’ in Nigeria would correspond to capacity utilisation of around 50 per 
cent, and hence ‘potential output’ does not have any connotation of corresponding to productive potential/capacity 
 
61 The original Phillips curve formulation as well as the Friedman version did identify inflation with labour market; 
but the new-Keynesian version and the NCM version are product market based. 
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is expanding? An answer, consistent with mainstream economists view, would be: due 
to the high cost of production. However, contrary to the mainstream view, this high 
cost is not attributable to wages, but to the high cost of infrastructures and amenities. 
In Nigeria, erratic and inadequate supply of basic amenities like electricity, water and 
security means that firms provide these in-house. While the cost of providing water 
and security is moderate depending on the kind of firm, the cost of generating 
electricity is high. For instance, firms would incur a lump-sum cost of acquiring high 
capacity generators; then would incur the recurrent costs of fuelling, servicing, and 
repairing these generators. These recurrent costs are usually higher and transmitted to 
goods’ prices to ensure that firms at least break-even. In many cases, this limits firms’ 
competitiveness vis-à-vis cheaper imported substitute. To minimise their losses while 
staying competitive, firms run their generators intermittently and rely on the erratic 
power supplied at much lower rate. This, thus, makes firms (and the economy in 
general) to operate with slack human and physical capital capacity, which explains the 
high unemployment and low capacity utilisation in Nigeria.  
Nonetheless, the concurrence of high growth rate and very high unemployment rate 
may be due to increasing productivity in some non-labour intensive sectors like the oil 
sector. It may also be indicative of the large inequality between the few rich and 
multitude poor; where the high lifestyle of the rich obscures deprivation. However, 
and more importantly, it is reflective of the large and widening difference between 
realised output and the true potential output. Due to past shocks or policies, growth 
may have been repressed over time so that the long-run path of growth is depressed 
permanently. In this regard, application of the Lucas wedge would show an 
astronomical and permanent loss of output and social welfare.
62
 This would mean that 
while the economy is expanding the true potential is growing even faster so that the 
output gap is widening and unemployment rising. If we measure the economy’s 
potential in terms of its human and physical capital, and noting the rising levels of 
entrants into the labour market, the economy’s potential is clearly ascending. Given 
that these new entrants are not absorbed as quickly as they emerge, the economy’s 
output would expand more slowly than its potential. Thus, eliminating the currently 
                                            
62 The Lucas wedge is a graphical illustration of the cumulative loss in an economies’ output following a slowdown 
in the real GDP growth rate; thus showing where the economy would have been without the deceleration.  
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high unemployment rate would require significant absorption of the new entrant, 
leading to a soaring GDP growth.  
Welfare analysis of the inflation-output trade-off and its implication for the overall 
wellbeing is important for any macroeconomic policy. The Lucas wedge (in figure 7.1) 
contains a welfare analysis of disinflation. In 1985:Q1 Nigeria’s real GDP was about 
N51 billion while inflation rate was 20.0 per cent. By 2011:Q4, real GDP had risen 
five-fold to N246 billion while inflation had halved. During this period both real GDP 
and inflation showed some fluctuations. However, holding all things constant, we may 
insert a hypothetical projection of these variables which shows a fluctuation-free path 
from their initial levels to the final levels. This projection line would thus represent the 
Lucas wedge potential levels of real GDP and inflation rate. Assuming that at the 
beginning of 1985 the government could correctly forecast/determine the level of real 
GDP in 2011:Q4, then it is optimal to choose policies which maintained the projection. 
GDP levels above the forecast trajectory would increase welfare while those below 
would lower welfare. To achieve this, the government can also reduce inflation at a 
constant speed from its 1985 level to its 2011 level. Inflation rates below the trajectory 
are considered extra achievements and welfare gains while rates above are welfare 
losses.  
The wedge in panel (a) shows a cumulative welfare loss of N5,249 billion in real GDP, 
while panel (c) indicates a modest cumulative welfare gain of 34.26 percentage points. 
These suggest an enormous loss of N153 billion per percentage point reduction in 
inflation rate. Given the considerable economic and political upheavals of the 1987-
1997 period, the ensuing lower growth cum higher inflation rates during this period 
can undermine the gains from disinflation and amplify output loss. So another set of 
wedges is produced for a more recent period of 2005-2011 characterised by lower 
inflation and faster growth. Panels (b) and (d) present the wedges for this period with 
a cumulative output loss of N709 billion and disinflationary benefits of 161.80 
percentage points implying a loss of N4.4 billion per percentage point of disinflation. 
This thus connotes that with a constant disinflation of 0.51 percentage points per 
quarter the hypothetical cost is N8.9 billion annually; an enormous cost to bear if anti-
inflationary policies are effective.  
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Figure 7.1: A Lucas Wedge Analysis of the Welfare Effect of Disinflation 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
However, the dynamics of inflation may not be due to demand but to other factors.  A 
visual inspection of figure 7.1 does not elucidate the inflation-output relationship in 
Nigeria. What is nonetheless apparent is that there seem to be structural breaks in both 
variables during the mid/late-1990s preceded by slow growth and high inflation (and 
inflation volatility) which ameliorated thereafter. To gain some insight into the 
inflation-output relationship, the Nigerian PC is plotted in figure 7.2 for output gap 
and inflation rate.
63
 This is illustrated for full- and sub-samples to determine the 
possible existence of structural breaks in the relationship and also presented for 
aggregate, non-oil and oil output. Ideally if inflation is demand-pushed then the PC 
should generally be upward sloping, indicating      .     
In panel (a) the full sample aggregate relationship is presented with a trend line, which 
showed a flat PC indicating that inflation is on the average irresponsive to changes in 
the output gap. When the data are broken into sub-samples of 1985-1995 and 1996-
2011, the result presented in panel (b) indicated transition from a somewhat vertical 
PC in the earlier period to a horizontal curve in the latter period. This would suggest 
that the cost of disinflation has increased over the two sample periods. While the 
deductions for the non-oil sector in panel (c) mimics the aggregate, the oil sector – 
panel (d) – showed a slightly inverse relationship initially which became horizontal in 
                                            
63 The output gap is derived from the Hodrick-Prescott filter with         
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the latter period. Overall, figure 7.2 indicate that the PC may be more-or-less 
horizontal both at aggregate and sectoral levels, in recent times. The flattening 
coincided with the CBN autonomy conferred in the late-1990s and the subsequent 
active use of the interest rate for monetary policy; thus, indicating increased costs of 
an NCM-type monetary policy in Nigeria.  
Figure 7.2: The Phillips Curve: Nigeria’s Inflation and Output Gap 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
To further highlight the relationship between inflation and output, and given the 
assumption of the NAIRU that positive output gaps accelerates inflation, figure 7.3 
plots the relationship between changes in inflation and output gap. If the assumptions 
of the NAIRU and NCM are correct, we expect to see positive inflation changes per 
positive output gap. However, especially for aggregate and non-oil sector, the figures 
tended to show an inverse relationship in most cases. This further illustrates that 
inflation in Nigeria is not demand but supply-driven. Thus when production is 
increased, more are supplied to the market causing price to fall, but when less are 
produced scarcity drives prices up. 
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Figure 7.3: Price Acceleration and Output Gap 
 
Data Source: CBN and NBS 
Two recent studies commissioned by the CBN provided evidence supporting this view. 
First, studying The Dynamics of Inflation in Nigeria, Mordi et al. (2007) found that 
output gap was insignificant and negatively signed while exchange rate and foreign 
prices were key determinants of inflation. Similarly, the second study on Inflation 
Forecasting Models for Nigeria by Adebiyi et al. (2010) documented the exchange 
rate rather than demand as significant in explaining and forecasting inflation. These 
thus suggest that attempts to dampen AD in order to combat inflation can be counter-
productive and very costly, since it would lead to unnecessary increase in 
unemployment, suppressed supply and heighten inflationary pressure.       
7.4 Model Specification, Methodology and Data 
64 
7.4.1 The Models 
In line with recent literature, this chapter investigates the inflation-output nexus and 
the costs of inflation using a PC analysis. This conventionally shows the relationship 
between AD and inflation in an economy. However, inflation may be determined by 
many other non-demand factors. Though the proponents of the NCM and the natural 
rate hypothesis do not dispute these, they nonetheless suggest that while demand 
effects are permanent those of supply are transitory. Given that a number of studies 
                                            
64 This chapter relies heavily on earlier discussions in chapters five and six. 
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have shown that supply factors are significant and non-transitory, our interest in this 
chapter is to model the PC in a way that incorporates supply factors (while also 
providing information for both the short- and long-run). Dupasquier and Ricketts 
(1998) showed that the inclusion of supply shock variables significantly reduces the 
standard errors of the regression and enhances the precision of the estimated 
parameters. To capture the possible nonlinearity in the inflation-output nexus, we 
consider both symmetric and asymmetric specifications of the PC. From equation 7.3, 
the linear LR-PC is thus specific as  
       ̃                                                   (7.4) 
 ̃      ̅  
where    is the annualised inflation rate,  ̃  measures the deviation of log real GDP 
from its  trend,    is a      vector of   supply factors and    is the stochastic error 
term which is assumedly    (    
 ). The subscript   indicates that the variables are 
time-series while     and   are the (conforming vector of) long-run parameters to be 
estimated. Our objective is to determine the characteristics of   and its relative 
importance vis-à-vis   in the inflationary process. 
From the preceding chapters, we noted that non-stationarity of most economic 
variables affects the validity of inferences made with such variables. Hence, to avert 
the problem of spurious regression as well as enable us capture both long-run 
relationships and short-run dynamics we, again, conduct a cointegration analysis using 
the ARDL model à la Pesaran and Shin (1998) discussed earlier. Consequently, 
equation 7.4 is re-specified to derive our benchmark linear-ARDL model as 
              ̃           ( )     ( )  ̃   ( )              (7.5) 
where   is the intercept,   is the error correction parameter which measures the speed 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium following a shock and satisfies       . 
The parameter   nests the long-run partial elasticity of demand,   is a vector which 
embeds the long-run parameters of supply determinants and       (    
 ) is the error 
term. Long-run parameters are extracted as      ⁄  and      ⁄  (see chapters 
five and six). The terms  ( ),  ( ) and  ( ) are lag polynomials in the short-run 
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variables with    and   as short-run dynamic parameters. This specification enabled 
the concurrent estimation of the short- and long-run dynamics of inflation. The lag 
augmentation in the model captures price stickiness and the short-run impact of 
demand and supply factors.  
To investigate the possibility of asymmetry and nonlinearity, equation 7.5 is modified 
in line with discussions in preceding chapters. First, we investigate the possibility of 
asymmetric effect with output gap as the transition variable (i.e. the hypothesis that 
inflation responds differently to negative vis-à-vis positive gaps). From the 
asymmetric ARDL model of Shin et al. (2009) discussed earlier, this requires splitting 
the output gap about a zero threshold. The asymmetric regressor is thus generated as   
 ̃   ̃   ̃ 
( )   ̃ 
( )                                                     (7.6) 
where the constant  ̃  is any real number, while   ̃ 
( )
 and  ̃ 
( )
 constitute the partial 
sum processes of the positive and negative changes in  ̃  derived as 
                 ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃     ̃                                                   (7.7) 
   ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃     ̃                                                   (7.8) 
which breaks the variables into two regimes viz: regime_1 (i.e.  ̃   ) for positive 
gaps and regime_2 (i.e.  ̃   ) for negative gaps.    ̃     is an indicator function that 
equalled unity when the argument is true and zero otherwise. By substituting for  ̃   in 
equation 7.5 the asymmetric ARDL becomes  
                         
( ) ̃   
( )   ( ) ̃   
( )         
  ( )     
( )( )  ̃ 
( )   ( )( )  ̃ 
( )   ( )                  (7.9) 
where  ( )and ( )  are asymmetric parameters which nest the asymmetric long-run 
elasticities of demand  (i.e.   ( )and  ( ) ) derived as  ( )   ⁄  and  ( )   ⁄ , 
respectively, while  ( ) and ( )   are the short-run parameters in regimes_1 and_2. 
Asymmetry is then tested via the Wald-test under     
( )   ( )  and      
( )  
 ( ) for the long- and short-run, respectively. 
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Next, we investigate nonlinearity in the inflation-output nexus to determine if the 
relationship changes at some levels of output gaps. Filardo (1998) and Greenwood-
Nimmo et al. (2011) showed that this nonlinearity can be complex since there may be 
one or more thresholds. Following these studies, we assume a maximum of two 
thresholds and thus specify a T-ARDL[1] and T-ARDL[2] models for single or double 
thresholds, respectively. For the two-regime T-ARDL[1], the threshold is defined as 
   ̃   ; where   and     are unknown threshold and delay parameters to be 
estimated. By redefining equation 7.6 accordingly, the asymmetric regressor can now 
be disaggregated as 
 ̃   ̃   ̃ 
( )   ̃ 
( )                                                     (7.10) 
where   ̃ 
( )
 and  ̃ 
( )
 are the partial sum processes of the changes in  ̃  in regime_1 
( ̃   ) and regime_2 ( ̃   ), respectively, derived as 
 ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃     ̃       ; 
    ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃     ̃                                             (7.11) 
where    ̃       is the indicator. Substituting equation 7.10 into 7.5 the T-ARDL[1] 
model is derived as 
                         
( ) ̃   
( )   ( ) ̃   
( )         
  ( )     
( )( )  ̃ 
( )   ( )( )  ̃ 
( )   ( )                  (7.12) 
where, as previously defined,   ( )and  ( )  are asymmetric parameters nesting the 
nonlinear long-run effects of demand  ( )and  ( ) derived as  ( )   ⁄  and  ( )   ⁄ , 
respectively, while  ( )  and  ( )  are the short-run parameters in both regimes. A 
Wald-test is, again, performed for     
( )   ( )  and      
( )   ( )  to test long- 
and short-run nonlinearity, respectively. 
For the T-ARDL[2], two unknown thresholds are specified leading to three possible 
regimes. The first threshold ( ( )) defined the upper regime for large positive gaps 
while the other ( ( )) bounds the lower regime for large negative gaps. The middle 
regime contains moderate gaps. In this case,  ̃  is discomposed as  
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 ̃   ̃   ̃ 
( )   ̃ 
( )   ̃ 
( )                                                     (7.13) 
where  ̃ 
( ) is the partial sum process for the changes in  ̃  in the  
   regime defined as  
 ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃   { ̃     ( )}  
   ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃   { ( )  ̃     ( )}                                 (7.14) 
 ̃ 
( )  ∑       ̃   { ̃     ( )}  
where  { ̃     ( )}  is again the indicator function. Substituting equation 7.13 into 7.5 
yields the T-ARDL[2] as  
                                 ∑ 
( ) ̃   
( )         
  ( )    ∑ 
( )( )  ̃ 
( )   ( )                            (7.15) 
where   [     ] represents the respective regimes. Again,  ( ) contains the nonlinear 
long-run parameter  ( ( )) while  ( )  represents the short-run nonlinear parameters. 
Once more, test of nonlinearity is based on the Wald-test for     
( )     ( )    , 
and     
( )     ( )    , in the long- and short-run, respectively.  
For both the T-ARDL[1] and T-ARDL[2], the stochastic and unknown thresholds are 
estimated by conducting a grid search and selecting the pair (   ) that minimised the 
    as follows 
               ̂  
      [           ]
             
   (   )                                            (7.16) 
where     is derived from OLS regressions of equations 7.12 and 7.15, respectively, 
for different values of      , and   is the set of all possible values of the transition 
variable after removing non-zero observations in the top and bottom 15th-percentile. 
This is to ensure that there are at least 15 per cent of non-zero values in each regime. 
The search is conducted sequentially in increments of 0.25 per cent in the gap while 
the estimation of the delay parameter is limited to       given the quarterly 
frequency of our data.
65
 Following Hansen (2000), a likelihood-ratio test, is then 
conducted for the T-ARDL[1] to test the null hypothesis of no threshold versus the 
                                            
65 The sequence for     were chosen conveniently, this nonetheless produced a total of about 1000 equations for 
the grid search.  
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alternative of single threshold, while for the T-ARDL[2] the null of single threshold is 
tested against the alternative of double threshold. The likelihood-ratio test enables to 
investigate the robustness of the threshold models and thus, ascertain that our results 
are not due to outliers. 
The linear and nonlinear equations 7.5, 7.9, 7.12 and 7.15 represent the different PCs 
to be investigated. In the literature, the     vector of supply determinants    
included factors like indirect taxes (see Dupasquier and Ricketts, 1998), exchange rate 
and import prices (see Adebiyi et al., 2010; Dwyer et al. 2009; and Mordi et al., 2007), 
and oil prices (see Rumler and Valderrama, 2008; Dupasquier and Ricketts, 1998; and 
Kromphardt and Logeay, 2011) which represent domestic and foreign factors. 
Consequently, we define    to include exchange rate changes  (  ) , import prices 
changes (  
   ), oil price changes (  
   ) and domestic spare capacity (  ), to capture 
foreign and domestic shocks. Cumulative dynamic multipliers in these models are 
computed, as discussed in chapter 6, to analyse adjustment path to steady-state 
equilibrium after an impulse to regressors. 
7.4.2 Methodology 
Parameters in the above equations are estimated by the applying the OLS procedure to 
the various ARDL models. Given its time-series nature, and the fact that inflation is 
affected by an array of factors, all of which may not enter any specific model, OLS 
estimation of a model of inflation can be subjected to a number of problems like 
endogeneity bias, autocorrelation, and non-stationary of variables (as explained in 
earlier chapters). Nonetheless, according to Pesaran and Shin (1998), the ARDL 
modelling approach has the advantage of producing consistent parameters estimate 
even in the presence of these problems. Adequate lag augmentation, using an 
appropriate information criterion, concurrently eliminates the problems of 
autocorrelation and endogeneity bias.  
Pesaran and Shin (op.cit) also indicated that the OLS estimators of the cointegrating 
parameters of the ARDL are Gaussian and efficient. As in the previous chapters, test 
of cointegration is conducted using the PSS bounds F-test which is performed under 
the (joint) null of no cointegration as  
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( )                                                       (7.17) 
where   [     ] is the respective regimes in appropriate ARDL models. The F-
statistic is compared with the asymptotic critical values provided in Pesaran et al. 
(2001) as discussed in the preceding chapters. Again robust OLS estimators are 
derived using the Newey-West method to produce HAC standard errors which ensure 
the validity of our inferences even in the presence of the classical problems. All 
restrictions and models evaluations are conducted at the 5 per cent level of 
significance. 
Empirical investigation follows a general to specific approach where eight lags of the 
all variables are initially included in the over-parameterised equation. To determine 
the optimal lag length we conduct a sequential search between one-to-eight lags by 
estimating various versions of the benchmark equation 7.5 and selecting the lag with 
the lowest AIC. The appropriate lag-length is then applied to all the variants of the 
ARDL model. A parsimonious model is thereafter obtained in each model by deleting 
insignificant dynamic regressors from the model while being mindful of the fit and the 
AIC criterion. For any set of potential parsimonious models, that with the least AIC is 
preferred. Where variables emerge insignificant both in the long- and short-run, they 
are expunged from the model. Coefficients of the remaining significant short-run 
variables in the models are then summed-up to derive the short-run dynamic 
parameter for the respective variables. We further evaluate the correctness of our 
model specification using Ramsey’s RESET with the null of no specification error. 
This is an F-statistic specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals. 
For the variables  ̃       
       we expect positive signs a priori, implying that these 
are inflationary while for   
    in Nigeria, we have no priors. The ambiguity of   
    is 
because rising oil prices can raise the cost of production while concurrently enhancing 
government subsidies, which lower domestic costs and inflation. However, oil prices 
can also have demand effect via its effect on government expenditure though this 
would already be captured by  ̃ .  
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7.4.3 The Data 
Analysis in this chapter is conducted using quarterly data spanning 1985:Q1-2011:Q4. 
The dataset include the log of real GDP (  ) defined as the gross domestic product at 
1990 constant basic prices, which is subdivided into non-oil and oil sector to capture 
the structure of the Nigerian economy. Using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter         potential output ( ̅ ) is derived as the trend of log of 
real GDP. Inflation rate (  ) is defined as the annualised change in the log of headline 
CPI while exchange rate changes  (  ) is the annualised change in log of nominal 
exchange rate defined as naira per dollar rate. We derive domestic spare capacity (  ) 
as  
     
                    
   
 
where capacity utilisation is the percentage of installed capacity of the manufacturing 
sector used during the period. Oil price change (  
   ) is the annualised difference in 
log of quarterly average of the dollar per barrel price of bonny light (Nigeria’s 
reference crude petroleum). Imported inflation (  
   ) is the annualised change in log 
of import commodity price index. Since according to the CBN (2009a) majority of 
Nigeria’s import originate from industrials countries, the OECD producer price index 
is used as proxy for import prices. All domestic dataset are sourced from the CBN and 
the NBS while the OECD price index is obtained from the OECD database.  
7.5 Empirical Analysis 
Given the possibility of bi-directional relationships between some of the potential 
explanatory variables (e.g. output gap versus excess capacity and oil price versus 
exchange rate), a variance inflation factor (VIF) test of multicollinearity is conducted. 
The estimated VIF are all relatively low, ranging from 1.28-2.75; where excess 
capacity possessed the highest VIF. This result indicated the possible absence of 
multicollinearity problems among the regressors. Subsequently, we conducted 
stationarity tests to examine the time-series properties of the variables. The tests are 
conducted using both the ADF test with the null hypothesis of a unit root and the 
KPSS test with a null hypothesis of stationarity. The results contained in table 7.1, 
showed a mixture of  ( ) and  ( ) properties among the variables. While total and 
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non-oil gaps as well as excess capacity are  ( ), all other variables are  ( ). However, 
as observed earlier, the combination of   ( ) and  ( ) variables in the model would 
not affect the validity of our analysis based on the ARDL model and the PSS F-test.   
Table 7.1: Times-Series Property of Variables 
                 ADF       KPSS 
 Levels 1st-Diff. Decision  Levels 1st-Diff. Decision 
Domestic Inflation ( )  -3.06** -7.27***  ( )  0.33 0.03  ( ) 
Output Gap ( ̃  ) -0.63 -15.94***  ( )  0.95*** 0.14  ( ) 
 Non-Oil ( ̃  ) -0.45 -17.41***  ( )  0.96*** 0.12  ( ) 
 Oil ( ̃  ) -4.43*** -7.51***  ( )  0.44* 0.12  ( ) 
Exchange Rate Changes ( )  -2.89** -8.84***  ( )  0.43* 0.35*  ( ) 
Excess Capacity  ( ) -1.33 -3.60***  ( )  0.65** 0.20  ( ) 
Oil Price Changes  (    ) -3.58*** -6.87***  ( )  0.44* 0.35*  ( ) 
Import Price Inflation (    ) -5.54*** -8.06***  ( )  0.31 0.20  ( ) 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN, NBS and OECD database. 
Note: Tests of stationarity were conducted with intercept but no trend. The ADF test was conducted under the null hypothesis of unit root 
using MacKinnon critical values of –3.49,–2.88 and –2.58 for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively, while the KPSS test 
was performed under the null hypothesis of stationarity with asymptotic critical values of 0.73,0.46 and 0.34 for the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
For the empirical analysis, the various ARDL models are estimated for total ( ̃  ), 
non-oil ( ̃  )  and oil ( ̃  )  output gaps adopting a general to specific approach. 
Using the AIC criterion, and searching between one-to-eight lags, we found the 
optimal lag length at eight. This search is conducted basically for the linear  ̃   
model and the outcome is adopted for other models. Hence, we specified an over-
parameterisation with a lag-order of eight in all cases and derive parsimony by 
deleting insignificant short-run regressors from the model, complemented with the 
AIC criterion.  
7.5.1 The Linear-ARDL Model 
Standard specification of the PC as contained in the NCM do not contain supply 
factors, which are usually subsumed into the error term and are assumed to have no 
long-run relevance. Hence, the linear model in equation 7.5 is estimated initially under 
this assumption. This required the necessary imposition of zero value on all the   
elements of the    vector. Thus, a simple linear-PC is estimated without supply factors, 
the result of which is contained in panel (A) of table 7.2 below.
66
 The results indicated 
an inverse and somewhat insignificant relationship between inflation and the output 
gap both in the long- and short-run. The inverse relationship is indicative of the 
                                            
66 Given the length of the original tables abridged versions are presented in the main text showing the relationships 
of interest. The complete tables are contained in the appendices. 
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dominant effect supply shocks since these would reduce equilibrium output and raise 
prices simultaneously. In this specification, inflation is driven mostly by inertia in the 
short-run, and by non-demand factors in the long-run. This is contrary to the 
underlying assumptions of the NCM-PC. Diagnostic and summary statistics, however, 
suggest that this specification is inadequate. While the RESET rejected the null 
hypothesis of no specification error, the PSS F-test could not reject the null of no 
cointegration. The  ̅  is also low and accompanied by relatively high    .  
Table 7.2: Results of the Linear-ARDL Phillips Curve Models  
 (A)  Simple PC (B)  Supply-Augmented PC 
 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
   
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
   
-2.40* 
(1.43) 
-1.93 
(1.50) 
-0.86 
(2.98) 
0.27 
(2.06) 
-1.32 
(1.62) 
4.51* 
(2.47) 
 [    ]     
1.41* 
(0.80) 
1.50* 
(0.81) 
1.59* 
(0.91) 
 [    ]     
1.03 
(1.44) 
1.88* 
(1.05) 
1.61 
(1.42) 
 [    
   ]     
-0.44 
(0.30) 
-0.50 
(0.33) 
-0.37 
(0.37) 
 [    
   
]
     
-2.59 
(4.09) 
-3.72 
(4.15) 
-12.40 
(7.82) 
∑      
 
     
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
0.41** 
(0.21) 
0.35* 
(0.18) 
0.49* 
(0.28) 
0.58** 
(0.23) 
0.61*** 
(0.19) 
∑   ̃   
 
     
-0.30 
(0.22) 
-0.40* 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-1.76*** 
(0.59) 
-0.34* 
(0.20) 
-0.34** 
(0.14) 
∑      
 
        
-0.90*** 
(0.17) 
-0.93*** 
(0.16) 
-0.96*** 
(0.13) 
∑      
 
        
2.37*** 
(0.71) 
2.35*** 
(0.68) 
3.28*** 
(0.83) 
∑      
    
        
-0.33*** 
(0.13) 
-0.37*** 
(0.12) 
-0.38*** 
(0.12) 
∑      
    
        
6.08*** 
(1.63) 
6.55*** 
(1.64) 
7.50*** 
(2.16) 
 ̅   0.27 0.25 0.29 0.56 0.54 0.60 
RSS 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.21 0.17 
AIC -2.40 -2.36 -2.42 -2.73 -2.71 -2.81 
F-Test(PSS) 2.66 1.36 1.76 8.15
** 7.92** 8.56** 
RESET 
4.21** 
[0.03] 
5.34** 
[0.01] 
3.05** 
[0.04] 
0.06 
[0.80] 
0.01 
[0.97] 
0.27 
[0.59] 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN, NBS and OECD database. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q4. Figures in ( ) are HAC 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. RSS denotes residual sum of squares while AIC 
is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for 
case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of 
Ramsey’s specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ]. 
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Given the poor performance of the simple-PC, the restriction on the    vector is 
relaxed and equation 7.5 is re-estimated with supply-factors augmentation. The results 
of the supply-augmented PC are shown in panel (B). As in the preceding model, the 
error correction parameter ( ) is correctly sized and signed in all equations, although 
slightly larger in the augmented-PC. Again, in most cases the coefficient of output gap 
is negatively signed and/or insignificant both in the long- and short-run. The only 
exception is for the oil gap where it is significantly positive in the long-run. However, 
exchange rate changes are consistently found to be a significantly positive determinant 
of inflation while excess capacity is only significant in the non-oil model. These 
findings are consistent with our prior expectations.  
Import and oil price changes are, however, negatively signed. For import prices, this 
may indicate the effect of competition between domestic production and importation; 
hence, falling foreign prices makes import cheaper. Generally, the cost of production 
in Nigeria is high given that firms provide their own infrastructures, which sometimes 
makes importation a cheaper option for many tradables. Hence, rising import prices 
make local alternatives to be more attractive to consumers and encourage domestic 
production and supplies. Increased supply would thus reduce domestic inflation. The 
negative sign for oil price could reflect impact of oil-windfalls on the government’s 
ability to subsidies domestic activities as well as the increased ability to finance long-
term public investments.  
In the short-run the drivers of inflation are found to be excess capacity, import price 
and inflation inertia. Output gap, oil prices and exchange rate changes are negatively 
signed in the short-run. Overall, excess capacity increased inflation both in the long- 
and short-run which again suggests that inadequate supply, rather than excess demand 
is the more important determinant of inflation. Compared with the previous 
specification, model evaluation based on the  ̅ ,     and AIC indicated a better fit. 
The RESET also could not reject the null of no mis-specification even as the PSS F-
test confirmed cointegration among the variables.  
The results from both versions of the linear model suggest that the LR-PC may not be 
vertical but somewhat flat (with a slightly negative slope). In the short-run, the PC is 
mostly downward sloping. These do not only suggest that inflation is supply-driven 
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but also dismantles the notion of long-run neutrality. This conclusion is further 
highlighted in figure 7.4 which presents the cumulative dynamic multipliers for the 
linear models. The figure illustrates the adjustment paths from short-run 
disequilibrium to long-run equilibrium following output gap shocks.          
Figure 7.4: Dynamic Multipliers of the Linear Models 
 
The paths of the simple-PC are shown in row (A) while row (B) illustrates the traverse 
of the augmented-PC for total, non-oil and oil gap models in columns 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. These charts depict symmetry in response following positive or negative 
shocks to the output gap. In the simple-PC, following a positive shock which increases 
GDP above potential, the multipliers are entirely negative through-out its lifespan. 
This negative-side adjustment is replicated for  ̃   in the augmented-PC while 
for  ̃  , it is positive. For  ̃  , the initial adjustments were considerably negative. 
This diminished after three years becoming positive after eight years. In all these, the 
adjustment pattern is symmetric over the life of the shock, generally sluggish and 
somewhat long-lived. It can be seen that it takes over a decade, in most cases, to 
correct short-run disequilibrium and attain the long-run steady-state of the model. This 
thus supports non-neutrality of real variables in the long-run. 
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7.5.2 The Nonlinear-ARDL Models 
The results of nonlinear and asymmetric ARDL models of equations 7.9, 7.12 and 
7.15 are presented in table 7.3 below. Panel (A) contains the results of the asymmetric 
ARDL which tests the hypothesis that positive gaps behave differently from negative 
gaps. A priori, we expect coefficients of both positive and negative gaps to be 
positively signed. Equality of these would indicate symmetry in the relationship. In 
panel (B) is the result of the single (unknown) threshold. If the threshold is estimated 
to be zero then results in panels (A) and (B) would coincide. The results of the double 
(unknown) thresholds are tabulated in panel (C). This contains the inflation-output 
relationship in three regimes: large positive, moderate level, and large negative gaps. 
Again, our a priori expectation in both threshold models is that all coefficients of 
outputs gaps are positively signed; where equality of these would imply linearity in 
the relationship. 
7.5.2.1 The Asymmetric NARDL Model 
The coefficients of the positive and negative gaps are all significant in all cases 
for   ̃  ,  ̃   and   ̃   but are considerably larger for   ̃  . However, these are 
perversely signed in some cases. For  ̃   and  ̃  , both positive and negative gaps 
are inflationary, while for  ̃   both gaps are deflationary. This suggests a “V-shaped” 
LR-PC for   ̃   and   ̃  , and “ -shaped” LR-PC for  ̃  . Thus, irrespective of 
whether output is above or below potential, inflation dynamics are unaffected. Other 
factors rather than demand would thus be responsible for inflation in Nigeria. Given 
the more-or-less equality in the absolute values of the coefficient, the overall effect of 
AD on inflation would be approximately zero (or insignificantly negative). This 
explains the findings in the preceding linear models and those of Mordi et al. (2007) 
and Adebiyi et al. (2010) for Nigeria. As in the linear models, exchange rate changes 
and spare capacity are found to be the significant inflationary factors while import 
prices maintained an inverse effect. However, oil price coefficient in the  ̃   and  ̃   
equations now became inflationary while for  ̃   it remained negative.  
In the short-run, output gaps are deflationary for  ̃   and   ̃   but inflationary 
for  ̃  . The significant drivers of inflation in the short-run are spare capacity, import 
prices and inertia, while exchange rate and oil prices dampened inflation. Analysis of 
the model diagnostics generally indicated no specification error and confirmed long-
255 
 
 
 
run relationship among the variables. The  ̅ ,     and AIC are slightly better than 
those in the linear model. Wald-tests of symmetry that     
( )   ( ) and     
( )  
 ( ) rejected the null both in the long- and short-run. However, a slightly modified 
test of      
( )    ( ) and      
( )    ( )  could not reject the null of 
symmetry in the long-run absolute values of the coefficients but reject the null in the 
short-run. This indicated a basically horizontal LR-PC and an oblique SR-PC. These 
findings are also supported by the plots of the dynamic multipliers in row (A) of figure 
7.5 below. This showed coincidence in adjustment paths for positive and negative 
demand shocks, both of which are inflationary. Inflationary pressures, by implication, 
subsist regardless of whether the economy is contracting or expanding, so that 
inflation may basically not be an AD phenomenon. Hence, the net impacts of these as 
shown are more-or-less zero, indicative of a flat PC. Inflation is, thus, due to other 
factors, so that expansionary policy may be conducted undaunted of inflationary 
pressures since the inflation-output trade-off disappears.  
7.5.2.2 The Nonlinear T-ARDL[1] Model 
Moving away from the assumption of a known threshold around zero output gap, the 
two-regime T-ARDL[1] model is estimated by first deriving the threshold (   ̃   ; 
where    ). For  ̃   and  ̃   we found the infimum-    at   2.5 and 5.5 per 
cent, respectively, with    , while for  ̃   we found    1.25 per cent and    . 
The likelihood ratio test validated these thresholds at the 5 per cent significance level.  
Results of the T-ARDL[1] model presented in panel (B) are somewhat similar to that 
of the NARDL in panel (A). Though, the coefficients of the output gap are smaller 
than in the preceding model, the inferences therefrom are somewhat identical. First, 
the coefficient for  ̃   is considerably larger than those of  ̃   and  ̃  . For each 
sector, the absolute values of the coefficients were identical while they bore opposite 
signs which imply that the overall effects are approximately zero. Again, this would 
imply a horizontal LR-PC. As in the preceding model, the significant inflationary 
factors in the long-run are the exchange rate changes and excess capacity. Oil prices 
are again inflationary for  ̃   and   ̃   but not  ̃   while import prices reduced 
inflation in the long-run. 
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Table 7.3: Results of the Nonlinear-ARDL Phillips Curve Models 
 (A) NARDL Model (B) T-ARDL[1] Model (C) T-ARDL[2] Model 
 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   
-0.34** 
(0.14) 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.78*** 
(0.09) 
-0.38*** 
(0.13) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.51*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
   
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.62*** 
(0.07) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.22*** 
(0.04) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
 ( ) ( )  
28.82** 
(12.49) 
6.38** 
(3.05) 
-2.67*** 
(0.39) 
16.47*** 
(5.63) 
6.54*** 
(1.82) 
-1.34** 
(0.52) 
17.93*** 
(6.18) 
5.76*** 
(1.58) 
-0.32 
(0.22) 
 ( ) ( )  
-28.82** 
(12.39) 
-7.23** 
(2.98) 
2.47*** 
(0.37) 
-16.34*** 
(5.59) 
-6.75*** 
(1.84) 
1.07** 
(0.51) 
10.99*** 
(3.95) 
-2.47*** 
(0.71) 
0.96* 
(0.53) 
 ( )        
-17.14*** 
(5.91) 
-6.56*** 
(1.77) 
-0.51 
(0.52) 
 [    ]  
1.29* 
(0.68) 
0.74** 
(0.31) 
0.37*** 
(0.04) 
1.26*** 
(0.39) 
0.81*** 
(0.22) 
0.50** 
(0.23) 
1.61** 
(0.61) 
2.12*** 
(0.64) 
0.65 
(0.56) 
 [    ]  
3.33** 
(1.71) 
3.11*** 
(0.76) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
3.58** 
(1.66) 
1.96** 
(0.01) 
-0.09 
(0.43) 
4.27** 
(1.89) 
1.25* 
(0.67) 
-0.55 
(0.96) 
 [    
   ]  
-1.27*** 
(0.39) 
0.70** 
(0.28) 
0.52*** 
(0.07) 
-0.46** 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
-1.85** 
(0.73) 
-1.14*** 
(0.39) 
-0.24 
(0.35) 
 [    
   
]
  
-4.60 
(4.00) 
-15.62*** 
(4.58) 
-10.92*** 
(1.44) 
-1.97 
(1.94) 
-6.81*** 
(2.29) 
-11.90*** 
(3.30) 
-3.67 
(2.74) 
-13.64*** 
(4.78) 
-20.56*** 
(6.88) 
∑      
 
     
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.75*** 
(0.15) 
0.90*** 
(0.23) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
0.68*** 
(0.07) 
0.72*** 
(0.10) 
0.64** 
(0.25) 
0.78*** 
(0.18) 
0.84*** 
(0.12) 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     
-16.78*** 
(3.78) 
-2.51 
(2.28) 
0.91*** 
(0.17) 
-9.58*** 
(2.01) 
-0.35 
(0.84) 
-0.57** 
(0.27) 
-6.69*** 
(0.88) 
0.98 
(0.79) 
-0.97*** 
(0.24) 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     
20.35*** 
(4.97) 
12.06*** 
(2.70) 
-0.63* 
(0.33) 
12.04*** 
(2.65) 
3.51** 
(1.53) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-5.04*** 
(1.24) 
-7.25*** 
(1.36) 
0.55*** 
(0.23) 
∑   ̃   
( ) 
           
9.52*** 
(1.20) 
6.10*** 
(1.19) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
∑      
 
     
-2.16*** 
(0.24) 
-1.43*** 
(0.26) 
-0.30** 
(0.11) 
-2.00*** 
(0.25) 
-1.47*** 
(0.29) 
-0.93*** 
(0.15) 
-1.67*** 
(0.21) 
-2.77*** 
(0.34) 
-0.90*** 
(0.13) 
∑      
 
     
3.94* 
(2.13) 
8.27*** 
(2.90) 
8.91*** 
(1.06) 
3.15*** 
(1.26) 
2.94** 
(1.10) 
4.25*** 
(0.94) 
4.51*** 
(1.06) 
5.30*** 
(1.36) 
4.75*** 
(1.34) 
∑      
    
     
0.87* 
(0.48) 
-0.73*** 
(0.23) 
-0.35* 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-1.26*** 
(0.18) 
0.79*** 
(0.21) 
-0.46*** 
(0.09) 
∑      
    
     
5.73*** 
(1.92) 
6.63*** 
(1.52) 
7.98*** 
(1.68) 
6.05*** 
(1.42) 
8.19*** 
(2.11) 
14.40*** 
(3.43) 
5.52*** 
(0.72) 
7.17*** 
(1.91) 
14.22*** 
(2.55) 
 ̅   0.52 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.72 0.63 
RSS 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.12 
AIC -2.61 -2.78 -2.82 -2.72 -2.90 -2.82 -2.99 -3.17 -2.89 
F-Test(PSS) 12.86
** 9.25** 16.70** 16.00** 7.96** 7.37** 20.92** 17.64** 8.55** 
RESET 
0.08 
[0.77] 
0.62 
[0.43] 
0.01 
[0.90] 
0.61 
[0.43] 
0.31 
[0.57] 
0.61 
[0.43] 
0.43 
[0.40] 
2.42 
[0.12] 
0.52 
[0.46] 
          
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN, NBS and OECD database.. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q4. Figures in ( ) are HAC 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. RSS denotes residual sum of squares while AIC 
is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for 
case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of 
Ramsey’s specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ]. 
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In the short-run, declining positive gaps are perversely inflationary until it reaches 2.5 
or 5.5 percents for  ̃   and  ̃  , respectively, beyond which further declines become 
deflationary. For  ̃  , declining gaps are also inflationary until output is 1.25 per cent 
below potential after which the gap-effect becomes insignificant. The results of the 
other short-run factors are also similar to those found in the preceding NARDL model. 
Nonetheless, the models diagnostics showed a slightly better fit for the T-ARDL[1] 
vis-à-vis the NARDL and ARDL models. Existence of long-run relationship is 
confirmed by the PSS F-test while the RESET indicated no mis-specification. The  ̅ , 
    and AIC also showed marginal improvement on the average. Tests of linearity, 
once more, rejected the null hypothesis both in the long- and the short-run; but could 
not reject the null of linearity in the long-run absolute values of the coefficients. This 
again suggested that the LR-PC is more-or-less horizontal though the SR-PC is 
positively sloped especially for  ̃   and  ̃  . Row (B) of figure 7.5 illustrates the 
adjustment pattern following positive and negative shocks to output gap. Again, the 
plots of the dynamic multipliers supported the symmetry found in absolute values and 
the zero overall effect of AD on inflation. As in the NARDL, it takes over ten years 
for short-run disequilibrium to be fully adjusted. 
7.5.2.3 The Nonlinear T-ARDL[2] Model 
The T-ARDL[2] comprised two unknown thresholds ( ( )     ( )) which are 
estimated sequentially. First, the positive threshold  ( ) is obtained. Then, holding this 
constant,  ( ) is estimated, after which   ( ) is re-estimated. The thresholds ( ( )) and 
the delay parameter ( ) are estimated concurrently. Results of the grid search 
suggested that   ( )                , and  ( )                    for   ̃  , 
 ̃   and  ̃  , respectively, with    . These are again validated with a likelihood 
ratio test. 
Panel (C) presents the result of the T-ARDL[2] models. As in the NARDL and T-
ARDL[1], the speed of adjustment ( ) is significant with correct size and sign in all 
equations though marginally lower in the T-ARDL[2]. The long-run coefficients of  ̃ 
are larger, in absolute terms, for the extreme regimes than the middle regime in all 
cases. Again, the coefficient are considerably larger for  ̃   than for  ̃   and  ̃  . 
Furthermore, in the two extreme regimes, the absolute values of the coefficients,  ( ) 
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and  ( ), are identical but with different signs. These suggested that large gaps are 
inflationary for  ̃   and  ̃  , but deflationary for  ̃  , irrespective of whether they 
are positive or negative gaps.  
Figure 7.5: Dynamic Multipliers of the Nonlinear Models 
 
In the middle regime, increasing output gaps are inflationary while falling gaps are 
deflationary for   ̃   and  ̃  . The converse holds for   ̃  . Hence for the whole 
economy, contractionary policy would moderate inflation only when output gap is 
above       per cent. If output gap falls below this threshold, then contractionary 
policy becomes inflationary. This is also the case for oil output gaps with an 
inflationary threshold of       per cent. For the non-oil sector, however, the 
implication is dire. Contractionary policy would reduce inflation only if output gaps 
are above 5.50 per cent. When output gaps are below this threshold contractionary 
policy would be counter-productive; policymakers should, thus, only react if non-oil 
output gap is excessively positive. Given the susceptibility of the non-oil sector to 
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domestic policies, it means that effort should be made to maintain a mildly positive 
level of output gaps in the non-oil sector in order to rein-in inflation.  
Nonetheless, the converse signs of the coefficients,  ( )  and   ( ) , in the all three 
sectors, suggests that long-run inflation dynamics is essentially impervious to the scale 
and direction of output gap and that other factors may be more apt in the inflation 
process.  As in the preceding models, the significant inflationary factors in the long-
run are the exchange rate changes and excess capacity while oil prices and import 
prices dampen inflation. In the short-run, import price, excess capacity and inertia 
drive inflation while exchange rate and oil prices moderate inflation. Contractionary 
policies would be inflationary in  ̃   and   ̃   models when gaps are above 
      and       per cent, respectively.   
The model diagnostics generally suggested a better fit than the preceding model. 
However, while the Wald-test suggested long-run asymmetry for  ̃   and  ̃  , it 
could not reject the null for  ̃  . In the short-run, the null hypothesis is not rejected in 
all models. Again, absolute value symmetry was found in the extreme regimes of  ̃   
and  ̃  . These findings are confirmed in the row (C) of figure 7.5 which showed 
somewhat symmetry in the adjustment path following shocks to  ̃  , although these 
are perversely signed. For  ̃   and  ̃  , positive and negative shocks are generally 
inflationary, however, for  ̃   it is deflationary in the middle regime. Hence, when 
non-oil output gap is moderate, negative shocks would increase inflation permanently. 
The effect would be largest in the first three years and would moderate in the fourth 
year. 
7.6 Analysis of Findings 
Based on the NCM principle that inflation is an AD phenomenon our prior expectation 
is that the coefficient of output gap is positive and significant both in the linear and the 
nonlinear cases. Concurrently, demand is expected to be the most prominent 
determinant of inflation. Given that macroeconomic policies are usually directed at the 
non-oil sector in Nigeria, since the oil sector is largely assumed to follow international 
factors, our analysis focus basically on the total and non-oil economy. The coefficients, 
in the total and the non-oil models are mostly found to be negative and in some cases 
zero. This is indicative of a slightly horizontal LR-PC similar to that found by 
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Kromphardt and Logeay (2011) for some industrialised economies. Our results 
nonetheless show that the inflation-output relationship is inverse and thus, perverse. 
This implied that economic expansions are not necessarily inflationary in a developing 
country like Nigeria.  
Inflation is thus not an AD phenomenon but attributable to other factors. Exchange 
rate changes and slack capacity are consistently found to be the significant drivers of 
inflation in the long-run, while import prices and slack capacity determined inflation 
significantly in the short-run. These suggest that supply factors are the significant 
source of inflationary pressures and somewhat explains the negative coefficient found 
for output gap. Basically, supply shocks are more prominent than demand shocks, so 
that the supply curve is shifted to the left causing prices to rise while aggregate output 
declines. From the results above, the effects of these shocks are not transient as 
usually assumed but persist for more than a decade before disequilibrium is fully 
corrected. 
The finding is not entirely surprising given the features of the Nigerian economy, 
which included high incidence of poverty. Food and other basic necessities constitute 
the bulk of the budget in an average Nigerian household. Besides, food constitutes 
over 60 per cent of the CPI basket. With poverty, demand for basic necessities (like 
food) would be inelastic to contractionary policies while supply-induced scarcity 
would fuel inflation. Contractionary policies would thus worsen domestic production 
and heighten inflation. The combination of poverty and the high weights of food in 
household budget and the CPI basket, thus, ensure that prices are supply rather than 
demand shock driven.       
The results so far do not show the relative importance of the different variables. These 
are highlighted by the scaled coefficients in tables 7.4 and 7.5 below. Scaled 
coefficients are standardised from point estimates of parameters (in tables 7.2 and 7.3) 
by multiplying the estimated coefficient of a regressor by the standard deviation of the 
regressand and scaling by the standard deviation of the regressor. The resulting 
parameters confirm that exchange rate and excess capacity are the most important 
drivers of inflation in the long-run. Basically, a one-per cent increase in the rate of 
change of the exchange rate, would increase inflation by over 2.0 per cent on the 
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average, while a one-per cent increase in excess capacity causes inflation to rise by 
about 1.3 per cent. In the short-run, the exchange rate has the highest, though perverse, 
impact. The most important inflationary factor in the short-run is import prices which 
one-per cent shock induces a 1.2 per cent rise in inflation. In all, output gap have a 
comparatively modest contribution which usually cancelled out in the nonlinear 
models. 
Table 7.4: Scaled Coefficients of the Linear Models  
 (A)  Simple PC (B)  Supply-Augmented PC 
 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   -0.50 -0.46 -0.25 0.05 -0.31 1.34 
 [    ]     2.34 2.49 2.64 
 [    ]     0.45 0.83 0.71 
 [    
   ]     -0.64 -0.73 -0.54 
 [    
   
]
     -0.33 -0.47 -1.58 
∑      
 
     0.57 0.41 0.35 0.51 0.60 0.63 
∑   ̃   
 
     -0.14 0.20 -0.10 -0.77 -0.17 -0.36 
∑      
 
        -2.64 -2.72 -2.82 
∑      
 
        0.28 0.27 0.39 
∑      
    
        -0.96 -1.07 -1.13 
∑      
    
        1.19 1.28 1.47 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN, NBS and OECD database. 
However, results from the preceding section suggests that the T-ARDL[2] 
outperformed the others and that the overall impact across its regime is not necessarily 
zero. While the coefficients in the two outer regimes cancelled out that in the middle 
regime presented significant ramification for policy. For the whole economy, 
disinflationary policy would be effective for large positive gaps but would generally 
become counter-productive for gaps below       per cent. In this regard, as long as 
output gap is above this threshold, a one-per cent contraction in the economy would 
reduce inflation by 1.6 per cent which is less than the 2.7 per cent impact of exchange 
rate, and 1.8 per cent for excess capacity. However, much of the inflation-output 
connection observed for the aggregate economy may be due to the oil sector. 
Considering the non-oil sector, the nonlinearity in the relationship indicated that 
disinflationary policies are only effective when gaps are above 5.5 per cent. Policies 
that reduce gaps below this level would be inflationary. Examination of figure 7.2 
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shows that this threshold is in the eightieth percentile, which means that for 80 per 
cent of the data, contraction of non-oil output is inflationary.      
Table 7.5: Scaled Coefficients of the Nonlinear Models 
  (A)    NARDL Model (B)    T-ARDL[1] Model (C)    T-ARDL[2] Model 
  
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector   
 
   (1)   (2)    (3)     (4)     (5)    (6)       (7)    (8)   (9) 
 ( ) ( )  1.56 1.07 -0.38 1.40 1.06 0.26 1.65 1.26 0.21 
 ( ) ( )  -1.56 -1.07 0.38 -1.40 -1.06 0.21 1.61 -1.24 0.12 
 ( )    
  
      -1.65 -1.26 0.10 
 [    ]  2.14 1.59 0.62 2.09 1.35 0.79 2.67 3.51 1.08 
 [    ]  1.47 1.37 -0.01 1.58 0.86 -0.03 1.88 0.55 -0.24 
 [    
   ]  -1.85 1.03 0.76 -0.67 0.01 0.02 -2.70 -1.67 -0.36 
 [    
   
]
  -0.58 -1.99 -1.39 -0.25 -0.87 -1.44 -0.47 -1.74 -2.62 
∑      
 
     0.59 0.76 0.90 0.55 0.69 0.74 0.66 0.80 0.86 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     -1.05 -0.25 0.14 -0.55 -0.02 -0.05 -0.39 0.05 -0.15 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     1.69 1.24 -0.05 1.07 0.36 -0.01 -0.14 -0.16 0.02 
∑   ̃   
( ) 
     
 
  
 
      0.82 0.60 -0.00 
∑      
 
     -6.38 -4.24 -0.95 -5.29 -4.33 -2.28 -4.94 -8.19 -2.03 
∑      
 
     0.47 0.99 1.05 0.37 0.34 0.50 0.53 0.63 0.56 
∑      
    
     2.50 -2.13 -1.43 0.06 -0.28 -1.44 -3.65 2.25 -1.35 
∑      
    
     1.12 1.32 1.56 1.18 1.60 2.82 1.08 1.40 2.78 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the CBN, NBS and OECD database. 
The implication of these for NCM-type monetary policy in Nigeria is that since 
inflation is not inherently an AD phenomenon, attempts to disinflate using 
contractionary measures would be counter-productive and would cause inflation to 
spiral probably out of control. Rather than contract, policy should aim to enhance AS. 
As noted earlier, data from the NBS suggested that unemployment is rising, while the 
economy is growing. This is indicative of inadequate supply and capacity 
underutilisation. Essentially, scarcity drives inflation, but these shortages are not due 
to excess demand. Part of the causes of slack capacity in the economy is the dearth of 
essential and basic public infrastructures like electricity, water and security, which 
makes firms to provide for these in-house. These firms have to procure large 
generators which are very expensive to purchase and maintain. The costs of providing 
own security and other amenities are also high. Therefore, these secondary factors 
heighten costs of locally produced commodities thereby making imports a cheaper 
option. When import prices rise local production, by increasing domestic supply, 
removes pressure from the exchange rate and causes inflation to fall.  
263 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the task of macroeconomic policy should be to boost local production 
and supply. Nigeria is an import dependent country mostly for the reason of poor 
infrastructure mentioned earlier. This import dependence explains to some extent the 
prominent role of exchange rate in the inflation process. While monetary policy 
cannot provide infrastructure it can boost local production by increasing the 
availability of long-term credit to the real sector and by lowering interest rate. This 
would dampen the cost of capital and provide more funds for investment. These cheap 
funds would translate into cheaper domestic prices and larger domestic supplies. Since, 
the central bank does not lend to the public, it can encourage lending to productive 
sectors by guaranteeing such loans provided that banks have done due-diligence with 
the credit appraisal. Increased local production would thus reduce slack capacity and 
would translate into lower unemployment.  
Under the NCM, disinflationary policies are undertaken by contracting demand so that 
the cost of disinflation is seen as the amount of output sacrificed. In this case it can be 
computed as the reciprocal of the coefficient of the output gap to show the percentage 
sacrifice of output per percentage point decline in inflation. However, when this 
coefficient is negatively signed, the cost of disinflation becomes large and 
complicated. In this regard, disinflationary policies would contract output but rather 
than moderate inflation would accelerate inflation. Tables 7.6 present implied costs of 
disinflation. The figures in italics are derived from individual coefficients while those 
in bold-format are derived from the average of the coefficients in respective models.  
For the entire economy, the coefficients are not consistently signed. In the T-ARDL[2] 
model, again due the effect of the oil sector, the table shows that a one-percentage 
point fall in inflation only requires the output gap to reduce by 0.25 per cent overall. 
During overheating, when output is above the threshold, however, the cost is even less, 
at 0.05 per cent. For the non-oil sector, the coefficients are mostly negative, which 
means that policy induced contractions in non-oil output will create further 
inflationary pressure. In the T-ARDL[2] model, for gaps above 5.5 per cent, 
contractionary policy required the sacrifice of 0.17 per cent in the growth rate for 
every one percentage point of disinflation. This does not seem too costly a sacrifice to 
make. However, output gap is mostly below this threshold. The average picture for the 
T-ARDL[2] non-oil model thus suggests that contractionary policy which slows 
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demand by 0.92 per cent would also cause a one-per cent rise in inflation; therefore, 
causing more harm than good. 
Table 7.6: Implied Costs of Disinflation  
 
Whole  
Economy 
Non-Oil  
 Sector 
Oil 
 Sector  
Simple ARDL -0.41 -0.51 -1.16 
        ⁄   -0.41 -0.51 -1.16 
    
Augmented ARDL 3.68 -0.75 0.22 
        ⁄   3.68 -0.75 0.22 
    
NARDL -30.70 -2.34 -9.92 
        ( )⁄   0.03 0.15 -0.37 
        ( )⁄   -0.03 -0.13 0.40 
    
T-ARDL[1] 15.46 -9.60 -7.45 
        ( )⁄   0.06 0.15 -0.74 
        ( )⁄   -0.06 -0.14 0.92 
    
T-ARDL[2] 0.25 -0.91 23.84 
        ( )⁄   0.05 0.17 -3.07 
        ( )⁄   0.09 -0.40 1.03 
        ( )⁄   -0.05 -0.15 -1.93 
Source: Author’s computations based on results in tables 7.2 and 7.3 above. 
Overall, the analysis revealed that the LR-PC is not vertical but somewhat horizontal. 
This implies that irrespective of the level of output gap, inflationary pressures may 
persist or dissipate due to other non-demand factors. Hence, inflation in Nigeria is not 
an AD but rather an AS phenomenon. The negative sign found on most of the output 
gaps coefficients can be interpreted to mean that supply shocks are more prominent 
than demand shocks, thereby weakening the NCM assertion. Generally supply factors 
especially exchange rate and excess capacity are found to be the most important 
drivers in the long-run while import prices and excess capacity are the determinants in 
the short-run. The findings on the excess capacity, have very important ramification 
for policy. Macroeconomic policies should endeavour to boost capacity utilisation. 
Since, the low capacity utilisation may be traced to the inadequate supply of public 
infrastructure which has the attendant effect of increasing cost of production, 
monetary policy should aim to reduce cost by ensuring lower lending rates and 
increased availability of credits to the productive sector. This will not only increase 
supply but would also ensure that domestic products can compete with imported 
counterparts. The offshoot of this is the reduced unemployment and enhanced social 
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welfare. Basically attainment of higher social welfare would be Pareto optimal since 
the inflation-output trade-off is inexistent from the results.  
The policy implication of the NCM is that the central bank should focus on long-run 
price-stability and short-run output stabilisation. This implies an optimisation 
procedure with inflation minimisation as the objective function and output as the 
constraint. However, our findings suggests that for a developing countries like Nigeria, 
it may be more beneficial if the role is defined the other way round so that output 
growth maximisation becomes the long-run objective and inflation the short-run 
constraint. In this regard, the central bank role should be to encourage economic 
expansion and employment creation in the long-run while reducing inflation 
variability in the short-run.  
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we investigated the inflation-GDP connection in Nigeria and its 
consequences for monetary policy using a PC. Recently, the CBN mandate was 
amended to designate inflation as the overriding objective of monetary policy. 
Consequently, the CBN began active use of the short-term interest rate as policy 
instrument. This is consistent with the tenets of the NCM with the underlying 
assumption that inflation is an AD phenomenon and AS effects are temporal. Based 
on the consequences of inflation for the economy, an NCM-type policy is actively 
anti-inflation and contractionary irrespective of the source of inflation. However, the 
cost of disinflation would be excruciating if output loss is permanent or if inflation is 
supply- rather than demand-driven in the long-run. In this case, NCM-type anti-
inflationary policies would lower the growth path and economic capacity permanently. 
For many developing countries this may be the case given the prevalence of supply 
over demand shocks and the allocative inefficiencies which characterise these 
countries.  
By estimating linear and nonlinear-ARDL models, we found that the LR-PC is not 
vertical but almost horizontal with a negative slope. This is due to the negative and 
sometimes insignificant coefficient found for the output gap in most cases. The 
finding of a slightly horizontal relationship resembles that of Kromphardt and Logeay 
(2011), although ours was perversely signed. Our results thus suggest, first, the 
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absence of long-run neutrality assumed by the NCM and, second, that inflation is not 
due to domestic expansions of output but to non-demand factors. Basically the most 
important long-run drivers are exchange rate and domestic spare capacity while import 
prices and spare capacity are germane in the short-run. Results of the nonlinear 
analysis also indicated that inflation-output relationship changes with the level of 
output gap, although the overall impact is zero. The PC in this regard is generally 
found to be “V-shaped” both for the whole economy and the non-oil sector. Thus, for 
gaps above some threshold expansions are inflationary while for gaps below it 
contractions are inflationary. This implies that, inflationary pressures subsist 
irrespective of whether gaps are positive or negative, thereby confirming that 
inflations are not demand-push. Besides, it suggests that anti-inflation contractionary 
policies are not necessarily disinflationary in Nigeria but inflationary. This has 
important implications for monetary policy.  
Even when gaps are above threshold so that expansions are inflationary, the estimated 
upper threshold (especially for the non-oil sector) at 5.5 per cent has dire ramifications. 
Above this threshold the relationship is positive but becomes negative below it. Hence, 
when non-oil gaps are above 5.5 per cent it pays to pursue contractionary policies but 
when it is below this threshold expansionary policies are beneficial. However, the data 
indicate that over 80 per cent of non-oil output gaps occur below this threshold. By 
implication 80 per cent of monetary policy decision should be expansionary as this 
would deliver both the desired lower inflation and the economic growth.  
The finding is not entirely surprising given the features of the Nigerian economy, 
which included high incidence of poverty, spare capacity and inadequate productive 
infrastructures. Food and other basic necessities constitute the bulk of the budget in an 
average Nigerian household. Besides, food constitutes over 60 per cent of the CPI 
basket. With poverty, demand for necessities like food would be inelastic to 
contractionary policies while supply-induced scarcity would fuel inflation. 
Contractionary policies would thus worsen domestic production and heighten inflation. 
The combination of poverty and the high weight of food in budget and CPI basket thus 
ensure that prices are supply rather than demand shock driven. Besides, the inadequate 
provision of public infrastructures like electricity increases domestic cost, hampers 
competition with imported goods and reduces domestic capacity utilisation. This 
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causes supply constraints which heightens inflation. While a lot of agricultural 
produce are imported in Nigeria, several locally consumed food are perishable and 
somewhat non-tradeable. This requires domestic production to fill the gap and dampen 
supply-induced inflation.          
Accordingly, the task of macroeconomic policy should be to boost local production 
and supply. Nigeria is an import dependent country mostly for the reason of poor 
infrastructure mentioned earlier. This import dependence explains to some extent the 
prominent role of exchange rate in the inflation process. While monetary policy 
cannot provide infrastructure it can boost local production by increasing the 
availability of long-term credit to the real sector and by lowering interest rates. This 
would dampen the cost of capital and provide more funds for investment. These cheap 
funds would translate into cheaper domestic prices and larger domestic supplies. Since, 
the central bank does not lend to the public, it can encourage lending to productive 
sectors by guaranteeing such loans provided that banks have done due-diligence with 
the credit appraisal. Increased local production would thus reduce slack capacity and 
would translate into lower unemployment.  
268 
 
 
 
  
269 
 
 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
For many countries – developing or developed – monetary policy remains a tool for 
macroeconomic management, the design of which has increasingly followed the 
propositions of the NCM; with the short-term nominal interest rate as the sole policy 
instrument and price-stability as its overriding objective. While this approach may be 
effective in combating inflation, the associated cost remains an area of concern, 
particularly for developing countries where the costs may be even be higher. 
According to its proponents, the cost of NCM-type policy is the momentary (and 
negligible) depression of aggregate demand and economic growth while the benefit is 
the permanent bliss of low and stable inflation (and the ensuing permanent economic 
growth). However, the costs may be enormous in terms of permanent loss of economic 
growth, entrenched unemployment, and financial fragility which may result from 
constant fine-tuning of the interest rate. Generally, an optimal policy should be both 
effective and achievable at minimal costs in terms of general economic wellbeing.  
Standard discussions of this type of monetary policy do not distinguish between 
developed and developing countries (Huang and Wei, 2006); thus, implying that the 
cost-benefits are comparable across countries. Hence many developing countries have 
joined advanced ones in adopting an NCM-type monetary policy. However, 
developing countries are idiosyncratically different from advances ones and their 
institutional features do not support much of the underlying assumptions and 
conclusions of the NCM approach. For instance, the NCM subtly assumes that 
financial markets are developed enough to transmit policy impulses to the rest of the 
economy, and that the economy continually operates about full potential. Hence, 
supply constraints are assumed non-existent and equilibrium is supply-determined, so 
that supply shocks are transitory and inflation is exclusively a demand phenomenon. 
These are generally at variance with the realities of many developing countries. Again, 
the objective of price-stability usually defined as an inflation rate of about 2 per cent 
has been criticised especially for developing countries. While the proponents of this 
objective argue that this level of inflation is optimal since it simultaneously averts the 
adverse consequences of inflation and deflation, critiques like Khan and Senhadji 
(2001) and Pollin and Zhu (2006) argued that, for developing countries, moderate 
level of inflation are beneficial to growth since the adverse effects emerge when the 
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rate exceeds 18 per cent. Generally, we argue that NCM-type policy is not only costly, 
but the costs are extremely dire for developing countries which need enhanced growth, 
lower unemployment and more financial stability.  
In Nigeria, like many developing countries, what constitutes an optimal monetary 
policy is yet to be fully appreciated; although the prevailing practice is somewhat 
congruous with the NCM, where policy rates are hiked in the face of inflationary 
pressure. This is with a view to first and foremost affect components of aggregate 
demand. Although average inflation rate most recently hovered around 11-12 per cent, 
efforts are continually directed at lowering this further (irrespective of its associated 
costs) given that price-stability, in Nigeria, is defined as 0-9 per cent rate of inflation. 
In the medium term, the CBN (in order to achieve this rate) plans to migrate to a full-
fledged IT framework which entrenches the interest rate and the inflation rate, 
respectively, as the sole instrument and objective of monetary policy. This would 
entail the announcement of a specific inflation target around which the effectiveness 
of the Bank’s policy actions would be judged. Adopting IT entails credibility of the 
CBN, an adequate understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
and the willingness to sacrifice other objectives (such as economic growth and 
employment) for the attainment of price-stability.  
Generally, Nigeria is characterised by weak institutional features, underdeveloped 
financial sector, fiscal dominance, high incidence of poverty, high unemployment, low 
capacity utilisation, and a complexly dichotomised (according to oil versus non-oil, 
formal versus informal, etc.) economy. These, jointly and/or independently, debilitate 
the conduct of monetary policy, diminish its reliability and heighten its associated cost. 
Besides, inadequate knowledge of the economic system and uncertainty about the 
transmission mechanism constitutes a major challenge to monetary policy in Nigeria 
(Uchendu, 2009a). This incomplete understanding – exacerbated by the existence of a 
vibrant and underestimated informal sector – is both with respect to the effectiveness 
and costs of monetary policy. These are believed to contribute to the volatility and 
slow economic growth in Nigeria (Batini, 2004, Balogun, 2007).  
Earlier studies on the design of monetary policy in Nigeria have generally tended to 
study the effectiveness assuming money supply as the policy instrument. In this regard, 
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Feridun et al. (2005) found that monetary policy resulted in increased instability in 
inflation and exchange rate in Nigeria. However, Olubusoye and Oyaromade (2008), 
Adam and Goderis (2008) attributed this instability to the disrupting effect of crude oil 
price volatility on the CBN’s efforts. Essentially, crude oil price volatility impacts on 
monetary policy through its impact on the fiscal revenue and monetary expansion. The 
dominance of the fiscal sector and the continued monetisation of crude oil receipts 
creates liquidity in the system and heats up the economy. Hence, in measuring the 
effects monetary policy in Nigeria, Chuku (2009) concluded that the monetary 
authority should place more emphasis on quantity-based anchors as against price-
based ones. In a recent study, Dada (2011) investigated the suitability of an IT 
framework in Nigeria via a nonlinear IS-LM framework which assumes monetary 
growth as the CBN policy variable, and found that IT increases output variability. 
However, the reality is that the hitherto QTM approach which underlies these studies 
is obsolete, given the realisation that money cannot be exogenously controlled by the 
central bank. Hence, monetary policy is not synonymous with managing the level and 
growth money supply, and policy effectiveness does not depend on the ability to 
control money.     
In this study, the effectiveness and costs of an NCM-type monetary policy in Nigeria 
is investigated using innovative econometric techniques. The thesis provides a 
systematic study of the effect of monetary policy in Nigeria paying attention to the 
peculiarities of the Nigerian economy. Consistent with the overall objectives of the 
thesis, effectiveness (investigated in two-folds) and costs of monetary policy are 
analysed in three empirical chapters; each of which was undertaken with a rigorous 
application of up to date techniques. The nonlinear techniques that we utilised enabled 
us to examine issues usually raised with respect to the asymmetric outcomes in the 
conduct of monetary policy. Compared with other studies (like Akerlof et al., 2000; 
Beccarini, 2007; Dada, 2011; Filardo, 1998; Gropp et al., 2007; Hoffman and Mizen, 
2004; Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Pollin and Zhu, 2006; and Sørensen and Werner, 
2006) most of which employed a single threshold to determine either size or sign 
asymmetry in the long- or short-run, we model nonlinearity in way that allows for the 
possibility of multiple inflection points, the determination of size and sign asymmetry, 
as well as the concurrent modelling of long- and short-run relationships.  
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To determine policy effectiveness, first, the NCM assumption of a complete pass-
through from policy rate to market rate (which is critical for the success of monetary 
policy) is examined. Here an array of market, retail deposit and lending rates are 
examined while attempt was made to also capture the role of financial market 
(under)development. Second, the effectiveness of monetary policy on aggregate 
demand is investigated given that it constitutes the intermediate target of policy. Given 
the high incidence of poverty in Nigeria and our associated assumption that 
consumption would, in this case, be inelastic to policy changes, the aggregate demand 
effect is limited to investigating the responsiveness of investment to monetary policy 
induced changes in interest rate. Here, a range of investment theories are examined 
with a view to determining the relative importance of monetary policy in the economy, 
using a rigorous framework. Finally, the cost and benefit analysis of monetary policy 
in Nigeria is investigated by estimating an NCM-PC. To understand the dynamics and 
source of inflation the standard NCM-PC is augmented with supply factors. The 
relative importance of demand vis-à-vis supply factors as well as the cost and benefits 
of disinflation are thereafter determined. The findings from these provide answers to 
the research questions of this study and are summarised as follows. 
a) Monetary policy generally does not effectively anchor interest rates in Nigeria; 
an ineffectiveness that has deteriorated with time. Specifically, the findings 
reveal that while the interest rate pass-through overshot for lending rate it was 
incomplete for deposit rate. These inexact responses pose a dilemma for 
policymakers as the policy outcome may be indeterminate. Besides, the interbank 
market was found to provide a weak anchor between monetary policy rate and 
retail rates; thereby further diminishing the effectiveness of monetary policy which 
is designed to be transmitted via the interbank market. Analysis of the time-varying 
pass-through parameter indicated that the ability of monetary policy to influence 
market rates has dwindled over time; the most recent parameter being the weakest. 
These, suggest that monetary policy may not be exactly effective in Nigeria and 
could be attributable to the nature and structure of the financial market. The 
Nigerian financial market is oligopolistic and is dominated by few DMBs. These 
banks possess market power to administer prices and ration credit in ways that 
enable them to maximise profits.  
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Overall, the analysis indicated that pass-through was stronger from policy to retail 
rates. However, the size of pass-through both in the short- and long-run had 
diminished over time. Thus, monetary policy (in the form of interest rate policy) 
had become weaker with time and the response lag of policy is increasing. While 
the inability of the interbank to anchor retail rates may essentially pose no threat, 
the considerable market power of commercial banks in price determination had an 
adverse effect on the pass-through process. This may be reflective of the 
inadvertent exclusion of non-bank private sector from the money market and low 
substitutability to banks’ products. In essence, for interest rate policy to be effective 
in Nigeria there is need to ensure that financial markets are deepened, so that all 
players and agents have considerable access to the market, and there is a wide array 
of instruments and securities to choose from. Secondly, the CBN may need to de-
emphasise its focus on the interbank market as it is more-or-less redundant in the 
monetary policy transmission process.  
b) NCM-type monetary policy is ineffective for policy rates changes below 125 basis 
points. Generally, the impact of interest rate policy on aggregate demand is 
targeted mainly at its private consumption and private investment components. The 
NCM-AD equation is derived from household time-optimised consumption 
behaviour while firms investment behaviour are suppressed (Arestis and Sawyer, 
2008a; 2008b). However, with the high incidence of poverty in Nigeria, an NCM-
type policy would not affect consumption, since this would mostly constitute 
necessities which are essentially inelastic. Hence, monetary policy adjustments 
would be ineffective for consumption, irrespective of the magnitude of change but 
may affect private sector investments. The effect of monetary policy on private 
investment differs for the oil vis-à-vis the non-oil sector. While oil sector decisions 
are driven largely by international developments, exogenous to monetary policy, 
the non-oil sector are the principal target of policy decision. Nonetheless, policy 
adjustments would only be effective if rates were altered considerably (e.g. 
between 100-150 basis points). Generally, the practice of monetary policy is to 
adjust interest rates gradually by about 25-50 basis points. Empirical analysis, 
however, indicated that such in changes would have no significant impact on 
private investment; and hence no effect on aggregate demand.  
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Basically, private investment in Nigeria is principally explained, in long-run, by 
other non-monetary factors especially public investments, which have 
complementary effects. Again, we found that the availability of credit had 
important implications for private investment. Lack of adequate long-term credit 
lowers investments in the long-run. However, in the short-run when short-term 
external financing options are available the relationship becomes positive. This is 
reflective of the notion of construction (initial) financing and investment (final) 
financing discussed in Davidson (1982), Graziani (2003) and Lavoie (2009), and 
may be underpinned by the fact that Nigerian banks are willing to provide short-
term financing and reluctant to avail long-term credits.  
Overall, the implications of the results for monetary policy in Nigeria are critical. 
The nonlinearity found in the investment-interest rate relationship suggests that 
policy may have perverse and undesirable impact on investment, aggregate demand 
and the economy in general; especially if the thresholds for this nonlinearity are ill 
understood. More importantly, while gradual policy rate adjustments would have 
ineffective impact, a ‘cold-turkey’-type large adjustments can increase 
uncertainties, financial fragility and undesirable effects in other sectors of the 
economy; thereby constituting a dilemma for the central bank.  
c) The cost of an NCM-type policy can be considerably high for Nigeria. Results 
from our three empirical chapters indicate that an interest rate based monetary 
policy aimed at curbing inflation via the AD can increases the challenges of the 
Nigerian economy rather than improve overall wellbeing.  
First, analysis of the pass-through suggested long-run positive asymmetry in 
lending rates. This indicated that while policy rate hikes were more readily 
incorporated into lending rates, banks were reluctant to reflect rate cuts. Hence, if 
the policy adjustments were considerable, then aggregate demand is contracted to a 
larger degree than it is expanded. This has the prospect of keeping economic 
growth perpetually under per.  
Second, related to this is the finding that policy rate hikes reduces private non-oil 
investment to a larger proportion than the bolstering effect of an equally sized rate 
cut. The result showed that the reducing effect of tight policies on non-oil 
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investments were large and sustained while recovery due to easy policy were 
smaller and transitory. Though moderate rate changes would not affect non-oil 
investment, accelerated changes would have an overall reducing effect in the long-
run. Hence, even if lending rate pass-through were symmetric, contractionary 
policy would depress aggregate demand permanently regardless of whether such 
policy is reversed immediately. The implication of this for monetary policy under 
the NCM is that, in aggressive drive to control inflation, the growth path of an 
economy might be lowered permanently. For a developing country like Nigeria, 
this would further retard the development prospect for any given investment 
multiplier.  
Third, the finding that monetary policy rate is only effective at low levels of 
interest rate and/or when rate changes are considerably large has implications for 
financial stability. An effective policy may require that rates be doubled or halved; 
thus, creating distortions, uncertainties and speculations in the economy. This result 
as well as the tendency to frequently adjust interest rate would lead to the 
Minskyan-type financial fragility.  
Finally, and more importantly, analysis of the Phillips curve showed a non-vertical 
long-run curve. In fact, the long-run Phillips curve was found to be slightly 
negatively sloped. The slanted nature of the Phillips curve implied that monetary 
policy is non-neutral in the long-run while the negative slope indicated that 
inflation is not necessarily a demand phenomenon. Indeed further analysis revealed 
that inflation in Nigeria is largely driven by supply-side factors like capacity 
underutilisation and exchange rate. Combined, these implied that using aggregate 
demand management measures to control inflation would not only have adverse 
consequences, but these would be permanent. Besides, it suggests that anti-inflation 
contractionary policies are not necessarily disinflationary in Nigeria but 
inflationary. An expansionary monetary policy would thus have an overall effect of 
increasing growth, employment, stability while reducing inflation in the long-run.  
These findings and their policy implications are not entirely surprising given the 
institutional features of the Nigerian economy. They generally suggested that the use 
of interest rate policy tended to create more problems than it can solve. Hence, to avert 
the associated problems, there is need for other instruments which the central banks 
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can control effectively. Moreover, monetary policy focus should be long-run output 
expansion and short-run price-stability, rather than the converse. This would have the 
benefit of lowering poverty and unemployment.  
Accordingly, policy should be directed at boosting local production and supply. 
Nigeria is an import dependent country mostly for the reason of poor infrastructure 
mentioned earlier. This import dependence explains to some extent the prominent role 
of exchange rate in the inflation process. While monetary policy cannot provide 
infrastructure it can boost local production by increasing the availability of long-term 
credit to the real sector and by lowering interest rates. This would dampen the cost of 
capital and provide more funds for investment. These cheap funds would translate into 
cheaper domestic prices and larger domestic supplies. Since, the central bank does not 
lend to the public, it can encourage lending to productive sectors by guaranteeing such 
loans provided that banks have done due-diligence with the credit appraisal. Increased 
local production would thus reduce slack capacity and would translate into lower 
unemployment. Overall, given the numerous challenges confronting the Nigerian 
economy, an optimal policy design should follow a multi-instrument-multi-target 
approach rather than focusing exclusively on one-instrument-one-target approach of 
the NCM.    
However, determining the set of variables that qualify for the multi-instrument-multi-
target would require further analysis. Here, our analysis indicate that the interest rate 
is an ineffective instrument in Nigeria while inflation is a sub-optimal objective and 
we suggested credit policy and economic growth as preferred instrument and target, 
respectively. However, it would be beneficial to analyse in detail the effectiveness and 
implication of this approach. This may require some further estimation in addition to 
calibration and simulations of our results. In addition, the viability of other variables 
like exchange rate as an instrument may also need to be explored. In essence, future 
work can concentrate on the determination of optimal policy alternatives for the 
Nigerian economy.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 5.1: Kalman Filter and the State-space Models 
The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm for computing efficient estimate of a state 
vector conditioned on appropriate information set (in the form of the observed data). It 
obtains conditional forecasts of the state vector      based on available or observed 
data at time    . Assuming that     the minimum mean square error estimate of 
    , which is conditional expectation of      based on information set available at  
   , is then provided as 
        (       )                                                 (A5.1) 
where the information set is  
     (                               )                                     (A5.2) 
If the assumption of normality is violated        then becomes the minimum mean 
square estimate of     . The mean square error (MSE) is obtained as  
        [(         )(         ) ]                                            (A5.3) 
which is the conditional variance matrix of      based on information set available at  
   .   
The recursive process of the Kalman filter begins with specifying the initial values for 
the state      and the variance matrix      which are then used to predict the 
conditional mean and variances of the state vector in the next period. Even when these 
initial values are unknown, Koopman, Shephard and Doornik (1999) showed that it is 
optimal to set         and        
  where the high initial conditional variance 
accounts for uncertainty about the values. This process continues recursively for the 
sample span. The sequence of recursion can follow a basic filtering process or a fixed 
interval smoothing method. While the basic filter obtains      based on information 
available at time t, the smoothing process uses information available for the entire T 
periods of the sample. Using this available information set, the predicted value of      
can be derived as  
          [        ]                                             (A5.4) 
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where                                                                                                       (A5.5) 
so that the prediction error is         
                                                                      (A5.6) 
and the prediction error variance is  
 ̃          [      
 ]                
                           (A5.7) 
Having obtained the estimates of the parameters and with the knowledge of the 
hyperparameters, the model may then be evaluated using prediction error 
decomposition. This implies that if the observations are normally distributed, as long 
as the prediction error and the associated prediction error variance are known, the 
value of the log likelihood function can be easily derived (Kim and Nelson, 1999). If 
the distribution of     ,      and      are Gaussian, then the conditional distribution 
         is also Gaussian so that 
           (         ̃ )                                               (A5.8) 
Under this assumption the log likelihood function can be expressed as 
      
 
 
      
 
 
∑     ̃ 
 
    
 
 
∑       
  
    ̃ 
                         (A5.9) 
which is then evaluated by the Kalman filter and maximised iteratively with respect to 
the unknown parameters. 
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Appendix 5.2: Linear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through without Exogenous Variables 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 
SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr > 1-Yr 
 
PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
0.12 
(0.86) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.27) 
0.49 
(0.37) 
0.23 
(0.28) 
0.32 
(0.27) 
0.40 
(0.32) 
 
0.67** 
(0.31) 
0.80** 
(0.39) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.05** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
   
0.37*** 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
   
1.00*** 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.76) 
0.61 
(0.42) 
0.70*** 
(0.24) 
0.61*** 
(0.19) 
0.74*** 
(0.23) 
0.68*** 
(0.19) 
0.72*** 
(0.16) 
 
0.84*** 
(0.20) 
0.82*** 
(0.33) 
    
0.61* 
(0.36) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.11) 
0.38*** 
(0.14) 
0.51*** 
(0.16) 
0.45*** 
(0.12) 
0.47*** 
(0.12) 
0.60*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
0.79*** 
(0.26) 
∑   
  
     
2.46** 
(0.97) 
0.32*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.12) 
0.55*** 
(0.13) 
0.51*** 
(0.16) 
0.61*** 
(0.12) 
0.59*** 
(0.14) 
0.74*** 
(0.18) 
 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
0.89*** 
(0.25) 
∑   
  
     
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
 ̅  0.21 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.22  0.34 0.31 
AIC 5.71 2.13 2.31 3.04 3.14 3.27 3.29 3.68  3.05 3.40 
F-Test(PSS) 9.48
** 1.16 2.09 4.30 3.68 2.92 4.46 6.56**  4.61 3.06 
    YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES  YES YES 
M.A.L 1.0 70.5 27.4 8.5 4.6 6.7 6.2 3.2  3.5 2.8 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through). M.A.L is the 
mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.3: Linear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through including 1996-Dummies   
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
0.12 
(0.86) 
2.31** 
(0.96) 
0.85 
(0.55) 
1.08 
(0.67) 
1.37 
(0.97) 
0.33 
(0.88) 
0.59 
(0.83) 
0.50 
(0.72) 
 
-0.50 
(0.68) 
-1.12 
(0.80) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.43*** 
(0.16) 
-0.47*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.66*** 
(0.15) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.78*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.27*** 
(0.07) 
-0.40*** 
(0.09) 
   
0.37*** 
(0.11) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.68*** 
(0.15) 
0.67*** 
(0.14) 
0.83*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.65*** 
(0.16) 
   
1.00*** 
(0.16) 
0.54*** 
(0.13) 
0.80*** 
(0.07) 
0.88*** 
(0.07) 
0.87*** 
(0.10) 
1.03*** 
(0.09) 
1.02*** 
(0.08) 
1.06*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.46*** 
(0.16) 
1.59*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.61* 
(0.36) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
0.63*** 
(0.09) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.81*** 
(0.08) 
0.79*** 
(0.07) 
0.85*** 
(0.73) 
 
0.85*** 
(0.21) 
1.02*** 
(0.22) 
∑   
  
     
2.46** 
(0.97) 
0.50*** 
(0.06) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
1.05*** 
(0.11) 
1.02*** 
(0.10) 
1.03*** 
(0.10) 
1.14*** 
(0.09) 
1.17*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.85*** 
(0.21) 
1.02*** 
(0.22) 
∑   
  
     
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
 
0.33*** 
(0.11) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
 
0.08 
(0.08) 
 
 Φ-Dummy  
-2.27** 
(0.96) 
-0.95* 
(0.55) 
-1.09* 
(0.66) 
-1.25 
(0.88) 
-0.31 
(0.91) 
-0.69 
(0.85) 
-0.65 
(0.75) 
 
-0.08 
(0.72) 
0.81 
(0.86) 
α-Dummy  
0.44*** 
(0.16) 
0.50*** 
(0.12) 
0.66*** 
(0.10) 
0.63*** 
(0.10) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.70*** 
(0.09) 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.07) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.24** 
(0.11) 
-0.39*** 
(0.10) 
-0.58*** 
(0.11) 
-0.55*** 
(0.11) 
-0.70*** 
(0.15) 
-0.70*** 
(0.13) 
-0.86*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.41*** 
(0.11) 
-0.67*** 
(0.16) 
 ̅  0.21 0.44 0.52 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.80  0.44 0.50 
AIC 5.71 1.75 1.78 2.29 2.52 2.48 2.44 2.36  2.90 3.05 
F-Test(PSS) 9.48
** 3.60 7.36** 15.78** 15.00** 16.34** 19.84*** 42.02**  6.23** 9.95** 
     YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
M.A.L 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2  0.5 -0.1 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through). M.A.L is the 
mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.4: Linear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through Including 1996-Dummies and 
M2/GDP 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
-6.33** 
(3.05) 
3.00*** 
(0.85) 
1.61** 
(0.55) 
2.09** 
(0.82) 
2.46** 
(1.10) 
1.39 
(1.14) 
1.59 
(1.07) 
1.37 
(1.01) 
 
0.52 
(0.82) 
0.62 
(0.90) 
     
-0.43*** 
(0.09) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.65*** 
(0.11) 
-0.63*** 
(0.10) 
-0.64*** 
(0.12) 
-0.65*** 
(0.10) 
-0.78*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
   
0.66*** 
(0.18) 
0.24** 
(0.09) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.55*** 
(0.11) 
0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.64*** 
(0.15) 
0.65*** 
(0.13) 
0.81*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
0.67*** 
(0.15) 
   
1.52*** 
(0.23) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
0.84*** 
(0.09) 
0.99*** 
(0.09) 
0.99*** 
(0.08) 
1.03*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.42*** 
(0.12) 
1.51*** 
(0.10) 
    
0.78* 
(0.45) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.48*** 
(0.09) 
0.65*** 
(0.09) 
0.73*** 
(0.09) 
0.81*** 
(0.09) 
0.77*** 
(0.07) 
0.84*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.86*** 
(0.18) 
1.02*** 
(0.20) 
∑   
  
     
1.82** 
(0.88) 
0.52*** 
(0.08) 
0.52*** 
(0.08) 
1.11*** 
(0.18) 
1.30*** 
(0.17) 
1.35*** 
(0.15) 
1.26*** 
(0.09) 
1.32*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.86*** 
(0.18) 
1.02*** 
(0.20) 
∑   
  
     
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
   
 Φ-Dummy  
-2.14** 
(0.88) 
-0.97* 
(0.54) 
-1.12* 
(0.58) 
-1.14 
(0.78) 
-0.33 
(080) 
-0.54 
(0.73) 
-0.59 
(0.67) 
 
-0.36 
(0.84) 
0.07 
(0.88) 
α-Dummy  
0.43*** 
(0.14) 
0.53*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(010) 
0.68*** 
(0.09) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.73*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.41*** 
(0.08) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.26*** 
(0.09) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
-0.62*** 
(0.09) 
-0.61*** 
(0.09) 
-0.73*** 
(0.14) 
-0.74*** 
(0.11) 
-0.88*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.53*** 
(0.11) 
-0.84*** 
(0.15) 
M2/GDP 
13.99** 
(6.55) 
-1.79** 
(0.72) 
-1.67** 
(0.81) 
-2.62* 
(1.47) 
-3.12** 
(1.50) 
-2.94* 
(1.61) 
-2.96* 
(1.59) 
-2.41 
(1.69) 
 
-3.96*** 
(1.50) 
-5.32*** 
(1.39) 
 ̅  0.23 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.80  0.45 0.53 
AIC 5.68 1.72 1.76 2.26 2.47 2.45 2.39 2.33  2.87 3.00 
F-Test(PSS) 11.19
** 5.58* 9.82** 18.82** 18.41** 16.31** 23.78** 52.26**  9.18** 17.44** 
    NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
M.A.L 0.5 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2  0.4 -0.1 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through). M.A.L is the 
mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.5: Linear-ARDL Interbank Rate Pass-through without Exogenous Variables 
 Deposits 
 
Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   0.19 
(0.16) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
0.73** 
(0.34) 
0.97*** 
(0.30) 
1.39*** 
(0.49) 
1.18*** 
(0.38) 
2.33*** 
(0.68)  
1.17** 
(0.49) 
1.25*** 
(0.38) 
     -0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.051 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.06) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.35*** 
(0.08)  
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
   0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03)  
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
   0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.39*** 
(0.06) 
0.34*** 
(0.06)  
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
0.54*** 
(0.13) 
    0.03
** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.04)  
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.019 
(0.01) 
∑   
  
     0.03
** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.04)  
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.019 
(0.01) 
∑   
  
     
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.13) 
 ̅   0.09 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.26  0.08 0.12 
AIC 2.14 2.04 3.14 2.99 3.53 3.48 3.85  1.77 2.19 
F-Test(PSS) 2.66 8.89
** 6.97** 11.29** 6.83** 10.35** 10.55**  8.11** 5.20* 
    NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
M.A.L 10.5 5.6 6.1 5.8 4.1 4.6 2.5  11.3 11.8 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January to 
January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the 
Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: 
unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-
test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through). M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
 
301 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.6: Linear-ARDL Interbank Rate Pass-through Including M2/GDP 
 Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
0.64* 
(0.38) 
0.73*** 
(0.23) 
0.60 
(0.39) 
0.88** 
(0.38) 
1.32*** 
(0.49) 
1.13** 
(0.48) 
2.03*** 
(0.65) 
 
1.05** 
(0.48) 
0.99** 
(0.41) 
     
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.35*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
   
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
   
0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
∑   
  
     
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
∑   
  
     
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
 
0.13* 
(0.085) 
 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.33** 
(0.14) 
 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.43*** 
(0.11) 
M2/GDP 
-1.27* 
(0.71) 
-0.95** 
(0.47 
0.62 
(1.22) 
0.34 
(0.96) 
0.27 
(1.41) 
0.18 
(1.25) 
1.16 
(1.69) 
 
0.36 
(0.48) 
1.52*** 
(0.49) 
 ̅   0.10 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.26  0.08 0.14 
AIC 2.14 2.04 3.16 3.01 3.54 3.49 3.86  1.78 2.17 
F-Test(PSS) 2.20 8.50
** 8.61** 11.18** 6.50** 9.55** 9.87**  8.04** 7.69** 
    NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
M.A.L 8.1 5.3 6.0 5.8 4.1 4.6 2.3  11.5 10.6 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1996 to 
January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the 
Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: 
unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-
test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through). M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.7: Nonlinear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through without Exogenous Variables 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
3.47 
(2.21) 
0.54*** 
(0.19) 
0.61*** 
(0.18) 
0.92*** 
(0.28) 
1.24*** 
(0.42) 
1.30*** 
(0.43) 
1.29*** 
(0.35) 
1.84*** 
(0.58) 
 
1.28*** 
(0.45) 
1.23*** 
(0.45) 
     
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
    
0.41*** 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
    
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
    
1.11*** 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
0.61*** 
(0.22) 
0.61*** 
(0.21) 
0.61*** 
(0.20) 
0.63*** 
(0.20) 
0.67*** 
(0.19 
 
0.99*** 
(0.24) 
1.13*** 
(0.32) 
    
1.11*** 
(0.19) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
0.70*** 
(0.24) 
0.69*** 
(0.21) 
0.73*** 
(0.20) 
0.76*** 
(0.21) 
0.78*** 
(019) 
 
0.94*** 
(0.23) 
0.98** 
(0.25) 
  
   
1.00** 
(0.50) 
0.15** 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.32*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.31** 
(0.11) 
  
   
0.14 
(0.45) 
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
0.50*** 
(0.14) 
0.69*** 
(0.13) 
0.56*** 
(0.10) 
0.55*** 
(0.14) 
0.75*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.94*** 
(0.19) 
1.05*** 
(0.25) 
∑   
   
     
1.00** 
(0.50) 
0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.38** 
(0.17) 
0.30*** 
(0.10) 
0.40** 
(0.16) 
0.40** 
(0.15) 
0.48*** 
(0.14) 
0.46*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.40** 
(0.17) 
0.71*** 
(0.18) 
∑   
   
      
0.35*** 
(0.07) 
0.53*** 
(0.13) 
0.65*** 
(0.13) 
0.69*** 
(0.13) 
0.68*** 
(0.12) 
0.55*** 
(0.14) 
0.75*** 
(0.15) 
 
0.99*** 
(0.20) 
1.15*** 
(0.22) 
∑   
  
     
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
 ̅   0.18 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.22  0.40 0.38 
AIC 5.75 2.13 2.25 3.01 3.10 3.28 3.29 3.67  2.99 3.30 
F-Test(PSS) 6.02
** 2.64 4.07 3.77 3.00 2.97 4.38 4.05  2.29 2.38 
      YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  YES YES 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
      YES YES                          YES YES 
  
    
                          YES              
         0.0 22.7 18.9 11.9 8.4 8.0 7.0 4.8  8.9 8.6 
         2.3 19.1 12.3 6.5 3.2 4.5 4.6 1.8  0.8 -0.8 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and 
  
    
  are Wald-tests of asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and 
     indicate positive and negative asymmetry, respectively). M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.8: Nonlinear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through Including 1996 Dummies 
 
IBR 
Deposits  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   3.47 
(2.21) 
4.63*** 
(1.51) 
5.05*** 
(1.28) 
6.42*** 
(1.20) 
6.60*** 
(1.21) 
6.73*** 
(1.30) 
7.48*** 
(1.11) 
8.74*** 
(0.94) 
 
3.62*** 
(1.13) 
5.67*** 
(1.06) 
     -0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.43*** 
(0.14) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
-0.62*** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.11) 
-0.77*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.28*** 
(0.09) 
-0.41*** 
(0.08) 
    0.41*** 
(0.15) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.56*** 
(0.12) 
0.55*** 
(0.11) 
0.69*** 
(0.17) 
0.70*** 
(0.13) 
0.85*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.42*** 
(0.12) 
0.62*** 
(0.13) 
    0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(0.17) 
0.73*** 
(0.13) 
0.88*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
    1.11*** 
(0.29) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.78*** 
(0.07) 
0.92*** 
(0.07) 
0.92*** 
(0.09) 
1.10*** 
(0.09) 
1.06*** 
(0.08) 
1.09*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.46*** 
(0.14) 
1.48*** 
(0.12) 
    1.11*** 
(0.18) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.79*** 
(0.06) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.96*** 
(0.09) 
1.14*** 
(0.10) 
1.10*** 
(0.08) 
1.13*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.39*** 
(0.14) 
1.13*** 
(0.12) 
  
   1.00** 
(0.50) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
0.44*** 
(0.14) 
0.51*** 
(0.13) 
0.73*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
0.70*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.47*** 
(0.15) 
0.61*** 
(0.12) 
  
   0.14 
(0.45) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
0.89*** 
(0.06) 
0.88*** 
(0.11) 
0.86*** 
(0.06) 
0.98*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.05*** 
(0.12) 
1.18*** 
(0.13) 
∑   
   
     1.00
** 
(0.50) 
0.404** 
(0.11) 
0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.59*** 
(0.16) 
0.70*** 
(0.12) 
0.73*** 
(0.11) 
0.85*** 
(0.11) 
0.87*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.55*** 
(0.16) 
1.40*** 
(0.51) 
∑   
   
      
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.70*** 
(0.07) 
0.89*** 
(0.07) 
0.96*** 
(0.06) 
0.99*** 
(0.10) 
1.01*** 
(0.07) 
1.02*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.05*** 
(0.12) 
1.29*** 
(0.11) 
∑   
  
     
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
 
Φ-Dummy  
 
-2.08** 
(1.02) 
-1.01* 
(0.58) 
-0.03 
(0.69) 
-0.27 
(0.83) 
0.95 
(1.03) 
0.62 
(0.82) 
0.73 
(0.69) 
 
-0.85 
(0.75) 
-0.27 
(0.74) 
 α-Dummy  
 
0.43*** 
(0.15) 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
0.67*** 
(0.11) 
0.65*** 
(0.10) 
0.69*** 
(0.12) 
0.73*** 
(0.12) 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.08) 
0.41*** 
(0.07) 
δ-Dummy  
 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
-0.62*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.75 
(0.17) 
-0.78*** 
(0.13) 
-0.91*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.39*** 
(0.10) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
 ̅  0.18 0.43 0.56 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.80  0.51 0.60 
AIC 5.75 1.73 1.74 2.22 2.500 2.44 2.40 2.32  2.82 2.87 
F-Test(PSS) 6.02
** 3.15 5.05** 11.28** 12.79** 8.87** 15.81** 29.73**  4.62* 9.19** 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES NO  NO NO 
      YES YES YES YES YES YES YES              
  
    
      YES             YES YES               
         0.0 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4  1.8 0.9 
         2.3 1.4 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  -0.2 -0.4 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and 
  
    
  are Wald-tests of asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and 
     indicate positive and negative asymmetry, respectively). M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.9: Nonlinear-ARDL Policy Rate Pass-through including 1996-Dummies and 
M2/GDP 
 
IBR 
Deposit  Lending 
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
   
3.96** 
(1.92) 
5.23*** 
(1.41) 
5.49*** 
(1.13) 
6.99*** 
(1.01) 
7.31*** 
(1.04) 
7.38*** 
(1.15) 
8.01*** 
(0.97) 
9.16*** 
(0.77) 
 
5.55*** 
(1.24) 
7.73*** 
(1.00) 
     
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.50*** 
(0.12) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.60*** 
(0.11) 
-0.62*** 
(0.12) 
-0.66*** 
(0.10) 
-0.77*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.34*** 
(0.09) 
-0.45*** 
(0.07) 
    
0.53*** 
(0.14) 
0.25** 
(0.09) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.67*** 
(0.16) 
0.69*** 
(0.13) 
0.84*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.48*** 
(0.12) 
0.63*** 
(0.13) 
    
0.70*** 
(0.16) 
0.25** 
(0.09) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.56*** 
(0.11) 
0.69*** 
(0.17) 
0.71*** 
(0.13) 
0.86*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.44*** 
(0.11) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
    
1.20*** 
(0.21) 
0.55*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.90*** 
(0.06) 
0.90*** 
(0.08) 
1.07*** 
(0.09) 
1.04*** 
(0.07) 
1.08*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.37*** 
(1.10) 
1.39*** 
(0.10) 
    
1.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.56*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.06) 
0.93*** 
(0.06) 
0.93*** 
(0.08) 
1.11*** 
(0.09) 
1.08*** 
(0.07) 
1.11*** 
(0.05) 
 
1.27*** 
(0.10) 
1.31*** 
(0.10) 
  
   
1.40** 
(0.56) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
0.45*** 
(0.14) 
0.53*** 
(0.13) 
0.74*** 
(0.11) 
0.72*** 
(0.12) 
0.70*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.54*** 
(0.15) 
0.65*** 
(0.12) 
  
   
0.42 
(0.34) 
0.40*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.05) 
0.72*** 
(0.06) 
0.88*** 
(0.05) 
0.87*** 
(0.11) 
0.85*** 
(0.06) 
0.96*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.03*** 
(0.10) 
1.15*** 
(0.11) 
∑   
   
     
1.40** 
(0.56) 
0.42*** 
(0.11) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.62*** 
(0.17) 
0.74*** 
(0.12) 
0.74*** 
(0.11) 
0.87*** 
(0.10) 
0.89*** 
(0.11) 
 
0.67*** 
(0.17) 
1.72 
(0.53) 
∑   
   
     
0.42 
(0.34) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.48*** 
(0.11) 
0.87*** 
(0.07) 
0.95*** 
(0.06) 
0.97*** 
(0.10) 
1.00*** 
(0.06) 
1.01*** 
(0.04) 
 
1.03*** 
(0.10) 
1.26*** 
(0.08) 
∑   
  
      
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
 
Φ-Dummy   
-1.96* 
(1.08) 
-1.07* 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
(0.70) 
-0.32 
(0.83) 
0.86 
(1.03) 
0.59 
(0.85) 
0.64 
(0.76) 
 
-1.81** 
(0.77) 
-1.52** 
(068) 
 α-Dummy   
0.43*** 
(0.15) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
0.69*** 
(0.10) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.71*** 
(0.11) 
0.74*** 
(0.09) 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.53*** 
(0.07) 
δ-Dummy   
-0.27*** 
(0.09) 
-0.41*** 
(0.10) 
-0.63*** 
(0.10) 
-0.64*** 
(0.09) 
-0.77*** 
(0.15) 
-0.80*** 
(0.12) 
-0.92*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.52*** 
(0.11) 
-0.73*** 
(0.11) 
M2/GDP 
20.94*** 
(7.44) 
-1.51** 
(0.67) 
-1.25 
(0.86) 
-2.05 
(1.39) 
-2.49* 
(1.43) 
-2.44 
(1.60) 
-2.10 
(1.55) 
-1.76 
(1.70) 
 
-4.52*** 
(1.33) 
-6.13*** 
(1.15) 
 ̅  0.21 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.80  0.52 0.64 
AIC 5.65 1.72 1.72 2.204 2.47 2.42 2.38 2.30  2.76 2.79 
F-Test(PSS) 8.57
** 4.14* 5.61** 11.16** 12.51** 9.48** 15.91** 29.24**  5.86** 14.27** 
      YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES  NO NO 
      NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES              
  
    
      YES     YES     YES YES              
         -0.9 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4  1.3 0.7 
         1.3 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1  -0.1 -0.3 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1985 to 
January 2011 except the interbank data which span January 1996 to January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values 
are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values 
from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and 
  
    
  are Wald-tests of asymmetric pass-through in the long- and short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and 
     indicate positive and negative asymmetry, respectively). M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.10: Nonlinear-ARDL Interbank Pass-through without Exogenous Variables 
 Deposits   Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
1.01** 
(0.46) 
1.82*** 
(0.55) 
2.04*** 
(0.68) 
1.99*** 
(0.57) 
2.71*** 
(0.95) 
2.66*** 
(0.73) 
4.68*** 
(1.01) 
 
1.67*** 
(0.56) 
1.86*** 
(0.52) 
     
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
    
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
    
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
    
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.43*** 
(0.07) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
    
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.48*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.44*** 
(0.08) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
∑   
   
      
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.32*** 
(0.08) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
∑   
   
       
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.44*** 
(0.10) 
  
0.04** 
(0.02) 
∑   
  
     
0.21** 
(0.09) 
  
0.13* 
(0.09) 
 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.45*** 
(0.10) 
 ̅  0.10 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.31  0.11 0.14 
AIC 2.14 2.28 3.12 2.96 3.54 3.50 3.86  1.80 2.21 
F-Test(PSS) 2.16 5.79
** 4.29* 5.91** 3.81 5.53** 8.23**  5.64** 4.94** 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
  
    
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
         6.4 4.2 5.0 5.5 4.1 4.5 2.5  11.8 12.5 
         6.4 4.2 5.1 5.8 4.4 4.5 2.1  11.8 12.5 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1996 to 
January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the 
Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: 
unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-
test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of asymmetric pass-through in the long- and 
short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and negative asymmetry, respectively). M.A.L is 
the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 5.11: Nonlinear-ARDL Results for Interbank Pass-through with M2/GDP 
 Deposits   Lending  
 SDR 7-Day 1-Mth 3-Mth 6-Mth 1-Yr >1-Yr  PLR MLR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
   
3.26*** 
(0.66) 
2.27*** 
(0.70) 
2.88*** 
(0.88) 
2.54*** 
(0.63) 
3.15*** 
(1.01) 
3.05*** 
(0.74) 
4.69*** 
(0.99) 
 
1.49*** 
(0.53) 
1.84*** 
(0.46) 
     
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
    
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
    
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
    
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.53*** 
(0.08) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.48*** 
(0.09) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
    
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.44*** 
(0.07) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
0.45*** 
(0.09) 
  
   
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
  
   
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
∑   
   
     
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.31*** 
(0.08) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
∑   
   
       
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
  
0.03* 
(0.01) 
∑   
  
     
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
  
0.13* 
(0.08) 
 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
M2/GDP 
-0.43 
(0.81) 
-1.91* 
(1.13) 
-3.76* 
(1.90) 
-2.41* 
(1.39) 
-2.25 
(1.84) 
-2.16 
(1.72) 
-0.04 
(2.32) 
 
1.16* 
(0.70) 
2.76*** 
(0.65) 
 ̅  0.35 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.30  0.11 0.17 
AIC 1.88 2.27 3.27 2.95 3.54 3.51 3.87  1.80 2.18 
F-Test(PSS) 8.01
** 5.53** 4.02 6.30** 3.53 5.84** 8.21**  6.87** 8.35** 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
      NO NO NO NO NO NO NO  NO NO 
          YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
  
    
  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
         1.8 3.8 4.3 5.0 3.9 4.4 2.2  11.9 10.6 
         1.8 3.7 4.3 5.1 3.9 4.2 2.1  12.1 10.7 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted using EViews 7.0 software. All data are of monthly frequency for the period January 1996 to 
January 2011. Figures in ( ) are HAC standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the 
Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: 
unrestricted intercept and no trend) using asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). Test of complete pass-through is the Wald-
test for β = 1 (YES connotes complete pass-through).       and   
    
  are Wald-tests of asymmetric pass-through in the long- and 
short-run, respectively, (YES suggests symmetry, while     and      indicate positive and negative asymmetry, respectively). M.A.L is 
the mean adjustment lag of pass-through. 
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Appendix 6.1: Result ARDL Model of Investment (Various Interest Regimes) 
 (A) ARDL Model (B) T-ARDL[1] Model (C) T-ARDL[2] Model 
 I  I_N I_O I  I_N I_O I  I_N I_O 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   
1.12*** 
(0.30) 
1.19*** 
0.30 
-2.21* 
(1.15) 
1.37*** 
(0.38) 
1.53*** 
(0.27) 
-0.22 
(0.90) 
2.98*** 
(0.52) 
2.14*** 
(0.29) 
0.80 
(1.40) 
   
-0.21*** 
(0.04) 
-0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.52*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.40*** 
(0.04) 
-0.47*** 
(0.09) 
-0.49*** 
(0.07) 
-0.59*** 
(0.05) 
-0.50*** 
(0.13) 
 ( )  
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.36*** 
(0.06) 
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
 ( )     
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.20*** 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
 ( )        
-1.12*** 
(0.23) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
-1.02*** 
(0.36) 
 ( )  
-0.37* 
(0.19) 
-0.50** 
(0.19) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.33) 
-0.73*** 
(0.10) 
-0.90*** 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.21) 
 ( )     
-0.74*** 
(0.22) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.32** 
(0.14) 
 ( )        
-2.27*** 
(0.44) 
-0.67*** 
(0.17) 
-2.03** 
(0.81) 
        
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
      
0.003 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.49*** 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.17) 
       
0.24*** 
(0.04) 
0.38*** 
(0.06) 
0.49*** 
(0.11) 
0.22*** 
(0.04) 
0.37*** 
(0.04) 
0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
           
0.30*** 
(0.10) 
 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.33*** 
(0.07) 
 
       
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
         
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
  
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
  
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
  (     )   
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
 
∑      
( ) 
     
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.23 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
∑      
( ) 
        
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
0.56*** 
(0.14) 
0.74*** 
(0.15) 
0.41*** 
(0.11) 
∑      
( ) 
           
0.64** 
(0.28) 
-0.48*** 
(0.13) 
1.05* 
(0.57) 
∑      
 
     
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.08) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
0.62*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.40*** 
(0.08) 
0.61*** 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
∑        
 
     
0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
∑      
 
     
0.95*** 
(0.09) 
0.46*** 
(0.11) 
0.63*** 
(0.11) 
0.50*** 
(0.15) 
0.60*** 
(0.15) 
0.48*** 
(0.07) 
1.83*** 
(0.32) 
1.38*** 
(0.08) 
0.57*** 
(0.07) 
∑       
 
     
0.35*** 
(0.04) 
0.39*** 
(0.06) 
0.51*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.06) 
-0.33*** 
(0.11) 
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
∑       
 
         
-0.71 
(0.80) 
 
-2.03*** 
(0.48) 
-1.30** 
(0.65) 
 
∑       
 
     
-0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.01** 
(0.003) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.006) 
∑       
 
       
0.48*** 
(0.16) 
  
0.40*** 
(0.16) 
  
0.4821** 
(0.2091) 
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Appendix 61: Cont’d 
 ̅   0.91 0.79 0.66 0.91 0.86 0.68 0.96 0.91 0.71 
RSS 0.10 0.25 0.71 0.10 0.17 0.72 0.03 0.10 0.66 
AIC -3.60 -2.76 -1.62 -3.59 -3.02 -1.67 -4.20 -3.30 -1.69 
F-Test(PSS) 6.09
** 10.31** 8.94** 4.87** 18.67** 4.79** 10.58** 21.37** 3.82** 
RESET 
3.11* 
[0.06] 
3.95** 
[0.03] 
3.01* 
[0.09] 
0.02 
[0.89] 
3.53* 
[0.06] 
0.06 
[0.81] 
0.27 
[0.43] 
0.08 
[0.72] 
0.08 
[0.77] 
LR-Sym(1) 
   (   ) 
   NO NO YES NO NO NO 
LR-Sym(2) 
      
      NO YES NO 
SR-Sym(1) 
   (   ) 
   YES YES NO NO NO NO 
SR-Sym(2) 
      
      NO NO NO 
     ( )  3.9 2.2 1.3 4.3 2.7 2.6 2.4 1.2 1.6 
     ( )     4.4 2.1 1.5 0.9 0.4 1.2 
     ( )        0.7 0.9 0.1 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria and the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2. Figures in ( ) are HAC 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. AIC is the Akaike information criterion for 
evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for case III: unrestricted intercept and no 
trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of Ramsey’s specification error test using 
the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ]. LR-Sym(∙) and SR-Sym(∙) are Wald-tests for asymmetric elasticities in the long- and 
short-run, respectively, where test(1) investigates asymmetry in all regimes in a given model and test(2) is for positive or negative 
asymmetry in model C. RSS means residual sum of while M.A.L is the mean adjustment lag. 
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Appendix 7.1: Results of the Linear-ARDL Phillips Curve Models 
 (A)  Simple PC (B)  Supply-Augmented PC 
 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
   
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
   
-0.23* 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
0.38*** 
(0.13) 
   
-2.40* 
(1.43) 
-1.93 
(1.50) 
-0.86 
(2.98) 
0.27 
(2.06) 
-1.32 
(1.62) 
4.51* 
(2.47) 
 [    ]     
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
 [    ]     
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
 [    
   ]     
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 [    
   
]
     
-0.25 
(0.33) 
-0.35 
(0.32) 
-1.06** 
(0.46) 
 [    ]     
1.41* 
(0.80) 
1.50* 
(0.81) 
1.59* 
(0.91) 
 [    ]     
1.03 
(1.44) 
1.88* 
(1.05) 
1.61 
(1.42) 
 [    
   ]     
-0.44 
(0.30) 
-0.50 
(0.33) 
-0.37 
(0.37) 
 [    
   
]
     
-2.59 
(4.09) 
-3.72 
(4.15) 
-12.40 
(7.82) 
∑      
 
     
0.57*** 
(0.10) 
0.41** 
(0.21) 
0.35* 
(0.18) 
0.49* 
(0.28) 
0.58** 
(0.25) 
0.61*** 
(0.19) 
∑   ̃   
 
     
-0.30 
(0.22) 
0.40* 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-1.76*** 
(0.59) 
-0.34* 
(0.20) 
-0.34** 
(0.14) 
∑      
 
        
-0.90*** 
(0.17) 
-0.93*** 
(0.16) 
-0.96*** 
(0.13) 
∑      
 
        
2.37*** 
(0.71) 
2.35*** 
(0.68) 
3.28*** 
(0.83) 
∑      
    
        
-0.33*** 
(0.13) 
-0.37*** 
(0.12) 
-0.38*** 
(0.12) 
∑      
    
        
6.08*** 
(1.63) 
6.55*** 
(1.64) 
7.50*** 
(2.16) 
 ̅   0.27 .025 0.29 0.56 0.54 0.60 
RSS 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.21 0.17 
AIC -2.40 -2.36 -2.42 -2.73 -2.71 -2.81 
F-Test(PSS) 2.66 1.36 1.76 8.15
** 7.92** 8.56** 
RESET 
4.21** 
[0.03] 
5.34** 
[0.01] 
3.05** 
[0.04] 
0.06 
[0.80] 
0.01 
[0.97] 
0.27 
[0.59] 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria, the National Bureau of Statistics and OECD database. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q4. Figures in ( ) are HAC 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. RSS denotes residual sum of squares while AIC 
is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for 
case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of 
Ramsey’s specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ].  
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Appendix 7.2: Results of the Nonlinear-ARDL Phillips Curve Models  
 (D) NARDL Model (E) T-ARDL[1] Model (F) T-ARDL[2] Model 
 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Whole 
Economy 
Non-Oil    
Sector 
Oil            
Sector 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   
-0.34** 
(0.14) 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.78*** 
(0.09) 
-0.38*** 
(0.13) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
-0.50*** 
(0.11) 
-0.51*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
   
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.62*** 
(0.07) 
-0.16*** 
(0.04) 
-0.22*** 
(0.04) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
 ( ) ( )  
4.48*** 
(0.92) 
1.40** 
(0.61) 
-1.66*** 
(0.22) 
2.78*** 
(0.51) 
1.45*** 
(0.37) 
-0.29** 
(0.12) 
2.58*** 
(0.27) 
1.07*** 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 ( ) ( )  
-4.49*** 
(0.93) 
-1.58** 
(0.58) 
1.53*** 
(0.21) 
-2.76*** 
(0.50) 
-1.49*** 
(0.36) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
1.58*** 
(0.34) 
-0.46*** 
(0.11) 
0.10*** 
(0.05) 
 ( )        
-2.46*** 
(0.26) 
-1.21*** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
 ( ) ( )  
28.82** 
(12.49) 
6.38** 
(3.05) 
-2.67*** 
(0.39) 
16.47*** 
(5.63) 
6.54*** 
(1.82) 
-1.34** 
(0.52) 
17.93*** 
(6.18) 
5.76*** 
(1.58) 
-0.32 
(0.22) 
 ( ) ( )  
-28.82** 
(12.39) 
-7.23** 
(2.98) 
2.47*** 
(0.37) 
-16.34*** 
(5.59) 
-6.75*** 
(1.84) 
1.07** 
(0.51) 
10.99*** 
(3.95) 
-2.47*** 
(0.71) 
0.96* 
(0.53) 
 ( )        
-17.14*** 
(5.91) 
-6.56*** 
(1.77) 
-0.51 
(0.52) 
 [    ]  
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.03) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.23*** 
(0.04) 
0.39*** 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
 [    ]  
0.51** 
(0.19) 
0.68*** 
(.016) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.60*** 
(0.20) 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
0.61*** 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
 [    
   ]  
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.26*** 
(0.04) 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
 [    
   
]
  
-0.71 
(0.70) 
-3.43*** 
(0.98) 
-6.79*** 
(0.82) 
-0.33 
(0.30) 
-1.51*** 
(0.38) 
-2.60*** 
(0.78) 
-0.53 
(0.33) 
-2.53*** 
(0.60) 
-2.27*** 
(0.67) 
 [    ]  
1.29* 
(0.68) 
0.74** 
(0.31) 
0.37*** 
(0.04) 
1.26*** 
(0.39) 
0.81*** 
(0.22) 
0.50** 
(0.23) 
1.61** 
(0.61) 
2.12*** 
(0.64) 
0.65 
(0.56) 
 [    ]  
3.33** 
(1.71) 
3.11*** 
(0.76) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
3.58** 
(1.66) 
1.96** 
(0.01) 
-0.09 
(0.43) 
4.27** 
(1.89) 
1.25* 
(0.67) 
-0.55 
(0.96) 
 [    
   ]  
-1.27*** 
(0.39) 
0.70** 
(0.28) 
0.52*** 
(0.07) 
-0.46** 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
-1.85** 
(0.73) 
-1.14*** 
(0.39) 
-0.24 
(0.35) 
 [    
   
]
  
-4.60 
(4.00) 
-15.62*** 
(4.58) 
-10.92*** 
(1.44) 
-1.97 
(1.94) 
-6.81*** 
(2.29) 
-11.90*** 
(3.30) 
-3.67 
(2.74) 
-13.64*** 
(4.78) 
-20.56*** 
(6.88) 
∑      
 
     
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.75*** 
(0.15) 
0.90*** 
(0.23) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
0.68*** 
(0.07) 
0.72*** 
(0.10) 
0.64** 
(0.25) 
0.78*** 
(0.18) 
0.84*** 
(0.12) 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     
-16.78*** 
(3.78) 
-2.51 
(2.28) 
0.91*** 
(0.17) 
-9.58*** 
(2.01) 
-0.35 
(0.84) 
-0.57** 
(0.27) 
-6.69*** 
(0.88) 
0.98 
(0.79) 
-0.97*** 
(0.24) 
∑   ̃   
( ) ( ) 
     
20.35*** 
(4.97) 
12.06*** 
(2.70) 
-0.63* 
(0.33) 
12.04*** 
(2.65) 
3.51** 
(1.53) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-5.04*** 
(1.24) 
-7.25*** 
(1.36) 
0.55*** 
(0.23) 
∑   ̃   
( ) 
           
9.52*** 
(1.20) 
6.10*** 
(1.19) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
∑      
 
     
-2.16*** 
(0.24) 
-1.43*** 
(0.26) 
-0.30** 
(0.11) 
-2.00*** 
(0.25) 
-1.47*** 
(0.29) 
-0.93*** 
(0.15) 
-1.67*** 
(0.21) 
-2.77*** 
(0.34) 
-0.90*** 
(0.13) 
∑      
 
     
3.94* 
(2.13) 
8.27*** 
(2.90) 
8.91*** 
(1.06) 
3.15*** 
(1.26) 
2.94** 
(1.10) 
4.25*** 
(0.94) 
4.51*** 
(1.06) 
5.30*** 
(1.36) 
4.75*** 
(1.34) 
∑      
    
     
0.87* 
(0.48) 
-0.73*** 
(0.23) 
-0.35* 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-1.26*** 
(0.18) 
0.79*** 
(0.21) 
-0.46*** 
(0.09) 
∑      
    
     
5.73*** 
(1.92) 
6.63*** 
(1.52) 
7.98*** 
(1.68) 
6.05*** 
(1.42) 
8.19*** 
(2.11) 
14.40*** 
(3.43) 
5.52*** 
(0.72) 
7.17*** 
(1.91) 
14.22*** 
(2.55) 
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Appendix 7.2: Cont’d 
 ̅   0.52 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.72 0.63 
RSS 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.12 
AIC -2.61 -2.78 -2.82 -2.72 -2.90 -2.82 -2.99 -3.17 -2.89 
F-Test(PSS) 12.86
** 9.25** 16.70** 16.00** 7.96** 7.37** 20.92** 17.64** 8.55** 
RESET 
0.08 
[0.77] 
0.62 
[0.43] 
0.01 
[0.90] 
0.61 
[0.43] 
0.31 
[0.57] 
0.61 
[0.43] 
0.43 
[0.40] 
2.42 
[0.12] 
0.52 
[0.46] 
LR-Sym(1) 
 ( )   ( ) 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
LR-Sym(2) 
   (   ) 
      NO NO YES 
SR-Sym(1) 
 ( )   ( ) 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
SR-Sym(2) 
   (   ) 
      NO NO NO 
                40.48** 62.87** 16.94** 21.65** 44.53** -1.80 
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the Central Bank of Nigeria and the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Econometric estimation was conducted with EViews 7.0 software using data are from 1985:Q1 to 2011:Q2. Figures in ( ) are HAC 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. RSS denotes residual sum of squares while AIC 
is the Akaike information criterion for evaluating models: smaller values are preferred. F-test(PSS) is the cointegration bounds-tests (for 
case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend) using 5% asymptotic critical values from Pesaran et al. (2001). RESET is the F-statistic of 
Ramsey’s specification error test using the squares of fitted residuals; p-values are in [ ]. LR-Sym(∙) and SR-Sym(∙) are Wald-tests for 
asymmetric multipliers in the long- and short-run, respectively, where test(1) investigates asymmetry in all regimes in all models and 
test(2) is for nonlinearity in model C.           is the likelihood ratio test for threshold validation. 
 
